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Football For All in Vietnam The challenges of an exit

A qualitative study of how seven Sport for Development professionals experienced an exit strategy

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Summary

This research paper explores the challenges a Vietnamese sport for development organization faced when its biggest funder withdrew its support. Although SDP stakeholders often call for funder independency and sustainable SDP activities, little research has been done on SDP organizations where its most significant donor gradually reduces the economic support to an SDP organization, aiming at a sustainable and independent outcome for both the organization and the activities. Therefore, the research question for this paper is: “What are the challenges facing a sport for development project, during and after a handover period, as the organization’s major donor gradually withdraws its funding?”

This study adhered to a constructionist epistemology and was conducted in an ethnographic manner. The methods chosen to answer the research question was participant observation and semi-structured interviews. For the participant observation, the researcher traveled to Vietnam and worked for the SDP organization in question as a volunteer for five months, from September 2018 to March 2019. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in February 2019, two months after the SDP organizations handover period concluded. The sample for the semi-structured interviewed consisted of seven individuals with strong attachment to the SDP organization: the director, the vice-director, the head of human relations, the head of the technical department, the head of the communications department, the head of the program department, and the former director and founder of the organization. The six former interviewees were native Vietnamese, while the former director was a Norwegian, based in Vietnam.

The central findings show that the organization faced challenges that could be put in four major categories: 1) Organizational restructuring, 2) the sustainability of the grassroots level activities, 3) the establishment of a commercial entity, 4) the replication of the organizations model on a national scale.

During the handover period, the organization faced shortcomings in human and financial capacity, but also experienced an increased workload, to cope with the added demands of a handover process.

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1. Introduction and Research Question

1.1 Introduction

Sport for Development or Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) organizations are found all over the world (Kidd, 2008). Even though there are almost as many utilizations of SDP, as there are organizations, the common denominator for these organizations is the use of sport and sports activities, to tackle various issues within the global landscape of development. Typically, an SDP organization is at the mercy of one or more prominent donors, and when said donors decide to reduce or terminate funding to an SDP organization, the interventions or activities stop. Therefore, an often-mentioned end goal for SDP organization is to make itself redundant, but for the impact of the program or intervention to be sustainable (Straume & Steen-Johnsen, 2010). In other words, SDP organizations usually strive for sustainable outcomes, where the impact of an intervention or program is sustained, also after the SDP organization cease, or alter operations. However, there is a gap in the current SDP research relating to just how an SDP organization handles the loss of a major benefactor. Football For All in Vietnam (FFAV) offers an example of just such a case. What happens when a well renowned, and long-running SDP organization loses its biggest donor? How does the organization prepare for the future? What priorities were being made in the two years leading up to the donor withdrawing, and how did said priorities impact the organization, the individuals working within the organization, and their future?

On a personal level, I first became interested in sport for development as the topic for my master thesis through my volunteering work in Zambia in 2016/17. By participating in the Youth Sport Exchange Program (YSEP), I spent ten months working as a football coach in a Zambian Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). To initiate my master thesis, I read up on the Norwegian Football Association's (NFF) sport for development initiatives and programs, and how they differed from the YSEP approach. I was drawn to Football for All in Vietnam (FFAV), for multiple reasons. The duration of the program, the geographical setting, as well as the handover process, sparked my interest. During my first year as a master student at the Norwegian School of Sport Science (NIH), I participated in yet another exchange program, allowing me to study at the University of Ottawa for two terms. Here, I became increasingly interested in organizational structures and other sport management related topics. Therefore, I

viewed FFAV as an intriguing starting point for a research question dealing with sport for development, and organizational theory intersecting. As I became more knowledgeable about FFAV, and the organization's challenges, I saw an opportunity to bring together several topics within the sport for development field. Donor dependency, work on policy level versus grassroots, sustainability, and organizational structures were all on display in FFAV's Handover Period (HOP).

1.2 Research Question

I chose the following research question: "What are the challenges facing a sport for development project, during and after a handover period, as the organization's major donor gradually withdraws its funding?"

The rationale for the above research question is a perceived gap in the sport for development literature and development literature in general regarding exit strategies and the effects of fund withdrawal (Hayman, 2015, 2016; Hayman & Lewis, 2018). Self-sustainability and sustainable outcomes are often mentioned as the end-goal for a development project (Straume & Steen-Johnsen, 2012). However, there is little research concerning the inner workings of such a process and the problems and challenges that might occur (Hayman & Lewis, 2018; Holloway, 1997). As the development landscape in middle-income countries is changing, so are the demands of the local organizations (Appel & Pallas, 2018). Therefore, exploring the challenges facing an SDP organization that was established when Vietnam was still a lower income country, could provide insight into how a Southern partner experience being on the sharp end of an exit strategy (Hayman & Lewis, 2018).

This thesis will first provide a review of the current research relating to exit strategies and SDP. Secondly, the thesis specific context of a the FFAV will be addressed. Third, the research design for this thesis will be explained. Following this, the thesis provides an analysis of the findings using thematic analysis and discussing the findings in light of current relevant literature. The thesis concludes that the organization challenges during the aid withdrawal relating to organizational restructure, the sustainability of the grassroots level activities, the establishment of a commercial entity, and the replication of the organizations model on a national scale.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This master thesis deals with challenges relating to a sport for development organization during funding withdrawal. The interpretation and analysis conducted are informed by research regarding Sport for Development (SDP), as well as context specific development progress in Vietnam. To situate the study, this literature review will first address the notion of sustainability in a developmental context, as well as the current research on aid withdrawal and exit strategies. Secondly, the concept of SDP will be explored, particularly illuminating the recent trend in the field to focus on SDP organizational structure. In doing so, this thesis will provide context for FFAV's challenges, and situating these challenges within the current milieu of the SDP literature.

