

DISSERTATION FROM THE
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF
SPORT SCIENCES
2017

Anna-Maria Strittmatter

Legitimation Processes of Sport Organizations

The Case of Norwegian Youth Sport Policy and
the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games

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Für Mama

Acknowledgements

“Go for what makes you happy,” my mother told me all my life. And so I did. I went for happiness and started this PhD project at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences (NSSS). Happy I was, holding my dream job for the past three years. Being a PhD Candidate at NSSS provided all I could wish for as an employee: Freedom and variety as well as security and challenges. Along the way, I was very lucky—lucky that I met so many interesting, competent, and amazing people, for which I am deeply grateful.

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Summary

Introduction: The Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sport's (NIF) main argument for hosting the 2016 Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games (hereafter referred to as Lillehammer 2016) was the alleged positive demonstration effect, the promise that the event would increase the active engagement of youth in Norwegian organized sports in terms of participation, young leadership, and young coaches, and play an important role in NIF's youth sport policy.

Aim: The aim of this research is to analyze how different actors shape and influence Norwegian youth sport policy in connection to Lillehammer 2016 as legitimation process of NIF. This aim was met through the examination of four research questions, which comprise the entire policy process, from formulation (Article 1) via implementation (Article 2) and perception of the policy target group (Article 3) to the policy outcome (Article 4).

Theoretical framework: The combination of neo-institutional theory and implementation literature served as analytical framework for examining how structures and practices within the youth policy process and Lillehammer 2016 are expressed, implemented, reproduced, and changed.

Methods: The study is based on qualitative inquiry comprising 33 interviews with actors central to policy process in connection with Lillehammer 2016. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of the bid committee (n=8) who were involved in the policy formulation, as well as with representatives of NIF (n=4), the organizing committee (n=4) and the County of Oppland (n=1) who were involved in the implementation of the policy. As well, participants (n=16) of a young leaders program, which was organized in connection with Lillehammer 2016, were interviewed. The study is complemented by document analysis and observations which were conducted before, during, and after the event.

Findings and discussion: A main finding is that a sport event is often convenient for the legitimation of sport politicians' needs, while actually not fitting into the policy already ongoing. The key conclusion from this dissertation is that the legitimation process of NIF could be found in all stages of the policy process:

In the policy formulation and legitimation stage, the language used for the Lillehammer 2016 bid in documents, meetings, and by the bid committee was based on taken-for-granted understandings of youth sport policy, and it was worked out purposefully to provide assurance of the alleged necessity of Lillehammer 2016 as a solution to the existing—and long-lasting—challenges of Norwegian youth sport. In that respect, youth sport policy has become a self-imposed norm and a convenient symbolic strategy and assumed solution to NIF's dropout problem. Lillehammer 2016 was not a solution to the dropout problem—rather the opposite—but the dropout problem was a convenient argument to justify the Lillehammer 2016 bid.

The policy implementation was characterized by conflicts of interests among the implementing organizations, institutional pressure from NIF on the implementing agents as well as a lack of implementation strategy. This created tension between the policymaker within NIF, the implementing agents as well as the policy target group, and challenged successful implementation. NIF can document that they created projects involving young people, however, none of the projects were created by strategically using Lillehammer 2016 to develop youth sport; they are more a series of projects initiated by the few implementing agents. NIF will get the credit for this even though only the young leaders part of the youth sport policy goals was followed up.

For NIF, an initiated young leaders program was an excellent opportunity to reach some of the promised goals of Lillehammer 2016, e. g. including young volunteers in the event and at the same time reaching the milestones that were written for national youth sport policy regarding the involvement of young leaders. I discuss if it was more important for NIF to convince and satisfy the public about their 'successful outcome' of youth sport policy, i. e. an actual increase of young people engaged in organized sport. Based on the empirical findings, this study provides a theoretical model for understanding the relation between sport policy process and legitimation processes of sport organizations.

Keywords: Youth sport, organizational legitimacy, neo-institutional theory, policy implementation, sport policy, Olympic events, Youth Olympic Games, sport management

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Article 1

Strittmatter, A.-M. (2016). Defining a problem to fit the solution: A neo-institutional explanation for legitimizing the bid for the 2016 Lillehammer winter Youth Olympic Games. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 8(3), 421–437.

Article 2

Strittmatter, A.-M. & Skille, E. Å. (2016). Boosting youth sport? Implementation of Norwegian youth sport policy through the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games. *Sport in Society*, 1–17. doi:10.1080/17430437.2015.1124568

Article 3

Strittmatter, A.-M., Hanstad, D. V. & Skirstad, B. (Submitted). Mismatch of expectations between target group and implementing agents in youth sport policy. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*.

Article 4

Strittmatter, A.-M. (Under review). Increasing youth sport engagement through the Youth Olympic Games: Leveraging strategies and tactics. *International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing*.

1. Introduction

Contemporary sport organizations face major performance pressure from the public, the government but also from the organizations' members. These pressures derive from expectations that governing sport organizations provide increased services to its members, increased membership numbers, sport for all and at the same time structures that generate world champion athletes and teams (e.g., Ronglan, 2015; Stenling, 2014; Yeh & Taylor, 2008). National sport governing bodies, such as the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF), are often monopolistic umbrella organizations responsible for implementing national sport policies. The main income of NIF is government funds, and actions by NIF and government spending are expected to play a wider social role (see also Coalter, 2007) and be legitimized in the eyes of the public. This puts sport organizations such as NIF into a constant strive for legitimacy, understood as the support of an organization's actions that are assumed to generally be appropriate within norms and values expected from the public (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Houlihan, 2000; Ronglan, 2015; Skille, 2009; Stenling, 2014; Yeh & Taylor, 2008). Even though NIF is not a state institution, it has taken on the role to implement the state's policy as it is defined in the White Paper on Sport (Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 1992; 2002; 2012). Therefore, NIF's legitimacy depends on its capacity to fulfil the overall aim of the state's sport policy, such as the state's youth sport policy.

More and more young people are dropping out of organized sport worldwide, and this is also the case for Norway. The dropout from organized sport is an important issue for NIF, which is the largest voluntary organization (Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 1992; Skille & Säfvenbom, 2011) and largest youth organization in Norway (Sisjord & Græsdal, 2003; Skille, 2011).¹ Also, sport is the main leisure activity for Norwegian youth (Seippel, 2005). Several pilot projects have been conducted by NIF in order to get youth involved in Norwegian sport but despite the attempts of NIF in the last two decades to prevent young people leaving sport clubs, the dropout rate from organized sport has remained stable (Skille & Säfvenbom, 2011). The dropout of young people has been acknowledged as a threat to the survival of conventional Norwegian sport system, which is based on volunteerism. Therefore, one of the main questions and challenges for NIF is how to keep young people within the structures of Norwegian sport in terms of both participating and

¹ NIF delimits youth as people aged between 13 and 19 years (NIF, 2012).

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volunteering in sport. NIF has been criticized for failing to work efficiently for youth's interests (Skille, 2011) and is now fighting for legitimacy from youth and the public by creating activities that should legitimate NIF being *the* monopolistic organization that can develop sport for (all) youth in Norway.

One of the activities that were supposed to push youth sport in Norway was the 2016 Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games (hereafter referred to as Lillehammer 2016). The main argument for hosting Lillehammer 2016 was the alleged positive demonstration effect, the promise that the event would increase the active involvement of youth in Norwegian organized sport in terms of participation, young leadership, and young coaches (NIF, 2010), and play an important role in NIF's youth sport policy (YSP). Lillehammer 2016 were said to be the driving force for realizing the goals of NIF's YSP. This contrasts with previous research, which showed that hosting an elite sport event does not generate mass sport involvement (Hanstad & Skille, 2010; Taks, Green, Misener, & Chalip, 2014; Weed et al., 2012). While large-scale sporting events are popular vehicles to implement political, cultural, and social benefits (Parent, 2008), the direct effect on the level of sport participation of the population remains to be proven (Hanstad & Skille, 2010; Taks et al., 2014). As Veal, Toohey and Frawley (2012) found:

There is an apparent contradiction in seeking to promote grassroots participation by hosting elite-level international sporting events. The practice is predicated on the widely held belief that success in elite sport inspires individuals to become sport participants at the grassroots level (p. 158).

Acknowledging the paradox in NIF's argumentation concerning the YSP and the practical pursuit of its goals through Lillehammer 2016, the question of how NIF has intended to move forward with the realization of its goals came up for me. At first, formulating these goals despite lack of evidence for their fulfilment led me to reflect on whether NIF's strategy for Lillehammer 2016 might have been misaligned with the intended goals, and be subject of NIF's legitimation process. Process of legitimation is understood as the behavior of organizations in order to increase their perceived legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975).

In this study, I use Lillehammer 2016 as case in order to understand NIF's youth policy process as a process of legitimation. In order to shed light on these processes, I study how different actors shape and influence Norwegian youth sport policy in connection with Lillehammer 2016 as legitimation process of NIF.

Sport policy in Norway relies a lot on mutual dependency between the public and volunteer sectors. The public sector on the one side provides facilities and economic support for sport organizations while the volunteer sector is responsible for activity (Skille, 2008). Sport policy implementation relies on the monopolistic umbrella organization of sport and on voluntary implementers at the local level. Implementing bodies of sport, such as sport clubs, and national sport federations (NFs) are all federated in NIF. Since sport clubs are the primary providers of sporting activity, any sport policy to be implemented or imported into a sport club must be interpreted and implemented by the representatives of the sport club (Skille, 2008).

Norway, as part of Scandinavia, is a welfare state characterized by social democratic ideology and a strong involvement of civic and state bodies (Skille, 2008). Norwegian sport support the vision of sport for all and are primarily based on volunteerism. Participation happens on an individual membership basis in a sport club, which is affiliated with a NF. Activity is voluntary, as are most of the coaching and club management tasks. NIF is a monopolistic umbrella organization of sport, which is responsible for implementing national sport policies. However, interpretation of policies often differs from one (sport) organization to another. How different sport organizations and individuals perceive and interpret NIF's YSP in connection with Lillehammer 2016 and then shape the policy process is examined in this dissertation.

The aim of this research is to analyze how different actors shape and influence Norwegian youth sport policy in connection with Lillehammer 2016 as legitimation process of NIF. This goal is met through the examination of four research questions, which comprise the whole policy process. In the following sections, the policy process is described, which then leads to the development of the research model and four research questions.

The policy process

The policy process is useful as a descriptive model for organizing the findings of the present study in order to answer my research questions. Additionally, it provides the structure for the analytical entry points. Research on the policy process is mostly focused on public policies, including (but not limited to) statutes, laws, and governmental programs. Public policies are found to be both means to an end and ends in themselves “and can range in form from procedural to substantive and from symbolic to instrumental” (Weible, 2014, p.5).

Introduction

Policy can be distinguished from “decision”, but can hardly be distinguished from “administration” (Hill & Hupe, 2014). It involves both the behavior and intentions of those who formulate the policy, but also action and inaction following the formulation. A policy develops over time as a result of relationships within and between organizations and is a purposive course of action. The outcome of policies may or may not be predictable (Hupe & Hill, 2015). While policymakers formulate the objectives, administrative staff is responsible for developing protocols for appropriate follow-up on the objectives. Researching the policy process involves policy interactions over time that are connected to an organization and its surrounding actors, events, and contexts including the outcome of a policy (Weible, 2014). The events can be both anticipated and unanticipated. Taking into account the policy process as a process of continuous interaction between actors, groups within society, and institutions, the policy process is a continuum without a clear beginning and end (Weible, 2014). However, in order to capture this process analytically, several stages of policy process are defined in the policy literature as policy derives from initiation and formulation and is then modified by negotiations before it is carried into practice (John, 1998). Through decisions and input from actors involved in the policy, a policy moves through the political system guided by ideas and structured by institutions that influence the output of the policy (Easton, 1953). While one output of a policy can be seen as an input for another policy, policy scholars also refer to the policy process as the “policy cycle”, which includes different stages (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Jenkins, 1978; John, 1998; May & Wildavsky, 1979; Parsons, 1995).

Comprising several policy cycle models from the above named scholars, the policy cycle includes the following stages: a) *Agenda setting*—characterized by identification of problems and definition of the problem’s nature; b) *Policy formulation*—where policy objectives are set and solutions and policy instruments are selected; c) *Legitimation*—in which approval of political parties and support of interest groups is ensured; d) *Implementation*—defined by allocation of responsibility to organizations or unit of government, providing resources and objectives are taken into account; e) *Monitoring and evaluation*—where the degree of success, hence outcome, is assessed; and f) *Policy maintenance, succession or termination*—in which the decision is to be made whether to continue, replace or end a policy.

Criticism of the stages model within research on policy process is focused on the arguments that the phases are blurred and inter-correlated (John, 1998; Nakamura, 1987) and that the model lacks causal theory or testable hypotheses as well as analysis (Weible, 2014). Despite this critic, the

policy process is regarded as a useful descriptive model for the organization of results of the present study. How the policy process is applied as research model is presented in the following.

Research model

In order to analyze the policy process of the Norwegian YSP, four stages of the policy cycle are applied as analytical pieces. This is simplified in the research model in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Research model

In the first analytical entry point, I combine the above named agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimization stages into the stage of *policy formulation and legitimization*. In the second entry point, I analyze the policy implementation stage of the Norwegian YSP comprising the *implemented actions*. The analysis includes insights into how the YSP and Lillehammer 2016 are interconnected and shaped by actors, structures, and practices of the organizations involved. The third entry point of analysis is concerned with the monitoring of implemented actions and the *enactment of target group*, focusing on their perception and the implementing agents' adoptions of these. The fourth entry point comprises the evaluation of the whole policy process giving account to the *outcome of the policy*, hence both short-term and long-term outcome resulting from the policy. The four entry points of analysis direct attention to the four research questions of the present study as presented in the following section.

Research questions

The aim of this research is to analyze how different actors shape and influence Norwegian youth sport policy in connection with Lillehammer 2016 as legitimation process of NIF. As indicated above, many interactions take place within the policy process, and actors and intra- and inter-organizational issues need to be considered within policy process analysis. This complexity is reduced analytically by breaking down the policy process into four analytical entry points, which are consistent with the process of the Norwegian YSP in connection with Lillehammer 2016.

1. *How was youth sport policy formulated and legitimated as main argument for the Lillehammer 2016 bid?*
2. *How was Norwegian youth sport policy implemented through Lillehammer 2016?*
3. *How was the implemented youth sport policy perceived and processed by the policy target group?*
4. *What was the outcome of the youth sport policy goals at its implementation through Lillehammer 2016?*

Following the introduction of the research aim and questions, in Chapter 2, I present the context in which the study is situated, including the Norwegian YSP and the concept of the Youth Olympic Games (YOG) in general and its role within Norwegian organized sport. Chapter 3 provides an explanation of the theoretical framework and concepts applied. In Chapter 4, I give an account of my approach to collection, processing, and analysis of data as well as an explanation of quality assessment and ethical consideration of the study. The key empirical findings emanating from the single articles are presented in Chapter 5. In the theoretical discussion of findings, in Chapter 6, I seek to transcend the four analytical entry points and consider how this dissertation may inform the more complete picture of sport organizations' legitimation process in general, but as well in connection with Olympic events. I conclude with notes on limitations and suggestions for further research.

2. Context

As sketched in the introduction, NIF has been concerned with policy for youth for the past decades. The YSP has over time become a fixed strategy for NIF (NIF, 2007) as well as the government (Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 2002; 2007; 2012).² In order to show how NIF's special focus on the youth came about, I provide a brief summary of the emergence of the Norwegian YSP in this chapter. Thereafter, I offer a description of the concept of the Youth Olympic Games (YOG) in general and their role within the Norwegian YSP.

Norwegian youth sport policy

Sport is the most popular leisure time activity among children and adolescents (Skille, 2007; Woods, 2011). Acknowledging the important role of sport in the lives of young people, scholars have extensively discussed the *who*, *what*, *where*, *how*, and *why* of participation in youth sport (De Knop, 1996; Ommundsen, 2011; Woods, 2011). In the last two decades, the increasing dropout of young people from organized sport has gained a lot of attention in sport social science. This ongoing dropout has caused a shift in the strategies of governmental policies regarding youth sport, which required national and international sport organizations to focus on young people (Ogle, 1997).

The dropout of young people in traditional sport has gained much attention by researchers not only in Norway, but also internationally (e.g., Brettschneider & Naul, 2004; Gould, 1987; Houlihan, 2011; Woods, 2011). Seippel (2005) and colleagues (2011) studied physical activity based on membership in Norwegian sport among adolescents and examined the reasons for dropping out and staying within organized sport. The research shows that most adolescents are dropping out by the age of 16–19 years and that the dropout rate among girls is bigger than among boys (Enoksen, 2011; Seippel, 2005). The reasons for dropout are complex. Rationales include lack of time, increased pressure on performance, incompatibility of sport and work, family, school, and other interests (De Knop, 1996; Ommundsen, 2011; Seippel, 2005) as well as loss of joy in the activity (Enoksen, 2011; Sisjord, 1994, 1995). Comparing the participation rate in 1992, 2002, and 2010, Seippel, Sletten, and Strandbu (2011) found that athletes who are dropping out are younger

² The White Paper on Sport represents the governmental sport policy, which had been delivered for the third time in 2012 (St. meld. Nr. 26, 2011-2012) after St. meld. Nr.41 (1991-1992) and St. meld. Nr. 23 (1999-2000).

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in age today than they were 20 years ago. With the rising dropout rate, the membership of commercial sport, such as fitness centers, has increased in recent decades, outside NIF's responsibility.

While children and youth policy in Norwegian sport was non-existent before the 1960s, the development of sport for the young ones became stronger by the mid-1980s (Sisjord & Græsdal, 2003). The increasing awareness of the difficulties with the dropout of young people from organized sport in the 1980s and early 1990s caused NIF to develop a youth sport policy (NIF, 1992a). In 1991, the development of youth sport was for the first time a major concern. The focus was on participation of young people in decision making processes, involvement of young leaders and coaches, physical activity offers on different performance levels, prevention from dropout, and helping athletes to combine sport with education, work, friends, etc. (NIF, 1992b).

Acknowledging the dropout of young people as a threat to the survival of conventional Norwegian sport system, NIF introduced the development of youth sport into their program for the first time in 1991. In the annual report of NIF in 1991, the need for the development of participation among young people in organized sport as coaches, leaders, and athletes has been put on the agenda (NIF, 1992a) and articulated as a central goal throughout the years (NIF, 1994, 1995). The focus was on young people's participation in decision making processes, involvement of young leaders and coaches, physical activity offers on different performance levels, preventing dropout, and helping athletes to combine sport with education, work, friends, etc. (NIF, 1992b). In 1992, a youth committee (NUK) was established within and supported within the NIF structure. The aim behind NUK was that youth themselves should be active in forming the YSP within NIF to a larger degree (NIF, 1992b). As well, the initiators of NUK organized the first youth sport general assembly (YSGA) discussing youth issues within NIF (Waldahl & Skille, 2016). From the very first year of its existence, representatives of NUK have been involved in several working groups handling NIF's politics (NIF, 1994).

Several pilot projects have been conducted in order to get youth involved in Norwegian sport, such as the leadership courses for 14 to 18 year-olds "Youth Can, Wants and Dares" or "Active Youth" (NIF, 1992b, 1994) as well as the FUNI Project by NIF which was started in 1997 and lasted until 2000, in single occasions the project period was extended to 2001 (Sisjord & Græsdal, 2003). The main goal of NIF then was that all young people (aged 13 to 25) should not only get the opportunities that are line with their conditions, wishes, and needs but also be part of decision-

making in all levels of organized Norwegian sport (NIF, 1998). The YSGA, held in 1994, approved a strategic document for youth sport, entitled “from words to action” (NIF, 1995, p. 1). At the second YSGA in 1994, the YSP was stated to be an “established concept” within Norwegian Sport (Waldahl & Skille, 2016). Even though NUK was made into an own organization within NIF, and finally terminated in 2006, NUK representatives were active within the Norwegian sport network to develop the YSP. For example, they ensured a quota of young people represented in NIF’s board of directors (Waldahl & Skille, 2016). As mentioned before, NIF’s legitimacy is dependent upon the organization’s capacity to fulfil the overall aim of the state’s sport policy. The governmental YSP is similar defined to NIF’s one. However, the governmental policy is not limited to organized sport, but also encompasses sport outside NIF. However, focus of this dissertation is on NIF’s YSP. Besides economic support, the Norwegian state supports NIF symbolically. Since 2011, the strategy of NIF’s YSP has been called ‘youth campaign’ with the aim to involve more young people in organized sport on performance level (athletes & coaches) and organizational level (leaders on voluntary basis) (NIF, 2011). Lillehammer 2016 acquired an important position in NIF’s rhetoric about the ‘youth campaign’ (ungdomsløftet—literally to be translated as *youth lift*).

The Youth Olympic Games

The concept of the Youth Olympic Games (YOG), introduced in 2007, is the result of the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) strategy to focus on youth (IOC, 2011). YOG are organized in summer and winter versions, which follow the traditional Olympic circle of being organized once every fourth year. The first Summer YOG were staged in 2010 in Singapore. Two years later, Innsbruck was the host for the first Winter YOG (IOC, 2011). In order to be accepted by the IOC as a worthwhile and trusted candidate, the bid committee has to hand in a candidature file answering certain questions via a questionnaire given by the IOC. In the so-called Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire, the IOC articulates descriptions, rules and deadlines to be verified by the candidate cities at the different steps of the bidding process (IOC, 2010). The bid for YOG requires several guarantees from third parties, which purposes are to secure the organizing committee (YOGOC) and the IOC from any financial shortfall and to give the YOGOC the best opportunity to organize the event (IOC, 2010). Since YOG are a relatively new event, the number of studies is limited but more and more studies have been published since 2012. In order to

understand the nature, organization and eventual (non-) impacts of the event, existing research papers about the event are sketched in this section.

In existing research articles, YOG have been criticized for many different reasons. The fact that this elite sport event is implemented for the youngest of sportsmen brings up critical ethical concerns, such as the athletes' early specialization connected to overtraining and overambitious coaching, which all are factors that contribute to burnout at an early age and to dropout (Digel, 2008; Judge et al., 2013; Parry, 2012). The IOC and the organizers are communicating their intention that YOG are not predominately focused on high-performance sport competition. However, scholars have criticized the IOC and National Olympic Committees (NOCs) as well as sport federations, coaches, and athletes themselves for their overemphasis on winning (Judge et al., 2013; Krieger, 2012; Kristiansen, 2015). This portrays YOG as an elite sporting event embodying the sporting excellence of the Olympic Games, which may lead to competitive anxiety among athletes (Ledochowski et al., 2012). Furthermore, Raschner, Müller, and Hildebrandt (2012) discussed the relative age effect of the athletes during Singapore 2010 as a fairness issue. Also, YOG opened discussions about health aspects such as injuries (Ruedl et al., 2012; Steffen & Engebretsen, 2011) and medical services (Blank et al., 2012).

Several research projects focus on the sustainability of YOG. Besides stressing the residents' support of the Singapore YOG 2010, Chiam and Cheng (2013) also highlighted locals' negative perceptions regarding environmental pollution and inconveniences due to traffic and overcrowding. Parent and colleagues (2015) examined the event's sustainability by identifying the key stakeholders and their salience towards YOG. Even though YOG are supposed to be first and foremost for young athletes, Parent and colleagues (2015) argue that the athletes actually cannot be seen as relatively important. Salient stakeholder groups of YOG are different in comparison to the Olympic Games, where the media and sponsors play much more important roles. YOG are lacking international media attention (Hanstad, Parent, & Kristiansen, 2013; Judge et al., 2013; Judge, Petersen, & Lydum, 2009). A recently published book about YOG (Hanstad, Parent, & Houlihan, 2014) includes a critique of the IOC's intention of introducing the Olympic values to a worldwide community of young people through YOG (Doll-Tepper, 2014; Kristiansen & Parent, 2014). In addition, the development of young athletes, coaches, and volunteers at the same time (Bodemar & Skille, 2014) is to be questioned considering that one single event is supposed to create this immense impact on young people. Skille and Houlihan (2014) criticized the IOC and

organizers for legitimizing YOG in terms of increased mass sport participation, while the focus of youth elite sport appears designed to generate future Olympians. In that context, they specifically argued that hosting YOG in Norway is a contradiction between the changing attitude of youth elite sport in Norway and traditional Norwegian values in which children and young people's right to play should be protected rather than used to compete internationally (Skille & Houlihan, 2014).

Nevertheless, Norwegian sport policy makers claimed YOG to be a perfectly fitting event for implementing their YSP and applied to host the Winter YOG in Lillehammer. The bid committee consisted of NIF and the City of Lillehammer. After the Norwegian bid for YOG 2012 had failed, the bid committee was successful in their second try, becoming the host for the second winter version that took place in 2016 in Lillehammer. While there were four cities bidding for YOG 2012, Lillehammer was the only candidate city applying for the host of YOG 2016. The bid committee based its concept on the NIF's YSP with the goal of communicating the importance of organized sport to young people through this event: "Lillehammer 2016 will play an important role in increasing youth sport participation (...) over a 10 year development perspective" (NIF, 2012, p.10). Besides being a major event for elite youth athletes, Lillehammer 2016 are an important part of a 10 years plan regarding the Norwegian YSP (NIF, 2010). The bid committee mentioned the youth as the most important stakeholders (NIF, 2010).

Whether Lillehammer 2016 are going to be what they are promised to be, an event "by the youth, with the youth, and for the youth" (NIF, 2010, p. 6) with sustainable development for the engagement of young people in organized sport is discussed by shedding light on how NIF's YSP process was shaped in connection with Lillehammer 2016 as legitimation process of NIF.

3. Theoretical framework

Based on the research questions, the relevant theoretical framework needs to capture an organizational as well as individual level of analysis. In this thesis, I conceptualize the sport policy process as subject to an institutional context that is characterized by actions from individuals deriving from institutional pressure of its organizational environment evoking both resistance and change.

The theories used in this dissertation are organizational neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Zucker, 1977) and implementation theory (Hill & Hupe, 2014; Lipsky, 1980; Marsh & Smith, 2000; Scharpf, 1978). They contribute to and complement my process based analytical entry points as well as my analysis on organizational and administrative level of individuals.

The main developments that can be explained by neo-institutional theory are summarized by Kikulis (2000): a) institutions emerge over time; b) institutions control behavior through unquestioned compliance to rules and values; and c) human agents play an active role in the determination of which ideas and actions are institutionalized. Organizational neo-institutionalism, as an umbrella perspective, is a product of the appropriate organization of means and ends. It is a helpful analytical framework for examining the policy process of the YSP in which means and ends of the YSP and Lillehammer 2016 are expressed, implemented, reproduced and changed. Organizational neo-institutionalism contains a wide variety of concepts, three of which I choose to focus on due to their analytical suitability of the YSP process as legitimation process of NIF: legitimacy, isomorphism, and organizational change. Since sport organizations are nested within organizational fields, neo-institutional theory became one of the most widely applied theories within sport management literature (Washington & Patterson, 2011). It is considered suitable as analytical framework for sport policy and sport management studies (Bodemar & Skille, 2014; Houlihan, 2012; Leopkey & Parent, 2012; O'Brien & Slack, 2004; Skirstad & Chelladurai, 2011; Stenling, 2013a; 2013b; 2014; Stenling & Fahlén, 2009; 2014).

Researching policy implementation involves systematic analysis of the emergence of actions when actors handle a policy problem (O'Toole, 2000). Implementation research is regarded as a sub-discipline of political science and public administration (Hill & Hupe, 2014). The process of implementation is complicated, occurs across time and space, and involves a lot of actors. Within

sport policy research, the policy process was found to be reliant on partnerships (Kay, 1996) involving competing interests (Green, 2004; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Green & Oakley, 2001; Houlihan, 1997) of national sport governing bodies and the government. Policy implementation is seen as successful if the resulting outcomes of the policy are in line with the original policy intention (O’Gorman, 2011; Skille, 2008). The policy that is to be implemented can be understood as the product of decisions and actions in the first stages of the policy process. However, the content of this policy and the impact on those affected, i. e. the policy target group, is usually modified, adapted, changed, or disputed during the actual implementation. The interplay between policy formation (formulation and decision-making) and policy implementation is crucial for the study of implementation (Hill & Hupe, 2014) and is explored by applying implementation literature complementing the neo-institutional analysis.

First, I give an account of general organizational institutionalism, derived and developed from the works of Berger and Luckmann (1967) and Schütz (1967), and its conceptual evolution into neo-intuitional theory. From that, I give a more detailed presentation of the key concepts applied in my research—the concepts of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Zucker, 1977), isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and change (Campbell, 2004; Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Hardy & Maguire, 2008). Following a presentation of implementation theory and its core concepts of top-down (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975) and bottom-up analysis (Lipsky, 1980) as well as Scharpf’s (1978) middle-range approach and policy network approaches by Marsh and Smith (2000), I sum up the theoretical framework and give account of its application for the present study.

Organizational neo-institutionalism: key concepts

Taking on the argumentation from old institutionalism in the early 1950 and 1960s (such as Selznick, 1948, 1957), organizational neo-institutionalism is especially rooted in the sociological science and based on the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967). The fundamental works published at the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s by Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Zucker (1977) set the base for neo-institutionalism. While old institutionalism focused on normative dimensions of single institutions, such as formal and informal actions, patterns of influence, and coalitions of actors within organizations, neo-intuitionalists focused attention on cognitive dimensions such as taken-for-granted rules and expectations in an environment of

organizations and the environment's influence on the interest, power and conflict among the organizations embedded (Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008). Instead of considering organizations as efficiency striving and being means to achieve subordinated goals by rational ends, neo-institutionalists argue that modern organizations are confronted with multileveled and complex patterns of rationalized and institutionalized expectation structures (Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008). The institutional environment generates political and social pressure that influences the organization independent of efficiency outcome (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Claiming that formal structures are not necessary the most efficient as well as not necessarily in line with actions, Meyer and Rowan (1977) set the big break for new thinking of organizational theory. Their main claim was that it is the institutional contexts in which expectations and notions influence how efficient and effective organizations are. These notions and expectations are rationalized depending on how stakeholders identify them as appropriate to achieve defined goals. This contrasts with Weber's (1972) inner-organizational model of bureaucratization which was the state of the art of organizational effectiveness until Meyer and Rowan's (1977) work was published. Instead of looking into differences of organizational structures, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) focused on the hegemony of structures and practices among organizations. The concept of organizational field (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), comprising all actors and organizations, has influence on the structure and actions within, and survival of, single organizations. This concept is broader ranging than other concepts at that time because it accounts for the "totality of relevant actors" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Zucker's (1977) initial work on the institutionalization as a variable for cultural persistence within organizations completes the fundamental publications of organizational neo-institutionalism. These founding authors agree that structures and practices within organizations are influenced by external expectations. Actors and their interests are institutional rules themselves and without complying with the institutional frames, organizations are unlikely to succeed. How the YSP came about (Article 1) and has been processed in connection with Lillehammer 2016 (Articles 2 and 4) is discussed in light of the institutional contexts of the organizations involved. In the following I present the meaning and application of the concepts of legitimacy, isomorphism, and change that are used in the analysis.

Legitimacy

The successful acquisition by National Olympic committees (NOCs) of legitimacy from the government is crucial since their survival depends on governmental and public support. Legitimacy

in the eyes of the IOC is also crucial since their approval is necessary for the existence of NOCs. Legitimacy has for a long time been understood by researchers as critical for organizations (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Parsons & Smelser, 1956). From this focus, neo-institutionalism, as described above, emerged. According to Suchman (1995) legitimacy is understood as a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate, within some socially constructed system or norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574); and/or as “the degree of cultural support for an organization—the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives” as defined by Meyer and Scott (1983, p. 201). Neo-institutional theorists found that organizations are constantly striving for stability and legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977) and that they are driven by their interest, which is defined socially or institutionally (Hinings & Greenwood, 1989) as well as by self-interest. Using the concept of legitimacy helps to understand the generation, implementation and maintenance of NIF’s YSP and its reproduction as the main argument for Lillehammer 2016 bid (Article 1) as well as the actions of the implementing agents (Article 2). Organizations (such as NOCs), their policymakers and implementers are driven by the organization’s interests (i.e. their strategic objectives) as well as by self-interest (i.e. organizational survival / expansion), but also by a concern to be socially accepted by the public. Collective social acceptance is one characteristic of institutionalized processes, actions and behavior. This acceptance goes hand in hand with legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Suchman, 1995). This means that practices are reproduced and present in everyday actions, language and thinking (for example through policies), which reinforces the diffusion of acceptance in an organizational field within a so-called institutionalization process (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). If the diffusion of structures reached a widespread audience, and are accepted and taken for socially given, they are seen as institutionalized (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). In this regard, institutionalization can be seen as socially constructed legitimacy (Washington & Patterson, 2011). In other words, one possible outcome of institutionalization is legitimacy (Jepperson, 1991). Language, values, norms and concepts are the foci of neo-institutional analysis.

Since neo-institutional theory sheds light on the ways in which organizations act due to institutional processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker 1977) it serves as the analytical framework for this present research. Institutionalization of structures, practices,

beliefs, values and language is an ongoing process (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). Processes, practices and obligations are institutionalized when they “take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341). Actions that are highly institutionalized are presented in a way that makes it unlikely that they can be questioned. Such actions are communicated as facts and are realized as being necessary. As presented in Article 1, the YSP became a ‘taken-for-granted’ rule by undergoing a process of institutionalization. In order for a rule to be institutionalized, it has to gain widespread acceptance among stakeholders outside the focal organization (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), an example of which would be NIF seeking acceptance of the YSP from the government and IOC. The adoption of legitimate structures from external areas can increase the commitment of internal participants (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The rhetoric of an organization’s discourse can therefore have a contagious effect on the organization’s environment.

One core assumption of institutional theory is that organizational structures are created, sustained and changed through maintenance of institutionalized myths (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Aligning these myths is crucial for organizations in order to attain legitimacy and ensure their survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). If the actors within and stakeholders outside the organization are supportive and adopt the organization’s arguments in the wider structure, survival can be secured in the long run (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Consequently, social values as well as the common understandings of appropriate and meaningful behavior affect organizations (Zucker, 1983). This is the point of departure for the discussion on the organizational behavior of NIF and the 2016 Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games Organizing Committee (LYOGOC) in terms of the implementation process of the YSP (Articles 2 and 4). Looking into NIF’s and LYOGOC’s actions and practices which are shaped as result of the strive for legitimacy are especially looked at.

The increase of institutionalization of structures and actions within and among organizations leads to isomorphism, which is a concept in neo-institutionalism by which one might consider how organizations resemble each other and develop similar structures and actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) as presented in the following section.

Isomorphism

Supporters of neo-institutional theory claim that the structure of organizations and the behavior of organization members are influenced by the rules and beliefs in their environment (Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987). Institutional environments include social norms and expectations to and from all

stakeholders of the focal organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This has significant influence on the action and behavior (strategic as well as structural) of the organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).

Following the debates concerning neo-institutionalism of the 1970s and 1980s, external pressure was perceived to be more important than the organizations' internal strategies, resulting in a focus on legitimacy over effectiveness. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three processes by which external pressures produced isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism refers to when an organization is exposed to pressure to introduce specific organizational solutions. Parent organizations, such as the IOC and NIF, have the power and ability to make sub-organizations adopt and conform to their (the IOC's and/or NIF's) practices and structures. Mimetic isomorphism refers to when an organization's activities are changed after mimicking other organizations, often due to uncertainty related to the organizations' (here NIF's, and LYOGOC's) understanding of their own goals and tools. Normative isomorphism refers to how professional norms are acquired and spread through professional networks, formal education or work experiences. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) found that organizations become isomorphic with their institutional context in order to secure legitimacy, which is crucial for the organizations survival. Therefore, social values, as well as the common understandings of appropriate and meaningful behavior affect organizations (Zucker, 1983).

The concept of isomorphism is based on the assumption that the external environment of an organization affects the internal culture, defined as the "values, beliefs and basic assumptions that help guide and control member behavior" which is caused by the fact that organizations adopt and adapt to behavior and structures of actors around them (MacIntosh, Doherty, & Walker, 2010, p. 445). Organizations within highly elaborated institutional environments that are successfully undergoing isomorphic change due to the environment either by coercive, mimetic, or normative forces tend to increase legitimacy as well as critical resources (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Coercive pressure from the IOC on NIFs and LYOGOC has been identified and discussed in Article 1. NIF and LYOGOC is nested within the institutional environment of its stakeholders and exposed to their influences since it is required to fulfil their expectations. Within event organizations generally, uncertainty is common since the organizing committees (such as the LYOGOC) undergo an almost constant organizational evolution (Parent, 2008). Structural and operational changes occur to the organization from planning mode (bid and founding of legal

organizing committee) to implementation mode (operational work and games time) and the wrap-up mode (reports) (Parent, 2008). Each mode is characterized by the period of time and the specific tasks or actions to be accomplished in the specific mode. Compared to other sport organizations, Olympic Games Organizing Committees (OGOC) are unique since they neither have a past (except of the few years of bid phase) nor do they have a future: Just shortly after the event is done, the organizing committee must do the financial wrap-up and write a report. About two years after the physical Games, the organization is closed down (Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2008; Parent & Deephouse, 2007). However, OGOC are always closely connected to NOCs of the host country. Regarding NIF and LYOGOC, organizations to mimic are be IOC, other OGOCs (former organizing committee of (Youth) Olympic Games, such as Innsbruck 2012), and other sport organizations as well as other civic organizations around Lillehammer as it is discussed in Articles 2 and 4.

While the concepts of isomorphism and legitimacy enable explanation of the maintenance and reproduction of the YSP through Lillehammer 2016, the concept of organizational change complements the analysis of the ongoing policy process.

Organizational change

Institutionalization of structures and practices, beliefs and values, is an ongoing process (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). While Zucker's (1977) concept explains the process of institutionalization, there is the process of de-institutionalization, which is characterized by the dismissing of legitimacy or social actions by organizational members (Kikulis, 2000). Hence, de-institutionalization has the opposite consequence of institutionalization, which I presented previously as socially constructed legitimacy (Jepperson, 1991; Washington & Patterson, 2011). The compliance of organizational forms and structure and institutionalized norms can happen to a high or low degree. When the compliance is low, changes occur. The actions of human agents are influenced and shaped by institutionalized ideas and structures, which they did not create themselves. These ideas and structures are usually adopted from the institutional environment in which the agents are acting. In order to fit the environment, actors create new ideas and introduce them to the organizations (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Kikulis, 2000). Based on a number of criticisms of early neo-institutionalism theorizing (Campbell, 2004; Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Fahlén, Stenling, & Vestin, 2008; Leopkey & Parent, 2012; Skille, 2008; 2011), organizational change is now a focal point for neo-institutional theorists. The critic is directed towards the claim that within institutional change,

practices are not diffused in the exact same way in one organization, as they existed in the other organization. They have to pass a filter of cultural and local limitations in order to be applicable in another organization (Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008), which is explained as the editing process (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) or the flow of ideas (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996).

This implies that objects that are to be diffused are strategically modified and adopted to the new cultural frame. The implementing agents construct a realization of stories in the exemplary organization and their own translation of such. This diffusion is responsible for isomorphism, homogeneity, heterogeneity, and institutional change (Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008).

Campbell (2004) argues that neo-institutionalism with a focus on explaining institutional change includes two concepts: diffusion and barrier determination. He claims that these concepts are needed to shed light on the mechanisms and renames these concepts in 'translation' and 'bricolage.' Studying institutional change of sport policy, Skille (2008) showed that the mechanisms of bricolage and translation (Campbell, 2004) were suitable for explaining sport policy implementation by local sport clubs. Bricolage implies that new institutional solutions are created by "recombining elements" in an innovative process (Campbell, 2004, p. 74). Translation involves the combination of new externally given elements received through diffusion as well as through their fitting to local context and inherited from the past (Campbell, 2004). Mechanisms within institutions, which are originated in a field, are introduced to another field; if translated successfully, they cause institutional change. Translation indicates that a new element is included and adapted to fit into the receiving context and implies that hybrid forms and practices are created (Campbell, 2004).

In addition to the concept of bricolage and translation, Hardy and Maguire (2008) identified a concept that could also illuminate organizational processes in relation to implementation. Entrepreneurship refers to how individual actors change the institutional field through innovation by developing new ideas (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). While literature on institutional entrepreneurship has focused on how change initiated by individuals is related to considerations of pressure (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004), there is disagreement about how much ability the individual entrepreneur actually has to create change (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Stenling, 2015). In this regard, the study of research question two includes an analysis of the power dynamic between the actors within LYOGOC, responsible for implementing Lillehammer 2016, and representative of NIF who are concerned with the implementation of the YSP (see Article 2 and 4).

The actions of human agents are influenced and shaped by institutionalized ideas and structures that they did not create. These ideas and structures are usually adopted from the institutional environment in which the agents are acting. In order to fit the environment, actors develop new ideas and introduce them to the organizations (Kikulis, 2000). Different factors trigger institutional change, a) exogenous factors such as war, revolution, law changes, and political pressures and/or b) endogenous, as e.g. contradiction of institutional elements, multiple institutional logics, or the application of abstract rules to concrete action (Walgenbach & Meyer, 2008). The latter is basis for discussion in Articles 2, 3 and 4 where I treat how the implementing agents role shape and are shaped by the institutional elements, practices and rules of the organizations involved in the YSP process and Lillehammer 2016.

Turning from organizational level of analysis to individual level, the following section presents implementation theory as important approach applied to analyze the actions of policy implementers (Articles 2 and 4) as well as the perception of the policy by the policy's target group (Article 3).

Implementation theory

Researching policy implementation involves systematic analysis of the emergence of actions with which actors handle a policy problem (O'Toole, 2000). Within implementation research, it is important to distinguish between structures and processes, between institutions and behavior, and between actors and activities (Hill & Hupe, 2014). In research, considerable attention is paid to the layers that characterize a political-administrative system. While there is a distinction between top and bottom loci, institutional relations are also addressed directing vertical and horizontal, called administrative layers (Hill & Hupe, 2014).

Two main approaches of implementation theory are top-down and bottom-up approaches. In this present study, I argue for and apply a middle range approach including both perspectives. Combining both perspectives enables me to identify the starting point of the YSP implementation process and at the same time, I am able to analyze policy actions and demands that might appear from the other end during the implementation process that I study. The top-down approach is based on a hierarchical perspective (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980) where political decisions are made and implementation moves through administrative layers (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Most top-down analysts conduct normative and prescriptive analysis and study those variables that interrupt the process of perfect implementation (Gunn, 1978). In contrast, bottom-up theorist

Lipsky (1980) stresses the importance of low-level agents, so-called street level bureaucrats. The effectiveness of public policy implementation depends on their ability to establish routines and to cope with pressures and uncertainty deriving from the work they do (Lipsky, 1980).

While the traditional policy theorists of top-down (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980) and bottom-up (Lipsky, 1980) approaches focus on explaining how policy develops, institutional theory applied in policy studies is concerned with how the organizations work, and how processes develop within the implementing organizations (Hill & Hupe, 2014).

Combining top-down and bottom-up perspectives, Scharpf (1978) argues that the success of implementation depends on the availability of relevant partner organizations. The willingness of partners to contribute and the professional network of implementing agents are crucial for successful implementation. Other determining factors of policy performance are inter-organizational communication, characteristics of the implementing agencies, conditions within the social, political, and economic environment as well as the complexity of policy actions, hence disposition of implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Furthermore, Scharpf (1978) argues that the relationship between the policy formulators and implementing agents is unstable, while Skille (2008) stresses the importance of local and structural context. The dialectical policy network approach (Marsh & Smith, 2000) takes elements of structure and agency into account and explains that the action of implementing agents is shaped by how these agents interpret structures and utilizes strategic knowledge (see also Harris & Houlihan, 2016; Lindsey, 2006).

The dialectical policy network approach is characterized by important relationships within policy implementation, such as the; a) structural context which influences network and resources that implementing agents have available; b) skills of the agents on how collaborative they manage to be to produce desired outcomes within an institutional context; c) network interaction and negotiating; d) wide range of factors that influence the networks; such as socio-political factors (structural context), human and financial resources, cooperation skills among the actors in the network, as well as the desired policy outcomes; and e) how interaction between structure and interaction of networks are reflected in the policy outcome (Harris & Houlihan, 2016; Marsh & Smith, 2000).

In order to capture both the dynamics of the environment within which implementing agents operate and the significance of internal organizational dynamics I supplement implementation approaches with neo-institutional theory in my analysis of Articles 2 and 4. The conflict between

bottom loci expectations of given socio-political issues and the top loci formulating often unsuitable policies for these issues (Lipsky, 1980) is basis for discussion in Article 3 where the young people's perception of the implemented YSP actions is subject to scrutiny.

Summary and implications for the study

As presented in this chapter, neo-institutional theory serves as a foundation to understand continuity (institutionalization) and change within organizations and their institutional environment (Kikulis, 2000). Many studies explored how organizations change their behavior, practices, and structures. At the same time, a continuity in governance and decision-making, such as policy formulation, has been proven (Kikulis, 2000). By adopting neo-institutional theory, I can unravel how Norwegian YSP in connection with Lillehammer 2016 was shaped by different actors as legitimation process of NIF. I explore how decision-making processes were created during the Lillehammer 2016 bid as well as preserved and changed during the implementation of the YSP and Lillehammer 2016.

Institutional environments are characterized by certain rules and requirements to which organizations must conform in order to receive support and legitimacy. Often, requirements are demanded from national or local government. NIF in its public monopoly position to develop sport for all, and youth sport, is given the responsibility by the Norwegian government to do so.

Changes in policies, professions, and programs can lead organizations to incorporate practices and procedures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The incorporation of these procedures helps the organization to increase and/or maintain legitimacy and survival. Using the YSP as main argument for the Lillehammer 2016 bid can be understood as incorporated procedure in order to for NIF to secure legitimacy (see also Article 1). The institutional analysis helps to scrutinize "the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions" (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). The purposive actions by NIF and the LYOGOC concerning the YSP fall under this understanding of my theoretical analysis.

However, there is a need to scrutinize policy processes in the context of the fact that the process is organized and influenced by intra- and inter-organizational values, norms, and relationships, as well as power structures and practices (Hill & Hupe, 2014) and also by the creation and impact of policy networks (Marsh & Smith, 2000). By combining implementation literature (Marsh & Smith, 2000; Scharpf, 1978; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975) and neo-institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan,

1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Zucker, 1977) I analyze how structures and practices enable as well as constrain actions that are subject to change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The implementation literature specifically helps to cover the policy process as a whole by helping to analyze the administrative layers, implementation resources and network relations in order to give an account of structural and agential effects on policy outcomes (Harris & Houlihan, 2016)

Since “[p]olicy implementation is constrained by the world outside the organization and the institutional context within they endeavor to act” (Parsons, 1995, p. 471), the analysis of the institutional context includes the relationship between policy makers, implementing agents, and their actions and the outside world. However, especially important is the target group which is the ultimately affected (or not affected) by the policy actions.

Formal structures as administrative layers within organizations arise within institutional contexts. The formal structure is the blueprint of an organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This includes the constitution of an organization (listing of departments, offices, staff, and programs). As well, in the formal structure, explicit goals and policies are formulated and how they interconnect, hence the objectives that link the rationalized structural elements (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). “Organizations in search of external support and stability incorporate all sorts of incompatible structural elements” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 356). Parent organizations, such as NIF, have the power and ability to make sub-organizations adopt and conform to their (NIF’s) beliefs and structures (Scott, 1987). This issue is discussed in Articles 2, 3, and 4 where findings show that the implementing agents felt pressured to conform NIF’s goal concerning the YSP, which affected the perception of the target group concerning the implemented YSP. The interconnections within the organizations and individuals involved in the implementation process of such initiatives, i. e. the policy makers (Article 1) implementing agents (Articles 2, 3, and 4) and the target group (Articles 3 and 4) are analyzed in order to discuss the facilitation of youth engagement in NIF through Lillehammer 2016.

In Article 1, I discuss the YSP policy making process and its connection to Lillehammer 2016 as influenced by institutionalized norms and culture of NIF’s environment that it is embedded in.

The intra- and inter-organizational relationships, expectations as well as administrative structures and practices of the YSP implementation are focused on in Article 2.

Theoretical framework

Article 3 sheds light on the young people's individual perception of the YSP as implemented through Lillehammer 2016 and discusses the conflict of expectation between the implementing agents and the target group for the policy.

In Article 4, I give an account of the strategic leverage of Lillehammer 2016 in achieving youth engagement as policy impact and discuss the process in perspective of organizational actions and restrictions in light of the young people's perceptions, which are resulting into the possible policy impact given after Lillehammer 2016.

4. Research approach, design, and methods

Positioning of the study

The choice of research design has been systematically related to the issues of ontological and epistemological positions (Bryman, 1984; Grix, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McNamee, 2005). While ontology is about one's constitutional view of social reality, epistemology concerns the knowledge production process and poses the question of what we can know about the world and how we come to know what we know (Furlong & Marsh, 2010; Grix, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McNamee, 2005).

I position myself as a scholar of interpretive organizational research (Prasad & Prasad, 2002). The focus of interpretive paradigm is on the meaning of the actions of the agents. Supporters of the interpretive paradigm emphasize interpretation of social phenomena tend to use qualitative approaches (Furlong & Marsh, 2010). Interpretive inquiry has been noted as being of considerable importance for management and organizational research enhancing the symbolic meaning of the organizational world (Prasad & Prasad, 2002)

Interpretive inquiry is devoted to the epistemological philosophy of social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), also known as *constructivism* (Grix, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). This position states that criteria for judging reality and validity are not absolute but are rather derived from the consensus of community (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) through meaningful interpretation. The foundation of reality is subjective and intersubjective social knowledge is the active construction and creation by human consciousness. Hence, in constructivism knowing cannot be separated from the knower (Guba & Lincoln, 2005), so a critical reflection on my role as researcher when generating and analyzing data is necessary. Truth is never fixed or unvarying but subject to temporal and historical conditions and the emphasis on social construction of social reality.

An interpretive organizational approach committed to the philosophy of social construction appeals to me since I believe that in written and spoken conversations, persons are not only reporting events that reflect truth and reality 'out there' but also that language and interactions are subject to the construction of a shared reality through processes of institutionalization (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). In other words, truth is what people see to be true in the context of the social world into which they are embedded (Sugden, 2005).

In order to understand and explain the political processes in sport organization, the interpretive organizational inquiry remains of high relevance to grasp the complexity within organizations in terms of individual actions, organizational culture, language (micro-level), and institutional structures, processes, and phenomena (macro-level) (Prasad & Prasad, 2002).

Crotty's (1998) explanation of constructivism hits the point about my theoretical as well as practical conviction when generating and analyzing data within this research. He states that all knowledge and therefore meaningful reality, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and being developed and transmitted within essential social contexts (Crotty, 1980).

The contextual conditions under which policymakers, implementing agents and policy target groups act are hard to measure quantitatively. Qualitative inquiry facilitates understanding of actors' behavior due to the influence of others and as well providing the foundation for a good overview over social (organizational) structures because they do not exist independently from agents' opinions and actions in contrast to natural phenomena (Marsh & Stoker, 2010; Prasad & Prasad, 2002). The situations that I seek to study and in which no clear answers have been evaluated yet are too complex for a survey or an experimental research strategy.

Research design: qualitative case study

This research is based on a qualitative case study with an intensive and in-depth study of one single unit (Gerring, 2004). The units are to be understood as phenomena, processes and/or situations. Case study enables the researcher to shape new variables when discovering unexpected findings (George & Bennet, 2005). By allowing to consider large numbers of intervening dimensions, complex causal relations and interactions can be identified and interpreted by inductive and deductive observations of unexpected aspects (George & Bennet, 2005). Furthermore, case studies enable the study of variables that are hard to measure statistically, such as power, political relations, democracy etc. Case studies obtain *whether* and *how* variables like these matter to the outcome rather than assessing *how much* they mattered (George & Bennet, 2005). Before the researcher can receive understanding of the *why* through analytic coding of the data, the *what* and *how* in the data must be identified through data collection (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997).

Applying Gerring's (2004) classification of qualitative research, in this research, the YSP in connection with Lillehammer 2016 function as the studied case whereas the unit under observation

are the organizations involved in the formulation and implementation of the policy. The comprised cases, which are defined as the unit's observations under different points in time, are the stages of policy process: 1. policy formulation and legitimation, 2. policy implementation, 3. policy perception, and 4. policy outcome. Consequently, the thesis consists of four comprised cases focusing on different contexts concerning the organizational and individual level in which the policy is processed. The dimensions I am looking for at every level represent the interactions between organizations and actors, as well as, mechanisms, structures, influences, and pressures present in the policy process. Generating qualitative data helped to identify processes and mechanisms in the policy process shaped by the actors involved.

Generating Qualitative Data

Following a critical constructivist approach within the interpretative paradigm, I solely relied on qualitative data. Since qualitative case studies shed light on the *why* and *how*, the generation of data through semi-structured interviews, documents, and observations helped create knowledge within the studied field (Bryman, 1984).

Data from interviews are the most important within case studies (Yin, 2009). By allowing us to look into large numbers of intervening variables, complex causal relations, and interactions can be identified and interpreted by inductive observations of unexpected aspects (George & Bennet, 2005). Institutional structures and influence matter for the formulation, legitimation as well as implementation of a policy (Peters, 2012). In my study, influence is set as a dimension as well as the political structures of organizations that are involved in the policy implementation activities concerning Lillehammer 2016. In these structures, there are many different interactions and relations among the actors to be observed. How the actors experience these relations and influences, as well as how they act on them cannot be researched quantitatively. Other important techniques in conducting qualitative case studies, which I use, are the analyses of documents and observations. This also applies to observation, which is an appropriate method when examining complex social relationships and when "a major goal of the study is to construct qualitative contextual picture of a certain situation or flow of events" (Bryman, 1984, p. 81). In this study, data was generated in three rounds. The first two rounds of data gathering informed Research Questions 1 and 2 respectively. The second and third round informed Research Question 3. Whereas, Research Question 4 was

answered by analyzing the entire data set. Table 1 shows the rounds of data generation and their purpose for the respective articles in this dissertation.

Table 1. Data generation rounds in connection with the level analysis

Data generation	Interviewees	Policy Level	Article
Round 1	Bid committee (8)	Policy formulation and legitimation	Article 1, Article 4
Round 2	NIF, LYOGOC, Oppland (9)	Policy implementation	Article 2, Article 3, Article 4
Round 3	Young leaders (16)	Policy perception	Article 3, Article 4

In the following, a detailed explanation of practices and rationales of each round is provided.

Data generation round one

The sample of data generation Round 1 included documents that concerned the Lillehammer 2016 bid and Norwegian YSP produced by different organizations involved in the area. I consulted candidature files (n=2) of the bid committee (n=3), a strategic document produced by the LOGOC, which included a brief description about the goals and the strategic focus on youth (n=1), documents produced by NIF such as the annual reports from 1991 to 2013 (n=23), the sport policy documents (n=3), reports of board meetings, committees, and general assemblies (n=13), letters and documents sent to the Norwegian government and the IOC (n=8), reports of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs such as the White Paper on Sport, the state guarantee of the Norwegian Parliament for Lillehammer 2016 (n=8), and evaluation reports of the IOC Evaluation Commission concerning Lillehammer 2016 (n=2). Following Yin's (2009) two-tactic sampling, I first carefully defined the sample needed—in this case, all documents produced by NIF, the bid committee, the IOC, the Norwegian government; and second, I reviewed the resulting data to determine if the material was likely to fit the study. During data generation from the documents, I considered how the documents were embedded in the youth sport context in which they were produced; the circumstances under which they were produced; the purpose for which they were produced; the vocabulary used; and the underlying rhetoric.

The interviewees represented the *managerial elite* of the bid committee who controlled and adapted the institutional values of their organization (see also Hinings et al., 1996). The bid committee consisted of representatives of NIF and the Municipality of Lillehammer, and they engaged one IOC representative as consultant. It is their beliefs and values that matter when representing the organization (see Table 1). As stated above, in the interviews I researched the premises or rules that guided the interviewees to talk about the reasoning behind the Lillehammer 2016 bid. The interviews were guided by open as well as theoretically driven questions based on themes prominent to the institutional concepts of legitimacy and institutionalization concerning the YSP and YOG bid. The questions are provided in the interview guide in Appendix 4. An overview of participants, their affiliated organization and position within the bid committee is provided in Article 1 on Page 6. The interviews lasted between 39 and 70 minutes. They were conducted face-to-face six years after the bid process. The interviews took place in 2014, i. e. 1,5-2 years prior to the event.

Field notes about the objectives, ideas, and strategies concerning Lillehammer 2016 were produced when observing meetings organized by NIF provided insights into the ongoing discussions about the pro and contra of Lillehammer 2016. Further field notes were generated by observing speeches and presentations of the NIF president, the NIF Secretary General as well as the NIF Director for youth sport, which were conducted after the bid phase from December 2011 until March 2015. Such occasions were a conference about children and youth sport at the Norwegian sport gala 2015, a conference on major sport events in Lillehammer in January 2014, an international seminar on *social responsibility, development and peace through sport* in Oslo in December 2013, as well as on meetings initiated by LYOGOC (from October 2013 until March 2015). Furthermore, a presentation given by the NIF president about Norwegian YSP, Lillehammer 2016 and youth campaign as part of a study program at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences was observed

Data generation round two

Data second round of data generation focused on semi-structured interviews and observations in order to answer Research Questions 2 and 4. The data generated aimed at offering insight into meso-level of policy implementation and understanding perceptions and behavior of implementing

Research approach, design, and methods

agents and actors within their policy networks. The nine interviewees were selected according to their roles relevant to the operationalization of the YSP through Lillehammer 2016.

Following the information retrieved from the interviews in round one, employees of NIF and LYOGOC were identified as implementing agents. All interviewees were key informants with intensive insight on NIF's YSP's intended application to Lillehammer 2016 (see Article 2, page 5) or were reported as important actors for the collaboration by the implementing agents, such as Representatives of the County of Oppland (the county where the city of Lillehammer is placed). Thus, the selection procedure was based on a combination of strategic sampling and snowball sampling (George & Bennet, 2005; Yin, 2009). The interview guide was based on themes prominent in the implementation literature and neo-institutional theory (the complete interview guide is provided in Appendix 5). After starting openly, questions were narrowed down to focus the discussion on concrete implementation actions.

After observations in 54 hours of meetings, courses, and presentations that concerned NIF's YSP goals, field notes were generated. Phenomena that could reinforce, challenge, or complement on the statements of the interviewees were targeted. Observing the content and process of these meetings, which and how agents were involved in the implementation process, with whom they interacted, how ideas were created, developed, shaped, and operationalized, were identified. The main subject of observation in this study was the program for young leaders that were organized by NIF and LYOGOC to recruit volunteers to Lillehammer 2016 and to educate young leaders for Norwegian sport. Furthermore, presentations by NIF and LYOGOC concerning YSP and YOG were observed. Other observed events included a meeting initiated by the County of Oppland concerning school-related projects connected to Lillehammer 2016, a debate about YOG and youth sport at Lillehammer organized by LYOGOC, a conference about children and youth sport at the Norwegian sport gala 2015, a presentation on youth sport and Lillehammer 2016 given by a NIF representative as part of a study program at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences.

Data generation round three

Data generated in the third round focused on the target's group perception of implemented policy actions, hence young people participated in a program connected to Lillehammer 2016. Data from this round serve as the empirical basis for Article 3 and 4 and was used to explore this interest were

drawn through interviews, documents, and observations connected to the young leaders program and YOG.

The 76 young people who attended the course of the young leaders program in January 2016 (further referred to as young leaders) were invited for interviews. 51 of these were females and 25 were males. 39 young leaders were from the Counties of Oppland and Hedmark (Lillehammer's surrounding counties, further referred to as Inland); all other 17 Norwegian counties were represented as well. The majority of participants were from Inland. Interviews were conducted with 16 young leaders (aged between 16 and 20) as shown in Table 2. The interviewed persons were nine females and seven males with 12 from Inland. Four program participants (further referred to as young leaders) were from other Norwegian counties. Interview questions included open questions and guided questions from implementation theory. More detailed explanation of the selection of the interviewees and conduction of the interviews is presented in Article 3 and Appendix 6.

Reports used for data generation included three evaluation reports of the program. One evaluation report of three courses staged in 2014 (Hanstad, Tangevold, & Vollen 2015); one (Strittmatter & Hanstad, 2015) about the follow-up course of the earlier courses (October 2015); and an evaluation report on the young leaders' experiences during YOG (Hanstad et al., 2016). The reports include information about the young leaders' gender, age, and county of residence, their involvement in organized sport and their perception of Lillehammer 2016 before and during the event. The reports reveal if, how and why young leaders took part in the organization of YOG. This information was useful for analyzing the young leaders' perception of the implemented activities. Furthermore, 72 pages of field notes were generated through observations during a) four of the seven courses that were organized prior to Lillehammer 2016 between April 2014 and January 2016, and b) during the 12 days of the event itself in February 2016.

Summary of all interview data generation rounds

Data collection per round was finished when data saturation was reached. Concerning the interviews, I have interviewed every person whom I expected to give insights on the YSP, its formulation, and implementation and impact through Lillehammer 2016. Table 2 provides an overview over all interviewees that participated in the study.

Table 2. Participants in all rounds of interviews according to the policy level, their position, and their affiliated organization or home region.

Data generation	Policy level	Position	Organization / Home region
Round 1	Policy formulation	Employee	NIF
Round 1	Policy formulation	Employee	NIF
Round 1	Policy formulation	Employee	NIF
Round 1	Policy formulation	Employee	City of Lillehammer
Round 1	Policy formulation	Employee	NIF
Round 1	Policy formulation	Politician	NIF
Round 1	Policy formulation	Member	IOC
Round 1	Policy formulation	Politician	City of Lillehammer
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	NIF
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	County of Oppland
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	NIF
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	LYOGOC
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	NIF
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	NIF
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	LYOGOC
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	LYOGOC
Round 2	Implementation	Employee	LYOGOC
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Western Norway
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Northern Norway
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Northern Norway
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Southern Norway
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Western Norway
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland
Round 3	Perception	Young leader	Inland

The interviewees mirror my entry points of analysis as described in the research question. The bid committee and documents provided insights for my analysis on the formulation and legitimation of the Lillehammer 2016 bid (Research Question 1). Interviews with implementing agents and observations of policy actions enabled me to analyze the implementation process of the YSP in

connection with Lillehammer 2016 (Research Question 2). The interviews with the young leaders and document analysis of the program reports shed light on the perception of the policy target group (Research Question 3). These data helped giving account to the policy process as a whole in order to answer Research Question 4 looking into outcome of the youth sport policy goals. More details on data generation for each round are described in the Articles.

Processing and analyzing data

The primary tools in the generation and analysis of data are the theoretical concepts as outlined above in this thesis and explained in detail in each article. The process of data analysis for all four articles was followed by a two-cycle coding procedure proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994), including a combination of emerging and predefined codes with the help of MAXQDA Software. This approach requires an inductive coding, which corresponds to a descriptive and open observation of data where common patterns in the qualitative data, hence interviewees' statements, documents and field notes, were identified. Second cycle of coding involves the adoption of theoretical considerations. In articles two, three, and four, similarities and differences in the interviewees' statements, in the order in which they occurred, whether their statements occurred in correspondence to the observations, and if certain actions led to others, was looked at in the first step. Applying implementation theory led to the identification of indicators of (a) the chronological processes, or information about when the implementation started and how it proceeded; and (b) structures, or information about which activities were implemented and by whom. This enabled the emergence of topics that were presented as commands (top-down) and those that emerged from discussions (bottom-up). The institutional analysis focused on the organizational environment in which the actors involved in the policy on all levels (implementing agents, and or target group) are operating, the pressures they experienced, and how those pressures affected their actions and perceptions. These steps of coding help to examined how the actions, mechanisms, and processes contributed to the implementation of the YSP through Lillehammer 2016 and the impact on the youth sport development in Norway.

Complementing the two-cycling coding in article one, the application of tactics of discourse analysis according to Scheurich (1997) was dominant. Discourse analysis builds on written and spoken language that is structured in patterns (Jørgensen & Phillipps, 1999). In order for the patterns found in the discourse analysis to make sense, they have to be contextualized. This

approach enabled me to identify issues that provided an insight into the explicit and implicit reasons that were given to justify the bid for Lillehammer 2016. Furthermore, I looked for problems NIF explicitly tried to solve with Lillehammer 2016, the policy they applied, and how that policy was intended to be operationalized. Theoretical informed analysis focused on the institutional and socio-political contexts in which the written and spoken texts were produced by the persons and organizations involved in the formulation of the YSP and the Lillehammer 2016 bid.

Examples for how the categorization of emerging and theoretically informed codes enabled to answer the different research questions is illustrated in the coding procedure that can be found in Appendix 7.

Quality assessment

Andersen (2006) argues that a conscious and active role of the researcher is needed for a higher outcome of analytical control. Guba and Lincoln (1989) developed criteria for judging the quality concerning meaning and relevance to qualitative research studies: *trustworthiness*. Trustworthiness comprises sub-criteria such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

Credibility

A study judged as credible can be defined as one that is correct and strong in its statement (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). In order to increase credibility, the method used for investigation needs to be appropriate to what it investigates (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Triangulation can strengthen the data when the information from different sources leads to the same findings (Yin, 2009). A credible study can be understood as such when data has been properly collected and interpreted and its conclusion reflects the real world (Yin, 2009). In order to create and maintain credibility, I used key informants in order to answer my research questions complemented with the analysis of documents and field notes from observation. With the use of multiple sources of evidence, I secured triangulation of data (Yin, 2009). Furthermore, establishing a chain of evidence can enhance the credibility of the data. In order to prove that what was said and asked in an interview is understood by both sides: the researcher as well as the informant recorded all the interviews and followed up with the interviewees in spoken and written form when things were not clear or if I needed further information. To further ensure credibility, I gave the informants the chance to approve and/or neglect my understandings (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) both during and after the interviews and

observations. In order to make sure that I drew the same conclusion as the interviewees, I sometimes repeated their statements and asked whether I had understood them correctly. In meetings with the informants (for example during the young leaders courses) I shared my interpretations on what I observed at the course with course leaders, to make sure, that this was in line with what the participants also saw as what really happened.

Transferability

Transferability in qualitative research can be compared with generalization—or external validity—(Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Sparkes & Smith, 2013). Yin (2009) defines external validity the “domain to which a study’s finding can be generalized” (p. 40), hence the theoretical representativeness (Andersen, 2013). Systematizing and interpreting data is the base for generalization of the findings (Andersen, 2013). Generalizing the findings is often bound to develop new implications of new or already established generalizations (often from previously developed theories). The intensive study of a field (case study) aims to generalize across a larger set of units (Andersen, 2013; Gerring, 2004). In my study, the larger set of units is the legitimation process of sport organizations, how it was shaped by actors involved in the YSP process.

The subset of qualitative methods that aspires to cumulative and progressive generalizations about social life seek to develop and apply clear standards for judging whether some generalizations fit the social world better than others (George & Bennet, 2005).

Yin (2009) states that case studies can be generalizable if existing theory is used as framework and is being compared to the empirical findings of the case study. Since case studies have a richness of data, they serve as opportunity for scholars to test and develop theory as well derive new hypotheses (George & Bennet, 2005). In this project, I observed the implications of the theory at every stage of my research. The organization of data already started with the creation of the interview guide, which was structured by both, open questions followed by theoretically informed interrogations (all interview guides are presented in Appendices 5, 6, and 7). The empirical assumptions were closely connected to neo-institutional and implementation theory. Furthermore, when organizing the data in the analysis as described above, I confronted the analytical expectations and observed facts in light of the applied theoretical framework.

Dependability

Dependability “is concerned with the stability of the data over time” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 242). Therefore, the study must be consistent and accurate (Sparkes & Smith, 2013). In order to establish the trustworthiness of the study, researchers can strategically produce dependability audits including audit trails. In other words, researchers need to give a detailed description of the path they went and choices that were made concerning research process, so that the reader can follow. If the research process is an established process that is trackable and documentable and if the data is confirmable by tracking the process, dependability can be provided (Sparkes & Smith, 2013). In the previous chapters, I have described the detailed process of my choice of research design, data generation, processing, and analysis in order to prove dependability.

Confirmability

Confirmability means that the data, interpretations, and results of inquiries are based in the context and the inquired field apart from the researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The possibility for confirmable findings is to avoid subjectivity within the study, however as I argued above, an intersubjective co-construction between the interviewer and interviewee is an important part of knowledge generation. As well, it is necessary to take into account that questions and answers may vary from one interviewer to the other in terms of wording, appearance, etc. and therefore lead to different answers. My role as qualitative researcher is central in this present project. Therefore, the process of reflexivity, hence reflecting on my own self as being my own instrument (Berger, 2013), was crucial for me. Discussing findings and my understanding of data and processes within an international research group on YOG helped me to reflect about subjectivity and objectivity when analyzing. Making myself aware of my different nationality to Norwegian, foreign to the one I live and do research in, I found myself in a highly detached position from the studied field. However, I felt a need to reflect about the self-awareness of my data and in process of data analysis, interpretation and report of findings, which helped to allow judgment without bias (Sparkes & Smith). Protocols about how the data was systematized and interpreted to provide confirmability as well as dependability (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) can be find in Appendix 7.

Limitations

Limitations of the data collection were present in the first round. Interviews with the bid committee members were retrospectively conducted, so people might adapt their answers to how they would like the situation to have been. A limitation of the data collection process in round three was that the interviewed young leaders were not strategically picked from the whole population of young leaders participating in the program, but offered to take part in the interview.

Ethical considerations

The project was approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (see Appendix 2). Due to the network relations within Norwegian sport of my doctoral advisor, I gained easy access to participants, meetings and documents. All participants I wished to interview were positive about participating in my study. Prior to the interviews, all interviewees received and signed a written consent that informed them about the content and aim of the present project as well as their right to withdraw from the study at any time. Anonymity had different importance for the interviewees. While no interviewee is named with personal details such as name and age, all participants from the bid committee agreed prior to the interview that their position could be named when referring to their statements. Quoting the statements in the context of a certain political position was necessary in order to understand the contextual situation of the bid and the YSP. Being aware of this, I informed all interviewees that I would not reveal their names, however since the bid committee was small and attracted media attention all over Norway during the bid process, individuals might be identifiable. All interviewees stated their support either way. Private data identifying the participants in data generation rounds two and three were not reported in the present dissertation. The implementing agents were only categorized in terms of the organization they were employed in, leaving out their position. Here the participants also gave consent before the single interviews were recorded. The participants of the young leaders program were anonymized and only categorized by the area they live within Norway. The analysis of data in light of the above named theoretical framework and above methods applied resulted in findings and published articles, which criticize actions and non-actions within Norwegian sport structures. I had to be aware of the relation between being constructive yet with a critical mindset, and at the same time not cause problems for individuals involved in my study and the YSP process. In sum, ethical guidelines were followed according to scholarly rules of the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences.

5. Findings

In order to understand the YSP process concerning Lillehammer 2016, four articles present different levels of analyses, namely the stages within the policy process. While my theoretical and empirical interests situate my study within several fields of sport, I have chosen to submit my articles to journals concerned with sport management, sport policy, and the sociology of sport. In the following, a summary of the findings, including key aspects of all four articles, is presented. These findings of all articles are discussed extensively in the next chapter that is focused on how the different levels of analysis, as presented in the four research questions, are related to each other.

Article 1

Strittmatter, A.-M. (2016). Defining a problem to fit the solution: A neo-institutional explanation for legitimizing the bid for the 2016 Lillehammer winter Youth Olympic Games. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 8(3), 421-437.

Article 1 is single-authored and builds on eight interviews with members central to the bidding process of Lillehammer 2016. The case study is linked to research question one: *How was youth sport policy formulated and legitimated as main argument for the Lillehammer 2016 bid?*

This article discusses the successful bid for Lillehammer 2016 and its incorporation within the broader youth sport strategy within organized sport in Norway. The findings show that the bid process was initiated by NIF after the IOC President had asked NIF to bid for the first ever YOG, a winter edition in 2012.

When researching the arguments pro YOG presented by the bid committee in the interviews, rhetoric patterns were identified similar or identical to the reasons identified through the analysis of documents relevant to the bid and field notes. By bidding for Lillehammer 2016, NIF claimed to realize NIF's YSP goals from as far back as 1990s. Rhetorical reproduction of Lillehammer 2016 being an "opportunity", "driving force", or "milestone" to strengthen youth sport in Norway present in everyday language and thinking of representatives in NIF and the bid committee. While the bid committee needed to trigger the support of the public, the discourse analysis of the bid argumentation showed that the bid committee strategically focused on formulating the goals for

the YOG according to the government's requirements within the bid, such as a focus on increasing the number of young people in sport, as well as volunteers within sport. Results show that representatives of NIF and the bid committee repeated statements and politically correct responses that previously were formulated in documents and meetings. An exclusively symbolic rhetoric was used when arguing for hosting Lillehammer 2016. While the interviewees claimed that Lillehammer 2016 are an opportunity, driving force, inspiration, and so forth, none of the interviewees could explain the mechanisms that would link Lillehammer 2016 to an actual increase in young people's participation in organized sport. While the findings from Article 1 indicated a strong assumption that Lillehammer 2016 would develop youth sport, the bid committee did not discuss how the event would in fact develop youth sport in Norway. Based on this analysis the discussion showed how the institutionalized rhetoric of the Norwegian YSP adopted by NIF became the main argument for the Lillehammer 2016 bid. Further findings show that rather than responding to the youth sport participation problem, NIF used the development of youth sport as a convenient rationale to bid for Lillehammer 2016 in order to secure legitimacy from two of its main stakeholders—the IOC and the Norwegian government. Rather than hosting Lillehammer 2016 as solution to a youth sport participation problem, NIF used the institutionalized rhetoric of the YSP, defining a problem to fit the solution.

Article 2

Strittmatter, A.-M. & Skille, E. Å. (2016). Boosting youth sport? Implementation of Norwegian youth sport policy through the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games. *Sport in Society*, 1–17. doi:10.1080/17430437.2015.1124568

While Article 1 revealed insights about the YSP objectives that NIF had in regard to Lillehammer 2016, Article 2 examined how these objectives were practically implemented. Article 2 aimed to answer research question two: *How was Norwegian youth sport policy implemented through Lillehammer 2016?*

The findings show that even though the YOG 2016 had already been awarded to Lillehammer in December 2011, it took some time before the YSP goals in connection with Lillehammer 2016 were operationalized. The District Sport Associations (DSAs) in Inland were assigned to train 200

Findings

young leaders in connection with the event. This assignment came from NIF top management. Representatives of the DSAs and NIF initiated the planning for the young leaders program involving LYOGOC in its implementation. Five key actors responsible for the planning and organization of the program were identified, representing the DSAs (n=2), NIF (n=1), and LYOGOC (n=2), which are hereafter referred to as the implementing agents. Some 223 young leaders participated in the young leaders program, which was taught in seven weekend courses within a 22 months' time span. The course was addressed to young people aged 13 to 19 years old. While the idea of the young leaders program was based on an existing version within the NIF structures for several years, the implementing agents adapted the content of the courses in order to connect it to Lillehammer 2016. By including LYOGOC into the course organization, existing institutional practices have been combined with new ideas of course content. Findings in Article 2 showed that the recruitment and training of young leaders was the only implemented action concerning the YSP in connection with Lillehammer 2016. The development of young coaches and the recruitment and retention of young athletes, as defined in NIF's YSP goals, were neglected. The implementation process was characterized by a lack of resources and strategy. The process was fully dependent and relying on policy networking skills of the implementing agents who faced huge complexity of administrative layers within the process. While the implementing agents created several side activities and linked them to the operationalization of NIF's YSP goals, they did not manage to involve national sport federations and sport clubs in the implementation process who are important organizations and resources for youth sport development under NIF's umbrella.

Article 3

Strittmatter, A.-M., Hanstad, D. V. & Skirstad, B. (Submitted). Mismatch of expectations between target group and implementing agents in youth sport policy. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*.

Article 3 focuses on the implemented policy action identified in Article 2, the young leaders program in connection with Lillehammer 2016. The article sheds light on the policy target's group perception of the program and discusses how it can make a difference to youth engagement in organized sport. It explores Research Question 3: *How was the implemented youth sport policy perceived and processed by the policy target group?*

The analysis shows that the young leaders had a positive overall impression on the program. Many activities were reported as fun and as having positive learning outcomes—knowledge on communication, rhetoric, conflict solving, and Norwegian sport in general, as well the opportunity to network and socialize was perceived as positive. Some 223 young leaders were trained in the lead up to Lillehammer 2016, but only 115 volunteered during the event. The young leaders were promised voluntary leadership positions during Lillehammer 2016, which they looked forward to. However, only 17% stated that they had leadership tasks during Lillehammer 2016 (Hanstad et al., 2016).

While the first-time gatherings were positively judged, the follow-up courses were more often criticized by the young people. The young leaders criticized lack of communication and lack of information after and ahead of the gatherings that followed, as well what the young leaders actually should do during Lillehammer 2016. The analysis showed a mismatch in expectations of the young leaders and the implementing agents (hence, the program organizers) concerning goals and realization of the program. The young leaders on one side expected to have leader positions during the games, as they were promised by the implementing agents, and expected to be trained for these positions during the program. However, such training was not intended to be included by the implementing agents due to lack of strategic planning of the program and a scarcity in financial and human resources. At the same time, LYOGOC did not consider the young leaders suitable for tasks with high responsibility because of their young age and lack of work experience. LYOGOC could not provide what the implementing agents had promised the young leaders. Competing interests of the agents and organizations involved in the policy process is in line with existing implementation literature emphasizing the mismatch of policy in practice and policy on paper (Hupe & Hill, 2015).

On the website “Why are we hosting the Youth Olympic Games?” the LYOGOC in the Norwegian version states that Lillehammer 2016 is a part of the 10 year plan to recruit new coaches, leaders, volunteers, and athletes. However, it is also stated that the (only) program is about volunteer leaders “220 young volunteers from all over the country have gone through a 18 month learning program to become young leaders during and after the Games” (Lillehammer2016, n. d. a). In the English translation, athletes and coaches were not mentioned (Lillehammer2016, n. d. b).

Rather than creating a program that served the needs and wishes of the young people, the young leaders program was initiated and implemented because of the promised outcome that Lillehammer would have on the youth. The most interesting point of discussion, as discussed in Chapter 6, presented by these findings is the lack of common understanding of the intended policy goals and communication of how to proceed on different policy levels and organizations involved in the implementation, hence LYOGOC, implementing agents, and the policy target group. Based on the empirical data analysis, a framework is proposed for successful policy implementation for intended policy outcome in connection with sport events.

Article 4

Strittmatter, A.-M. (Under review). Increasing youth sport engagement through the Youth Olympic Games: Leveraging strategies and tactics. *International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing*.

Building on insights of Articles 1, 2, and 3, Article 4 points out the leveraging strategies and tactics of the YSP goals connected with Lillehammer 2016 and how they impact the event outcome concerning the YSP goals. Article 4 is single-authored and focuses on Research Question 4: *What was the outcome of the youth sport policy goals at its implementation through Lillehammer 2016?*

Data show that policy networks have been identified as the most important leveraging tactic for trying to get more young people engaged into organized sport through Lillehammer 2016. The network on local and regional level has been of special interest and focus among the implementing agents—these were created among NIF, the DSAs surrounding the Lillehammer region, involving schools, universities, and projects in the community of Lillehammer in order to create a YOG spirit among people in the community. A “heightened sense of community” (Chalip, 2006, p.110) that sport events are able to trigger in the host area could be found in Lillehammer among politicians, organizers, implementing agents, and youth. While the LYOGOC was more focused on what happened during the event on local level, NIF expressed their concerns also outside the Lillehammer region and in a more long-lasting impact concerning youth engagement in organized sport, also outside the local resident. This concern was not followed up on.

Objectives concerning increased youth engagement in Norwegian sport were strongly connected to Lillehammer 2016 as the most important resource since the start of the bid process dated back in 2008. The legacy of the Winter Olympics 1994 was described as a motivational factor for the population to support the youth edition. Communal atmosphere stemming from Lillehammer 1994 was reported to be useful when thinking about the future impact of Lillehammer 2016. The legacy of Lillehammer 1994, including its venues and experience with volunteering, might have been a resource for leveraging the promotion for increased youth engagement and participation in sport. However, the argumentation from the interviewees seemed to be more aimed at convincing why Lillehammer 2016 should be staged instead of how it actually strategically could be used for the YSP objectives.

Leveraging resources that could be identified were the existing manuals and structure of the already existing young leaders program in NIF, which was copied and adopted to Lillehammer 2016 in order to fit NIF's YSP goals concerning YOG. However, the human resources (implementing agents) and their ability to create, influence, and act within the policy network were found as the most important leveraging resource in this present study. Despite a lack of human and financial resources, and although action was limited by the implementing agents, their expertise in the field and ability to create solutions by operating in a network helped to push the sport community symbolically, especially in the local area.

6. Discussion

The overall aim of this dissertation was to understand NIF's YSP process in connection with Lillehammer 2016 as legitimization process of NIF. In order to create such understanding, I discuss, in this chapter, the key empirical findings in relation to the research questions and in light of the theoretical framework presented above. In the first part, I refer to Research Question 1: How was youth sport policy formulated and legitimated as main argument for the Lillehammer 2016 bid? Following the discussion of the implementation of the YSP through Lillehammer 2016 (Research Question 2), I discuss the analysis of Research Questions 3 and 4, focusing on the target group's perception and processing of the YSP, which, as I argue, influences the YSP outcome and the impact of Lillehammer 2016 concerning the whole YSP process. The final part of the discussion comprises the impact and outcome of Lillehammer 2016 and the whole YSP process.

Legitimizing the bid for Lillehammer 2016 (RQ1)

Regarding Research Question 1 '*how was youth sport policy formulated and legitimated as main argument for the Lillehammer 2016 bid?*', one of the key insights of Article 1 is the disconnect between the articulated reasoning for the Lillehammer 2016 bid and the actual NIF reason.

An institutionalization process of the YSP was identified, resulting into its adoption as the main reason for the formulation of the Lillehammer 2016 bid. The same rhetoric of the YSP as was formulated more than 20 years ago to fight the dropout problem was used as the strongest argument for the Lillehammer 2016 bid. In Article 1, it is shown that the formulation of the YSP structures have become institutionalized over time, and have become an accepted myth and value within the context of NIF; this can be referred to as the institutional contamination of rhetorical expression (Nordhaug, 2010).

As presented in Chapter 1, policy argumentation does not always comply with rational choice. Nevertheless, argumentation is often subject to rhetorical language, argumentation, symbols, and strategy, or a so-called hidden agenda (Chalip, 1995; Sam, 2003). Policy making has been found to be a result of institutionalized processes; and policymakers with influence and power do not always or exclusively use rational arguments (Flyvbjerg, 2001). The bid committee used a symbolic rhetoric in their argumentation pro Lillehammer 2016, for example, describing the event as an 'opportunity,' 'driving force,' and 'milestone' for youth sport development in Norway. Such symbolic rhetoric is common practice in policy making. The language used for the Lillehammer

2016 bid in documents, meetings, and by the bid committee was based on taken-for-granted understanding of the YSP, and worked out purposefully to provide assurance of the alleged necessity of Lillehammer 2016 as a solution to the existing—even long-lasting—challenges of Norwegian youth sport. In that respect, the YSP has become a self-imposed norm (see also Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) and a convenient symbolic strategy and assumed solution to NIF's dropout problem. Lillehammer 2016 were not a solution to the dropout problem—rather the opposite—yet the dropout problem was used as a convenient argument to justify the bid. This process of managing legitimacy is confirmed by Suchman's (1995) statements that managers seeking for legitimacy often find it easiest to position their argumentation within pre-existing institutional elements of their organizations. By taking advantage of being a “cultural insider” (Suchman, 1995, p. 587), NIF made Lillehammer 2016 part of the YSP and therefore managed to make the event (and itself) more desirable and appropriate for the public.

The symbolic meaning of Lillehammer 2016 were reinforced by NIF and its stakeholders through the introduction of the term ‘youth campaign’ (ungdomsløftet—meaning *youth lift*). While the bid committee could not articulate the vision behind this term, everyone was convinced that it was a good thing—typical of policy legitimation processes. The fact that NIF did not encounter any opposition to the Lillehammer 2016 bid showed that the term seemed legitimate to the political Norwegian sport system, such as national federations and the government. In order to have gained the support from all stakeholders, the justification that Lillehammer 2016 would produce benefits for all key stakeholders had to be plausible to the government and the public, so a clear institutionalized process of the YSP was identified (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Zucker, 1977)

It is understandable that the YSP was used as a justification for supporting the bid for an event, perfectly adapted as a problem for which Lillehammer 2016 were argued to be a solution. The disconnection of the articulated reasoning for the bid with the actual intended reason could succeed due to the institutionalized rhetoric of the YSP.

Implementation of YSP in connection with Lillehammer 2016 (RQ2)

Through an analysis of the process of the implementation of the YSP through Lillehammer 2016, a series of distinctive characteristics was identified. The policy as it is owned and formulated by NIF was implemented in a top-down direction to its sub-organizations, the DSAs of Inland, which

Discussion

are the surrounding counties of Lillehammer. The main five implementing agents represent NIF (1), the DSAs (2), as well as LYOGOC (2). While these implementing agents work with the operationalization of the goals set for the YSP in connection with Lillehammer 2016, they operate within the institutional environment of their respective organizations, which coincidentally have the fulfilment of the YSP as primary organizational goal. While NIF was interested in showing that youth sport development is taking place as was been promised in their sport political agenda, the LYOGOC representatives were interested in recruiting volunteers for Lillehammer 2016 and creating a legacy by delivering a new generation of volunteers and leaders to NIF, as promised in the bid documents. The DSAs of Inland, which are responsible for competence development and sport organizations around Lillehammer, were most interested in fulfilling the YSP goals because it 'contributed to the competence and skill development' in their area.

This situation, as well as the lack of an implementation strategy from the very beginning of policy formulation (as described in Article 1) created tension between the policymaker within NIF and the implementing agents and challenged successful implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). For the implementing agents, it was clear that their actions were intended to achieve the goals of the YSP. However, the implementing agents lacked an understanding of how this rhetorical construction should be put into practice. In other words, they knew the goal, but not the means. Nevertheless, according to their normative knowledge of the field, the implementing agents identified how the policy could be operationalized. They had first to discuss and define what the YSP actually means, as well as redefine the policy to reflect something that they could do. The normative isomorphic process identified here shows that activities were initiated by the implementing agents working within these organizations. After working in Norwegian sport for many years, they have acquired professional norms, which can spread through their professional network (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The implementing agents were subject to high pressure by the institutional environment, leading to a reproduction of NIF structures caused by isomorphic processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Their normative knowledge in the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) was of help in creating change in the NIF practices and in working towards the YSP goals.

In order to fulfil the YSP goals, the entrepreneurs adapted NIF practices and modified them to best suit their purpose (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004). The perceived success of the implementing agents is based on both complying with, and hence, reproducing the practices of the NIF system

and the inclusion of municipalities and schools maximize the youth development opportunities of Lillehammer 2016. In order to perform, the implementing agents created new projects by translating new elements (Campbell, 2004) of Lillehammer 2016 into already existing NIF structures. The availability of cooperating partners such as LYOGOC was a decisive factor for these organizations to perform the implementation (see also Scharpf, 1978). By building, maintaining, and strengthening policy networks (Marsh & Smith, 2000), the implementing agents created new projects that contributed to the achievement of the policy goals and in that sense they worked as entrepreneurs (Hardy & Maguire, 2008), giving breadth to the policy implementation, as, for example, by implementing self-initiated side activities. The majority of projects were initiated independently of the YSP, but opportunistically connected to Lillehammer 2016 to deliver results for the YSP. In Article 2, the effectiveness of the implementation process was questioned for several reasons. First, NIF focused only on one pillar of the YSP—young leaders. The goals of increasing the involvement of young coaches and young athletes as was formulated in the bid and the YSP were not prioritized by NIF or by LYOGOC. Therefore, at time of publication of Article 2 the main achievement of the YSP implementation through Lillehammer was to train ca. 200 young leaders, a number that is small considering that NIF has 327,000 memberships in the same age group (NIF, 2014). As well, rather than listening to youth and their experiences and demands, the young leaders program focused more on educating youth to fit into the established NIF institution. NIF failed to involve the NFs and the clubs where the actual activity of coaching and sport practice takes place; no strategy had been established to deal with this situation. A top-down approach without meeting bottom-up demands led to ineffectiveness (Lipsky, 1980; Skille, 2008) because organizational conditions on the lower level (Lipsky, 1980) were not included. As well, administrative complexity was found to be hindering and time-consuming, resulting in a slow process of action.

The organizations under which the implementing agents were operating shaped the structural context with a) NIF as national sport governing body, formulating and owning the YSP goals; b) the DSAs of Inland that surround the host city Lillehammer and who were interested in YSP goals to be fulfilled in order to strengthen the sport structures on a regional level; and c) LYOGOC's main goal to implement the games as required under the strict requirement given by the IOC, and additionally to have part of the YSP as their own strategy, however without prioritizing it. These organizations and their structural and inter-relational connection shaped the institutional

environment of the implementing agents (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). At the same time, it was the agents' ability to act under and use this structural context that shaped the organizations (by creating a policy network). The implementing agents reflected on these structures and how they could be used for successful policy outcome (Marsh & Smith, 2000). Normative knowledge and skills within the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) thus were of necessity for the implementing agents and their tactics for using Lillehammer 2016 to fulfil the YSP goals.

While the young leaders program was the only identified concrete implemented action in connection with the YSP and its implementation through Lillehammer 2016, this program was further scrutinized in Article 3. In order to shed light on the success of this policy action, the next part focuses on how the young leaders program was perceived and processed by the policy target group.

Lillehammer 2016 for increased youth engagement?

(RQ 3 and 4)

Comparing what was achieved with what was expected (Hill & Hupe, 2014; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984), a gap in Norwegian youth policy implementation was identified: Adoption and perception of the intended policy and followed actions were not in line at any stage of the policy process. The policy and the potential of Lillehammer 2016 were not in line with the perceptions of implementing agents and the LYOGOC. As well, the implemented actions were not in line with the expectations of the policy target group's expectation. Neither policy formulators, implementing agents, nor LYOGOC understood the policy and its goals well enough to create and agree on a strategy for implementation. In addition, data show that the implementation process was ineffective in getting more young people engaged because the young leaders could not reconcile their own engagement in organized grass root level sport with their volunteer tasks at Lillehammer 2016. The event was not an appropriate vehicle to implement youth sport policy. Staging an Olympic event that is governed and organized by highly institutionalized rules and practices, and expecting a change on the behavior of the mass (the youth) without strategic implementation of policy goals is a goal meant to fail.

For NIF, the young leaders program was an excellent opportunity to reach some of the promised goals of Lillehammer 2016, hence the inclusion of young volunteers in the event and the milestones that were written for national YSP regarding the involvement of young leaders (NIF, 2011). One

can ask if it was more important for NIF to convince and satisfy the public or the Ministry of Culture about YSP. This was also echoed by LYOGOC. NIF's action can be seen, as mentioned earlier, as a strategic positioning or symbolic politics, as part of legitimation process. According to implementation theory (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984), it is always important to know the political and historic situation of the goals to be implemented. However, it is very hard to talk about a success or failure of a project without knowing what to measure the success of the project against (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). In this case, it was not clear for the involved organization how to measure an increased engagement of young people in organized sport. Donaldson and colleagues (2011) claim that “[f]or successful policy implementation, those who will be affected by or required to implement a policy must view it as a meaningful symbolic object. If they attach meaning to a policy it is more likely that they will be receptive to what it requires of them” (p. 757). The authors argue that implementation requires that the actors and organizations involved in the process “attach meaning and importance to the policy” (p. 757) and integrate those various meanings when policy making. However, the view of target group in the present case has been neglected within implementation research and I argue that the relationships between implementing agents is important during the process. Taking in feedback from the target group and making initiatives implementations more flexible with open end actions as suggested by Coalter (2013) would be of value for more appropriate choice and implementation of policy actions.

NIF's YSP goals were complex and not many organizations involved in Lillehammer 2016 were interested in following them up. While the successful planning and execution of the event itself was given priority, the goals that the LYOGOC had were fulfilled. For example, the young leaders program was primarily assigned to fulfilling YSP goals, getting more young people engaged in organized sport, however, in the end, 115 young people were volunteers at the event. In other words, only the goal that was formulated for LYOGOC (young volunteers) was properly pursued by NIF. The LYOGOC staff reported that they felt high pressure from IOC to involve young people in the organization of the event. LYOGOC and NIF prioritized those actions that conformed to the rules and requirements of the most important stakeholder of the YOG, the IOC, in order to receive support and legitimacy (see also Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2008).

The implementing agents brought the organizations they work for in a positive light, managing to connect with many different local actors, such as schools, county counsels, universities, etc. and creating a policy network (Lindsey, 2006; Marsh & Smith, 2000) that influenced the YSP outcomes

and can implement projects at a local level in the future. A heightened sense of community (Chalip, 2006) was thereby reinforced, which opened opportunity to work on and create new ideas, such as follow-up projects on youth sport. However, as many negotiations concerning the YSP between the organizations were built on informal exchanges among individuals, the question is how formal and sustainable these collaborations can be for leaving an actual legacy and do not just disappear after the games. As presented in Article 4, leverage problems such as lack of money, human resources, and strategic plans were identified. While many projects have been created, the network has not reached the depth required to anchor such projects into organizations that have an interest into keeping these projects up and running for a longer period of time after the games.

The young leaders program was realized in connection with creating a new generation of volunteers, a policy outcome leveraged through Lillehammer 2016. However, due to the small number of people who joined it, the sustainability of this outcome remains to be seen. The YSP goals to recruit more young leaders, volunteers, coaches, and participants into organized sport with help of Lillehammer 2016 were not consistent with the implementation of the event itself, and fell short regarding the high hopes. Chalip (2006) emphasizes that public discourse including political issues are substitutions rather than a stimulus for leverage. However, production and constant reproduction of the symbolic meaning of YOG by the bid committee and top managers within NIF, and staff of LYOGOC put several projects into place that might otherwise not have existed. A plan for the young leaders after the event has not been worked out. The YSP goal implementation through the event was not doable for the few implementing agents and the organizations involved. The technical details of implementation proved to be more time-consuming and more difficult than NIF and its partner organizations had assumed. NIF could not use the event to get their YSP objective fulfilled by applying these strategies and tactics. Creating such a huge event and at the same time creating big socially beneficial outcomes at the youth sport level was not realizable. Therefore, the strategies and tactics applied for Lillehammer 2016 did not leverage youth engagement in organized sport.

Understanding YSP and Lillehammer 2016 as legitimation process of NIF

In order to understand how different actors shape and influence Norwegian youth sport policy in connection with Lillehammer 2016 as legitimation process of NIF, one has to look at how and why

these policies evolve and how they develop. As presented in the introduction, the policy process has stages of 1. policy formulation and legitimation, 2. implemented actions, 3. enactment of target group and 4. policy outcome. In public policy, a problem that is to be solved is usually on the agenda, and policies are formulated in order to create a solution to the problem. However, the policy process in connection with Lillehammer 2016 started at a different end. In order to answer the research questions, I discuss this point along three dimensions: the first dimension draws on the YOG as questionable supply for the demand of youth sport reform within NIF. Following this point, possible hidden agendas of the YOG bid and host is under scrutiny before discussing Olympic events and their politics in a more general sense.

“Houston, we have a solution! Can we find a problem?”

As revealed in Article 1, NIF decided to bid for and host Lillehammer 2016, and afterward attached the dropout problem to it. NIF politicians decided on the supply, and argued for the demand afterwards. Instead of finding a solution to the dropout problem, they attached the YSP and its challenges to the dropout as a fitting problem to be solved by Lillehammer 2016—exactly the other way around of what literature shows to be effective policy implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), and what organizational institutionalism predicts (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977): a constant reproduction of values, norms, and structures. This justifies the application of organizational theory driven approaches, as neo-institutional theory when analyzing a policy process.

Normative isomorphic processes within an institutional environment are a typical response to uncertainty of an organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As for NIF and the actors involved in the YSP, from the very beginning of the policy process, there had steadily been a high level of vagueness regarding the implementation of objectives within the YSP process. However, although the YSP objectives and their implementation in connection with Lillehammer 2016 were vague, the event mirrored values of protecting and strengthening youth. This culture is dominant in Norwegian sport and the policy network’s focus of the YSP was concerned with creating something for youth, as the whole event was. Even though specific objectives were absent, the general conviction that Lillehammer 2016 should be about youth was very strong among all key stakeholders. While all organizations and actors seemed to want to do the right thing, no one seemed to be strategically clear what this right thing for youth was. Several organizations were not sure what to do because there was no clear sense of how to do it. This vagueness from the top

spread down to administrative and operational levels, and actually created space for innovation on the street level, which Stenling (2013b) referred to as “space for translation” (p. 506). NIF and the DSAs could have been dynamic and innovative in the policy network they created, however, as exemplified by the young leaders program, the implementing agents chose to be conservative and focus on the reproduction of NIF practices. Concerning the young leaders program, most of the 223 participants are already socialized in NIF sport structures, and so new recruitments were absent. Therefore, in a way, NIF missed its chance to use Lillehammer 2016 as innovation arena for projects against NIF’s challenges connected to dropout.

Hidden agenda?

Either way, NIF and its main stakeholders report the event as successful and as contributing to the YSP after the games as well. This is possible because when goals are vague, results are not questioned. Concerning the bid phase, the policy implementation stage or policy outcome, NIF failed to offer an account of what exactly was and was not achieved. Was there a boost in youth sport after games? How was that measured? Moreover, how could that be explained? How can Lillehammer 2016 be classified as a success considering that it was not clear what the YSP goals for Lillehammer were?

And if the official reasons for hosting the event cannot be explained thoroughly by the bid committee, as shown in Article 1, what *were* the reasons? Rather than youth, the international audience may actually be the main target behind the Norwegian YOG bid, as I argue in Article 1. The bid process is a highly political one, and provides the chance for close cooperation with one of NIF’s most important stakeholders: the IOC. A closer bond between NIF and the IOC through the Lillehammer 2016 bid was an advantage for NIF because at the same time, NIF decided to bid for the 2022 Oslo Winter Olympic Games. Another reason why the Lillehammer 2016 bid should be supported was the ongoing development of the municipality of Lillehammer as a leading winter sport region and the development of competence in organizing major sport events there. The youth aspect was applied to legitimate government finance used to host such an event. Hosting Lillehammer 2016, which would ensure a bright future for youth sport, can contribute to a positive image of NIF, nationally (government) and internationally (IOC).

Lillehammer 2016 were a convenient tool for enhancing legitimacy but not a way to tackle a youth dropout problem. This interpretation can be supported by the neo-institutional explanation that organizations would rather pursue improving legitimacy than performance (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983). This is typically perceived as efficient in the eyes of the organization's stakeholders (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The findings can be interpreted as Suchman's (1995) pragmatic legitimacy of organizations, which is "rested in self-interest calculations of an organization's most immediate audience" (p. 578), while the affected audience of NIF (its member organizations, public, young people in Norway) is met with the organization's willingness to contribute to the audience's wellbeing. The audience's response is commitment to the organization. However, for organizations it is more important and easier to display such responsiveness rather than proving results (Suchman, 1995). The analysis of formulation and argumentation pro Lillehammer 2016 as legitimation process set the scene for actions and use of rhetoric concerning the young leaders program later, which helped to strengthen NIF's legitimated positions in connection with Lillehammer 2016 all the way from the bid, through its implementation and the wrap-up.

Building on an argument by Stenling (2015) that the organizing of sport is always also public sport policy implementation, this research strengthens the connection between the two research fields within sport management. The theoretical concepts of organization studies and sport policy implementation showed to be useful to provide the multilevel analysis of sport policy implementation issues where organizations of different natures are involved. By combining empirical analysis with concepts that shed light on inter- and intra-organizational structure as well as process-based aspects, the sport policy process can be understood as the changing and maintaining of the organization of sport on several administrative levels. My study shows that the combination of a vertical policy process analysis (Lipsky, 1980; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980) combined with the horizontal and structural understanding of actions and non-actions (Campbell, 2004; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Marsh & Smith, 2000) helps an understanding of the organization and legitimization of a sport organization that is politically required to deliver policy outcome. My theoretical framework helps to provide an understanding that sport policy processes are subject to institutions' being willing to change on paper, but not in the direction sought after in public policy processes. In the next and final discussion section, I draw on this argument further relating to politics and Olympic events in general.

Sport policy and politics—all about legitimation processes

This study shows how sport organizations are able to operate as institutions characterized by unrealistic goals and unfulfilled promises. Governing bodies for sport are often financed by public money, hence tax payers, and are responsible for implementing public sport and health policies.

Discussion

However, the actions of sport organizations often do not comply with their goals and the policies given by government. Not meeting policy goals does not often have consequences such as cuts in budget or resources.

For example, concerning Olympic events, information concerning the outcome of policies in connection with events is systematically withheld. Sport organizations under Olympic Committees are unlikely to challenge this, resulting into institutionalized and legitimized taken-for-granted habits.

My dissertation as case study shows this clearly: while NIF operated all the way with unrealistic and unclear policy goals for youth sport, their actions were accepted and unchallenged by sport organizations under NIF's umbrella. After the event, NIF politicians claimed a high success rate for youth sport with neither concrete outcome rates nor a future strategic plan. As well, the Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs functioning as governmental control authority had been positive about the achievements of goals of Lillehammer 2016—even though the policy outcome lacked specificity. However, the outcomes that were reported were associated with governmental targets and indicators for youth sport policy, which are similarly flawed. NIF's neglect to investigate causal links between mechanisms and outcome of a sport program—or in this case sport event—(see also Lindsey & Bacon, 2016) confirms the legitimized role of National Olympic Committees and the power strength an Olympic event has.

Stenling's (2015) call of strengthening a cross-fertilization on sport policy implementation and organizing of sport is suggested to be further followed, as I did in this dissertation. My study provides a theoretically conceptualization of a sport policy process as a whole and shows its relation to legitimation processes within sport organizations. Based on the summary of my findings and the discussions in the articles as well as the main purpose of the study, Figure 2 brings my theoretical and empirical findings together showing a model explaining relationship between policy and legitimation processes.




Figure 2. Relationship between policy process and legitimation processes

The model represents a theorization of the sport policy process as legitimation process. My theoretical argumentation is based on the findings of this dissertation, which are structured using the four policy stages 1. policy formulation and legitimation, 2. implemented actions, 3. enactment of target group and 4. policy outcome.

Policy formulations are created and characterized by *self-imposed norms of institutionalized structures*, values and myths of organizations (DiMaggio, 1983) because organizations (such as NOCs), their policy formulators and implementers are driven by the organization’s interests as well as by *self-interest*.

Figure 2 shows this in the first of stage of policy process, policy formulation and legitimation, shaped by *self-interested calculations* (Suchman, 1995) of organizations, *symbolism of policy* within the institutional environment, and the *rhetoric reproduction* of the policy arguments (Nordhaug, 2010; Strittmatter, 2016) of it in order to legitimate future actions.

Discussion

Between the first and second stage, I found that policies within sport organizations are mostly moving *top-down* (Hupe & Hill, 1994; Skille, 2008; Strittmatter & Skille, 2016), causing *institutional pressure* to which the implementing agents are subject to. This influences the implementation of the policy process and the implemented actions, as shown in the second stage.

Being aware of embeddedness of the policy in its institutional context, implementation actions are grounded into *isomorphic process* (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and the *reproduction of practices* (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2008), which are implemented and translated (Campbell, 2004) to *fit established structures*. This again is representing processes established in order secure legitimacy, as stated within neo-institutional theory. The concept of isomorphism is caused by the fact that organizations adopt and adapt to behavior and structures of actors around them (MacIntosh, Doherty & Walker, 2010). Organizations within highly elaborated institutional environments that are successfully undergoing isomorphic change due to the environment either by coercive, mimetic, or normative forces tend to increase legitimacy as well as critical resources (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

The enactment of the target group as response to the implementing actions depends on the suitability of implemented action to meet the target group's needs. Moreover, bottom-up demands must be fulfilled by implementation actions (Hill & Hupe, 2014; Lipsky, 1980). As well, the vehicle to implement a policy (such as sport events) needs to be chosen carefully and needs to be controlled by implementing actors. Otherwise, a conflict of interest might appear between the ones that control policy and those that control the vehicle. The degree of awareness of what the target group desires and expects is decisive within the policy process, along with the degree of attachment of meaning of policy, goals, and actions. If the target group makes meaning of the policy goals and implemented actions, then they are more likely to be receptive to the implemented actions (Donaldson, Leggett & Finch, 2011) and might adapt to them. That is, if the target group perceives policy goals and implemented actions as legitimate, then it is more likely that they adopt behaviors in line with intended policy outcome. The higher policy formulators and implementing agents control of the vehicle, the higher the awareness of the target group's desires and expectations, and the more likely that the intended policy outcome will be fulfilled.

However, independent of how the policy outcome looks in practice, the fourth stage of policy outcome is characterized by *self-justification* of the implemented actions, which results in increased legitimacy of the organization itself. The need to justify policy is found in all stages of policy

process due to *institutional contamination of rhetoric expressions of policy* (Nordhaug, 2010). For the organization and its actions to be seen as legitimate, even though the policy outcome is negative or not at all aligned with the goals, organizations have to decouple in order to secure legitimacy. Claims of policy as being a success is *decoupled* from actual policy outcome (Bromley & Powell, 2012; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) for legitimacy purpose and self-justification of an organization's actions. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested, organizations decouple by adopting structures for legitimacy purpose without implementing them due to perceived conflicts in their efficiency.

More recently, researchers have found that organizations can reverse decoupling processes, so-called recoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Since policy outcome and evaluation can also be the start of a new policy process, recoupling processes might be starting points for policy formulation and legitimation of new rounds of policy process in the same context. Blocking the pressure of myths created and persisting in the institutional contamination of rhetorical expression may result in legitimation of new or following policy formulation.

The model represents proposition deriving from the analysis and discussion of my data. As well, the theoretical argument is supported by the literature. However, the arrows and interconnection of the concepts that influence the policy process became propositions, which overall, in terms of the actions and the actors, can be elaborated; for example, what kind of isomorphic pressure (normative, mimetic, or coercive) has the strongest influence on the implemented actions? Another proposition from this model is that when control of the vehicle to implement policy is low, and rhetoric is superficial (such as in leveraging policies and Olympic events), decoupling and self-justification is stronger. These propositions need further elaboration and are to be tested quantitatively and applied in other contexts within (sport) policy and management studies.

7. Concluding remarks

The purpose of this dissertation was to shed light on the legitimation process within Norwegian organized sport by systematically analyzing the Norwegian youth sport policy process, its formulation, implementation, and its outcome in connection with Lillehammer 2016. The longitudinal research design of this qualitative case study offered a better understanding of the processing of the policy over time in connection with the event.

In the policy formulation and legitimation stage, the language used for the Lillehammer bid in documents, meetings, and by the bid committee was based on taken-for-granted understandings of youth sport policy, and it was worked out purposefully to provide assurance of the alleged necessity of Lillehammer 2016 as a solution to the existing—and long-lasting—challenges of Norwegian youth sport. NIF decided to bid for and host Lillehammer 2016, and afterward attached the dropout problem to it. Instead of finding a solution to the dropout problem, they attached the YSP and its challenges to the dropout as a fitting problem to be solved by Lillehammer 2016—exactly the other way around of what literature shows to be effective policy implementation. The policy implementation was characterized by conflicts of interests among the implementing organizations, institutional pressure from NIF on the implementing agents as well as a lack of implementation strategy, which created tension between the policymaker within NIF, the implementing agents as well as the policy target group, all of which challenged successful implementation. NIF can document that they created projects involving young people, however, none of the projects were created by strategically using Lillehammer 2016 to develop youth sport; they are more a series of projects initiated by the few implementing agents. NIF will get the credit for this even though only the young leaders part of the goals of the youth sport policy were followed up. For NIF, the initiated young leaders program was an excellent opportunity to reach some of the promised goals of Lillehammer 2016, e. g. including young volunteers in the event and at the same time reaching the milestones that were written for national youth sport policy regarding the involvement of young leaders.

The key conclusion emanating from this dissertation is that legitimation process of NIF could be found on all stages of the policy process, from formulation and legitimation via implementation and the outcome. A gap of policy implementing from the exaggerated formulated YSP and their potential impact on youth were shed light on. The analysis of findings in my four articles, which

cover the policy process, are informing about a theoretically conceptualization of a sport policy process as legitimation process. In this aspect, this study emphasized the organizational aspects that are important in sport policy research: The non-harmonization of the policy goals among the implementing organizations was a big hindrance for successful policy implementation. This refers especially to NIF as implementer of governmental YSP, but also to LYOGOC, the implementer of event and manager of event legacy, responding to high expectations in the organizational field of sport. The gap of administrative layers within sport organizations, such as NIF as umbrella, and the sport clubs and teams where actual impact would matter is big and should be minored by correct flow and situating of resources and right communication that are in favor for the development of youth sport.

Implications for practice and future research

In this dissertation, I provided a theoretically conceptualization of a sport policy process as legitimation process as a whole. But it also gives account to strategic leveraging of a sport event as well as the opportunities and challenges of inter-organizational communication, networking, and strategic partnerships relevant for any sport manager. However, most studies on policy process are focusing on policy formulating (ex ante) and the outcome (ex post). Therefore, I suggest more studies to focus on the whole policy process in the world of sports in order to theorize legitimation process of sport organizations and the role of sport events in these sport policy processes. A main finding is that a sport event often comes convenient for legitimation needs of sport politicians, while actually not fitting in to the policy already ongoing. This might help reveal and understand hidden agendas, corruption mechanisms, and or inefficient policy and project implementation within sport institutions.

Limitations of the study are the neglect of economic aspects. The flow of financial income and expenses concerning implemented actions and resources connected to such programs provide more insights on intra- and inter-organizational cooperation and potential creditors involved in projects connected to youth sport events. As well, this present case is limited to NIF's YSP objectives, and focuses on the outcomes of young people and organized sport. I did not look into other social aspects in the life of young people, which would be beneficial to research about how youth elite sport events might have value for young people in non-sportive aspects. Future research about costs and benefits from a socio-economical perspective would be helpful to shed light on what kind of

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leveraging strategies could strengthen (youth) sport engagement in Olympic host countries. In regard of bid processes of major sport events where a lot of public money is to be used, governmental authorities should set high demands on clear and measurable policy goals and implementation strategies. A control system is suggested to be established controlling progresses of such implementation processes through events or other governmentally financed sport projects.

Sport events should be more recognized and critically discussed in public for their nature of a short-term festival, bringing joy and activity to the host region, rather than articulated as long-term impact on sport activity. As my research shows, short-term impacts may not lead to sustained success in the longer term. Successful future (youth) sport policies, policymakers, and stakeholders need to consider implementation, evaluation, and funding from the beginning stages of policy development in order to achieve the desired outcome. One problem is that the relationship between policy formation and policy implementation is assumed rather than problematized, and the same is true for ambiguity and conflicts in the policy process. Policy formulators, implementing agents, and organizing committee must understand the policy and its goals, and agree on a strategy for implementation. Youth engagement in organized sport calls for inter-organizational communication and strategic management in terms of goals, appropriate vehicles, as well as intense involvement at the club level. My findings concerning the perceptions of young leaders program show that such a program can have an impact on youth engagement if facilitators provide young people with a local platform such as clubs and teams.

Processing policy is complex and interactive, not only in terms of the relationship between implementing agents and organizations, but, and especially, in the relationship between formulators, implementing agents, policy, and the target group. In order to offer a more holistic understanding on which policy outcomes have been achieved, or not achieved and why, I suggest further studies on how policy targets group experience and can contribute to the outcome of a given policy. Furthermore, I encourage researchers to focus on how policy makers can consider perception of the target groups while or before formulating policies in order to comprise the gap between the different levels of policy implementation. In regard of event management, the purpose of youth elite sport event as a leveraging platform for sport political goals concerning both mass sport and elite sport development needs further consideration because competition focused international youth events are growing in numbers and with unclear value for local mass youth sport.

8. References

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9. Articles

Article 1

Strittmatter, A.-M. (2016). Defining a problem to fit the solution: A neo-institutional explanation for legitimizing the bid for the 2016 Lillehammer winter Youth Olympic Games. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 8(3), 421-437.

Article 2

Strittmatter, A.-M. & Skille, E. Å. (2016). Boosting youth sport? Implementation of Norwegian youth sport policy through the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games. *Sport in Society*, 1–17. doi:10.1080/17430437.2015.1124568

Article 3

Strittmatter, A.-M., Hanstad, D. V. & Skirstad, B. (Submitted). Mismatch of expectations between target group and implementing agents in youth sport policy. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*.

Article 4

Strittmatter, A.-M. (Under review). Increasing youth sport engagement through the Youth Olympic Games: Leveraging strategies and tactics. *International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing*.

Article 1

Strittmatter, A.-M. (2016). Defining a problem to fit the solution: A neo-institutional explanation for legitimizing the bid for the 2016 Lillehammer winter Youth Olympic Games. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 8(3), 421–437.



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Defining a problem to fit the solution: A neo-institutional explanation for legitimising the bid for the 2016 Lillehammer winter Youth Olympic Games

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses the successful bid for the 2016 Lillehammer winter Youth Olympic Games (YOG) and its incorporation within the broader youth sport strategy within organised sport in Norway. Although it is widely accepted that the argument that major sports events are a solution to problems of low levels of involvement in sport is not generally supported by evidence Norwegian sport organisations used this argument as a primary justification for hosting the YOG. The aim of the research is to investigate: a) why NIF used this argument even though there was so little evidence to support its validity; and b) how and why this seemingly contradictory argument was successfully 'sold' to the public. The research was guided by the methodological approach of discourse analysis and the theoretical framework of the neo-institutionalist concept of legitimacy. Based on this analysis I show how the institutionalised rhetoric of the Norwegian youth sport policy (YSP) adopted by the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) became the main argument for the YOG bid. Further findings show that rather than responding to the youth sport participation problem, NIF used the development of youth sport as a convenient rationale to bid for the YOG in order to secure legitimacy from two of its main stakeholders – the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Norwegian government. Rather than hosting the YOG as solution to a youth sport participation problem, NIF used the institutionalised rhetoric of the YSP, defining a problem to fit the solution.

KEYWORDS

Youth sport policy;
organisational legitimacy;
Youth Olympic Games;
institutionalisation process;
sport policy discourse

Introduction

Using the development of mass sport and youth sport as a justification for an Olympic Games bid is a popular strategy of Olympic host cities and nations, and is one that has generated increasing interest among sport policy researchers (Coalter 2004, Gratton and Preuss 2008, Girginov and Hills 2009, Veal and Frawley 2009, Hanstad and Skille 2010, Bullough 2011, Veal *et al.* 2012, Weed *et al.* 2012). One explicit goal for hosting Olympic events is the desire for sustainable sports development (Girginov and Hills 2009, Bullough 2011). However, while large scale sporting events are popular vehicles to implement political, cultural and social benefits (Parent 2008), the direct effect on the level of sports participation of the population remains to be proven (Hanstad and Skille 2010, Taks *et al.* 2014).

There is an apparent contradiction in seeking to promote grassroots participation by hosting elite-level international sporting events. The practice is predicated on the widely belief that success in elite sport inspires individuals to become sports participants at grassroots level (Veal *et al.* 2012, p. 158).

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From previous research it is clear that Olympic events do not increase mass participation. We know that this so-called 'demonstration effect' (Weed *et al.* 2012) does not occur. Nevertheless, sport politicians and sport managers continue to use it as justification for hosting Olympic events.

The aim of this article is to investigate the disconnect between the argument and the lack of evidence, using the successful bid for the 2016 Lillehammer winter Youth Olympic Games (YOG) as a case. The main argument in the bid for the YOG used by the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sport (NIF) was the alleged positive demonstration effect, the promise that the event would increase the active involvement of youth in Norwegian organised sports in terms of participation, young leadership, and young coaches (Lillehammer2016 2010), and play an important role in NIF's youth sport policy (YSP). This argument contrasts with previous research, which showed that hosting an elite sport event does not generate mass sport involvement (Hanstad and Skille 2010, Weed *et al.* 2012, Taks *et al.* 2014). I investigate a) why NIF used this argument even though it lacked evidence, and b) how and why this seemingly contradictory argumentation as sold to the public was successful. This article contributes to existing literature in several ways. By analysing the discourse for the YOG bid I show that generation and reproduction as well as acceptance of the sport policy can be examined through the discourse analysis of the institutionalisation process of a given policy. Furthermore, my discussion provides an explanation of how sport policy-makers rhetorically reproduce the rationalisation for the YOG bid despite the lack of supporting evidence, thereby providing an explanation of the disconnect mentioned above.

The first section of the article provides a brief summary of the background of the emergence to the Norwegian YSP. This is followed by an explanation of sport policy as discourse in section two. Subsequently, I explain the theoretical premises of the applied neo-institutional framework followed by an explanation of the research approach and methods adopted for the study. I then present and discuss my findings and in the final section, I provide a brief conclusion and suggest topics for future research on YSP discourses.

The emergence of Norwegian youth sport development as a policy theme and the contradictory argumentation for the YOG bid

Sport is one of the most popular leisure-time activities among children and adolescents (Skille 2007, Woods 2011). Acknowledging the important role of sport in the lives of young persons, scholars have widely discussed the *who, what, where, how* and *why* of youth sport participation. In the last two decades, the increasing drop-out of young people from organised sports has gained much attention of sport social scientists (Brettschneider and Naul 2004, Seippel 2005, Houlihan 2011, Seippel *et al.* 2011, Woods 2011). This ongoing drop-out process has resulted in a shift in the strategies of government policies regarding youth sports, and increased national and international sport organisations' focus on young people (Ogle 1997). NIF defines youth as individuals between 13 and 19 years of age (NIF 2011). Seippel (2005) studied physical activity based on membership in NIF among adolescents and examined the reasons for dropping out versus staying within organised sports. He found that most adolescents drop out in the age range 16–19. The drop-out rate among girls is higher than among boys (Seippel 2005, Enoksen 2011). The reasons for dropping out are complex and many and include the time commitment, increased pressure on performance, compatibility of sports and work, family, school and other interests (De Knop *et al.* 1996, Seippel 2005, Ommundsen 2011) as well as the loss of pleasure (Sisjord 1994, 1995, Enoksen 2011). Comparing the participation rates in 1992, 2002 and 2010, Seippel *et al.* (2011) found that athletes are dropping out at an earlier age today than they did over 20 years ago. Currently, more young people join sports teams at a younger age, which partly explains why they also drop out of organised sports earlier (Seippel *et al.* 2011). A steady increase in the membership of very young children aged five or under has been documented in the past decade (NIF 2000, 2004, 2014). In 2013, almost 81,500 children aged five and younger were registered as members of sports clubs

compared to 62,500 memberships in 2003, an increase of 23% within the 10-year period (NIF 2004, 2014). This growth can be partly explained by the increased birth rate in Norway in recent years.

Parallel to the increased drop-out from traditional (organised and competitive) sports, unorganised or self-organised training as well as membership at fitness centres has increased since the mid-1980s (De Knop *et al.* 1996, Seippel *et al.* 2011, Breivik and Rafoss 2012). Even though sport participation is generally stable, participation in organised sports, hence membership-based sports under the umbrella of NIF, is declining. The drop-out from organised sport is an important issue for NIF – the largest voluntary organisation (Skille and Säfvenbom 2011, Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2012) and also the largest youth organisation within Norway based on membership (Sisjord and Græsdal 2003, Skille 2011). Sport is also the main leisure-time activity of Norwegian youth (Seippel 2005). Several pilot projects have been conducted in order to encourage youth to become involved in NIF (Sisjord and Græsdal 2003, Skille 2005). Despite efforts of NIF in the last two decades to encourage youth to stay in sports clubs, the drop-out rate from organised sport has not decreased (Skille and Säfvenbom 2011). Acknowledging the drop-out of youth as a threat to the survival of conventional sports described above, NIF had already introduced the development of youth sport as a major consideration in their policy in the early 1990s (NIF 1992). In the annual report of 1991, NIF emphasised the need for participation of youth in organised sports as coaches, leaders, and athletes (NIF 1992), an aim which remained central to NIF strategy throughout the 1990s (NIF 1994, 1995). More specifically, the strategic objectives were focused on: increasing the participation of youth in decision-making processes; strengthening the involvement of young leaders and coaches in all levels of sport; increasing involvement in physical activity at different performance levels; the prevention/reduction of drop-out; and helping athletes combine sport with education, work, friends, etc. (NIF 1992). Over time, the YSP became a permanent strategy of NIF (2007) as well of the government as expressed in the most recent White Paper on Sport (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2012). The third White Paper on Sport was published in 2012 (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 1992, 1999, 2012). Even though NIF is not a state institution, it has responsibility for implementing state policy as defined in the White Paper. NIF's legitimacy depends on its capacity to fulfil the overall aim of state sport policy. However, government YSP is defined similarly to that of NIF. Besides financial support, the Norwegian government supports NIF symbolically.

Since 2011, the YSP strategy of NIF has been called the 'youth campaign' (Skille and Houlihan 2014) and is designed to involve more young persons in organised sports at competition level as athletes and coaches, and at the organisational level as leaders (NIF 2011). The Bid Committee for YOG 2016 based its bid on NIF's 'youth campaign' with the goal of communicating the importance of organised sports to youth through this event (Lillehammer2016 2010). However, there is a significant weakness concerning NIF's bid strategy for the YOG which is the assumption that young people's sport participation will increase as a result of hosting the event. Moreover, the fact that an elite sport event is to be implemented for young athletes raises critical ethical concerns such as the athletes' early specialisation, which may lead to overtraining and overambitious coaching and which may lead in turn to burnout and drop-out (Digel 2008, Judge *et al.* 2009, Parry 2012). Even though the YOG are not officially focused on high-performance sports competition, scholars note that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and National Olympic Committees as well as sport federations, coaches and athletes themselves, strongly contribute to the maintenance of an emphasis on winning (Judge *et al.* 2009, Krieger 2013, Kristiansen 2015). This emphasis makes the YOG an elite sporting event, embodying the sporting excellence of the Olympic Games, which may, according to Ledochowski *et al.* (2012), lead to competitive anxiety among the athletes. Given the fact that performance pressure is one of the main reasons for dropping out of organised sports (Seippel 2005), the bid for the YOG, an event addressed to young (elite) athletes, can be seen as contradictory to NIF's goal of increasing youth participation. NIF is accused of not having succeeded in achieving its young leadership objectives in the past and that the approach toward the recruitment of young people into organisational work has to be improved (Field

notes, NIF leader meeting, Tromsø 2010). Since NIF has been criticised of having failed as a youth sport organisation (Skille 2008), the drop-out problem cannot be neglected by NIF (Skille and Säfvenbom 2011).

Following an outline of the conceptualisation of sport policy as discourse, the theoretical framework of neo-institutionalism and the research methods are discussed. In exploring sport policy as discourse I discuss the YSP discourse that NIF articulated as action against the drop-out as main justification for bidding for the YOG. I will also discuss how this contradictory argument was sustained and accepted.

Sport policy as discourse

Researchers in policy and politics look for an explanation of the role of ideas in order to understand the processes of policy-making (Finlayson 2004). Policies are driven by ideas about policy goals and solutions to problems. It is important to analyse these policy ideas 'because they not only *reflect* public values and the demands of interest groups, they *shape* public expectations as well' (Sam 2003, p. 190). Policy-making has been found to not always comply with rational choices but rather to be subject to rhetorical language, argumentation and symbols, as well as strategy (Chalip 1995, Sam 2003). Chalip (1995, p. 4) claimed sport policy to be 'infused with unexamined assumptions', which are often used as rhetorical strategies that are meant to persuade and convince when required. Rhetoric is an indispensable resource for bid committees as well as policy-makers as well bid committees seek to present strong arguments in order to convince the stakeholders that they represent the most appropriate future host of sports events. Rhetoric is defined as an art of discourse and as the effective use of language to persuade and to influence (Kristiansen 2010, Coaffee 2012). Discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but also of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning (Fairclough 1992, p. 64). Discourse analysis builds on written and spoken language structured in patterns (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999) and can be employed as a tool where argumentation is necessary, for example to influence the environment within which a decision will be made (Sam 2003, Kristiansen 2010). Discourse analysis has been used widely as a methodological tool to understand processes of sport policy-making (Finlayson 2004, Green 2004, Green and Houlihan 2005, Hayhurst 2009, Piggan *et al.* 2009, Piggan 2010, Agergaard 2011, Berg and Chalip 2012, Jedlicka 2012, Straume and Hasselgård 2013, Hasselgård and Straume 2015).

Examining rhetoric through discourse analysis, I aim to explain how the formulation of the Norwegian YSP has been used by the Bid Committee as the main argument for the YOG 2016 bid. New institutional theory helps not only to explain *what* rhetoric is used but *how* the processes of adopting a certain rhetorical style are generated (Nordhaug 2010). This approach helps me analyse how and why the rhetoric of NIF's YSP arguments helped the YOG bid to succeed. In that respect, the discussion is based on the neo-institutional premises of *organizational legitimacy* derived from the process of institutionalisation (Zucker 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Tolbert and Zucker 1996).

Theoretical framework: neo-institutional concept of legitimacy

Using the concept of legitimacy helps us to understand the generation of NIF's YSP and its reproduction as the main argument for the YOG bid. Neo-institutional theorists found that organisations are constantly striving for legitimacy, to be understood as 'the degree of cultural support for an organisation – the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives' (Meyer and Scott 1983, p. 201).

The successful acquisition by National Olympic committees (NOCs) of legitimacy from the government is crucial since their survival depends on governmental and public support. Legitimacy in the eyes of the IOC is also crucial since their approval is necessary for the existence of NOCs. Therefore, organisations (such as NOCs) and their policy-makers are driven by their interests (i.e. their strategic objectives), which are socially or institutionally defined from an institutional perspective (Hinings and Greenwood 1988) as well as by self-interest (i.e. organisational survival/expansion), but also by a concern to be socially accepted by the public.

Collective social acceptance is one characteristic of institutionalised processes, actions and behaviour. This acceptance goes hand-in-hand with legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Suchmann 1995). This means that practices are reproduced and present in everyday actions, language, and thinking (for example, through policies), which reinforce the diffusion of acceptance in an organisational field (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). In this regard, institutionalisation can be seen as socially constructed legitimacy (Washington and Patterson 2011). In other words, one possible outcome of institutionalisation is legitimacy (Jepperson 1991). Language, values, norms, and concepts are foci of neo-institutional analysis. Since neo-institutional theory sheds light on the way organisations act due to institutional processes (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Zucker 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983) it serves as the analytical framework for this article.

Institutionalisation of structures, practices, beliefs, values and language is an ongoing process (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Processes, practices and obligations are institutionalised when they 'take on a rule-like status in social thought and action' (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p. 341). As will be shown, the YSP became a 'taken-for-granted' rule by undergoing a process of institutionalisation. In order for a rule to be institutionalised, it has to gain widespread acceptance among the stakeholders outside the focal organisation (Tolbert and Zucker 1996) an example of which would be NIF seeking acceptance of the YSP from the government and IOC. The adoption of legitimate structures from external areas can increase the commitment of internal participants (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The rhetoric of an organisation's discourse can therefore have a contagious effect on the organisation's environment.

One core assumption of institutional theory is that organisational structures are created and developed by institutionalised myths (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Supporting these myths is crucial for organisations in order to attain legitimacy and ensure their survival (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). If the actors within and stakeholders outside the organisation are supportive and adopt the organisation's arguments in the wider structure, survival can be secured in the long run (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Consequently, social values as well as the common understandings of appropriate and meaningful behaviour affect organisations (Zucker 1983). These premises are the key basis for my analysis of why NIF used the contradictory argumentation of generating mass sport participation among youth and how NIF's rationalisation led to the commitment of external stakeholders to support the bid for the YOG which then succeeded.

Research approach and methods

I examine the discourse of the YSP and its rhetoric as applied to the YOG bid. In doing so, I analyse the contradictory rationalisation of the YOG bid in order to shed light on the disconnection between the intended rationale for the Olympic Games bid and the articulated rationale. I understand discourse as a certain way of explaining the social world (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). The core of discourse is text, including written or spoken words, produced in a discursive happening (Fairclough 1992), as in this case, the formulation and presentation of the Norwegian YSP and the production of the YOG bidding documents, as well as the explanation of the reasons for the YOG bid. As mentioned above, discourse is produced by written and spoken statements – therefore

qualitative data for this study are based on archival material (main source), interviews, and observations.

Documents

My starting point was the consultation of policy documents concerning the YOG bid and the Norwegian YSP, such as the candidature files and strategic documents of the Bid Committee ($n = 3$) and documents produced by the Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games Organising Committee, which included a brief description about the goals and the strategic focus on youth. Other key documents were those from NIF including the annual reports from 1991 to 2013 ($n = 23$), the sport policy documents that are adopted every fourth year at the NIF general assembly ($n = 3$), reports of board meetings, committees, and general assemblies ($n = 13$), letters and documents produced by NIF delegates sent to the Norwegian government and the IOC ($n = 8$), as well as reports of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs such as the White Paper on Sport and the state guarantee of the Norwegian parliament for the YOG ($n = 8$). In addition evaluation reports of the IOC Evaluation Commission concerning the YOG ($n = 2$) were examined. The collection procedure was based on two-tactic-sampling as suggested by Yin (2011) which involved: first, a careful definition of the sample needed – as in this case, all documents produced by NIF, the Bid Committee, the IOC, the Norwegian government; and second, a constant review of the resulting data to determine if the material is likely to fit the study. When collecting data from documents, I considered: how they were embedded in the context in which they were produced; the circumstances under which they were produced; the purpose for which they were produced; the vocabulary used; and the underlying rhetoric. In total, 58 documents were analysed.

Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with central actors in the bidding process for the YOG and/or the YSP in NIF as a means of complementing and checking the information obtained from the documents. The interviewees were between 38 and 75 years old (mean 54 years).

The interviewees were chosen because they were the managerial elite of the Bid Committee and therefore controlled and adapted the institutional values of the organisation they represent (Hinings *et al.* 1996). The Bid Committee consisted of representatives of NIF and the Municipality of Lillehammer, and engaged one IOC representative as consultant. It is their beliefs and values that matter when representing the organisation. Therefore, the sample consisted of the NIF president during the bid period, the NIF Secretary General, the advisor of the NIF Secretary General who functioned as administrative director of the Bid Committee, the NIF Financial Director as well as the NIF Legal Director. Furthermore, the former mayor of Lillehammer and the Director of the Olympic Venue in Lillehammer as well as one Norwegian IOC member were interviewed. In order to assure anonymity of the participants, their specific position is not included – only their affiliation with the respective

Table 1. Overview of interviewees.

No.	Role/position within bid committee
1.	Employee NIF
2.	Employee NIF
3.	Employee NIF
4.	Employee Lillehammer
5.	Employee NIF
6.	Politician NIF
7.	Member IOC
8.	Politician Lillehammer

entity (see Table 1). Even though NIF and its YSP concerning the YOG bid is the main focus of the analysis, the interviewed representatives of Lillehammer are important key persons in the production of the YOG bid documents. Complementing the discourse analysis of the documents, through interviews I researched the premises or rules that guided the interviewees to talk about the reasoning behind the YOG bid. The interviews were retrospective to the bid process 6 years later and took place at the interviewees' offices, in quiet meeting rooms at their work-place, or at their home addresses. The interview guide first listed open questions, such as: 'Could you tell me how the bid for the YOG came about? What was your role in the bid process? What were the reasons to bid for the YOG? How do you think the YOG will contribute to the development of youth sport in Norway?' Secondly, follow-up questions were based on themes prominent to the institutional concepts of legitimacy and institutionalisation. In order to track the institutionalisation process questions like 'On what knowledge and/or facts did you base your reasons for the bid?' were asked. Questions aimed at finding out more about the success of the bid, and thus securing the survival of the bid committee (see also Meyer and Rowan 1977), included: 'Who were the most important stakeholders for the bid committee? Why were they so important? Were they supportive? If so, in what way? How did these stakeholder perceive the argumentation in favour of the YOG in the bidding process?'. One limitation of the data collection is that the interviews were conducted retrospectively after 6 years, so people now and then adapt their answers to how they would like the situation to have been. The interviews lasted between 39 and 70 minutes. When referring to the statements of the interviewees later in this article, their positions, and number as listed in Table 1 is given: for example, Employee NIF, I[Interviewee]5.

Observations

Observations were carried out during several NIF meetings including board meetings and general assemblies that took place within the bidding phase between 2008 and 2011. These meetings provided insight into the ongoing discussions about the pros and cons of a YOG bid. Field notes relating to the ideas and strategies for the YOG bid were produced. Further field notes were generated by observing speeches and presentations by the NIF president, the NIF Secretary General as well as the NIF Director for Youth Sport. These notes were made after the bid phase from December 2011 until March 2015 at a range of events including a conference about children and youth sport at the Norwegian sports gala 2015, a conference on major sports events in Lillehammer in January 2014, an international seminar on *social responsibility, development and peace through sport* in Oslo in December 2013, as well as at meetings initiated by the Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games Organising Committee (from October 2013 until March 2015). Furthermore, a presentation given by the NIF president about the Norwegian YSP, the YOG and the youth campaign as part of a study programme at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences was observed. These events were characterised by a one-way communication where the NIF representatives presented the idea of the YOG and their objective for youth sports to the public. Observing these speeches and presentations enabled me to gather data about the rhetoric used by NIF policy-makers.

Data analysis

The analysis began with organising and coding the data from the documents, and transcribing interviews and field notes using the software MaxQda (version 11). Systematising the data through protocols enabled me to keep track of the collected data.

The analysis was based on discourse analysis protocols. Discourse analysis builds on written and spoken language structured in patterns (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). In order for the patterns found in the discourse analysis to make sense, they have to be put into

context which I did by using the concepts of legitimacy in regard to institutionalisation processes. This approach helps facilitate the content analysis and clarify the identification of issues concerning the YOG bid and to uncover the dominant discourse for the YOG bid. In my analysis, I followed the suggested discourse analysis methods of Scheurich (1997) to look for issues that provided an insight into the explicit and implicit reasons that were given to justify the bid for the YOG. Furthermore, I looked for problems NIF tried to solve with the YOG, the policy they applied, and how that policy was intended to be operationalised. Additionally, in the analysis of the interviews my focus was on unravelling the emphasised elements of the discourse and how evidence was used in the argumentation. Furthermore, I examined the institutional and socio-political contexts in which the written and spoken texts were produced by the persons and organisations involved in the formulation of the YSP and the YOG bidding documents. In addition, the use of rhetoric containing ideological statements was analysed. All data were treated equally in the analysis, which enabled me to identify rhetoric patterns. After I followed the above mentioned discourse analytical steps I was able to interpret the data by creating a holistic view of the fragmented discursive texts retrieved from documents, interviews and observation. In the following section I present the rhetoric patterns of documents, interviews and field notes from observation found in the argumentation for the YOG bid. In light of institutional theory, I discuss the justification of the YOG bid as an institutionalised process and a striving for legitimacy by NIF.

Bid process of the 2016 Lillehammer winter Youth Olympic Games

The concept of the YOG, which was introduced in 2007, is the result of the IOC strategy to focus more on youth. Since there was not too much time for planning the first summer YOG that took place in 2010 and the first winter YOG organised in 2012, the IOC contacted 'some countries that have a winter culture and that could be relevant for hosting the Olympic Games of a modern era, and which have the sport facilities to pull it through' (Employee NIF, Interviewee [I] 5). It was in the beginning of 2008 when NIF was first approached by IOC president Jacques Rogge asking Norway to bid for the first winter YOG (Employee NIF, I5, Politician NIF, I6). The Norwegian bid for the YOG 2012 had failed since the final state guarantee had not been secured in time in 2008. The reason for not getting the state guarantee in place was caused by the time-consuming administration process within the Norwegian government, preventing final approval before the IOC's deadline. Innsbruck hosted the first winter YOG instead. During 2009 and 2010, NIF had again been approached on a number of occasions by Rogge requesting them to bid for the second winter YOG 2016 (Employee NIF, I5). This was positively received by NIF as well as by the Lillehammer Municipality. The Bid Committee was successful in its second attempt to host the second winter YOG. While there were four cities bidding for the YOG 2012 (Innsbruck, Harbin, Kuopi and Lillehammer), Lillehammer was the only candidate applying to host the YOG in 2016.

The YOG was Jacques Rogge's baby. Jacques Rogge knew he could count on Norway because of our culture, experiences from the Olympic Games in Lillehammer and he relied on Norway as a winter sports nation and he supported Norway. In order to realise his big goal with the Youth Olympics, he needed a safe and good organiser (Employee NIF, I5).

The fact that IOC asked NIF to bid for the YOG reflected the high expectations that the IOC had of NIF. Since the IOC is an important stakeholder for NIF, IOC's legitimacy is crucial for NIF (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The bid for the YOG requires several guarantees from third parties, the objective being to protect the Youth Olympic Games Organising Committee (YOGOC) and the IOC against any financial shortfall and to give the YOGOC the best opportunity to organise the event (IOC 2010). The costs of the YOG are shared by the public authorities of the host city and the IOC. Despite the IOC's support, the Bid Committee had to convince the authorities of the benefits to be derived from public investment in the YOG. It was therefore up to the Bid Committee to find a

persuasive argument. 'The fact that youth sport was becoming increasingly important in Norway was a big advantage for the YOG bid' (Employee NIF, 11). The emergence of the YSP as presented above became the main argument in the pro-YOG reasoning.

The institutionalised rhetoric of the YSP and the YOG bid discourse

When researching the reasons for hosting the YOG, I looked into the argument presented in the documents and also asked all interviewees about the intention of bidding for the YOG. My results show similar use of rhetoric within the documents, interviews, as well as in field notes (see tables below). With the use of tables, I visualised the rhetoric patterns in the documents, interviews and field notes from observations which were used to support the argumentation for the YOG bid. In light of institutional theory, I discuss, in the following section, the justification of the YOG bid as an institutionalised process and a striving for legitimacy by NIF in the eyes of the public and the IOC.

The YOG: an 'opportunity', 'driving force' and 'milestone'

The YOG are meant to strengthen and supplement the holistic field of YSP development. Hence, they should contribute to ensuring the future volunteer culture as well as coaching and leadership development, especially among youth (see Table 2). The YOG were attributed metaphoric and symbolic meaning, which is the rhetorical use of a different object (than the YOG) representing the YOG.

The data shown in Table 2 revealed that the YOG is seen as an 'opportunity,' a 'driving force,' as well as a 'milestone within a 10-year-program'. The discursive style from the documents adopted by the Bid Committee can be seen (in Table 2). By bidding for the YOG, NIF claimed to bring their articulated goals into action and realise NIF's goals from as far back as the 1990s. The wording used in documents, interviews and elsewhere, aimed at establishing cultural support of the public by providing an explanation for the necessity of the YOG, and hence the legitimacy of the bid (Scott and Meyer 1991) and its social acceptance (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Hinings and Greenwood 1988). The results show that the rhetoric for the YOG bid has steadily been reproduced and is present in everyday language and thinking (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). The rhetorical use of the 'youth campaign' as part of the YSP strengthens my claim of the rhetorical reproduction as will be explained in the following section.

Table 2. Symbolic and metaphoric rhetoric of the YOG.

Documents	Interviews	Observations
The YOG are an «opportunity to develop Norwegian youth sport» (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2011, p. 3).	<i>'We saw the opportunity to develop Norwegian youth sport'</i> (Politician NIF, 16).	An event like this could give important stimuli,
The youth campaign is a ten years vision which shall strengthen the role of young people in all areas of Norwegian sport and in which the 2016 Lillehammer YOG will be an important milestone (NIF 2013, p. 51).	<i>'It (The YOG) will be a milestone, a source of inspiration, something that can be kind of a driving force for everything that we wish to develop within Norwegian youth sport. It was the main argument all the way long.'</i> (Employee NIF, 11).	inspiration and opportunities to develop youth sport (Field notes, NIF leader meeting, Tromsø 2010).
The YOG in Lillehammer mark the most important milestone for NIF's work regarding the 'youth campaign' in Norwegian sports (Tvedt 2013, p. 112).	<i>'We've chosen to put the YOG into a long-term process of development of new young athletes, new young volunteers, new young coaches, new young leaders'</i> (Employee NIF, 15).	The YOG are a milestone within our ten years strategy for the youth campaign' (Quote from NIF representative field notes, course for young leaders presentation about youth campaign, Norwegian School of Sport Sciences Oslo, 2013).
The YOG 2016 will be an important driving force within the youth campaign of Norwegian sports (...) in a longer 10 years perspective (NIF 2014, p. 13).	<i>'[The YOG are a] driving force for everything that we wish to develop within Norwegian youth sport'</i> (Employee NIF, 11).	

Table 3. The YOG and the youth campaign.

Documents	Interviews	Observations
Norwegian organised sport plans to use the YOG as a platform for a national programme with the goal to develop a new generation of competitive athletes, leaders and volunteers (Lillehammer2016 2010, p. 7). The 'youth campaign' requires comprehensive efforts including both, breadth of activities and the opportunity to develop elite athletes (...) the YOG will be able to supplement this initiative in a good way (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2011, p. 7).	'we have related the bid to what we have been saying all along: that we should be innovative, we must be innovative and they [the YOG] should be part of the 'youth campaign' (Employee NIF, 15).	The YOG shall strengthen the implementation of the youth campaign (Quote from NIF representative field notes, course for young leaders presentation about 'youth campaign', Norwegian School of Sport Sciences Oslo, 2013).

The YOG: supplement, implement and strengthen the youth campaign

As shown in Table 3, it is argued that the YOG will be a 'platform' supplementing, implementing and 'strengthening' the youth campaign. Table 3 shows how the discourse of the YOG bid in connection with the youth campaign is characterised by the continuous, institutionalised, and taken-for-granted use of rhetoric having taken on a rule-like status in NIF's action and language (Tolbert and Zucker 1996), which has developed to an institutionalised myth (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Statements from presentations such as that the 'YOG shall strengthen the implementation of the youth campaign' and from interviewees that the YOG 'should be part of the youth campaign' (Employee NIF, 15) leave us with questions: Why should the YOG be part of this? How will it be part of the youth campaign? How will it strengthen it? These questions are left open in the rhetoric of data stemming from documents and observations, and even though having been asked in follow-up questions, interviewees never answered concretely. As shown in Tables 4–6, the interviewees solely repeated their arguments without being able to point on how YOG will actually be a contribution to the youth campaign. Interpreting the YSP and the youth campaign as an institutionalised myth (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) leads me to assume that NIF and its stakeholders support these myths (Meyer and Rowan 1977). These myths are supportive for NIF and its legitimation as an organisation, because the popular support for NIF's behaviour is decisive for its survival (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). NIF's arguments were adopted in the wider structure. With the government providing financial support for the YOG, it demanded that the finance should go directly toward increasing the recruitment of young people within organised sports (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2007).

In Table 4, the rhetoric patterns of the YOG catalysing one core goal of the youth campaign – the increase of youth sport participation – are presented. Besides the increase in young active participants, the youth campaign has as its aim the recruitment of more young leaders into organised sports. As volunteerism is a core value of Norwegian sports, the recruitment of volunteers has been a much used argument within the Bid Committee (see Table 5). In order to get the state guarantee, the Bid Committee strategically focused on formulating the goals for the YOG according to the government's requirements within the bid

Table 4. The importance of the YOG for increased youth sport participation.

Documents	Interviews
The YOG will play an important role in increasing youth sports participation (NIF 2013) (...) we will continue to establish a solid foundation for programmes that will attract youth and ensure their active and enthusiastic participation for life. (Lillehammer2016 2010, p. 4). It is expected from NIF that the YOG in Norway will increase sport participation among children and adolescents in the years to come, and thus also contribute to increased physical activity in general in this age group (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2011, p. 7).	<i>To get young people more physically active (...) has been important [as main argument of the YOG Bid]</i> (Employee NIF, 15). <i>'Another reason was to get the youth active'</i> (Employee NIF, 13).

Table 5. The YOG as an opportunity to recruit young leaders and to develop a new generation of volunteers.

Documents	Interviews	Observations
There is now a need for both to increase and rejuvenate volunteer corps, and the Youth Olympic Games will be a good opportunity to recruit a new generation of volunteers (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2011, p. 7). Norwegian sports lead the continued development of young coaches and young leaders (...). We believe hosting YOG 2016 offers great possibilities also for accelerating the education and development of coaches, officials and leaders in all sports (Lillehammer2016 2010, p. 4).	<i>'To get young people more (...) involved in volunteering has been important'</i> <i>'So ideally, by hosting the YOG you want to get a new generation of volunteers that understand the value of volunteering'</i> (Employee NIF, 13). <i>'I remember that during the bid process, it was apparent to use the Youth Olympics in order to put a new generation of volunteers in place. It was the very broad consensus that a new generation volunteers had to be a central objective in the event.'</i> (Employee Lillehammer, 14)	We haven't succeeded with young leadership in the past. We have to see at our strategic approaches and the YOG in order to get more young people involved in the organisational work of sports (Field notes, NIF leader meeting, Tromsø 2010). The event also provides a good opportunity to recruit a large number of young people as volunteers , both in the planning and implementation phase. The YOG will be a learning arena for young leaders . (Field notes, NIF leader meeting, Tromsø 2010).

Table 6. The YOG as enticement and inspiration.

Documents	Interviews	Observations
The YOG are an « inspiration for the competitive oriented part of sports' (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2011, p. 3) YOGOC guarantees that the YOG 2016 will be just as exciting and inspirational experience for the volunteers as it will be for the participating athletes (Lillehammer2016 2010, p. 42)	<i>'It (the YOG) shall be (...) a source of inspiration'</i> (Employee NIF, 11) <i>'(...) provide an inspiration to participate in different sports'</i> (Employee NIF, 15). <i>'The YOG will inspire the youth to participate in sports, not only at top-level, but at general. The main point is not to win the gold medal, but to participate'</i> (Member IOC, 17) <i>'There is something alluring in the Olympics. For young people it is attractive to meet an international environment. It is easier to recruit if you have Youth Olympics as enticement – in which the young people will be involved in'</i> (Employee Lillehammer, 14)	An event like this will be an inspiration for future top athletes, while there is something to strive for the organisation (NIF board meeting no. 36, 2010). The YOG (...) should be an inspiration and create competence for the future generations of youth sport (NIF 2012 board meeting no. 8).

Table 7. Rhetorical arguments of interviewees directly referred to documents.

Interviews	Referred document
<i>'We built a lot upon what has been written in the White Paper on Volunteerism from 2007. There are many nice things written down about volunteering which we used in the application to get the state guarantee from the government.</i> (Politician NIF, 16).	Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2007, White Paper on Volunteerism The Government sport policy pursues that (...) the volunteer- and membership-based sport should ensure good frames providing comprehensive and inclusive activities (...) (and to) contribute to activity and participation in membership-based organisations that organise sports and physical activity for children and adolescents. (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 2007, p. 211).
<i>'The youth is our main target group and this was the profound reference for NIF to take action, and this was in line with the sport political document and NIFs commitment to the development of children and youth sport and this was the lead for such a commitment (the bid for the YOG)'</i> (Employee NIF, 11).	NIF 2007, Sport political document The youth should be one of the most important targets within Norwegian sports. The youth sport should be characterised by large participation through the development and facilitation of varied activities that are in line with young people's own conditions, wishes and needs (NIF 2007, p. 8).
<i>'If you look at the sport political documents which were approved four years before, you can see that the youth has been the main target group in the past 30 years. We know that the drop-out among young people is tremendous. So the YOG could bring in new stimuli that will make young people to return to organised sports and make them stay'</i> (Employee NIF, 15)	NIF 2007, Sport political document The youth should be one of the most important targets within Norwegian sports. The youth sport should be characterised by large participation through the development and facilitation of varied activities that are in line with young people's own conditions, wishes and needs (NIF 2007, p. 8).

(Member IOC, 17 – see also Table 7). For example, it was emphasised that the YOG should function as training arena for young people to learn leadership skills (see Table 5). The recruitment of young volunteers for the YOG, where 2,500 volunteers are needed, should be a major step in the recruitment of young leaders into organised sports (Lillehammer2016 2010). In other words NIF is expecting that event volunteers will continue to be volunteers with leadership experience in their own clubs or associations. In Table 5, the continuity of the rhetoric about the ‘new generation of volunteers’ can be seen, spread among the institutional field of the YOG Bid Committee, including its members and the government as well as NIF.

The fact that the YOG had the intention of boosting recruitment of young coaches has been mentioned in various documents (e.g. Lillehammer2016 2010, Ministry of Culture 2011, 2012, NIF 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). But *how* the recruitment of young coaches will be supported through the YOG was clarified neither in documents nor by the interviewees who could not name or explain any strategies or actions that are planned for the recruitment of young coaches in connection to the YOG. So in contrast to the uniform rhetoric, proving that actions are or will be taken is a problem. This situation indicates that the implementation of the promises has been left open.

The YOG: enticement and inspiration

Even though NIF has run volunteer and young leader courses in the past, NIF struggled to recruit enough young people in preparation for the YOG (Employee, Lillehammer, I4). The Bid Committee claimed that the YOG served as a motivating engine for young people to sign up for these courses because they will have concrete roles where they will be able to practice their knowledge. The YOG were therefore intended to boost the attractiveness of NIF courses offered to young people (Employee Lillehammer, I4).

The results in Tables 2–6 show that the people interviewed are repeating the statements and politically correct responses which have previously been formulated in documents and meetings. The exclusively symbolic rhetoric about the YOG being an opportunity, driving force, inspiration, and so forth, is also characterised whereby none of the interviewees could explain the mechanisms which would link the YOG and an actual increase in young people participating in organised sports. Findings from the interviews indicated a strong assumption that the bid for the YOG would develop youth sport. But *how* the YOG will practically develop youth sport was not discussed during the bid (Employee NIF, I1). The following discussion focusses on the articulated reasoning for the bid and the disconnection with the actual intended reason, explaining the focus on legitimacy rather than efficiency.

Attaching a problem to the solution

Interpreting the rhetoric of the YOG bid, a process of institutionalisation of the Norwegian YSP can be clearly identified. The fact that the development of youth sport, as formulated more than 20 years ago, is the strongest argument for the bid shows that institutionalisation has been reached (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). While child and youth policy in Norwegian sports was non-existent prior to 1960, the development of sport for youth became stronger by the mid-1980s (Sisjord and Græsdal 2003). From 1991 onward, the development of youth sport was a major concern emphasised in every annual report published by NIF. Since then, youth has been one of the main target groups for NIF. Commencing in the early 1990s as a solution to the drop-out problem, youth sport became a factor in NIF sport policy. The formulation of the YSP structures has been institutionalised over time by appearing as an accepted myth and value within the institutional environment of NIF, which could be referred to as the institutional contamination of rhetorical expression (Nordhaug 2010). The YSP has been transferred as strategy for the YOG bid. The YOG are consequently not a solution to the drop-out problem,

but the drop-out problem could be used as convenient argument to justify the bid. The YSP has become a self-imposed norm and a convenient symbolic strategy and alleged solution to NIF's drop-out problem. This symbolic meaning of the YOG has been even more empowered by Norwegian sports through the introduction of another symbolic term, the 'youth campaign'. 'The youth campaign has always been the strategy of NIF, so it was natural to just bring it up as reason for the bid' (Employee NIF, I1). Not only have the structures survived over a long period of time, but they are also dispersed among actors and adopters such as the Norwegian state and the national sport federations.

The language used for the YOG bid in documents, meetings and by the Bid Committee is worked out purposefully to provide assurance of the alleged necessity of the YOG as a solution to the challenges facing Norwegian youth sport. The consequence of the institutionalisation of the YSP is that it is used as a convenient strategy formulation for the YOG bid. Policy argumentation does not always comply with rational choice, but rather is subject to rhetorical language, argumentation and symbols as well as strategy (Chalip 1995, Sam 2003). The symbolic rhetoric used in the YOG bid discourse as presented in Tables 2–6 is common practice in policy-making. Policy-making has been found to be a result of institutionalised processes; and policy-makers with influence and power do not always or exclusively use rational argument (Flyvbjerg 2001). This symbolic rhetoric of YOG as a driving force for the development of youth sport and as a catalysing element of the 'youth campaign' is a discursive construction by NIF. The fact that what lies behind the symbolic meaning could not be articulated shows that the term is so institutionalised within the NIF structure that its actors accept it as argument since NIF did not encounter any opposition to the YOG bid. The unanimous pro-YOG decision in the Norwegian parliament, as well as the lack of opposition from the stakeholders of the Bid Committee as detected in the interviews, confirms the bid for the YOG to be a legitimate action by NIF. In order to gain the support from all stakeholders, the justification that the YOG will produce benefits for all key stakeholders must be plausible to the government and the public. It is therefore understandable that the YSP is used as a justification for supporting the contradictory bid for an event, perfectly adapted as a problem for which the YOG are argued to be part of the solution. The disconnection of the articulated reasoning for the bid with the actual intended reason could succeed due to the institutionalised rhetoric of the YSP. Nevertheless, within the argumentation of the Bid Committee 'the youth campaign' remains as an empty promise, a simple policy-setting devoid of a plan for its implementation. As one bid member stated: 'We did not concretely discuss how to operationalise this [the youth campaign]' (Employee NIF, I1).

After having analysed why NIF used the 'youth campaign' argument, the discussion can be taken further by analysing the intended goals of NIF. Rather than youth, the international audience may actually be the main target behind the Norwegian YOG bid. When NIF was asked by the IOC to bid for the YOG, I argue that NIF found itself in a position to respond positively to the request in order to secure legitimacy from the IOC. My findings show that rather than working on a strategic solution to its drop-out problem, NIF used a problem (the drop-out) as justifying the solution (YOG). This means that the NIF top management knew that NIF needed convincing arguments in order to get the state guarantee in place. The drop-out was the perfectly fitting *problem*, defining the main argument for the YOG bid. 'Youth sport was getting more and more important in Norway [and] was a big advantage for the YOG bid' (Employee NIF, I1). My argument, that the IOC may actually be the main target of the Norwegian YOG bid, is supported by statements of the interviewees. The bid for the YOG has strengthened cooperation with the IOC (Employees NIF, I2, I3 I5; Employee Lillehammer, I4). 'That IOC assigned the YOG to Lillehammer enabled us to come into closer dialogue with key persons in the IOC. Then it was easier [for us] to present ourselves and make them understand the Norwegian sports system' (Employee NIF, I5).

This closer bond between NIF and the IOC through the YOG bid is an advantage for NIF and its cooperation with the IOC. This bond came to be an advantage for NIF as well when deciding

to bid for the 2022 Oslo Winter Olympic Games (Employees NIF, I2 and I3, Employee Lillehammer, I4). The close cooperation was of particular concern for the NIF representatives in the Bid Committee. Another reason why the YOG bid should be supported was the ongoing development of the municipality of Lillehammer as a leading winter sports region and the development of competence in organising major sports events there (Employee Lillehammer, I4; Politician Lillehammer, I8). The youth aspect then seemed to have to be applied in order to legitimate government finance used to host such an event as can be seen in the rhetoric presented in Table 7.

Hosting the YOG, which should ensure a bright future for youth sport, can contribute to a positive image of NIF, nationally (government) and internationally (IOC). The YOG seemed to be a convenient tool for enhancing legitimacy rather than as an action to tackle a youth drop-out problem. This interpretation can be supported by the neo-institutional explanation that organisations would rather pursue improving legitimacy than performance (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). These legitimate actions are actually perceived as efficient in the eyes of the organisation's stakeholders (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In the bid, the YOG were claimed to be a stimulus for something that NIF had not been able to realise in the previous 30 years. Even though NIF has changed its image and rhetoric in recent years, whether the activity and identity has changed remains questionable (Skille 2011). It can be argued that sport politicians and sport managers involved in the bid just 'hit and hope' that the problem of drop-out may be solved by staging the YOG, which also is an explanation as to why this contradiction has been ignored by the Bid Committee. Nevertheless, rhetorically reproducing the development of youth sport in Norway is just a small part of the policy process concerning the YOG. An analysis and evaluation of the YSP implementation will show whether the strategy of hosting the YOG in order to develop youth sport participation has been successful.

Conclusion

In this article, I explained how the reasoning for the bidding of Olympic sports events is rooted in institutionalised processes of NIF striving for legitimacy from a) the IOC and b) the Norwegian government. My analysis shows a clear discursive pattern of the purposeful use of the YOG as catalyst in NIF's rhetoric about the YSP. With the YOG bid, NIF was able to strengthen its bonds with the IOC and needed a reason to justify spending public money, which is provided by Norwegian government through the state guarantee. Youth sport development had therefore been identified as a perfectly fitting problem for which the YOG are supposed to be the solution. I argue that the bid for the YOG, being a consequence of the institutionalisation of YSP within the structure of Norwegian sports – and therefore its discursive construction, serves perfectly as a rational process for the YOG bid. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of youth sport steadily helps the NIF to gain legitimacy and to justify their actions to the public. Developing youth sport is therefore a perfect justification for legitimising the YOG bid. I further showed that the term 'youth campaign' has been rhetorically reproduced as a means of legitimising NIF's actions. This explains the disconnection between articulated reasoning and intended reasons by NIF. From existing research, we know that events do not generate promises made concerning the development of mass sport participation (Hanstad and Skille 2010, Weed *et al.* 2012, Taks *et al.* 2014), but still, sport politicians use it as the main argument to host major sports events. Since the whole concept of the YOG is rooted in the perceived need to address declining youth sport participation rates, also refers to the legitimisation of the YOG in general, not only the Lillehammer event.

In the past, NIF has been criticised for failing to be a youth organisation (Skille 2011). Since NIF has not changed its image and rhetoric, it is questionable whether the activity and identity will be changed by hosting the YOG. Hosting Olympic events can contribute to a positive image of NIF, nationally and internationally. As the Bid Committee has been successful in justifying the hosting of the YOG today, the time has come to bring the articulated goals into action and deliver what has been promised. The emergence of a sport participation legacy raises the important issue of how host cities subsequently

promote policy interventions that claim sustainable sports development as an explicit goal (Girginov and Hills 2009). This article is limited to the policy arguments pro-YOG and does not look into the strategy of implementation. I therefore propose that future research concentrates on the implementation of the policies that are set for events such as the YOG. In addition, there is scope for further investigation of political structures, processes, activities and implementation of policies that aim to actually develop mass sport in host countries through major sports events.

Disclosure statement

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Article 2

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Boosting youth sport? Implementation of Norwegian youth sport policy through the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games

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ABSTRACT

Neo-institutional concepts of organizational change and organizational reproduction combined with implementation theory are employed to examine the implementation of the Norwegian youth sport policy (YSP) associated with the Youth Olympic Games. The YSP also called 'youth campaign', aims at increasing the number of young leaders, young coaches and young athletes. Data were generated from semi-structured interviews and observations and show that implementation is characterized by revitalization of existing practices within the Norwegian sports system through translation and bricolage and innovative entrepreneurship. Our data indicate that the focus of the implementation was on the recruitment and education of young leaders. The development of young coaches and the recruitment and retention of young athletes are neglected. The non-involvement of national sport federations and sports clubs as well as the complexity of administrative layers are causes for the lack of effective implementation. In sum, a lasting impact on the Norwegian youth sport development is doubtful.

Introduction

Olympic sport events are often organized partly at least as the result of a national (sport) political agenda, such as the London 2012 sport participation legacy objectives (Weed et al. 2015). Part of the rationale for hosting the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games (YOG) was their potential to contribute to the objectives of the national youth sport policy (YSP) as defined by the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF). One of its aims is to increase young persons' participation within Norwegian organized sports. By operationalizing YSP, which since 2011 has been called the 'youth campaign' (*ungdomsløftet* in Norwegian; Skille and Houlihan 2014; Strittmatter 2015), the recruitment of young athletes, leaders and coaches (NIF 2013) has been prominent objectives with the YOG identified as the driving force behind the implementation of the policy.

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In a previous study, it was found that the development of the YSP as the main argument when bidding for the YOG was caused by institutionalized processes within NIF and which reflects a concern with enhancing the organization's legitimacy rather than a particular concern with elite youth competition or the Olympic Movement (Strittmatter 2015). While there are studies looking into the policy-making processes of sports events (Coaffee 2012; Green 2009; Leopkey, Mutter, and Parent 2010), research into the implementation of sport policies through major sports events is limited. Sports programmes change between being envisioned and formulated by policy-makers and being implemented. While there are many studies of agenda setting and policy choice in relation to sport policy studies of policy implementation are limited (O'Gorman 2011).

Research into sport policy implementation has focused on the gaps between policy-making and its implementation (Kay 1996). Other studies have concentrated on the dynamics and processes of implementation (May, Harris, and Collins 2013; O'Gorman 2011; Skille 2008; Skirstad 2011; Stenling 2013). Policy implementation is considered successful if the resulting policy outcomes are in accordance with the original policy intention (Houlihan 2005; O'Gorman 2011; Skille 2008; Skirstad 2011). In our study, we unravel the structures and practices of implementing a general YSP (for the masses) with the aid of a youth elite sport event by scrutinizing how the 'youth campaign' is a part of the YOG. This article explores how NIF's objectives concerning Norwegian youth sport are practically pursued through the hosting of the YOG. The research question is: How is Norwegian YSP implemented through the YOG? The study is framed by implementation theory and neo-institutional theory, which provide an understanding of structure, behaviour, practices and change within the organizational context of the YSP implementation. In the following section, we present the Norwegian sports system and the YSP content of the YOG. Following the theory and method sections, the findings are discussed. The article concludes with a summary and proposals for future research.

Norwegian sports system

Sport policy in Norway is strongly influenced by the Nordic welfare state ideology and social democracy (Skille 2008, 2011), characterized by close cooperation between state and civil society organization. At the government level, sport policy is formulated and administered by the Department of Sports Policy (DSP) within the Ministry of Cultural Affairs (Bergsgard 2007). However, the state has no bodies for the implementation of sport policy and this is the sole responsibility of the volunteer organizations under NIF. Although municipalities and communities play important roles in promoting grass roots activities (Bergsgard and Norberg 2010), the mutual dependence of the DSP and NIF is an important fact for this study. Sharing the vision of sport for all, the DSP administers the essential financial resources (which primarily go to NIF), while NIF has the practical capacity to implement sport policy.

NIF is structured according to a double line approach with 54 National Federations (NFs) which are responsible for specific sports in the country and 19 District Sport Associations (DSAs) – one for each district. At the grass roots of the Norwegian sports system are 11,800 sports clubs promoting and providing sports activity (NIF 2014; Skille 2008). The voluntary basis is crucial for the preservation of Norwegian organized sports, both regarding everyday sport in the clubs and for the organization of sport events (Opedal and Bergsgard 2009).

Norwegian YSP and the YOG

In NIF's sport policy documents and in the bidding documents for the YOG, it was stated that the YOG is the driving force to recruit young people regarding participation, leaders and coaches (Lillehammer 2016 2010; NIF 2014; Strittmatter 2015). In order to reduce the number of young people leaving sports clubs during their teenage years (the drop-out problem), NIF has prioritized youth sport since the early 1990s (NIF 1992; Strittmatter 2015). Being host for the YOG 2016, NIF and the Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games Organizing Committee (LYOGOC) implied not only organizing an international youth elite sport event, but also working towards the realization of general goals, including the recruitment of young people and legitimating the spending of public money.

The organizations involved in the implementation of the YSP and the YOG are NIF (specifically, the development department and the DSAs of Oppland and Hedmark), the sports competence centre *Innlandet*,¹ and LYOGOC. In other words, the *implementing agents* involved in the implementation process represent different organizations. Other relevant actors are municipal and voluntary organizations within the districts Oppland and Hedmark and schools in this region. These are not essential for the implementation of YSP, but organize side projects mediating the implementation of the YOG.

NIF's goals were formulated in the bidding process and communicated to LYOGOC (Strittmatter 2015). However, an implementation strategy was not specified, instead operationalization delegated to LYOGOC (Strittmatter 2015). Implementing agents were not defined in the bidding process but key persons and tasks were identified subsequently during the implementing process for the YOG. However, each implementing agent operates within its distinct institutional environment, with the consequence that implementing agents may have different views, goals and ways of working which may impact the delivery of the YOG.

Theoretical framework

Two main approaches of implementation theory are top-down or bottom-up approach, but we argue for and apply a middle range approach. The top-down approach is based on a hierarchical perspective (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980) where political decisions are made and implementation moves through administrative layers (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). Most top-down analysts conduct normative and prescriptive analysis and study those variables that interrupt the process of perfect implementation (Gunn 1978). In contrast, bottom-up theorist Lipsky (1980) stresses the importance of lower levels agents, so-called street-level bureaucrats. The effectiveness of public policy implementation depends on their ability to establish routine and to cope with pressures and uncertainty deriving from the work they do (Lipsky 1980).

Combining top-down and bottom-up perspectives, Scharpf (1978) argues that the success of implementation depends on the availability of relevant partner organizations. The willingness of partners to contribute and the professional network of implementing agents are crucial for successful implementation. Other determining factors of policy performance are interorganizational communication, characteristics of the implementing agencies, conditions within the social, political, and economic environment as well as the complexion of policy actions, hence disposition of implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). Furthermore, Scharpf (1978) argues that the relationship between the policy-makers and

implementing agents is unstable, while Skille (2008) stresses the importance of local context. In order to capture both the dynamics of the environment within which implementing agents operate and also the significance of internal organizational dynamics we supplement implementation approaches with institutional theory.

Neo-institutional theory is based on the assumption that organizations adapt to their environment to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Acquiring legitimacy is challenging due to expectations based on established customs and traditions on the one hand, and of creative and liberal trends on the other (Greenwood et al. 2008). The YOG is an interesting case, as it is a new entity owned by a traditional organization – the International Olympic Committee (IOC) – to attract youth. Thus, neo-institutional theory offers concepts to cover both reproduction and change.

Neo-institutionalism considers how organizations resemble each other and develop similar structures and actions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Following the debates concerning neo-institutionalism of the 1970s and 1980s, external pressure was perceived to be more important than the organizations' internal strategies, resulting in a focus on legitimacy over effectiveness. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three processes by which external pressures produced isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive isomorphism refers to when an organization is exposed to pressure to introduce specific organizational solutions. Mimetic isomorphism refers to when an organization's activities are changed after mimicking other organizations, often chosen due to uncertainty related to the organizations' (here DSAs' and LYOGOC's) understanding of their goals and tools. Regarding LYOGOC, organizations to mimic could be NIF, IYOGOC (the only former organizing committee of a winter YOG, in Innsbruck 2012), and other sports and civic organizations in Lillehammer. Normative isomorphism refers to how professional norms are acquired and spread through professional networks, formal education or work experiences.

Based on a number of criticisms of early neo-institutionalism theorizing (Campbell 2004; Fahlén, Stenling, and Vestin 2008; Leopkey and Parent 2012; Skille 2008, 2010, 2011), organizational change is now a focal point for neo-institutional theorists. Studying institutional change of sport policy, Skille (2008) showed that the mechanisms of 'bricolage' and 'translation' (Campbell 2004) were suitable for explaining implementation. Bricolage implies that new institutional solutions are created by 'recombining elements in an innovative process' (Campbell 2004). Translation indicates that a new element is included and adapted to fit into the receiving context (Campbell 2004). In addition to the concept of bricolage and translation, Hardy and Maguire (2008) identified a concept which could also illuminate organizational processes in relation to implementation. Entrepreneurship refers to how individual actors change the institutional field through innovation (Hardy and Maguire 2008). While the literature on institutional entrepreneurship has focused on how change initiated by individuals is related to considerations of pressure (Lawrence and Phillips 2004), there is disagreement about how much ability the individual entrepreneur actually has to create change (Hardy and Maguire 2008). In our case, the power dynamic between LYOGOC, responsible for implementing the YOG, and NIF, concerned with implementation of the YSP is a focus of this article. Using the constructs of isomorphism, bricolage, translation and entrepreneurship, we analyse how NIF and LYOGOC arrange their activities to implement the YSP through the YOG.

Methods

In order to track the process of the policy implementation of YSP through the YOG by identifying the structures and mechanisms of the implementing agents, data were gathered through semi-structured interviews and observation. Applying a qualitative research approach, we identified anticipated and unanticipated outcomes of the implementation of the Norwegian YSP through the YOG. As Yin (2009) has argued, qualitative data help to understand the process from action to outcome and enables a researcher to develop causal explanations of phenomena.

Interviews

Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted. The interviewees were selected according to their roles relevant to the operationalization of YSP through the YOG, representing NIF working in the central headquarters (NIF Representatives 1 and 4) and in the DSAs of Hedmark and Oppland (NIF Representatives 2 and 3), LYOGOC (LYOGOC Representatives 1 and 2) and the district of Oppland (Oppland representative). Thus, the selection procedure was based on a combination of strategic sampling and snowball sampling (George and Bennet 2005; Yin 2009).

First, we identified the key players responsible for implementing the goals of NIF's YSP by conducting semi-structured interviews with members of the bid committee who hired the initial staff of LYOGOC. Interviews with the bid committee from a preceding study (Strittmatter 2015) served as a point of departure for this study, and led us to representatives of NIF and staff members at LYOGOC responsible for volunteer recruitment. All interviewees were key informants with intensive insight into NIF's YSP's intended application to the YOG.

The interview guide was based on themes prominent in the implementation literature and neo-institutional theory. Each interview was guided by open questions, for example, 'Tell me how you implemented the goals. Who did you work with? Why did you do it that way? Where did the ideas come from? Did you receive help from anybody?' Follow-up questions aimed at narrowing down the focus of the discussion to concrete implementation actions. Here, interviewees were asked whether they had been pressured to act in a certain way (coercive pressure); if they adapted ideas from other organizations (mimetic isomorphism); if they used existing programmes and translated their own ideas (translation) with or without the help of experts (normative isomorphism); who came up with certain programmes, if they were innovated (bricolage) by themselves (entrepreneurship). In order to identify chains of implementation processes, we also asked about the administrative layers the implementing agents had to deal with.

Observations

Field notes were generated through observations. In 54 h of meetings, courses and presentations that concerned NIF's YSP goals, we looked for phenomena that could reinforce, challenge or complement on the statements of the interviewees. We observed which agents were involved in the implementation process, how they were involved, and with whom they interacted (policy networking). By doing so, we observed how ideas were created,

developed, shaped and operationalized. The main subject of observation in this study was the observation of the programme for young leaders that was organized by NIF and LYOGOC to recruit volunteers to the YOG and to educate young leaders for Norwegian sports. Furthermore, presentations by NIF and LYOGOC concerning YSP and YOG were observed. Other observed events included a meeting initiated by Oppland county concerning school-related projects connected to the YOG, a debate about YOG and youth sport at Lillehammer organized by LYOGOC, a conference about children and youth sport at the Norwegian sports gala 2015, a presentation on youth sport and the YOG given by a NIF representative as part of a study programme at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences.²

Data analysis

All interviews were transcribed verbatim. The analysis followed the two-step procedure proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994). This approach requires an inductive coding, which corresponds to a descriptive and open observation of data where we identified common patterns in the interviewees' statements and field notes. More specifically, we looked for similarities and differences in the interviewees' statements, in the order in which they occurred, whether their statements occurred in correspondence to our observations and if certain actions led to others. Secondly, we coded the data adopting the above theoretical considerations. Applying implementation theory, we looked into indicators of (a) the chronological processes, hence information about when the implementation started and how it proceeded; and (b) structures, hence information about which activities were implemented and by whom. We looked for topics that were presented as commands (top-down) and those that emerged from discussions (bottom-up). The institutional analysis focused on the implementing agents, identifying the organizations in which they were located, the organizational environment in which they operated, the pressures they experienced, and how those pressures affected their actions. We also examined how the actions, mechanisms and processes contributed to the YSP implementation through the YOG.

Results and discussion

Emerging from the analysis, this section is structured in four parts: first, we present when and how the implementation process started and developed; second we outline the implemented activities, particularly the programme for young leaders; third we sketch three smaller implementation activities that mediate the YSP goals through the YOG; fourth, we discuss the implementation activities through the YOG as part of the YSP, based on the implementing agents' opinions and experiences and theoretical guidance.

The implementation process

After the award of the YOG 2016 to Lillehammer in December 2011, it took some time before the goals were operationalized. In November 2012, NIF established a position on youth sport in order to work against dropout and towards the goals of the YSP as defined in NIF's sport policy document (NIF 2011). 'When I took over the position, I started from scratch and had to find out "what is it we actually have to do here?" ... I [then] started to set a direction for the work on youth sport' (NIF Representative 1).

As a 150th anniversary gift in 2011,³ NIF received an additional fund of 11 million Norwegian crowns (NOK)⁴ specifically for youth sport. NIF informed the DSAs that the funds were intended to encourage young persons to continue participation in organized sports longer.

Within NIF everyone is interested in creating a new generation of volunteers, young leaders, and young coaches and we had to start getting the snowball rolling with the YOG. This was hard in the beginning because we did not know how to tackle it. (NIF Representative 1)

The first people involved with the implementation of the YSP connected to the YOG were assigned in November 2013. These were not members of LYOGOC, but employees of NIF. In November 2013, NIF held a meeting at the DSA Hedmark where NIF's involvement in the YOG was discussed (NIF Representative 2).

It was a gathering of the DSA Hedmark about networking competency. There were eight or ten persons who function as lecturers and instructors for sports in Hedmark ... [and] representatives from the district and from NIF top management. (NIF Representative 3)

At this meeting, it was announced that 200 young leaders would be educated by NIF in cooperation with the DSAs, a decision made by the top management in NIF who were trying to find an organizational solution to the implementation of the YSP (NIF Representative 2). Being exposed to coercive pressure from the NIF top management – 'they told us that we are now responsible for the education of 200 young leaders from all over Norway' (NIF Representative 2) – the representatives of the NIF development department and DSAs of Hedmark and Oppland took the initiative to work towards the policy goals.

The young leaders programme

The young leaders programme was initiated at the end of 2013. NIF invited LYOGOC to host the course, aiming at two goals: (a) recruitment of young volunteers for the YOG and (b) education of young leaders for organized sports. Two years prior to the YOG, six courses were conducted (field notes, 18 April 2015), addressing persons between 13 and 19 years of age (NIF 2011). The first three courses were start-up courses held in 2014 (field notes, 19 September 2014): the first was in Elverum⁵ where 54 young people from the DSAs Oppland and Hedmark participated; the second, held in Trondheim involved 53 participants⁶ who were recruited from the other 17 DSAs in Norway; and the third course was held in Oslo⁷ where 66 young people were recruited by the national sport federations (NSFs) (field notes, 30 October 2014). These 173 young people were invited to participate in a follow-up course in Hamar⁸ connected to the annual Norwegian sports gala in January 2015;⁹ 120 persons from all over Norway participated in the event (field notes, 9 January 2015).

In order to engage more young people within Lillehammer, NIF and LYOGOC organized another start-up course for the DSA Oppland in Lillehammer in April 2015 counting 32 participants. Another follow-up course was conducted six months later where 199 young leaders were invited, and of which 82 took part (field notes, 23 November 2015). The courses were designed to be interactive and took place during weekends when the young person's learned about the organization of Norwegian sports, leadership qualities, communication skills and the YOG (field notes, 20 September 2014). By integrating elements from existing NIF training programmes and practices into the young leaders programme with some

innovative YOG elements, the training courses reflected a relation of bricolage (Campbell 2004) by the implementing agents.

I know that there have been young leaders courses in Hedmark and Oppland many years ago. It was a priority for which a lot of money was provided. But I think it is much easier to recruit participants by including the YOG because it attracts young people to be part of it [the YOG]. (NIF Representative 4)

The young leaders programme had existed for many years and had been run many times, but 'when the money was spent, the project died' (NIF Representative 1). With the YOG, the young leaders programme was revitalized with new inputs replicating NIF's previous practices. By including LYOGOC in the course organization, existing institutional practices (course for young leaders) have been combined with new ideas of course content (YOG). Considering the YOG as an external element to the YSP of NIF, the YOG was actively imported – and translated (Campbell 2004) – into these courses and adjusted to fit the programme for educating young leaders.

My job was not to look for something new that would elevate the YOG – this is the task of the organizing committee. My task was to find out how we could make the YOG a good event. And then it [the young leaders programme] was coming up – we knew we had a concept, we knew that it works, and that it addresses the target group. Taking something familiar, something that includes topics about the every-day-life in sports, is very important, I think. (NIF Representative 1)

Hence, the young leaders programme represents a reproduction of NIF's structure, practices and values (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), and is meant to be the organizational solution to NIF's problems related to youth sports.

Additional and smaller innovations

In addition, three smaller programmes – seen as responses to the expectations related to NIF's YSP and the YOG – were investigated: a mentor programme, a torch relay, and the 'try the sport' programme.

The mentor programme was initiated by the DSAs of Hedmark and Oppland, and was established immediately after the start of the young leaders programme. The DSAs assigned adults with long experience in sports, leadership and events to function as mentors for participants of the young leaders programme. The mentors supported the young leaders in their work as coaches in sport clubs or as volunteers at sports events.

It is a continuation in the way that young people who attended the course have a follow-up, otherwise we lose them. If you have an experienced mentor who keeps you in the loop, you will not forget what you have learned [during the course]. (NIF Representative 2)

The mentors are volunteers. The two implementing agents initiating the mentor programme presented the idea to Oppland county and then received funding from the county. The district used this programme to create competence for the surroundings of Lillehammer with the YOG as an instrument. All the young leaders in the DSAs of Hedmark and Oppland were assigned to mentors, which was possible because the implementing agents worked within the DSAs. Nevertheless, implementing the model in other DSAs and finding people willing to be mentors remained a challenge (field notes, 16 December 2014; NIF Representative 2). This programme was initiated by the DSAs in Hedmark and Oppland with no involvements from national level and NIF.

The idea of the mentor programme existed before the commencement of the young leaders programme with the YOG. Rather than being strategically established for and with the YOG, the mentor programme appeared to be more opportunistic adopted as part of the YSP because it furthered NIF's goals.

It is a bit random. It is not something that is planned and run centrally [by NIF]. The DSA Hedmark has been ahead in this in terms of what we should get out of the YOG. NIF was a step behind. (NIF Representative 2)

All the interviewees linked the mentor programme to the implementation of the YSP. The programme was not a top-down implementation, but was able to contribute to NIF's goals thanks to the successful policy network that was constructed by the implementing agents. By connecting the mentor programme to the young leaders programme, the key persons were able to change NIF practices concerning the education of young leaders through innovative elements (Hardy and Maguire 2008).

The Olympic torch relay was another activity related to the LYOGOC's conceptualization of the YSP (field notes, 21 September 2014 and 9 January 2015). A few weeks prior to the YOG, LYOGOC and NIF including the DSAs planned a torch tour in the winter of 2015–2016 through all districts in Norway when stories of young Norwegian people in sports will also be shared (field notes 10 January 2015). The initiator was LYOGOC and the idea was worked out during and around the young leaders programme in cooperation with NIF (field notes 19 September 2014 and 10 January 2015). The aim was to involve the young leaders in specific tasks associated with the YOG. LYOGOC and NIF wanted to encourage all the DSAs throughout Norway to engage in the relay and help the young leaders with the planning and implementation of it. 'In order to stage the event, the DSAs must involve the young leaders in the planning and implementation [of the torch relay event]. That's a requirement from our side' (NIF Representative 4). The concept of the torch relay is common for youth Olympic events, and was organized also during the 2012 Innsbruck YOG and the 2015 Vorarlberg/Liechtenstein European Youth Olympic Festival (Kristiansen, Strittmatter, and Skirstad 2015.)

'Try the sport' is a project planned to operate during the YOG where spectators, parents and participants can try different sports. 'Try the sport' is intended to promote physical activity (field notes, 16 December 2014), and is organized in collaboration with the NSFs, international federations and the IOC. It is a side programme of the YOG and is approved by the IOC and by LYOGOC. IOC provides the project plan and delivers it to LYOGOC who will operationalize the project (NIF Representatives 2 and 3).

The representatives of the DSAs of Hedmark and Oppland are responsible for implementing the specific 'taster' sports events, and schools send students to 'try the sport' activities.

It is a special sports program during the YOG in order to get spectators to the venues. How else would you get schools to take a day off and send students to the [YOG] competitions? The idea is to create an arena where they [the students] can have an active day. (NIF Representative 3)

As 'try the sport' was also organized at the 2012 Innsbruck YOG and demanded by the IOC, it is both a mimetic and a coercive process in terms of its influence on LYOGOC and NIF.

Overall implementation analysis

The implementation of NIF's YSP can be interpreted as a top-down process (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980), where NIF commands the Oppland and Hedmark DSA to be implementing agents. One of the first things the DSAs did was to get LYOGOC on board. LYOGOC and the two DSAs are implementing agents operating within different institutional environments and are enhanced to strong beliefs and rules of their own organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). While NIF is interested in showing that youth sport development is taking place as it had been promised in their sport political agenda (NIF Representatives 1 and 4), the LYOGOC representatives are interested in recruiting volunteers for the YOG and creating a legacy by delivering a new generation of volunteers and leaders to NIF, as it was promised in the bid documents (LYOGOC Representative 1). The DSAs of Oppland and Hedmark, which are responsible for competence development and the sport organizations around Lillehammer, are most interested in fulfilling the YSP goals because it 'contributes to the competence and skill development' in their area (NIF Representative 2). The characteristics of the implementing agencies (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975) are a determining factor for the nature of implementation of the YSP.

The success of each single organization delivering their organizational objectives is dependent on the legitimacy gained in the organizational environment under which the organizational actors experience institutional pressure (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). The expectations of the YOG increased pressure on LYOGOC 2 years before the event.

We felt that there was a strong mandate in the bid, and this is what we actually have to deliver. So, in the beginning it was very important to clarify the expectations and the roles of the people involved. What can be done? Who shall we involve? How can they contribute? What role should they play in the planning and implementation of the YOG? What positive impact can we get out of it? So there were clear expectations, and one really clear expectation was that something has to happen. (LYOGOC Representative 1)

The institutional environment of an organization includes social norms and expectations from stakeholders (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Tolbert and Zucker 1996; Zucker 1977). In order to maintain legitimacy, organizations are likely to act in accordance with institutional expectations, something that explains the mimetic isomorphic processes that the entrepreneurs underwent while setting up the young leaders programme and the mentor programme. When LYOGOC entered the young leaders programme, their representatives were occupied with mapping the size, and kind of project needed. NIF put pressure on the implementing agents to initiate action (LYOGOC Representatives 1 and 2).

I was a bit afraid that the commitment would decrease because people were so impatient. It was important to get started, to get people involved fast. So instead of having a very clear strategy for how things should be done, I was most keen to get things going, get people involved, ask them for advice, and have meetings. (LYOGOC Representative 1)

For the implementing agents, it was clear that their actions were intended to achieve the goals of the YSP and they were subject to coercive isomorphism. The implementing agents lacked an understanding of how this rhetorical construction should be put into practice (see also Strittmatter 2015).

I think there is a lot more work to do on informing what the notion of the YSP actually means. People have heard about boosting youth sport participation, but no one really knows what and where it should be. I do not have a clue myself. (NIF Representative 3)

Nevertheless, according to their normative knowledge of the field, the implementing agents identified how the policy could be operationalized. They had first to discuss and define what the YSP actually means, as well as redefine the policy to something that they could do (NIF Representatives 1, 2, and 3). The normative isomorphic process identified here shows that activities were initiated by the implementing agents working within these organizations. After working in Norwegian sports for many years, they have acquired professional norms, which can spread through their professional network (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

Entrepreneurship and policy networks – the tools for implementing action

We perceive the implementing agents to be institutional entrepreneurs who use their power to create change in an organization based on their knowledge of the organization and its environment (Hardy and Maguire 2008). While there is neither a strategy nor a plan for the implementing agents from the top, the implementing agents act towards purposeful change through their leverage of social and political skills (Wijen and Ansari 2007). By introducing side projects to the YOG and linking these to the YSP, the entrepreneurs brought change to the institutional NIF system (Hardy and Maguire 2008), for example, by implementing a self-initiated mentor programme as follow-up to the young leaders programme. The activities conducted by the implementing agents show that they were able to induce change in the NIF practices through translating innovative ideas that originated with the YOG. In order to fulfil the YSP goals, the entrepreneurs adapted NIF practices and modified them to best suit their own purpose (Lawrence and Phillips 2004).

The analysis shows that the implementing agents were crucial for contributing to the YSP goals due to their organizational interest in fulfilling the goals (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). While the young leaders programme can be interpreted as a top-down initiation of NIF policy, the creation of new networks and the stress on horizontal interorganizational communication (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975) was essential for successful implementation of the YSP concerning young leaders. The perceived success of the implementing agents is based on both complying with, and hence, reproducing the practices of the NIF system and the inclusion of municipalities and schools maximize the youth development opportunities of the YOG. By acting as ‘network builders’, ‘catalysers’, or ‘coordinators’ (NIF Representatives 2, 3 and 4), the implementing agents linked several projects and involved more young people within the Lillehammer region. Due to the coercive pressure where something was expected from the implementing agents, combined with vague definitions of what exactly was required, the implementing agents’ solutions were mimetic processes. Responding to this uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), the implementing agents mimicked practices and programmes already existing in NIF.

We were concerned with topics like ‘what kind of education programs already exist? In what environment are they organized? How can we become involved in something that is already there?’ This was quite important for us because we have not much financial resources. So we needed to find partners who had resources, and who might have an already established program. (LYOGOC Representative 2)

Despite the coercive pressure placed upon the implementing agents, they were very free in their work due to the absence of a strategic implementation structures within NIF and LYOGOC (LYOGOC Representative 1; NIF Representatives 1 and 2). Since the implementing agents defined the course content and were in direct contact with the course participants, they perceived that they influenced the implementation process (NIF Representative 1). However, the implementing agents had limited budget and human resources, which influenced the character and effectiveness of implementation (Van Meter and Horn 1975). Furthermore, the implementing agents felt limited in their ability to fulfil the goals formulated by top management of NIF (NIF Representatives 1 and 2).

We, as administrative staff, had nothing to do with the YOG bid and the goals for youth sport. So, it is probably a bit like 'here is reality, and there is the bid'. But perhaps it is always like this. And then there is the budget, which doesn't match all the tasks we have to do. There is no match between the bid made on top and the staff and money and resources below. (NIF Representative 1)

The abstract formulation of the YSP remains a challenge for the implementing agents to practically pursue the policy goals, and confirms the gap between policy aspiration and the constrain faced by those responsible for implementation (see also, Strittmatter 2015).

Legitimacy over effectiveness

Almost two years have passed between the YSP goal definition and the first examples of policy action. But as soon as the implementing agents were assigned, they began translating policy into action especially when in relation to the implementation of the young leaders programme. Several critical points with the young leaders programme implementation were identified. First, while the main achievement of the implementation through the YOG was to educate 199 young leaders, that number is small compared to the 327,000 memberships of NIF in the same age group (NIF 2014). Second, implementation of the YSP through the YOG is a top-down initiative without taking the bottom-up demands into account (Lipsky 1980; Scharpf 1978). Studies show that the most effective implementation is when top-down initiatives meet the bottom-up demands (Skille 2008). Third, research into the history of NIF's youth policy has revealed that young leaders programme focused more on educating youth to fit into the established NIF institution instead of listening to youth and their experiences and demands (Waldahl and Skille 2014). Fourth, and most important for this particular study, are the actions taken and these not taken with regard to YSP. While the courses for young leaders are in line with NIF's YSP to recruit more young leaders into Norwegian sport, other pillars involving young athletes and young coaches were ignored.

We do not focus as much on the young coaches as we do on the young leaders because this is where our [the YSP implementing agents'] expertise lies. There, we have a bad conscience. At the same time, we do not work towards more sports activity. It is the federation that does that. It [the YSP] is a bit in limbo. (NIF Representative 1)

As the quote implies, the leaders programme is not anchored in those sport organizations that administer and provide the sport activities – the national sport organizations and sport clubs. Hence, the actual legacy and impact on youth sport remains doubtful, due to a top-down approach and lack of anchoring the policy. 'Well, as it always is in NIF, there is rarely a good plan, but a "we just start and develop a more detailed plan" during the process' (NIF Representative 4).

The interviewees stated that a strategic plan from NIF's top management of NIF was missing, especially regarding the NSFs. Nevertheless, the NIF Representatives (1, 2, and 3) agreed that the cooperation with NIF's administration and the NFs was challenging. Since the NSFs are sport-focused, NIF loses an opportunity concerning implementation of the YSP.

I think we could have realized exactly the same with young coaches and young athletes if you had employed someone to focus on this and said that 'this is what you should do'. But this only happened for the youth leadership part because there we have had a person in place and we had already some content. (NIF Representative 1)

Besides the lack of collective action in the sport system, time is another limiting factor in implementation, especially if the administrative layers and hurdles of communication to gain financial support were time-consuming (NIF Representatives 1 and 3), all of which are indications of ineffective implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). Constrained budgets within NIF and LYOGOC were mentioned as major challenges to the effective delivery of the YSP's goals. In that respect, NIF sees the financing of the young leaders programme as a contribution to the YOG. Although the implementing agents are entrepreneurs, their association with NIF led to a reproduction of the organization's practices. Being subjected to high pressure by the institutional environment in which they operate, the YSP implementing agents are working more towards legitimacy than effectiveness. The pressure to deliver as specified in the bid documents and the sport political documents (see also Strittmatter 2015) seem to have been placed on the shoulders of the few implementing agents who were given this near impossible task (see also Skirstad 2011).

I think that it is a bit like 's**t, this is what we have promised'. That one realizes that one went out with high promises. On paper we will be able to show that we have worked towards the policy goals, but showing that we created real impact will be difficult. (NIF Representative 1)

The YOG, NIF and LYOGOC can document that they created projects involving young people. But none of these projects were created by strategically using the YOG to develop youth sport; they are more a series of projects initiated by the few implementing agents for which NIF will get the credit although only one-third of the goals of the YSP were followed up.

The education of young leaders is initiated by NIF central and LYOGOC. The follow-up part with the mentors was developed on the basis of what we have done in Hedmark and Oppland. Who takes the credits for it in the end does not have too much to say, but, for sure, NIF as an organization will be benefiting from this. This is important for them, so they can publicize the boost of the youth campaign. (NIF Representative 3)

The actions taken in the implementation of the YSP in connection to the YOG are an effort by NIF to gain legitimacy rather than effectiveness. Further, the lack of collective action by the whole NIF organization contributed to ineffectiveness.

Conclusion

An analysis of the process of the implementation of the Norwegian YSP through the YOG identified a series of distinctive characteristics. The policy as it is owned and formulated by NIF is implemented in a top-down direction to its sub-organizations, the DSAs of Oppland and Hedmark. The main five actors represent NIF, the DSAs as well as LYOGOC. While these agents work with the operationalization of the goals set for the YSP in connection to

the YOG, they operate within the institutional environment of their respective organizations, which coincidentally have the fulfilment of the YSP as primary organizational goal. This situation, as well as the lack of an implementation strategy, creates tension between the policy-maker and the implementing agents and challenges successful implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). The implementing agents are subject to high pressure by the institutional environment leading to a reproduction of NIF structures caused by isomorphic processes (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In order to perform, the implementing agents create new projects by translating new elements (Campbell 2004) of the YOG into already existing NIF structures. The availability of cooperating partners such as LYOGOC was a decisive factor for these organizations to perform the implementation (Scharpf 1978). By building networks, the implementing agents created new projects contributing to the achievement of the policy goals and therefore function as entrepreneurs (Hardy and Maguire 2008), giving breadth to the policy implementation, as, for example, by implementing self-initiated side activities. The majority of projects are initiated independently of the YSP, but were opportunistically connected to the YOG to deliver results for the YSP.

The effectiveness of the implementation process can be discussed and questioned for several reasons. First, NIF focused only on one pillar of the YSP – young leaders. The goals of increasing the involvement of young coaches and young athletes were not prioritized by NIF or by LYOGOC. NIF failed to involve the NFs and the clubs where the actual activity of coaching and sport practice takes place; no strategy seems to be in place to deal with this situation. A top-down approach without meeting bottom-up demands leads to ineffectiveness (Lipsky 1980; Skille 2008) because organizational conditions on the lower level (Lipsky 1980) were not included. Further, administrative complexity needs to be overcome, which is time-consuming; hence the process is slow (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975).

These conclusions have implications for practice, policy and research, particularly regarding the tension between practitioners, as all the actions made by LYOGOC and the DSAs may be seen as a typical decoupling (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) where NIF's YSP is just used as a justification for a number of actions by LYOGOC and DSAs and which are more closely aligned to LYOGOC and the DSAs' organizational objectives. Thus, a clearer division of labour and responsibility between policy-making and implementation where concrete tasks and strategies are defined may be appropriate. More research is needed exploring the mechanisms of attracting youth to mass sport participation; and in particular studies aiming at identifying the mechanisms at explaining the potential relationship between events and sport participation are needed.

Notes

1. The competence centre of Innlandet is a joint venture between NIF and the counties of Hedmark and Oppland created to strengthen and develop expertise in sports within the Lillehammer region.
2. Place and date for each meeting is available by contacting the corresponding author.
3. The first national umbrella organization for sport in Norway, and a predecessor of NIF, was established in 1861 (Olstad 1987).
4. 11 million NOK = 1.3 million euro – less than 5% of the total grant from the DSP to NIF.
5. A town in Hedmark district, approximately 100 km from Lillehammer.
6. Norway's third-largest city and geographically located close to the centre of Norway.

7. The capital city of Norway, where DSP, NIF and most NFs are seated.
8. A town in Hedmark district, about 70 km from Lillehammer. Hamar was the location of some events during the Lillehammer 1994 games, and will house some athletes and events during YOG 2016.
9. The sports gala is an annual event where Norwegian sport celebrates itself, its elite stars as well as grass root representatives.

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Article 3

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**Mismatch of expectations between target group and implementing agents
in youth sport policy**

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Abstract

This study focused on an initiative by the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF), which aimed at increasing young people's engagement within Norwegian organised sports—a Young Leaders Programme (YLP) in connection with the 2016 Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games. Young people's perceptions of the YLP and how these perceptions relate to its implementation are explored to evaluate to what extent this programme can make a difference to youth engagement in organised sports. Qualitative data were generated through interviews with 16 YLP participants, aged 16–20, and five implementing agents. Findings show that there was a mismatch between the expectations of young leaders and the implementing agents concerning YLP, its goals, and its realisation. This study contributes to the identification of mechanisms in implementation. We conclude by outlining youth's understanding around what sport initiatives should focus on and how in order to generate the interest of young people.

Keywords

youth sport, sport policy, Youth Olympic Games, policy mechanisms, implementation

Introduction

The engagement of young people into organised sports is a concern for sport governing bodies both nationally as well as internationally as youth are seen as vital to sport organisations. Worldwide, many initiatives have been implemented to increase youth engagement, for example in terms of sport participation (Chalip and Green, 1998; Gaskin and Garland, 2005; Skille, 2008), elite sport development (Green and Houlihan, 2004; Relvas, et al., 2010; Richardson, Gilbourne, and Littlewood, 2004), and youth's voice in sport organisations (Waldahl and Skille, 2014). Research into sport policy implementation has focused on the gaps between sport policy-making and sports policy implementation (Kay, 1996) and on the dynamics and processes of sport programme implementation (Houlihan, 2014; O'Gorman, 2011; Skille, 2008; Stenling, 2013). Sport policies scholars found that policy implementation depends on the organisations responsible for issuing a certain policy (Piggin, Jackson and Lewis, 2009) and those who are responsible for putting the policy into practice (Reid, 2012; Skille, 2008; 2010; Strittmatter and Skille, 2016) as well as the process of implementation itself (O'Gorman, 2011). These studies on sport policy implementation focus mainly on the relationships between implementing agents and their organisations. Implementation researchers have recently called for examination of the experiences of the policy target group (Fahlén, 2015; Kay, 2009).

Coalter (2007; 2013) argues that the processes, experiences, and relationships among the people involved in implementing a (policy) initiative should be examined in relation to the target group (i.e., their attitudes, ways of thinking, resources, and skills). The combination of reasoning and resources are the mechanisms that make an initiative successful or not (Coalter, 2013). So far, target group perceptions are examined within policy (programme) *evaluation* research (Coalter, 2013; Donaldson, Leggett and Finch, 2011; Draper and Coalter, 2016) and provided insights for policy-makers and programme designs. However, theorisation about

implementation gaps from the perceptions and expectations of the policy's target group is missing. An exception is a study by Fahlén (2015) about participants' social expectations and willingness to take part in physical activities, which directly affects the result of policy intervention. Based on Fahlén's study, we know that target group perceptions and understandings are important to policy implementation, and this is an important part of our research.

In this study, we focused on an initiative by the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) concerning its youth sport policy (YSP), aimed at increasing young people's engagement within Norwegian organised sports by recruiting young athletes, leaders, and coaches. Youth sport has been prioritised on paper since 1992, but not much work has been done toward it (Skille, 2008). The extent of the policy's implementation was never specified. Politicians were confident that the 2016 Winter Youth Olympic Games in Lillehammer (hereafter Lillehammer2016) would attract more young people to Norwegian organised sport—indeed, a symbolic policy process (Edelman, 1971 in Hupe and Hill, 2015) to legitimise its bid (Strittmatter, 2016). The assumption that Lillehammer would attract youth to sports was popular and accepted in Norway.

The only vehicle to fulfil the policy aims of NIF was the Young Leader Programme (YLP), which was based on an already existing programme within the organisation—a series of leader courses for young people (aged between 13 and 19 years) over a 22 months' span, with the aim to educate 200 young people for taking on voluntary leader tasks during Lillehammer2016 and continue in voluntary leader positions in sports teams, clubs, and federations after the event. YLP was organised in cooperation with the central administration of NIF, two of NIFs district sport associations (DSAs), and the Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games Organising Committee (LYOGOC). The different levels of the sport organisation may have complicated policy implementation and the relationship between the policy formation

and implementation was never problematised by NIF or Lillehammer2016. In this study, we concentrated on YLP as a policy action in order to get young people engaged into Norwegian organised sports. Our research questions were:

- 1) How did the target group perceive the implementation of YLP?
- 2) How can this perception inform to what extent the YLP in connection with Lillehammer2016 can make a difference to youth engagement in organised sport in Norway?

By drawing on policy implementation literature (Hupe and Hill, 2015; Scharpf, 1978; Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975) and implementation studies specific to sport-based interventions, we analyse the interconnections between implementing agents and the target group for the policy.

Implementation literature

Within implementation research, it is important to distinguish between structures and processes, between institutions and behaviour, and between actors and activities (Hill and Hupe, 2014). The implementation phase is a late stage in the policy process, and it is subordinate to the agenda setting and the policy-making phase, often described as “the rest” (Hupe and Hill, 2015, p. 1). This view of implementation leaves little attention for political conflict and ambiguity (Hupe and Hill, 2015) and is one reason why the results of implementation are often disappointing. Implementation researchers distinguish between top-down and bottom-up loci. Further institutional relations are also addressed as vertical and horizontal interactions, called administrative layers. Traditional approaches to implementation of top-down (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980) and bottom-up (Lipsky, 1980) focus on policy development. Scharpf (1978) called for a combination of a top-down and bottom-up perspective in which participation of relevant partners and implementing agents has to be

assured (Scharpf, 1978). The same applies to the inter-organisational communication and social, political, and economic relations with partners (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975).

Within the field of sport policy research, policy implementation is considered successful if the outcomes of the policy are in line with its intentions (O’Gorman, 2011; Skille, 2008). When evaluating the outcome of a policy it is important to examine its implementation process. The study of policy implementation enables one to unravel how and why programs are implemented and it also enables one to explain and foresee successes or failures (O’Gorman, 2011). Policy scholars study outcomes and outputs of a policy by comparing what was achieved with what was expected (Hill and Hupe, 2014). If they are misaligned, then this is an *implementation gap*. The complexity of joint action reduces the chance of successful programme implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) suggest exploring what happens between intentions and achievements in a chronological and hierarchical order. Chronological order is referred to as the necessity of legitimate decision in order to realise a policy goal. Hierarchical order implies a top down implementation process. “Backward mapping” (Elmore, 1979, p. 604) is suitable for analysing an implementation process. Conducting a bottom-up analysis—where the starting point of policy implementation is located at the lowest level where the policy reaches its end point is looked at—enables us to explore how a policy makes difference to everyday life. Identifying conflict and patterns of behaviour at the lowest level helps to identify problems, which can then be brought to a higher organisational level.

Following both approaches in our analysis, we looked for the expectations on both sides of policy implementations. The implementing agents used a top-down pressured approach. Hupe and Hill (2015) discussed a miss-match of expectations on policy-in-practice (views on implementation) and policy-on-paper (meaning of how implementation is to be seen by policy formulators), and suggest that the different worldviews of the organisations

and individuals in the policy process may cause competing interests and expectations. We concentrated, as suggested by Coalter (2010), on the target's group understanding of what sport should be and the "social processes and mechanisms that might lead to desired outcomes for some participants or some organisations in certain circumstances" (p. 311). We looked for the worldviews and expectations held by the implementing agents and the target group of the policy and explored how they interrelated—or not—in the implementation of YLP. By applying implementation theory, we aim to better understand the complex interweaving of different actors involved in the implementation process. We discuss how the implementing agents' activities were perceived by the target group and how the interrelation between these two groups may or may not facilitate youth engagement in organised sport.

Methods

Data collection

Data were drawn from a larger research project analysing various aspects of YSP process concerning Lillehammer2016. Qualitative data were generated in the lead up to Lillehammer2016 and during the event through interviews, documents, and observations, so there is a triangulation in order to increase trustworthiness of the data (Yin, 2009).

Interviews

The 76 young leaders who took part in a course in January 2016 were invited for interviews. Fifty-one of these were females and 25 were males. Thirty-nine young leaders were from Oppland and Hedmark County (Lillehammer's surrounding counties, further referred to as Inland); all other 17 Norwegian counties were represented as well. The majority of participants were from Inland. Interviews were conducted with 16 young leaders (aged 16–20). The interviewed persons were nine females and seven males with 12 from Inland. Four

young leaders were from other Norwegian counties. Each interviewee was asked to review and sign an agreement form, in which they agreed to be recorded. We outlined confidentiality guidelines and participants' right to withdraw from the study at any point. Interview questions included open questions regarding, for example, the young people's relation to organised sports, the reason for participation in YLP, and how they experienced it. In addition, questions that emerged from the aforementioned implementation literature were posed in order to examine the chain and impact of implementation order to understand the process of implementing actions and how YLP was organised. Interviews were also conducted with the course organisers (further referred to as the implementing agents): five employees of NIF and LYOGOC. The implementing agents were identified based on an earlier study by Strittmatter and Skille (2016) on implementation activities in youth sport and Lillehammer2016. The selection procedure was based on strategic sampling to best inform the research questions (George and Bennet, 2005).

Documents

Three reports about YLP were used to generate data. One evaluation report of three courses held in 2014 (Hanstad, Tangevold and Vollen 2015); one (Strittmatter and Hanstad, 2015) about the follow-up course of the earlier courses (October 2015); and an evaluation report on the young leaders' experiences during Lillehammer2016 (Hanstad, Kristiansen, Sand, Skirstad and Strittmatter, 2016). These reports include information about the young leaders' gender, age, and county of residence. Data also include the young leaders' involvement in organised sports as athletes, coaches, and in other functions. In addition, the reports include an evaluation of the course by the participating young leaders; how they perceived the organisation, the single programme points, what they found positive and negative about the course, how they were followed-up by Norwegian sports organisations, and what they wanted

the content to be in future recruitment courses. Another important element of the reports is the connection of the young leaders towards Lillehammer2016 before and during the event. The reports reveal if and why young leaders took part in the organisation of Lillehammer2016, what roles they would have liked to have and which ones they actually had, and whether they felt prepared for their position. In addition, we analysed sport political documents such as the bidding documents and NIF's annual reports, which included information about the formulated policy goals and the intention with Lillehammer2016, as well as the involvement of youth. In total 132 pages were analysed.

Observations

Field notes (72 pages) were generated through observations of a) four of the seven courses that were organised prior Lillehammer2016 between April 2014 and January 2016, and b) the 12 days of the event itself in February 2016.

All three authors conducted observations. During the observations at YLP, we focused on situations in which the implementing agents interacted with the young leaders. Field notes were taken regarding how motivated young leaders were to participate in the courses, how they brought forward ideas, how and whether these ideas were considered by the implementing agents, how they were involved in discussions, as well as how they made progress during the course in terms of gaining knowledge and skills about Norwegian sports, being a leader, and Lillehammer2016. We recorded how Lillehammer2016 was brought up as topic during the courses, and how the implementing agents explained the involvement of the young leaders in the organisation and implementation of the event.

Our observations during Lillehammer2016 focused on how the young leaders were involved in the implementation of the event, what roles they had, and for what tasks they were responsible.

Data analysis

Interviews were transcribed verbatim by the first author and shared with the co-authors. Open coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was used to identify the key emerging themes. Field notes and documents were coded first and then compared to interview transcripts to assess if perceptions during observation were similar to those in the interviews. Examples of thematic categories that emerged from the open coding process were: expectations of YLP, sport for fun, YLP as socialising platform, learning outcome, network opportunity, communication, youth as resource, activation on club level, Lillehammer2016 as excitement, youth for youth. Theoretical coding was followed by identifying categories in light of implementation theory. Applying implementation theory led to the identification of indicators of a) the processes—information about when the implementation started and how it proceeded; and b) structures—information about which actions were implemented and by whom. This enabled the emergence of topics that were presented as commands (top-down) and those that emerged from discussions (bottom-up). This two-cycle coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) revealed how the chains of actions by implementing agents were perceived by the policy target group and the mechanisms between these two groups.

Findings and discussion

To answer the research questions, we first present the young leaders' perceptions of YLP. Then, we compare their perceptions with the process of how YLP was implemented by the implementing agents to identify implementation mechanisms between these two groups.

YLP was generally perceived as positive by the young leaders. In the first-time gatherings, the young leaders reported to be satisfied with the many activities offered and they reported the weekend as having been much *fun*. Especially the *learning outcome* from first-time gatherings as well as the experience gained by *networking*, communicating, and *socialising* with other young people interested in sports from all over Norway were perceived

as positive. Besides having gained “interesting knowledge about how sport is organised in Norway” (young leader, Inland), *communication skills* and how to be self-confident (young leaders from North Norway and Inland), the *leadership content* of the courses was perceived as useful by several. However, critiques came up after the follow-up courses. Too many and drawn out lectures were negatively perceived by the young leaders, who felt that more interactive programme points would have been better (young leader, North Norway).

In the first-time gathering, I also learned about communication skills and conflict solving and so on, and this should have been continued instead of only focusing on presentations about Olympic Games and Youth Olympic Games in general (young leader, North Norway).

Our findings show that there was a mismatch in expectations of the young leaders and the implementing agents concerning YLP, its goals, and its realisation. The implementing agents were criticised for not communicating enough information regarding how the courses would continue after and ahead of the gatherings that followed (young leaders, Inland; North Norway and West Norway). The lack of communication and lack of information, which many interviewed young people mentioned, was due to a lack of strategy for the implementation of the course (employee NIF) as well as a missing programme design (employee LYOGOC). Our data show that the implementation challenges did not start during policy implementation, but that they were already present during policy formulation. The YSP goals in connection to Lillehammer2016 were defined by NIF top management and politicians for the bid process. At the end of 2013, two years after Lillehammer was assigned as host city for Lillehammer2016, representatives of NIF, DSAs Hedmark and Oppland, and LYOGOC started planning YLP to meet the promise that NIF had made regarding improved youth engagement. These implementing agents received a call from NIF’s top administration, saying that they were now responsible to educate 200 young leaders in connection to

Lillehammer2016. This was a top-down command with no guidance, strategy, or suggestions from NIF top management (employee NIF). In the first planning stages, the implementing agents did not plan more than three courses in 2014.

In the beginning, we just planned on three first-time gatherings, we did not know that there would be follow-up courses; they were just organised ad-hoc. Had we known that, the programme would have been different. But there was no time to think things completely through, we had to act quickly (employee NIF).

In 2015, NIF received money for the YLP from a foundation and was able to implement further gatherings (employee NIF). However, this was not planned in the beginning (employee NIF). The implementing agents felt under time and performance pressure to proceed with the YSP implementation (employees NIF and employee LYOGOC), which caused a chain of challenges. The missing implementation strategy had several consequences: a) a mismatch between expectations of leaders and agents, and b) conflict of interests between the implementing organisations. We explain these challenges further in the following.

One of the most common criticisms from the interviewees was that they never knew what the next step was, what would happen after the course, and what they would be doing at Lillehammer2016. This lack of communication created a *mismatch of expectations* on both sides. The young people on the one side expected to have leader positions during Lillehammer2016 and expected to be trained for these jobs through YLP. The implementing agents did not intend to include such training as part of the course due to lack of a strategy and no plans from one gathering to the next (employee NIF), as well as lack of specified aims of which tasks they should have at the event. The implementing agents stated that they did not have the resources to organise this training (employee NIF).

They [the young leaders] had an expectation level of YLP and Lillehammer2016 that was completely unrealistic. This is our own fault because we created an incredible

good course programme for them in 2014 [the first-time gatherings]. I would have loved to have known that YLP would last 20 months in order to use our resources better. I would have liked to have involved the District Sport Associations and National Federations much more. We would have taken care of that and the LYOGOC could have given much more tasks for the young leaders with more details much earlier, so the young leaders would have had time to practice and prepare themselves better for Lillehammer2016 (employee NIF).

At the same time, the LYOGOC staff assigning tasks for Lillehammer2016 did not consider the young leaders as suitable for tasks with responsibility because of their young age and lack of experience. While the implementing agents tried to meet the expectations of the young leaders by assigning them leader roles during Lillehammer2016, the LYOGOC could not provide such roles for them. This caused a *conflict of interest* between the implementing agents—whose goal was to educate 200 young leaders for Norwegian sports—and the LYOGOC, who needed people they could rely on in terms of leadership skills and experience. This phenomenon is in line with the common mismatch of expectations in policy-in-practice and policy-on-paper (see also Hupe and Hill, 2015) and reinforced competing interests of both parties concerning the young leaders, who on paper were supposed to be the target group of both NIF and LYOGOC.

The young leaders expressed dissatisfaction about knowing nothing about their tasks until one month ahead of the event. This lack of knowledge about how YLP was supposed to be organised in the long run was also mirrored in the expectations of young people concerning their tasks during Lillehammer2016. The implementing agents made promises of leadership positions to the young leaders (field notes, September 19th 2014) and these young leaders expected leadership roles and training. The implementing agents used the same rhetoric as policy formulators and realised within the implementation process that the relation between

policy formulation and policy implementation was incompatible—they realised that there was an implementation gap (Hill and Hupe, 2014).

The rhetoric that was used in the beginning stressing the “with, by, and for the youth” was a mistake. We know that this was not happening (...) Of course, Lillehammer2016 was supposed to include a lot of young people, however, 15-20 years olds are the wrong age group to give leadership responsibilities (employee NIF).

In a preceding study, xxx (2016) argued that NIF’s actual agenda behind hosting Lillehammer2016 was to gain legitimacy from political stakeholders such as the International Olympic Committee and Norwegian governments rather than from their actual target group: young people (between 13 and 19). It is unlikely that policy objectives are to be fulfilled if a) formulated policy goals are intended to serve another agenda than formulated, and b) an implementation strategy (including detailed plan of the policy-making, implementing actions and intended outcomes) is missing (see also Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975).

Lillehammer2016 for youth engagement?

The young leaders were looking forward to the games, socialising, meeting people from different countries, the competitions, and the side programs (young leaders Inland, South, West and North Norway). As well, being part of an international event was reported as interesting and exciting. However, the fragmented implementation process and a missing strategic timeline for implementation of the YSP in connection to Lillehammer2016 meant that the knowledge gained by young people during the first-time gatherings was forgotten by the time of the follow-up gatherings (young leader, Inland). Nine months between the first, second, and third gathering was considered too big of a time gap by the young leaders as well as by the implementing agents. Further, there was confusion about what the actual goal of YLP was. On the one hand, they were promised leadership positions at Lillehammer2016, but

they did not get any training for this. The inclusion of Lillehammer2016 in YLP was too descriptive. Rather than informing the young leaders about their tasks, the implementing agents spent a lot of time explaining the history and goal of Lillehammer2016 (field notes, January 10, 2015; January 10, 2016).

I feel that this programme was too much focused on Lillehammer2016. But this was probably the goal—that we learned to be a leader there. But maybe also for our own club and for our own sport. But actually more for Lillehammer2016, I think (young leader, Inland).

Young people were very critical of how Lillehammer2016 would impact the engagement of young persons in sport organisations. Data revealed that while the event was an exciting experience for the youth, it may not have changed behaviour and attitudes towards sports.

Those who already have been engaged are maybe going to engage even more. But for those who are not engaged in sports, it [Lillehammer2016] is not so helpful (young leader, Inland).

The engagement of young people who are already involved in organised sports is likely to increase according to our respondents, however, Lillehammer2016 does not necessarily increase the number of young people engaged.

I think with such initiatives as Lillehammer2016 where young people from Hedmark and Oppland actually go and experience something big, young people understand how cool actually sport in Norway is (...) But I am not sure about if many will take the step to get active themselves (young leader, Inland).

This finding is similar to the results provided by Fahlén (2015), Skille (2008), and Stenling (2013) who found that instead of increasing the number of people into sports, this policy action rather was reproduced as another venue for those already involved in organised sport. Besides the doubt of increasing engagement, the young leaders also doubted that the number

of active participating young persons in sports would increase by staging the event. This is an implementation gap as the formulated goals are not in line with what was achieved (Hill and Hupe, 2014; Elmore, 1979). So if there was a gap in the implementation stage, how could the YLP have an impact on youth and their engagement in organised sport? Some 223 young leaders were educated in the lead up of Lillehammer2016, but only 115 volunteered during the event. Only 20 persons stated that they had leadership tasks during Lillehammer2016 (Hanstad et al., 2016). Networking, socialising, and contributing as resourceful persons are the things young leaders need in sport in order to be engaged. While they found the former two in YLP, they did not find the latter. They were involved in YLP because they expected leadership positions at Lillehammer2016. However, this promise was not fulfilled. The reasoning and resources of the young leaders, hence the mechanisms, were characterised by a mismatch of expectations. In light of Coalter's (2013) argument, the mechanisms make an initiative successful or not, and we argue that YLP will not be successful in terms of getting more young people engaged in sports.

Analysing the results, we found that instead of a felt need to serve the needs and wishes of the young people, YLP was initiated and implemented because leading persons in NIF needed to show that they were working towards the promised outcome that Lillehammer2016 would have on youth. Due to the lack of an effective and thorough implementation process, and because the implementation of YLP was a 'top-down' process, the impact on Lillehammer2016 and YLP on the young people is to be doubted. Policy was developed by the top of the organisational structure and then left with a lower administrative level (i.e., the implementing agents). The input of the young leaders was not taken into account.

How to facilitate youth engagement in organised sports

During the interviews, many general reflections arose on the nature of what sport organisations (NIF, DSAs, or clubs) could do—instead of YLP—in order to engage more young people in Norwegian organised sports as volunteers and participants. Data from the interviews with the young leaders revealed three initiatives that may attract young people engaged in organised sports: 1) more intensive involvement of local clubs in the YLP; 2) adult facilitators or mentors who encourage young people; and 3) clubs' focus on social life and fun rather than performance.

Involvement of clubs

The young leaders suggest the involvement of local clubs to engage more young persons.

It would have been good to have such a YLP in the clubs, but in a way not directed to Lillehammer2016, but a more general course about being a young leader. This would be helpful for new assisting coaches to gain competence (young leader, West Norway).

The YLP on a club level has several advantages—the knowledge gained in the courses can be applied right away (young leader, Oppland) and young people tend to feel more affiliated with their own clubs rather than big international events such as Lillehammer2016 (young leader, West Norway).

If you are spectator at Lillehammer2016 and you would like to contribute, it is difficult to know what you actually can do and who to contact. But if there is a person in your club that actually asks you to contribute with concrete tasks, then it is much easier to get engaged. This would help to get more young people engaged, I think, better than just organise Olympic games where you don't really know what tasks to do and how (young leader, Inland).

This quote confirms that a complex one-off event such as Lillehammer2016 is quite different from day-to-day activities in a local sport club. It is unlikely that persons are prepared for future tasks in local sports clubs through the staging of an international elite event. The young leaders support the bottom-loci of the YLP implementation where the interests of the policy end-users are more likely to be fulfilled than starting implementation on higher administrative levels (see also Lipsky, 1980).

Grown-up facilitators to encourage young people

Data from the interviewees clearly show that the first recommendation to join came from a third person, suggesting and inviting the young people to start with the YLP. That means that the communication about the course registration was directed top-down from the main organisation (NIF) to subordinate organisations (DSAs, clubs, NFs), and schools—not directly from the main organisation to the target group. Young people may not engage in organised sports, an event, or a programme such as the YLP due to lack of motivation and confidence. The young leaders reported that the first step has to come from another person (mostly adults) acting as facilitator providing the young people information and encouraging them to take on tasks.

The clubs have to show that we [the youth] are important. Because it does not help if we are not taken seriously. Most important is that we have the feeling that we are recognised and heard, I think (young leader, North Norway).

This is similar to the key mechanisms for sport programmes for change implementation, which are respect, trust, and reciprocity (Coalter, 2013, p. 602). This is in keeping with Eliasson's (2015) findings, which showed that for children to influence sport, they need adult support to get their voices heard. The young leaders were competent, as presented in the

following quote, and their input is valuable in programme design (Haudenhuyse, Theeboom and Nols, 2012).

If you want to focus on the youth, you have to make them feel that they are important, that adults listen to their ideas. We can contribute, we are resourceful – and I want that adult leaders in the clubs and sports associations realise that, realise that they can involve us, because we are capable of much (young leader, Inland).

This finding of the need for a *mentor* or *facilitating leader* who supports youth is similar to what Pawson (2006) suggested for youth at-risk and also to Coalter's (2012) argument for reciprocity between youth and leaders for increased value of sports towards youth. In order to achieve youth engagement, a stronger communication and information flow between organisations in Norwegian sports is needed. This finding corresponds with literature on the recruitment process of volunteers (Østerlund, 2013)—generally, people volunteer because someone asks them to. Social networks are very important. The most usual way to be recruited is through people one knows. One gets flattered when asked, which lowers the barrier to start and reduces one's doubts regarding competencies.

Sports clubs as social platforms

Structures within the clubs and teams have to be adopted in order for young people to have the chance to engage. A mentor programme was reported as highly appreciated by the young leaders. In this programme adults in a leadership position within sports show and explain young, inexperienced people work, tasks, and everyday life in Norwegian sports. Such a mentor programme already exists in the DSA of Hedmark. The implementing agents from the DSAs Hedmark and Oppland ensured a proper follow-up for the young leaders from these counties. They included the young leaders also in the organisation of other events, such as World Cups, national cups, and social events arranged by the DSA (Employee NIF; young leaders, Inland).

We know that the DSAs Hedmark and Oppland are very focused on youth. We wished we could get more DSAs to act that supportive for the young leaders and initiative for the youth (Employee LYOGOC).

Besides the initiatives of the DSAs and NIF on more regional and national levels, all interviewed young leaders mentioned that organised sport needs to be a fun social platform, and that too many teams and clubs are focused on performance. As argued by Stenling and Fahlén (2014), “sport” has different meanings for different people, and sport policy implementers must be aware of the meaning attributed to sport by the target group in order to meet their needs and expectations. A restructure on sport club level is necessary in order to motivate more young people to be active in teams, and to continue engaging as coaches and athletes. This implies that organising an international event, such as the YOG, might not be an appropriate instrument for the goals that NIF set for youth sport. The findings conform to existing studies that state that volunteer recruitment into sport organisations must meet members’ interests (Østerlund, 2013). NIF should consider the feedback from the target group itself in order to know what the target group actually wants. Replacing the drive for performance in Norwegian sports with “social and fun” aspects is proposed by the interviewees to increase youth engagement. Staging an international youth elite sport event, characterised by the need to win (Kristiansen, 2015), winning seems to be a completely contradictive strategy to what the YSP should stand for (see also Krieger, 2012). While NIF’s young leaders’ courses have existed for many years within DSAs and clubs in Norway, we think it was not an appropriate direction to adapt them on the national level and connect them to Lillehammer2016 without being able to keep promises. Implementation should not only benefit the policy actors who seek legitimacy maintenance (see also Tak, Sam and Jackson, 2016) but it needs to benefit first and foremost the target group. We argue that it would have been better to make strategic changes on a lower policy implementation level, or street level,

as bottom-up supporters suggest (Lipsky, 1980). At this stage, relationships could be built with organisations that meet expectations of the youth. In general, successful implementation of YSP requires organisational change to existing organisational and administrative structures on the grass root level (i.e., sports clubs) (see also Kay, 1996). The implementation process went into the wrong direction of the sports system structures—from an existing local and regional level to a national level programme with elements of an international level event. Rather than lifting it to the national level, an anchoring and elaboration of the programme on the club level would have been better, as requested by the young leaders and sport policy implementation researchers (Skille 2008). The idea of mentor programme can be adopted at the club level throughout Norway, and would be a street-level strategy to engage young people in local sport activities.

Conclusion

In considering this case study, the key theoretical policy and practical issues relate to how the implementation process of a sport policy initiative influences and was influenced by the relation between the policy target group and the implementing agents. The reasoning and resources of the young leaders, or mechanisms, were characterised by misaligned expectations. In light of Coalter's (2013) argument, these mechanisms make or break an initiative, and we argue that YLP will not attract more young people to sports.

As Hill and Hupe's (2014) argued, implementation is successful if the policy outcomes are in line with what was expected, and we build our argument on Pressman and Wildavsky's (1984) thought that policy action depends upon numerous links in a vertical line in the structures of Norwegian sports policy implementation and that deficits can be prevented by close co-operation of the agencies creating these links. But it also depends on who benefits most from the policy (Tak, Sam and Jackson, 2016) as well as the target group. Comparing what was achieved with what was expected (Hill and Hupe, 2014; Pressman and Wildavsky,

1984), we identified a gap in Norwegian youth policy implementation in connection to Lillehammer2016. We argue that the implementation process was unsuccessful in getting more young people engaged because the expectations of the policy target group were not met due to lack of conceptual clarity and inflated promises, as also found by other researchers (e.g. Coalter, 2010). Young leaders could not reconcile what they were promised and looking for with their actual volunteer tasks in Lillehammer2016. Staging an Olympic event that is governed by and organised under highly institutionalised rules and practices with little space for change on operational level (Bodemar and Skille, 2014), and expecting a change on the behaviour of the mass (the youth) without knowing and meeting their expectations followed by a lack of strategic implementation of policy goals is a goal meant to fail.

One problem is that the relationship between policy formation and policy implementation is assumed rather than problematised, and the same is true for ambiguity and conflicts in the policy process affecting the perception of the target group. Donaldson and colleagues (2011) claim that

[f]or successful policy implementation, those who will be affected by or required to implement a policy must view it as a meaningful symbolic object. If they attach meaning to a policy it is more likely that they will be receptive to what it requires of them (p. 757).

They argued that implementation requires actors and organisations to be involved in the process to “attach meaning and importance to the policy” (p.757) and to integrate those various meanings when developing policies. However, the view of target group in this sense has been neglected within implementation research. We argue for that relationship between implementing agents is important during the process. Considering the feedback from the target group and making initiatives implementations more flexible with open-end actions as suggested by Coalter (2013) would be a more appropriate implementation process.

Further studies should focus on how policy makers can consider perceptions of the target groups before choosing the vehicle for implementations in order to comprise the gap between the different levels of policy implementation. In regard of studies on sport events, the purpose of youth elite sport events as a leveraging platform for sport political goals needs further consideration.

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Article 4

Strittmatter, A.-M. (Under review). Increasing youth sport engagement through the Youth Olympic Games: Leveraging strategies and tactics. *International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing*.

**Increasing youth sport engagement through the Youth Olympic Games:
Leveraging strategies and tactics**

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Abstract

This study is focused on youth sport policy (YSP) implementation and outcomes by leveraging the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games with the formulated objective to increase the engagement of young people in Norwegian organised sport. The conceptual framework for analysing strategies and tactics of event leveraging studies combines implementation literature and neo-institutional theory. Planning and perceptions of the leveraging process were explored through 33 semi-structured interviews, documents, and field notes from observations. Vagueness in the YSP implementation of objectives connected to the event was observed. While the successful staging of the event itself was given priority, none of the stakeholder organisations involved in the implementation of the YSP prioritized its leverage. Leveraging challenges such as lack of strategy, money, and human resources were identified. Opportunities for innovation on street-level by the policy network were missed replacing reproduction of existing practices within Norwegian sports structure.

Key words: Social leveraging; Olympic events; sport policy; sport participation; neo-institutional theory; social impact; policy implementation; event leverage; policy network; event management.

1. Introduction

Major sport events such as the Olympic Games are a huge expense for host cities, communities, and countries—they are paid for with public money. The social benefits for citizens from such events have to justify the expense (Chalip, 2006; O'Brien and Gardiner, 2006; Mules, 1998; Preuss, 2004; Preuss and Solberg, 2006; Smith, 2010). Projects that are connected to sport events are often planned and implemented in order to fulfil existing public policy objectives (Derom and VanWynsberghe, 2015; Preuss and Solberg, 2006; Smith and Stevenson, 2009; Smith, 2014). Sport events are seen as means to achieve goals of health and sport participation policy (Derom and VanWynsberghe, 2015).

However, strategies to leverage sport events that increase sport participation are lacking (Taks et al., 2014). Potential sport participation legacies of Olympic events have been studied vastly in sport management and sport policy literature (Gratton and Taylor, 2000; Green and Houlihan, 2005; Hanstad and Skille, 2010; Houlihan and White, 2002), especially the policy formulation of the London 2012 Games (Harris and Houlihan, 2016; Weed et al., 2015). The belief in this so-called demonstration effect is reinforced and reproduced by (sport) policy makers (Weed et al. 2015), is a convenient rationalisation for spending public money (Houlihan and White, 2002), and has become an important argument in Olympic bids (Strittmatter, 2016). However, evidence of the demonstration effect is lacking.

Weed and colleagues (2015) claimed that if the demonstration effect is leveraged effectively, there might be some sport participation outcomes, however, the authors claim that recruiting *new* participants in sport is to be doubted—that effect is most likely due to participants who already are doing sports by getting even more involved in sports (Hanstad and Skille, 2010; Weed et al., 2012).

Thus, creating awareness and developing strategies and tactics for stimulating sport participation before the event, implementing these strategies and tactics during and after the event, seem to be essential to create successful sport participation outcomes. (Taks et al., 2014, p. 229)

The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) emphasised the social benefits for Norwegian organised sports when bidding and organising the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games (Lillehammer2016). The Youth Olympic Games (YOG) are for young athletes, between 15 and 18 years of age, and organised in Olympic cycles in summer and winter editions, however down-sized compared to the Olympics in terms of athletes, budget, venues, disciplines, and organisation (Hanstad et al., 2013). The concept was introduced by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 2007 in order to promote the Olympic values to the youth and inspire young people to participate in sport (Hanstad et al., 2013). As one of the main arguments for hosting Lillehammer2016, NIF argued that the games would increase young people's engagement in organised sports in Norway. This argument was connected to NIF's youth sport policy (YSP) aimed at recruiting more young leaders, young coaches, and young athletes into sport teams and clubs and counter young people's drop-out from teams and clubs in their teenager years. Lillehammer2016 was supposed to be the means to realize these policy goals (Strittmatter, 2016). This YSP is also supported by the Norwegian government, which demanded the leverage of YSP goals when agreeing on delivering the financial state guarantee for the hosting of Lillehammer2016.

How NIF uses the event to achieve these objectives is subject of this present study. I focus on the event leverage of Lillehammer2016 and its impact of the event concerning NIF

formulated YSP goals: the increase of youth engagement (young leaders and coaches) and participation within organised sports.

Taks, Chalip, and Green (2015) state that “sport participation impact is a derivative of social impact” (p. 3). Following Taks et al.’s (2014) proposal for future research to focus on monitoring the formulation and implementation of strategies and tactics of event leveraging for sport participation, the research questions are as follows: a) how was Lillehammer2016 strategically used for implementing the YSP; b) how were the strategies and tactics designed and implemented; and c) how did they impact the event outcome concerning the YSP goals?

This article contributes to existing sport event management and sport event leveraging literature in several ways: Relatively few studies have investigated the link between major sport events and sports participation, and none could be found on youth events and youth participation. I am shifting the focus from event organisers to one of the most important stakeholders of an Olympic event, the national Olympic Committee (NOC) and the host governments (Parent and Deephouse, 2007) in order to shed light on strategic and tactical behaviour of Olympic committees, host governments, and other stakeholders wishing to produce social benefits concerning sport participation in connection to the event.

Next, a literature review on sports events and social leverage is provided. Then, a section on the theoretical framework is explained followed by the research methodology. In the findings and discussion sections, leveraging strategies and tactics are analysed and the impact of Lillehammer2016 on youth engagement in Norwegian organised sport is discussed. The article concludes with implications for future research and sport managers.

2. Sport events and social leverage

Chalip (2006) distinguishes between social impact and social leverage. The former is connected to post event outcomes and latter includes the evaluation that takes into account the

stages of event cycle: bidding, planning, and implementation of the event. Event leveraging creates social benefits for local residents (O'Brien and Chalip, 2008; Smith, 2014). For example, sports events serve as an arena for development of skills in the community through volunteering and organising (Taks et al., 2013). Sport events themselves may impact the quality of life of those living in the host community in both negative and positive ways (Taks et al., 2015). However, claims of sport event impact as well as claims of sustainable post event legacy outcome, such as used by the IOC, Olympic host cities, and governments in order to legitimise the staging of events are often exaggerated and unrealistic. Sport event literature distinguishes between the terms of legacy and leverage. Taks and colleagues (2015) state that sustained outcomes are legacy, while strategic planning for event outcomes is called leverage. They also claim that a distinction between these two terms is important. Legacy planning is concerned with the outcomes of an event that are rendered for the community, while leverage “focuses on the community and the ways that it can integrate each event into its marketing and management strategies” (Taks et al., 2015, p.1), hence also often non-sporting objects. Looking into strategy and tactics that were implemented prior and during a sport event and then identifying the connection to the desired and or unintended outcomes is the basis for Chalip’s (2006) analytical framework of event leverage from a strategic *ex ante* point of view—prior and during the event. “The purpose of studying event leverage is to identify and explore event implementations than can optimise desired event outcomes” (Chalip, 2006, p. 112). Event-led leverage is determined by the implementations and tied to and dependent on levered projects (Smith, 2014). These projects directly influence and impact the event and optimise its outcomes. In contrast, other projects that use the event as opportunity but that are not necessarily depending on the event fall under event-themed leveraging (Smith, 2014). Such projects trigger symbolism, imagery, and emotions in order to theme policies by the hosts and justify the organisation of the event (Chalip, 2006; Smith,

2014). “In event themed projects, a wider set of non-essential projects are pursued—with the event used as a hook to achieve more interest, higher rates of participation and, hopefully better outcomes” (Smith, 2014, p. 19).

Outcomes connected to sport events have been examined in regards of projects leveraging urban development (Smith, 2010; 2014) and business and investment development (O’Brien, 2006; O’Brien and Gardiner, 2006). As well, leverage of sport events has been researched through socio-economic lenses by Derom and VanWynsberghe (2015) who argue for a stronger collaboration on governmental levels (local, provincial and regional) in order to gain social benefits through event leveraging. Researchers agree that social and economic benefits—besides entertainment—are not created simply by staging the event itself (Chalip, 2006, Smith, 2010), but depend on interorganisational interaction and the availability of networking opportunities among key event stakeholders (Chalip, 2004; Chalip and Leyns, 2002; O’Brien and Gardiner, 2006). Besides complexity of event networking and relationship development between the event stakeholders, O’Brien and Gardiner (2006) found that interorganisational linkages, institutional support, and legitimacy are central to leverage. In relation to the objectives of Lillehammer2016, managers rely on a network within sport organisations and local and national governments to do their part to make leverage effective, as I will discuss further down.

To the already existing guidelines for social as well economic outcomes (e.g. Chalip, 2004; Mackellar, 2015), Taks and colleagues (2014) stress that the identification of strategies and tactics is important for successful event leverage. More knowledge about ex ante leveraging process is required in order to understand how event outcomes are affected by event-themed leveraging projects. In this study, the implementation process of NIF’s and the host city’s strategic YSP goals identified by Strittmatter (2016) were examined.

None of the existing frameworks provide insight into implementation strategies and tactics. I argue that a process oriented analytical methodology combined with a process-oriented, inter- and intra-organisational relations and actors oriented theoretical framework is helpful in analysing the strategies and tactics of leveraging policy outcomes through sport events. Combining implementation theory, including policy network analysis, and neo-institutional theory is of help to go into interorganisational relationships, organisational structures, practices, and mechanisms of the organisations that are involved in the event and interested in increased youth engagement through Lillehammer2016.

3. Theoretical framework

Interorganisational relationships are crucial for leveraging social and economic outcomes of events. An important factor in event leverage is the highly intensive partnerships among those stakeholders' organisations (Chalip and Leyns, 2002) that "can affect or [are] affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives" (Freeman, 1984, p.46) and that are interacting in a network (Harris and Houlihan, 2016).

Building on O'Brien and Gardiner's (2006) findings on interorganisational linkages, institutional support and legitimacy are central to leverage and Tasks et al.'s (2014) argumentation for strategy and tactic identification, the present study applies a theoretical framework combining policy implementation literature and neo-institutional theory.

Neo-institutional theory is a foundation to understanding continuity and change within organisations and their institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kikulis, 2000). While there have been many studies on how organisations change their behaviour, practices, and structures, continuity in governance and decision-making has been proven (Kikulis, 2000). Applying neo-institutional theory, I unravel how governance and decision-making processes were created during the Lillehammer2016 bid and how they were preserved

and changed during the implementation of the YSP and Lillehammer2016. These processes help to further analyse how the aligned social benefits on youth engagement in organised sport are leveraged.

Organisations must conform to certain rules and requirements in order to receive support and legitimacy. National or local governments often put in place requirements that organisations must meet in terms of event leveraging (Djaballah et al., 2015). NIF in its public monopoly position to develop sport for all, and youth sport, is given the responsibility by the Norwegian government to do so.

Changes in policies, professions, and programmes can lead organisations to incorporate practices and procedures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), which contributes to the organisation's legitimacy and survival. Using youth sport development as main argument for the Lillehammer2016 bid can be understood as a means for NIF to secure legitimacy (Strittmatter, 2016). A neo-institutional analysis helps to scrutinize the purposive action of "individuals and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions" (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2008, p. 52). The purposive actions by NIF and the LYOGOC concerning the leverage of Lillehammer2016 fall under this understanding of my theoretical analysis.

However, there is a need to scrutinize policy processes in the context of the fact that those processes are organised and influenced by intra- and interorganisational values, norms, and relationships, as well as power structures and practices (Hill and Hupe, 2014). By combining implementation literature (Marsh and Smith, 2000; Scharpf, 1978; Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975) and neo-institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Zucker, 1977), I analyse how structures and cultures enable and constrain actions that shape and develop strategies and tactics. Formal structures as administrative layers within organisations arise within institutional contexts and are the blueprint of an organisation (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This includes the structure of an organisation (listing of

departments, offices, positioned staff, and programmes). As well, in the formal structure, explicit goals and policies are formulated and are interdependent, hence the objectives that link the rationalised structural elements. “Organisations in search of external support and stability incorporate all sorts of incompatible structural elements” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 356). Such elements in the structure and actions of NIF and LYOGOC are looked at and analysed regarding their degree of compatibility.

As “[p]olicy implementation is constrained by the world outside the organisation and the institutional context within they endeavour to act” (Parsons, 1995, p. 471), the analysis of the institutional context requires the analysis of structures and strategic actions. The dialectical policy network approach (Marsh and Smith, 2000) takes *structure* and *agency* into account. “It also clarifies that agents interpret structures and utilise strategic knowledge, and strategic context, which in turn ‘shape, but (...) do not determine, the agent’s future action’” (Harris and Houlihan, p. 6).

The dialectical policy network approach is characterized by important relationships within policy implementation, such as the a) structural context that influences the network and resources of implementing agents; b) agent’s collaboration in producing desired outcomes within an institutional context, c) network interaction and negotiating, d) socio-political factors (structural context), human and financial resources, cooperation between actors in the network, as well as the desired policy outcomes; and e) how interaction between structure and interaction of networks are reflected in the policy outcome (Harris and Houlihan, 2016; Marsh and Smith, 2000). It covers the policy process as a whole by helping analysing the network relations. “One of the key strengths of the dialectical approach is consideration of both structural and agential effects that are significant in relation to policy outcomes” (Harris and Houlihan, 2016, p. 7).

Complementing to these five relationships, I draw on the argument of Strittmatter, Hanstad and Skirstad (2016), taking into consideration the fit of the policy actions for desired policy outcome and the target's group perception of these action. Examining sport policy implementation on community level, Harris and Houlihan (2016) found that the dialectical network policy approach sheds light on the structural and agential factors that directly influence policy outcomes, however, it showed limitation in the individual agents' belief and values and how they affect the network relations. Combining these thoughts with the above named neo-institutional theory is applied as theoretical framework for this study.

4. Methods

This paper draws on findings from an on-going research project of the author examining the YSP process concerning Lillehammer2016 (xxx, 2016; xxx and yyy, 2016; xxx, vvvv and zzz, 2016). A longitudinal and multiple qualitative case study has been conducted in order to examine the event leverage of Lillehammer2016. An important factor in event leverage is the highly intensive partnerships among stakeholders' organisations (Chalip and Leyns, 2002). The responsibility for social leveraging is assigned to the host government (Smith, 2014). In major sports events, local, regional, and national level of governments of the host city host are important stakeholders (Parent and Deephouse, 2007), which is also the case for YOG (Hanstad et al., 2013). Concerning the YSP, the national and regional sport governing bodies are crucial for this research. Within sport policy implementation research, Strittmatter and colleagues (2016) call for an evaluation of target group's perception of policy actions as this perception is an important factor for successful policy outcome. All levels of sport policy implementation were taken into account in this study.

The study utilized embedded cases at different stages. The first case handled the strategies, goals, and policy formulation in the bid phase of Lillehammer2016 of the policy formulators

(i.e., the bid committee). Politicians and top-managers of NIF and City of Lillehammer, the leader of the bid committee, as well as legal and financial and advisors for NIF were interviewed. The interviewees were selected because they were involved in the bidding process and formulation of event outcome goals. The interviews with the bid committee offered insight into who was given responsibility to implement the goals. From this information, the interviewees for the second case of policy process implementation were selected strategically and through snowball procedure. The so-called implementing agents interviewed were representatives of a) NIF sport development department, b) two of NIF's District Sport Associations (DSAs) - in the region, Lillehammer is placed, also called 'Innlandet' - and c) staff of LYOGOC responsible for volunteers and youth involvement and county counsellor of the regional government of Lillehammer. These participants worked practically with the implementation of YSP goals in connection to Lillehammer2016 and provided in-depth information on actions, actors, and organisations involved in projects. Building on the findings of implemented actions from Case 2, the policy target group was interviewed. Sixteen young voluntary leaders during Lillehammer2016 (aged between 16 and 22 years; so-called young leaders) who were part of a leveraging project conducted by the implementing agents participated in the study. The young leaders talked about their perception of the leveraging projects and how they would change or not change their engagement in organised sports in Norway. A total of 33 people were interviewed summed up in all three case studies.

Table 1. List of interviewees who participated in the study

Data generation	Interviewees representing	Policy phase
Case 1	Bid committee (8)	Policy formulation
Case 2	NIF, NIF's DSAs Innlandet, LYOGOC, County of Oppland (9)	Policy implementation
Case 3	Young leaders (16)	Policy implementation

All people who were identified as worth interviewing allowed me to ask questions concerning my study. Interviews were conducted individually, held face-to-face in meeting rooms, offices, or at the homes of participants. All interviewees were informed about the content, aim of the research and their right to resign from the study at any time, and all participants signed a letter of consent. Interview questions centred on the policy process concerning YSP in connection with Lillehammer2016. While event leverage frameworks include the outcome of policy goals, questions suiting the event leverage frameworks (Chalip, 2006; O'Brien and Chalip, 2008) like the following examples were asked: What were the reasons for hosting Lillehammer2016? What will be the contribution for the host community, host region, and host country? The above named theoretical framework was then applied to further questions scrutinizing the structures, practices, actions, and mechanisms of leveraging. Examples for questions are: What were the intended outcomes of the events in terms of the YSP goals? What implementation strategies were used? What actions are taken, when, and why? Who were the involved actors and organisations? What were the reasons to act like this? Was there pressure from stakeholders to act this way?

All interviews were recorded and digitally transcribed. The transcripts were analysed using the two cycle tactic, following Miles and Hubermann (1994) including the analysis of a combination of emerging and pre-defined codes. While the first cycle coding was

characterized by organisation of patterns from emerging themes, the second cycle coding was conducted by looking for patterns through the lenses of the above named theoretical framework, for example the emergence of the code “policy network” when interviewees named partners they collaborated with to implemented a project (which then was also coded as “policy action”). Context and relations (Marsh and Smith, 2000) as well as pressures and influence patterns (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) were taking into consideration in the second cycle. In addition to the interviews, document analysis from documents concerning the YOG in general, Lillehammer2016, NIF, and NIF’s YSP was conducted. Field notes were generated at several meetings where Lillehammer2016 was brought up in connection to NIF’s YSP goals and their implementation. As well, courses of a young leaders programme (YLP) were observed over four weekends. The observation period stretched from autumn 2013 until summer 2016 after the games including 12 days during the games time in February 2016. In total, 92 pages of field notes were analysed, following a similar procedure to the interviews as described above.

5. Findings

In this section, I analyse the leveraging of youth sport engagement through Lillehammer2016. In the analysis, I consider strategic objectives, opportunities, and means of leverage and resources as proposed by O’Brien and Chalip (2008) and the strategies and tactics of the leveraging agents as proposed by Taks and colleagues (2015). By doing so, I also take into account structural contexts and agential actions (Marsh and Smith, 2000) as well as the institutional environment of the policy and its implementation through Lillehammer2016.

5.1 Leveraging strategies and tactics

Many projects connected to an event do not consider leverage as part of the event decision-making and planning process, but rather *ex post*; initiatives are connected to an event after key decisions have been made and approved (Smith, 2014). Smith (2014) states that just when major sports event hosts realize that the promised objectives are hard to achieve, they are initiating “leveraging projects that could improve the outcomes of the event” (p. 20). This is also true for Lillehammer2016. The demonstration effect (increased participation in sports by hosting an event) was rhetorically distributed and manifested in documents and campaigns related to the bid and the promotion of Lillehammer2016 by main stakeholder organisations. These stakeholders were a) NIF, as the owner and formulator of the YSP goals; b) the DSAs of Innlandet (the region surrounding Lillehammer) as the implementing organisation of the YSP; c) the LYOGOC, as important partner for the DSAs and leveraging organisation of the event itself; d) governmental institutions such as Lillehammer city and surrounding counties administration, as well as schools in the host area. These organisations were identified as the network that created strategic leverage objectives, hence the YSP goals in connection with Lillehammer2016. Even though the YSP is called a “strategy” (NIF, 2016, p. 24), tactics were established along the way. In the following I explain how the missing strategy influenced implementing agents’ action.

No strategy from beginning, no strategy on the way

While the YSP goals concerning Lillehammer2016 were formulated during the bid phase, no suggestions for strategic implementation were offered by the bid committee.

We didn't go really into how all the objectives concerning YSP should be operationalised concretely. It is up to NIFs district associations in cooperation with LYOGOC to work further with this. But how the methods will look like and how for example an education programme for young people should look actually be operationalised and how we really involve young people from all sports into this, we had no clue. It was too early to think about it during the bid. We needed to let the organising committee be part of it. We didn't want to lock them into a fixed plan.

(Member of the bid committee)

In order to get started with the YSP and Lillehammer2016, top managers from NIF—the main organisation behind YSP—made staff in NIF's development department and the DSAs of Innlandet responsible for training 200 young leaders in connection with Lillehammer2016 (NIF Representatives 1 and 2). While the implementing agents were told what to achieve, they were not told *how* to achieve it.

So, instead of having a clear strategy on how things should be done, we were mostly concerned about getting action started, to get people involved, bring them on the boat, ask them for advice, schedule meetings. So we started action fast, such as the young leaders programme. As well, collaboration with universities and schools, we wrote contracts, met student groups, informed and tried to start action and engagement in order to get people involved. (LYOGOC Representative 2)

The YLP that the interviewee referred to has existed for several years before Lillehammer2016 was thought of and its concept was copied and adapted to the event. Because there was no strategy, creating, expending, and maintaining the network has become

important for the implementing agents, who started to cooperate with LYOGOC and the County Council of Oppland, the county in which Lillehammer is placed. The implementing agents collaborated to produce desired outcomes within the sports and event context (see also Smith and Marsh, 2000).

The implementing agents described themselves as “catalyst s” and “network builders”, because they had great insights into the structures of the event, the DSAs, the community, and the districts. “We managed to handle the situations while understanding the whole picture with all its connections” (NIF Representative 2). The YSP implementation was influenced by collaboration and agents’ ability to produce desired outcomes within the institutional context of Lillehammer2016 and the Norwegian sports.

We have received signals that we have to contribute for the Youth Olympics, but we never sat together at a table with our bosses and said like this and this and this. We are flexible and just fix stuff. If there would have been persons that felt they are depending on knowing exactly what they have to, that wouldn’t work. But we have routine, we know Lillehammer and NIF and a bit of the mechanisms. (NIF Representative 2)

Tactics: creating projects—a network approach

Within a 22-month time span (from April 2014 until February 2016), seven weekend courses were organised where young people, aged between 14 and 22 years, from all over Norway were taught topics such as the values and structure in Norwegian organised sports, communication skills, rhetoric, leadership skills, and conflict solving. A total of 223 young people (hereafter referred to as young leaders) participated in one or more of these gatherings.

YLP had two goals. First, to recruit young volunteers for Lillehammer2016 and thereby create a new generation of volunteers. The second goal was to train a new generation of leaders in Norwegian sports organisation. The former was important for LYOGOC who needed to recruit young people in the organisation of Lillehammer2016 in order to fulfil their goal “by the youth, with the youth, and for the youth” (Lillehammer2016, 2010, p. 6). The latter was the intended policy outcome by NIF as part of the YSP (NIF, 2012). So, NIF, the two DSAs surrounding Lillehammer, and the LYOGOC shaped the structural context for implementing agents. The structural context and culture within and among these organisations influenced the tactics and their outcome (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

While YLP was the first concrete action concerning YSP goals, the implementing agents created and became involved in several other actions: the mentor programme, “Dream Day” (a school project), “Try the Sport”, and the Youth Olympic Torch Tour.

The mentor programme was initiated immediately after the start of YLP by the DSAs of Innlandet. The DSAs assigned adults with long experience in sports, leadership, and events to function as mentors for the young leaders. The mentors supported the young leaders in their work as coaches in sport clubs or as volunteers at sports events in order to give the young people a follow-up to keep them “in the loop” (NIF Representative 2). While the mentors are volunteers, the DSAs successfully applied for funding from Oppland county, where cooperation was created and financial contribution negotiated in line with the theoretical definition of characteristics in Marsh and Smith’s (2000) approach of policy network. Communication flow between the agents in the network was described as tight and very effective: “We never had anyone working against us, especially the city and community councils were very constructive” (NIF Representative 3). The district used this programme to create competence for the surroundings of Lillehammer with Lillehammer2016 as an

instrument—a purposive action at maintaining the institution of NIF (see also DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

The idea of the mentor programme existed before the young leaders course with Lillehammer2016. Rather than being strategically established for and with event, the programme appeared to be more opportunistic adopted as part of the YSP because it furthered NIF's goals. This serves as another example of the implementing agents actively setting projects into the structural and institutional context (Marsh and Smith, 2000), in order to contribute to the YSP goals. "Dream Day" was a project where students were transported from schools to the sport venues in order to watch competitions during Lillehammer2016 and take part in activities. "Try the Sport" was a project for youth to try out different sports. While YLP, mentor programme, and "Dream Day" were originated by the local actors, "Try the Sport" was mandated by the IOC to be implemented by LYOGOC and NIF. Despite or independent of their different origins, the ideas were created within and spread among the policy network. "That's why we call Lillehammer2016 the arena of opportunities" (County counsellor, Oppland). A ripple effect of such projects was reported by the implementing agents. The projects, such as from the schools, that were conducted in Oppland were copied in Hedmark, the neighbour county, and vice versa.

My main goal is to create new connections. All projects that were delivered were connected to my mandate, hence to connect LYOGOC, sports and youth through each of the project. (County counsellor, Oppland)

Even though implementing agents underscored that they managed very well to connect all these single projects to NIF's YSP (NIF Representative, 2; LYOGOC Representative, 1), my analysis shows that only YLP and the mentor programme were directly connected to NIF (and its sub-organisations). Moreover, the analysis revealed that the YLP and the mentor

programme are the only tactics that intentionally could increase youth engagement in organised sports. On the contrary, “Dream Day” and “Try the Sport” projects were not anchored in sport organisations. Even though students could try out new sports at the event, there was no information available on how to pursue this sport—the stations were hosted by individual volunteers, not representatives of sport clubs who could provide information about the sport. Therefore, it is doubtful that these projects will trigger an increase in young people’s engagement into organised sports. However, the implementing organisations missed opportunities by involving sports clubs and federations (Strittmatter and Skille, 2016). Similar to the findings of Weed and colleagues’ (2015) study concerning the London2012 Games, the young people’s sport engagement aspiration was of political belief in the demonstration effect and its rhetoric distribution and manifestation (Zucker, 1977) in documents and campaigns related to the bid and the promotion of Lillehammer2016.

While there was a lack of strategy in the beginning, consequently no strategic milestones were defined along the way. As well, a post games plan was missing.

I think that a lot depends on how NIF is able to take advantage of this after the games.

By now, from what I know, there is no plan for this. It’s like a working progress, I think. Of course, we need to have a gathering after the event in order to sum-up. But if there is there is a long-term plan? I haven’t seen one. (NIF Representative 4)

The LYOGOC staff reported that they felt high pressure from IOC to involve young people in the organisation of the event (LYOGOC Representatives 1 and 2). “They are very concerned with how we can create a good concept for the event itself. So therefore we have to prioritize the event and the implementation and what is important *NOW*” (LYOGOC Representative 1).

The education of young leaders through Lillehammer cannot be seen as leveraging young people's engagement in organised sports. Simply training young leaders for volunteering at an event does not necessarily lead to a long term youth engagement and participation in organised sport. The latter would require a change in young persons' behaviour beyond such an event (see also O'Brien and Chalip, 2008) but also changes in the structure of what organised sports is offering for young people. So the question how Lillehammer2016 could foster such a change needs to be addressed.

DSAs had meetings after Lillehammer2016 addressing legacy opportunities concerning certain issues—one special point was how to use the knowledge from Lillehammer and the projects, such as the YLP, in order to drive the goals on the YSP.

5.2 Leverage for youth engagement?

Lillehammer2016 fostered enthusiasm among young leaders. The rhetoric that the “YOG will create enthusiasm among youth” used by the IOC, the bid committee, NIF (Strittmatter, 2016) was confirmed by young leaders in terms of the youth who already are in sports.

This [Lillehammer2016] is a huge source for inspiration, I think. People might see someone doing sports and wish that they can be like him or her. And then they maybe want to try the sport and practice more and more. Eventually, they end up in a team or club. (Young leader, Lillehammer)

I have to say that I would really like to sit in a board of a club or association or something like this. (Young leader, North Norway)

The young leaders expressed their sense of belonging to the event, that they are part of it even though they had no influence on organising and / or implementation plans of the event itself.

They ‘solely’ were volunteers, helping out with lower level tasks. Host countries and host NOCs are required to provide immense of human, financial, and networking resources for communication and implementation in order to leverage youth engagement. Many young people who are not in organised sports are easily left out of the engagement in YOG and are hard to find. The young leaders agree on that the enthusiasm of young people who are not doing sports was limited.

I think such a happening where young people from Hedmark and Oppland get together and actually see how big such an event is, they will be impressed and think it is cool. But to take the step to get more engaged within sports? I am not really sure about that.
(Young leader, Hedmark)

Those that already are in sports, are probably getting even more engaged. But those that haven’t been engaged at all, I don’t think this [Lillehammer2016] helps a lot.
(Young leader, Lillehammer)

The young leaders have been pushed by NIF (e.g., through the intensive promotion campaign of the Youth Olympic Torch Tour). This has been criticised by people within NIF. While NIF and LYOGOC called the young leaders “creme de la creme of Norwegian youth” (field notes, discussion meeting on report of Lillehammer2016 volunteers, May 26 2016) because they were interested to engage in and contribute to Norwegian organised sports, a representative of the DSA said such a classification will distance NIF from young people who did not join the YLP. The YLP as *success factor* and *event legacy* was mentioned in several speeches by the CEO and leaders in NIF before, during, and after Lillehammer2016. With the term “young leaders being the new generation of volunteers” LYOGOC and NIF rhetorically created an

institution (see also Lawrence et al., 2008) that was reinforced by the leaders of NIF and LYOGOC over a long time. Through YLP, NIF has taken care of those who were motivated to engage in sports. This however, was a small group, and young people outside Norwegian sports structure may not have been reached. Successful leverage for increased youth engagement in organised sports simply could not be identified.

While the implementing agents agree on the many projects that were successful for the time being, an actual impact on the engagement of young people into organised sports is doubted by the implementing agents themselves

I think it is fun with such a big happening as the YOG and all the projects around it. And it was nice that we could call it a milestone that we have worked for three or four years. But I don't think that the event itself will change too much with youth sport. I don't think so. I hope I am wrong, but I think the distance to the young people outside of sport teams is too big. (NIF Representative, 1)

This finding is also supported in the literature, where several researchers emphasise that the recruitment of new participants into sport is unlikely, however sport events might touch those who already are in sports (Weed et al., 2015; Hanstad and Skille, 2010).

Young leaders from Lillehammer emphasised that Lillehammer2016 evoked a feeling of excitement due to local closeness. Something that is happening "at home."

I have a geographical affiliation to Lillehammer, and for me, it was just natural to be part of it and signing up as volunteer. And our school was very positive about us joining the YLP. If it had been in Northern Norway, I don't think I would have taken part. (Young leader, Lillehammer)

Excitement and engagement due to geographical closeness can be compared to a heightened sense of community (Chalip, 2006), which events are able to create inside the local residence. Evoking a “communal atmosphere” is considered a leverage resource (Chalip, 2006, p.110) for example, as Derom and VanWynsberghe’s (2015) argue in their study of the Tour de Flanders. The tour is perceived as belonging to the citizens in the community injecting “new energy” to the communal atmosphere (p. 118). Legacies from events can be classified as leverageable resources also as learning from the past experiences.

A “heightened sense of community” (Chalip, 2006, p.110) that sports events are able to trigger in the host area, could be found in Lillehammer among politicians, organisers, implementing agents, and youth. Policy networks have been created among NIF, the DSAs surrounding Lillehammer region, involving schools, universities, and projects in the community of Lillehammer in order to create a YOG spirit among people in the community. Local and regional networks were of special interest and focus among the implementing agents.

The most important partners that we have worked with are schools, both high schools and university colleges, in order to create projects in collaboration with pupils and students. As well, sport organisations were important, NIF, DSAs, NFs, cultural organisations, the Norwegian youth organisation of arts, county councils of Hedmark and Oppland—all these contacts are about creating activity and engagement among youth for two reasons: in order to get them engaged as volunteers, and to actively engage during the games. (LYOGOC Representative 1)

The county council saw the network that has been created as opportunity for future projects in a long-term perspective. While the county hosts FIS World Cups in Alpine and Nordic Combined every year, closer cooperation with schools and as well sport organisation is easier to coordinate after the guidelines that were worked out after Lillehammer2016 (County counsellor, Oppland). While the LYOGOC was more focused on what happened during the event on local level, NIF expressed concerns also outside the Lillehammer region and in a more long-lasting impact concerning youth engagement in organised sport, also outside local residents. This concern has not been followed up accordingly though.

While the majority of the young leaders stem from Oppland and Hedmark, NIF recruited young people from all of Norway. The Youth Olympic Torch Tour comprised 21 small events in all Norwegian counties in order to involve young people aside from local residents (LYOGOC Representative, 2). Other aims of the tour were to give young leaders in sports publicity (LYOGOC, 2016), and to promote the games among the whole country. While the above named mentor programme is well established in the DSAs of Innlandet without involvements from national level and NIF, the application in other Norwegian DSAs remained a challenge because it was hard to find people willing to be mentors for young leaders from other counties (NIF Representative 2).

5.3 Leverageable resources

Objectives concerning increased youth engagement in Norwegian sports were strongly connected to Lillehammer2016 as the most important resource since the start of the bid process dating back to 2008. However, the event itself cannot be classified as a leverage resource. Possible resource for leveraging was also the event legacy of Lillehammer1994 Winter Olympic Games, which were crucial for sports enthusiasm in the community, which still is referring to the spirit of the games. The slogan “Bring the Olympic flame back to

Lillehammer” has been communicated by NIF and LYOGOC on several occasions, and was also mirrored in the opening ceremony of Lillehammer2016.

Lillehammer region has a strong tradition for voluntary work, especially with the background from 1994. But those who volunteered back then are getting old. So ideally, we wish to get a new generation of volunteers so they learn value of the voluntary work as it was done in 1994. (Leader of the bid committee)

The legacy from the Winter Olympics 1994 was described as a motivational factor for the population to support the youth edition (bid committee member, NIF politician). The communal atmosphere stemming from Lillehammer1994 was reported to be useful when thinking about the future impact of Lillehammer2016.

It was very clear during the process that the Youth Olympics should be used to get a new generation of volunteers. And this argumentation was very well perceived in the surrounding towns in the Lillehammer region. Everyone said, ‘yes, we want to continue staging good events, and now it is the same people that did it in 94, and we need new ones joining the team in future’. This is how you maintain the brand Lillehammer. (Bid committee member, staff city of Lillehammer)

The legacy of Lillehammer1994, including its venues and experience with volunteering, might have been a resource for leveraging the little sister for increased youth engagement and participation in sport, however, the argumentation from the interviewees seemed to be more focused on the fact that Lillehammer2016 should be staged instead of how it actually strategically can be used for the YSP objectives.

Resources that could be identified were the existing manuals and structure of the already existing YLP in NIF, which was copied and adopted to Lillehammer2016 in order to fit NIF's YSP goals concerning Lillehammer2016 (see also Strittmatter and Skille, 2016). The most important resources though were the human resources (implementing agents) and their ability to create, influence, and act within the network, which was found the most important leveraging resource in this present study.

Things take time. We are depending on resources in all areas of the YSP. We need a resource person that has this goal as dedicated task. Without them nothing happens. More staff should be hired. (NIF Representative 1)

Human and financial resources influence the policy network (Marsh and Smith, 2000). However, due to lack of human and financial resources (NIF Representative 1; County counsellor, Oppland) action was limited by the implementing agents, however their expertise in the field and ability to create solutions by operating in a network helped to push the sport community's relationships, especially locally.

6. Discussion

The organisations under which the implementing agents were operating shaped the structural context with a) NIF as national sport governing body, formulating and owning the YSP goals; b) the DSAs of Innlandet surrounding host city Lillehammer who were interested in YSP goals to be fulfilled in order to strengthen the sport structures on regional level; and c) LYOGOC's main goal to implement the games as required, under the strict requirement given by the IOC, and additionally to have part of the YSP as their own, however without prioritizing YSP. These organisations and their structural and inter-relational connection

shaped the institutional environment of the implementing agents (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). At the same time, it was the agents' ability to act under and use this structural context that shaped the organisations (by creating a policy network). The implementing agents reflected on these structures and how they can be used for successful policy outcome (Marsh and Smith, 2000). Normative knowledge and skills within the field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) thus were of necessity for the implementing agents and their tactics for using Lillehammer2016 to fulfil the YSP goals.

NIF's YSP goals were complex and not many organisations involved in Lillehammer2016 were interested to follow them up. LYOGOC, for example, needed to focus on logistical and management issues for succesul planning and execution of the events itself. Event organising committes with often limited life-cylces are therefore not suited as major actor in long-term social development projects (Smith, 2014). However, goals that were directly of advantage for LYOGOC for staging the event could be realised. For example, the YLP was first and foremost assigned to fulfilling YSP goals, getting more young people engaged in organised sports, however, in the end, 115 young people were young volunteers at the event. In other words, only the goal that was formulated for LYOGOC (young volunteers) was properly pursued by NIF. LYOGOC and NIF prioritized those actions that conformed to the rules and requirements of the most important stakeholder of YOG, the IOC, in order to receive support and legitimacy. The policy actors representing these organisations responded to these pressures locally, which, as it can be understood from Lawrence et al. (2008), is a processes of maintenance and reproduction of the organisations' roles. As the findings show, the implementing agents acted within their own capacity being aware of the embeddedness of their work - the embeddedness of the YSP goals important for NIF, and NIF's and the events legitimacy from IOC as well as the public.

The implementing agents brought the organisations they work for in a positive light, and managed to interconnect with many different local actors, such as schools, county counsels, and universities, which created a network that may be useful for implementation of local projects. A heightened sense of community (Chalip, 2006) was thereby reinforced, leaving a chance to work on and create new ideas such as follow-up projects on youth sport. Even though scholars claim that such partnerships between governmental, local organisations and event agencies can trigger sustainable outcomes (Smith, 2014; Taks et al., 2014), they need to be handled in a sustainable enhancing way. While many negotiations concerning the YSP between the organisations were built on rather informal confirmations among individuals, the question is how formal and sustainable these future collaborations can be for leaving a legacy. Concerning the importance of interorganisational linkages, institutional support and legitimacy as central to leverage (O'Brien and Gardiner, 2006), the findings show that the actors and stakeholder organisation did connect, however, their relationship was rather vague. The organisations themselves lived separate lives and had different goals—and these were not necessarily connected to the YSP goals.

As presented above, problems including a lack of money, human resources, and strategic plans were identified. As well, a solid focus on marketing as proposed as successful leveraging tactics (Taks et al., 2014) was absent. Although the dialog and relations among the actors were good, the network was not used in the right way for leveraging Lillehammer2016 to fulfil YSP goals. Interorganisational linkages were not strongly executed due to a lack of interorganisational communication concerning strategic implementation of the programmes. Although many projects were created, the network has not reached the depth to anchor such project into organisations that have an interest in keeping these projects up and running for a longer period of time after the games.

The YLP was realized in connection with the notion of creating a new generation of volunteers, a policy outcome leveraged through Lillehammer2016. However, how sustainable this outcome will be is to be questioned due to the small amount of people who actually joined it. The YSP goals, recruiting more young leaders, volunteers, coaches, and participants into organised sports with help of Lillehammer2016 was not coherent with the implementation of the event. Chalip (2006) emphasises that public discourse including political issues are substitutions instead of a stimulus for leverage. However, production and constant reproduction of the symbolic meaning of Lillehammer2016 by the bid committee top-managers within NIF, and staff of LYOGOC put several projects into place that might otherwise not have existed. A plan for the young leaders after the event has not been worked out. The YSP goal implementation through the event seemed to be not bearable by the few implementing agents and the organisations involved. The technical details of implementation proved to be more time-consuming and more difficult than NIF and its partner organisations assumed. NIF could not use the event to get their YSP objective fulfilled by applying these strategies and tactics. Creating such a huge event and at the same time creating big positive social outcomes for youth sport was unrealistic. Therefore, the strategies and tactics applied for Lillehammer2016 were not the right ways in which to stimulate youth engagement in organised sports. Reflecting on interaction between structure and interaction of networks in the policy outcome (Marsh and Smith, 2000) might help NIF after the games to re-evaluate leveraging strategies for future projects.

7. Conclusion

This study focused on how NIF used Lillehammer2016 to get their objectives concerning YSP fulfilled. Using a conceptual framework built on implementation literature and institutional

theory provided insights on leverage problems and develops an understanding of how tactics are developed by implementing agents.

The study revealed that NIF's YSP goals were complex and not many organisations involved in Lillehammer2016 were interested to follow up on them. While the successful planning and execution of the event itself was given priority, the stakeholder organisations involved in the implementation of the YSP did not own this goal. Leveraging challenges then spread with lack of strategy, money, and human resources. This situation caused implementing agents to establish a policy network. Those involved actors and stakeholder organisations did not own these goals. Creating a huge event and at the same time creating big positive social outcomes for youth sport level was not realistic. Two leveraging projects reached out to young people who were motivated to be part in sports, a small group, however, that did not include young people outside the Norwegian sports structure. Therefore, successful leverage for increased youth engagement in organised sports was not identified.

In terms of institutionalism, the study shows that the motivation to do something for youth was strong among policy actors and the organisations involved in the event and leveraging actions of the YSP goals. While most organising committees are only focused on getting the games delivered, the LYOGOC showed a genuine commitment to create the basis for NIF's and the Norwegian government's goals of a new generation of volunteers. However, during and shortly after the event it was not clear which organisations would take the momentum forward.

As it stands, there is, and as my findings have shown, there has steadily been, a strong ambivalence around implementation of objectives within the YSP process. However, although the YSP objectives and their implementation in connection to Lillehammer2016 were vague, the event mirrored values of protecting and strengthening the youth. This culture is dominant in Norwegian sports and the policy network's focus of the YSP was concerned with creating

something for the youth, as the whole event was. Even though precise objectives were absent, the general objective that Lillehammer2016 should be about youth was very strong among all key stakeholders. While all organisations and actors seemed to want to do the right thing, no one seemed to be strategically clear what this right thing for youth was. Several organisations were not sure what to do because there was no clear sense of how to do it. This vagueness from the top spreading down the administrative and operational levels actually created space for innovation at the street level. NIF and the DSAs could have been dynamic and innovative in the policy network they created, however, as exemplified by YLP, the implementing agents chose to be conservative and focused on the reproduction of NIF practices. However, this situation intercorrelates with the interorganisational top-down pressure and exaggerated expectations from the top, which resulted in limited capacity at the street level (see also Lipsky, 1980). In that sense, it would be interesting to focus on the opportunities that could have been created by the policy network, but that weren't realized. I propose future research to concentrate on the analysis of establishment and management of effective network in order to create added value to leveraging goals. In this study, economic aspects were not addressed, which is a limitation of this study. As well, this present case was limited to NIFs YSP objectives, and focused on the outcomes of young people and organised sports. I did not look into other social aspects in the life of young people, which would be benefitting to research on how youth elite sport events might be beneficial to young people in non-sportive aspects. Future research about costs-benefits of from a socio-economical perspective would be helpful to shed light on what kind of leveraging strategies could be beneficial for (youth) sports engagement in Olympic host countries.

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10. Appendices

Appendix 1: Summary in Norwegian

Innledning: Hovedargumentet til Norges idrettsforbund og olympiske og paralympiske komité (NIF) for å arrangere Ungdoms-OL på Lillehammer 2016 (heretter kalt Lillehammer 2016) var en antakelse om at arrangementet ville øke deltakelsen av ungdom i den organiserte idretten, gi flere unge ledere og trenere og spille en viktig rolle i NIFs politikk for ungdomsidretten.

Hensikt: Målet med denne studien er å analysere hvordan ulike aktører formet og påvirket norsk ungdomsidrettspolitik i tilknytning til Lillehammer 2016 med særlig henblikk på hvordan det bidro til å legitimere NIF. Studien er bygget opp rundt fire problemstillinger, som omfatter hele den politiske prosessen, fra politikkformulering (Artikkel 1) via implementering (Artikkel 2) og målgruppens oppfatning av politikken (Artikkel 3) til politikken utfall (Artikkel 4).

Teoretisk rammeverk: En kombinasjon av neo-institusjonell organisasjonsteori og implementeringsteori ble brukt som analytisk rammeverk for å undersøke hvordan strukturer og praksis i den politiske prosessen knyttet til ungdomsidrett og Lillehammer 2016 kommer til uttrykk, blir implementert, reproduert og endret.

Metode: Studien er basert på en kvalitativ undersøkelse som omfatter 33 intervjuer med aktører som var sentrale i de politiske prosessene i forbindelse med Lillehammer 2016. De semi-strukturerte intervjuene ble gjennomført med representanter fra søkerkomiteen (n=8), som var involvert i politikkformuleringen og ansatte innen NIF (=4) organisasjonskomiteen (n=4) og Opplands fylkeskommune (n=1) som var involvert i implementering av NIFs ungdomspolitik. I tillegg ble det gjennomført intervjuer med deltakere (n=16) av lederkurset for ungdom som ble arrangert med spesiell tilknytning til Lillehammer 2016. Studien ble komplementert med dokumentanalyser og observasjoner gjennomført før, under og etter arrangementet.

Funn og diskusjon: Et hovedfunn er at et idrettsarrangement kan være nyttig for legitimering av interessen til idrettspolitikere, samtidig som denne interessen ikke nødvendigvis er i overensstemmelse med den gjeldende idrettspolitikken. Hovedkonklusjonen for denne

avhandlingen er at legitimeringsprosessen fra NIF kan bli sporet i samtlige stadier av den idrettspolitiske prosessen.

Språket som ble brukt i søknaden om Lillehammer 2016, i dokumenter, i møter, og i søkerkomiteens kommunikasjon, var basert på en tatt-for-gitt forståelse av målene for ungdomsidrettspolitikken. Språket i søknaden ble utarbeidet for å underbygge antakelsen om Lillehammer 2016 som en løsning på eksisterende og langvarige utfordringer i norsk ungdomsidrett. I så måte har politikken for ungdomsidretten bidratt til at allerede eksisterende normer og strategier knyttet til frafallsproblematikken forsterkes. Lillehammer 2016 var ikke en løsning på frafallsproblematikken, men først og fremst et argument for å rettfærdiggjøre søknaden.

Implementeringen var preget av interessekonflikter mellom de involverte organisasjonene, institusjonell press fra NIF på implementeringsagenter samt manglende gjennomføringsstrategi. Dette resulterte i spenninger mellom ledelsen i NIF, de administrative ansatte som skulle gjennomføre politikken samt målgruppen, noe som igjen førte til utfordringer når det gjaldt implementeringen av ungdomsidrettspolitikken. NIF kan ved sin deltakelse i Lillehammer 2016 dokumentere at de utviklet prosjekter som involverte unge mennesker, samtidig som prosjektene i liten grad bidro til å utvikle ungdomsidretten og forhindre frafallsproblematikken. Prosjektene gjenspeiler mer målsettinger initiert av få ansatte innen NIF og LYOGOC. NIF vil få æren for dette selv om bare delmålet for de unge ledere ble fulgt opp.

Å initiere et utdanningsprogram for unge ledere var for NIF en utmerket mulighet til å nå noen av de utlovede målene for Lillehammer 2016, som for eksempel inkludering av unge frivillige i arrangementet. Samtidig var involvering av unge ledere et delmål i NIFs idrettspolitisk dokumentet. Jeg diskuterer om det var viktigere for NIF å overbevise offentligheten om sin vellykkede ungdomspolitikken enn å få bidra til en reell økning av unge mennesker involvert i organisert idrett. Denne studien presenterer en teoretisk modell for å forstå forholdet mellom idrettspolitiske (prosesser) og legitimeringsprosesser av idrettsorganisasjoner basert på empiriske funn.

Stikkord: ungdomsidrett, legitimitet, neo-institusjonell teori, implementering av politikk, idrettspolitikken, olympiske leker, ungdoms-OL, sport management

**Appendix 2: Norwegian Social Science Data Services—
acceptance for collecting and keeping personal data**



Anna-Maria Strittmatter
Seksjon for kultur og samfunn Norges idrettshøgskole
Postboks 4014 Ullevål stadion
0806 OSLO

Vår dato: 16.05.2014

Vår ref: 38754 / 3 / LT

Deres dato:

Deres ref:

TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 12.05.2014. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

38754 *Youth Elite Sport Events - Bidding, Management and Impacts of the Youth Olympic Games 2016*
Behandlingsansvarlig *Norges idrettshøgskole, ved institusjonens øverste leder*
Daglig ansvarlig *Anna-Maria Strittmatter*

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger er meldepliktig i henhold til personopplysningsloven § 31. Behandlingen tilfredsstillende i personopplysningsloven.

Personvernombudets vurdering forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et eget skjema, <http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/meldeplikt/skjema.html>. Det skal også gis melding etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet.

Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database, <http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt>.

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 14.10.2017, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Vennlig hilsen

Katrine Utaaker Segadal

Lis Tenold

Kontaktperson: Lis Tenold tlf: 55 58 33 77

Vedlegg: Prosjektvurdering

Dokumentet er elektronisk produsert og godkjent ved NSDs rutiner for elektronisk godkjenning.

Avdelingskontorer / District Offices

OSLO: NSD, Universitetet i Oslo, Postboks 1055 Blindern, 0316 Oslo. Tel: +47-22 85 52 11. nsd@uio.no

TRONDHEIM: NSD, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, 7491 Trondheim. Tel: +47-73 59 19 07. kyrre.svarva@svt.ntnu.no

TROMSØ: NSD, SVF, Universitetet i Tromsø, 9037 Tromsø. Tel: +47-77 64 43 36. nsdmaa@svt.uit.no

Personvernombudet for forskning



Prosjektvurdering - Kommentar

Prosjektnr: 38754

Det gis skriftlig informasjon og innhentes skriftlig samtykke for deltakelse. Personvernombudet finner i utgangspunktet skrevet godt utformet, men forutsetter at det i samtykket tas vekk punktet ""Jeg samtykker til at personopplysninger kan publiseres/lagres etter prosjektslutt". Personvernombudet legger til grunn for sin godkjenning at revidert skriv ettersendes personvernombudet@nsd.uib.no før det tas kontakt med utvalget (merk eposten med prosjektnummer).

Personvernombudet legger til grunn at forsker etterfølger Norges idrettshøgskole sine interne rutiner for datasikkerhet. Dersom personopplysninger skal lagres på mobile enheter, bør opplysningene krypteres tilstrekkelig.

Forventet prosjektslutt er 14.10.2017. Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal innsamlede opplysninger da anonymiseres. Anonymisering innebærer å bearbeide datamaterialet slik at ingen enkeltpersoner kan gjenkjennes. Det gjøres ved å slette direkte personopplysninger (som navn/koblingsnøkkel), slette/omskrive indirekte personopplysninger (identifiserende sammenstilling av bakgrunnsopplysninger som f.eks. bosted/arbeidssted, alder og kjønn) samt slette lydopptak.

**Appendix 3: Information letter to the interviewees and consent
declaration form**

Forespørsel om deltakelse i forskningsprosjektet

”Norwegian Youth Sport Policy and the 2016 Lillehammer Winter Youth Olympic Games?”

Bakgrunn og formål

Formålet med studien er å belyse organisasjonsprosessen av Ungdoms-OL som skal gjennomføres 2016 i Lillehammer, Norge. I tillegg skal idrettspolitiske prosjekter knyttet til arrangementet belyses. Organisasjonsprosesser fra søknaden, via forberedelse og gjennomføring til virking i etterkant av avviklet arrangement skal belyses med bruk av intervjuer og observasjoner. Et hovedfokus ligger på aktørene som har innflytelse på Ungdoms-OL, hvordan de jobber og hvordan de samarbeider med organisasjonskomiteen.

Prosjektet er en doktorgradsstudie i sport management ved Seksjon for Kultur og Samfunn på Norges Idrettshøgskole og er knyttet til Forskningscenter for Barn- og Ungdomsidrett (FOBU).

Utvalget er trukket av representanter fra organisasjoner som samarbeider med organisasjonskomiteen av Ungdoms-OL 2016 og NIFs ungdomspolitik.

Hva innebærer deltakelse i studien?

Hovedtrekkene i studien er datainnsamling via intervjuer og observasjoner. Spørsmålene vil omhandle hvordan aktørene er involvert i organisasjonsprosess av Ungdoms-OL og prosjekter knyttet til arrangementet. Hvem arbeider aktørene mest sammen? Hvordan og hvorfor kom samarbeid på plass? Intervjuet registreres med hjelp av notater og lydopptak.

Hva skjer med informasjonen om deg?

Alle personopplysninger vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. Det er bare forskeren (Anna-Maria Strittmatter) som vil ha tilgang til personopplysninger. Direkte personidentifiserende opplysninger erstattes med et referansenummer som viser til en atskilt navneliste (koblingsnøkkel).. Personopplysninger lagres adskilt i fra koblingsnøkkel i et låst skap i forskers låst kontor.

Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes **14.10.2017**. Personopplysninger og lydopptak skal slettes med prosjektslutt.

Frivillig deltakelse

Det er frivillig å delta i studien, og du kan når som helst trekke ditt samtykke uten å oppgi noen grunn. Dersom du trekker deg, vil alle opplysninger om deg bli anonymisert.

Dersom du ønsker å delta eller har spørsmål til studien, ta kontakt med Anna-Maria Strittmatter, tlf. 97863856; epost: a.m.strittmatter@nih.no

Studien er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS.

Samtykke til deltakelse i studien

Jeg har mottatt informasjon om studien, og er villig til å delta

(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)

Jeg samtykker til å delta i intervju

Appendix 4: Interview guide, first round of data collection

1. Personlig informasjon Personal information

- Når er du født? **When were you born?**
- Hvilken utdannelse, yrkeserfaring og kompetanse har du? **What kind of education, work experience, and skills do you have?**

2. Organisering av søknadsprosedyren Organization of the bidding process

- Hva var din rolle i søknadsprosedyren? **What was your role in the bidding process?**
- Kan du beskrive søknadskomiteen for Lillehammer 2016 inkludert mål, styrker, svakheter, muligheter og hindringer eller utfordringer? **Can you describe the bid committee for Lillehammer 2016 including its goals, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges or limitations?**
- Kan du forklare kronologisk hvordan søknaden ble initiert, via organisering av prosessen og gjennomføring av søknaden til søknaden ble akseptert? **Can you explain how the bid process came about in chronological order from initiation and implementation until the bid was accepted?**
- Oppfølgingsspørsmål: Er det riktig at IOC ba NIF om å søke Ungdoms-OL 2016? **Follow-up question: Is it correct that IOC asked NIF to bid for Lillehammer 2016?**
- Hvordan reagerte folk i NIF og Lillehammer da de ble informert om Lillehammer 2016? **What was the reaction concerning the bid among people in NIF and Lillehammer?**
- Angående argumentasjon innen prosessen: hvem var for hva og hvem var mot hva? **Concerning the argumentation during the process, who was for what and who was against what?**

3. Samarbeidspartnere av søkerkomiteen Collaborations of the bid committee

- Hvilke organisasjoner / aktører var viktige for søkerkomiteen? **What organizations and actors were important within the bidding process?**
- Hvordan var samarbeidet med samarbeidspartnere? **How was the collaboration and why did you wish do collaborate with them?**

- Hva var de primære ønskede resultater for disse partnerskapene? Ble resultatene oppnådd?
Which goals did you wish for concerning these partnerships? Were the goals achieved?
 - Hvilket tema var det som ble mest diskutert? Var det noen uenighet? Hvem kom opp med temaer / ideer? **Which topic was most discussed? Was there agreement and/or disagreement? Who brought up topics / ideas?**
 - Hvilken rolle spilte IOC i søknadsprosessen? **What role did the IOC play in the bidding process?**
4. Grunner for å arrangere ungdoms-OL **Reasons for hosting Lillehammer 2016**
- Hva var intensjonene i første omgang da det ble besluttet å søke på Ungdoms-OL? **What were the objectives when it was first decided to bid for Lillehammer 2016?**
 - Er intensjonene fortsatt de samme? Har de endret seg over tid? **Are these goals the same today or have they changed?**
 - Oppfølgings spørsmål: Hvilken rolle spilte den pågående søkerprosessen for Oslo 2022 i denne sammenheng? **Which role did the bid for Oslo 2022 play in this context?**
5. Sideeffekter av Ungdoms-OL **Impact of Lillehammer 2016**
- Hva tror du Ungdoms-OL kan tilføre Lillehammer, Innlandet, hele Norge? **What do you think how can Lillehammer 2016 be a contribution for Lillehammer, Inland and whole Norway?**
 - Hva tror du Ungdoms-OL kan tilføre norsk idrett, ungdomsidrett, og ungdom generelt? **How do you think Lillehammer 2016 can contribute to Norwegian organized sports in Norway, youth sport, and youth in general?**
 - Oppfølgings spørsmål: Hvilke argumenter / undersøkelser / bevis baserer du disse synspunktene? **Follow-up question: On what arguments / research / proof do you base these viewpoints?**
 - Hvordan skal man sikre at disse sideeffekter blir realisert / hvilke strategier har dere? **How do you ensure that these impacts will be realised? What strategies do you have?**
 - Til avslutning, er det noe jeg ikke har spurt om som du ville fortelle? **Lastly, is there something I haven't asked that you would like to comment on?**

Appendix 5: Interview guide, second round of data collection

1. Personlig informasjon Personal information

- Når er du født? **When were you born?**
- Hvilken utdannelse, yrkeserfaring og kompetanse har du? **What kind of education, work experience, and skills do you have?**
- Hva er din rolle i arbeidet du gjør? **What is your role in your job?**
- Kan du forklare kronologisk hvordan det kom til at du driver med dette? Hvem var dine kontakter? **Can you explain chronologically how you came into this position? Who did you network with?**
- Hvorfor holder du på med dette? **Why are you working with what you are working with?**

2. Aktører i implementeringsprosessen Actors in the implementation process

- Hvem forholder du deg til? **Who did you deal with?**
- Hvem er de viktigste aktører du samarbeider med? **Who are the most important people you are working with?**
- Hvem er de viktigste aktører for at oppgaven din lykkes? **Who are the key players to complete this task successfully?**
- Kan du beskrive hvordan samarbeidet er? **Can you describe the nature/relationship of the partnership?**
- Hva var årsakene til at man ønsket disse som samarbeidspartnere? **Why did you choose to work with these partners?**

3. Prosess av implementeringsjobb Process of implementation work

- Disse prosjektene som du jobber med, var de definert før du kom inn eller fant/finner du på ting selv? **Were the project(s) you are working on defined before you started or did you create them yourself?**
- Må du rapportere til noen? **Do you have to report to someone?**
- Noen som tvinger deg til å jobbe på en visst måte? **Does someone force you to do your job in a certain way?**

- Er det noen du forsøker å etterligne fordi de er bedre enn deg selv? **Is there someone/something that you try to immitate because that person/project is better than you(rs)?**
- Henter du ideer fra andre organisasjoner eller andre steder? **Do you get ideas from other organizations or places?**
- Oppfølgingspørsmål: Hvis ja: hvilke ideer? Hvorfor er de ideene så gode? Kan de implementeres i den aktuelle prosjektet ditt? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke? **Follow up question: If yes: which ideas? Why are these ideas good? Can they be implemented in your respective project?**
- Hvem forteller deg hvordan du skal gjøre jobben? **Who / what tells you how you have to do your job?**
- Må du si til noen hva det er å gjøre? **Do you tell someone what needs to be done?**
- Til avslutning, er det noe jeg ikke har spurte om som du ville fortelle? **Lastly, is there something I haven't asked that you would like to comment on?**

Appendix 6: Interview guide, third round of data collection

1. Personlig informasjon Personal information

- Kan du fortelle litt om deg selv? Når er du født? **When were you born?**
- I hvilket fylke bor du? **In what county do you live?**

2. Forhold til norsk idrett Relation to organized sport

- Hvilket forhold har du til norsk idrett? **What connection do you have to organized sports?**
- Driver du med idrett? **Are you practicing sports?**
- Engasjerer du deg aktivt innen lag / klubb / krets / forbund? **Are you engaged actively in a team, club, district sport association, or sport federation?**
- Hadde du erfaring som leder innen norsk idrett før du deltok på kurs? **Did you have experience as leader within organized sports before you took part at the program?**

3. Deltakelse på lederkurs for ungdom Participation at the Young Leaders Program

- Hvilke kurser har du vært med på? **Which courses did you take?**
- Hvorfor deltok du på disse kursene? **Why did you take these courses?**
- Kan du forklare kronologisk hvordan det kom til at du deltok på kurs? **Can you explain in a chronological order how it came about that you participated at the programme?**
- Hva synes du om kursene i forhold til program, innhold, læring, involvering av unge? **What do you think about these courses in regard of the program content, involvement of young people?**

4. Oppfølging etter kursene Follow-up of courses

- Fikk du oppfølging etter kurser? **Did you receive a follow-up after the courses?**
- Oppfølgingsspørsmål: På hvilken måte, hvor, når og fra hvem? **Follow-up question: In which way, where, when, and by whom?**
- Hadde du ønsket å få oppfølging (på en annen måte)? **Would you have wished to receive a follow-up (in a different way)?**

- Hvilken oppfølging / forberedelse ønsker du deg FØR Ungdoms-OL? **Which follow-up / preparations do you wish to have BEFORE Lillehammer 2016?**
- Hvilken oppfølging ønsker du deg ETTER Ungdoms-OL? **Which follow-up do you wish to receive AFTER Lillehammer 2016?**

5. Roller under Ungdoms-OL **Roles during Lillehammer 2016**

- Skal du være frivillig under Ungdoms-OL? **Are you going to volunteer during Lillehammer 2016?**
- Hvilke(t) funksjon / oppgaver skal du jobbe med? **What position / tasks will you have?**
- Føler du deg godt forberedt for å ta opp en lederposisjon? **Do you feel well prepared to take on a leader position?**
- Føler du at du kan bringe inn dine egne ideer i organisering av Ungdoms-OL? **Do you feel you can bring up your own ideas in the organization of Lillehammer 2016?**

6. Virkning av Ungdoms-OL **Impact of Lillehammer 2016**

- Vil du fortsette / begynne med å engasjere deg som ung leder i idrettsklubb, idrettskrets, eller lignende? **Will you continue / start as a young leader in a sports club, sports association, or similar?**
- Oppfølgningsspørsmål: På hvilken måte? Hvorfor / Hvorfor ikke? **Follow-up question: How? Why / why not?**

7. Betydning av *ungdomsløftet* **Meaning of youth campaign**

- Hva legger du i ordet *ungdomsløftet*? **What do you connect with the word youth campaign?**
- Synes du at du kan inspirere andre unge til å delta i idrettsklubb /lag /krets /særforbund? **Do you think that you can inspire other young people to become engaged in sport clubs, teams, associations, or sports federations?**
- Oppfølgningsspørsmål: På hvilken måte? **Follow-up question: How?**
- Til avslutning, er det noe jeg ikke har spurte om som du ville fortelle? **Lastly, is there something I haven't asked that you would like to comment on?**

Appendix 7: Illustration of coding procedure

Excerpt from raw interview data	Theoretical consideration	Emergent code
<i>The youth campaign has always been the strategy of NIF, so it was natural to just bring it up as reason for the bid. But we did not concretely discuss how to operationalize this</i> (data generation round 1).	Organizations rather strive for legitimacy than action	NIF wanted Lillehammer to be announced as host but did not make plan for the implementation of the goals
<i>NIF strongly considered to take action concerning the dropout problem. And the strategy for the bid was in line with the sport political document and the focus on sport for the younger generation</i> (data generation round 1).	Problems constructed to legitimize Lillehammer 2016	Norwegian organized sport has a youth problem—Lillehammer 2016 is meant to solve it
<i>We felt that there was a strong mandate in the bid, and this is what we actually have to deliver. Pressure on LYOGOC</i> (data generation round 2).	organizations are likely to act in accordance with institutional expectations	Implementing agents experience institutional pressure
<i>They told us that we are now responsible for the education of 200 young leaders from all over Norway. That was all</i> (data generation round 2).	Young leaders program in connection with Lillehammer 2016 is a top-down initiative	Command without clear strategy