2.2 Sustainability

The question of a non-governmental organization's (NGO) self-sustainability has become a dominant concern amongst stakeholders in the development field, as the literature suggests that NGOs in middle-income countries are being challenged by changes in aid funding (Aldaba, Antezana, Valderrama, & Fowler, 2000; Arhin, Kumi, & Adam, 2018). According to Aldaba et al., (2000) there are three primary routes an NGO can choose to improve their organizational self-sustainability: Concentrate on non-financial support; generate an income as a part of, or parallel to what the organization does developmentally; make money of third-parties paying for services, or private donors. Echoing these findings, Arhin et al. (2018) postulate that NGOs are not passive recipients at the mercy of the changing development landscape, but are innovating and responding in creative ways to remain sustainable. Further, diversifying income streams are one of the more widely adapted strategies by local NGOs in countries who are entering beyond-aid scenarios, remaining self-sufficient and sustainable (Aldaba et al., 2000; Arhin et al., 2018; Hayman, 2016). Although money is essential, NGOs need to look beyond financial challenges, and focus on overall capacity building to remain sustainable (Aldaba et al., 2000)

One of the pitfalls for an NGO pursuing self-sustainability is a conflict between a socially oriented organizational culture, and business principles, possibly causing an

NGO to drift from its original goals (Aldaba et al., 2000). Additionally, income-generating ventures provide mixed results for the sustainability of non-profit organizations (Saqib, Khan, Michael, Haleem, & Khalid, 2017). Although downsizing can be a sound strategy for non-profit organizations to reduce their expenditures and stabilize the organization financially, it can have a negative effect on the organizational staff by creating a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty (Saqib et al., 2017). As Aldaba et al., (2000) concluded: NGOs could become more self-sustainable by nurturing partnerships within the public and private sector, develop entrepreneurial abilities and balancing their financial and technical expertise.

Although the sustainability of an NGO is often framed as a problem for the sponsor or donor organization, recent literature argues that NGO needs to be co-responsible for their sustainability and aid- dependency issues (Fowler, 2016). However, organizations will always need support, but overdependency on external aid is one of the main problems relating to NGO sustainability (Hayman, 2016). Still, due to various challenges such as organizational apathy and perceived challenges, most NGOs in developing countries struggle to self-finance, unless self- finance was the NGOs goal from its conception (Fowler, 2016).

Recent progress within the development field argues for sustainability to be more closely linked to an organizations agility, rather than a secure relationship and partnership with an external donor (Fowler, 2016). Coincidentally, Hayman (2016) understood sustainability for a Civil Society Organization (CSO) the organization's access to multi-faceted resources, including funding from different sources, and relevant skills and capacities. Additionally, a CSO needs adequate political space to operate (Hayman, 2016). One-party states such as Vietnam, often limit the impact of CSOs, making it more difficult for organizations to operate (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018).

Several scholars have called for stakeholders within the development field to support local partners and organizations, and not just see them as an instrument to deliver projects (Fowler, 2016; Hayman, 2016; Holloway, 1997). In short, focus more on the sustainability of organizations, not projects (Holloway, 1997). Most funders seem more concerned with the sustainability of impact and outcomes, as appose to organizational sustainability (Hayman, 2016).

Therefore, stakeholders within the development field have called for more donors and recipients alike to address the sustainability SDP organizations through robust exit strategies to prepare local CSOs if- or when- stakeholders go through funding withdrawal (Appe & Pallas, 2018; Hayman, 2016)

2.3 Aid Withdrawal and Exit Strategies

One of the critical ways of supporting the sustainability of a local organization is for partners to develop robust exit strategies, as local CSOs in many low- and middle-income countries are heavily influenced by foreign donors (Appe & Pallas, 2018; Holloway, 1997). While there is sound reasoning for injecting international development aid into a developing civil society sector, the effects of donor withdrawal are less clear (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018).

The ability of an International non-governmental organization (INGO)-meaning NGOs with an international scope that operates in two or more countries- to withdraw from a project or a country, has become an increasingly important part of international development aid strategies (Hayman, 2015). Countries who are transitioning from low- to middle- income are especially vulnerable to aid-cuts, as the spotlight of the development field shifts to the remaining poorest, and least developed countries (Appe & Pallas, 2018; Fowler, 2016). Dovetailing this, there has been an overall reduction in development aid provided to countries classified as lower-middle or middle income since 2009 (CIVICUS, 2015; Hayman, 2016; Hayman & Lewis, 2018).

Additionally, though there is a richness in developmental literature regarding the impacts of aid delivery, and how developmental efforts should avoid donor dependency and promote local ownership, not much has been said or written regarding fund withdrawal or exit strategies (Hayman, 2015). Donor impacts and aid tend to be treated as a static condition (Appe & Pallas, 2018). There is a perceived gap in the development literature, as it does not discuss how aid should be withdrawn or scaled down, the impacts an exit strategy could have on local structures, organizations and individuals, and the sustainability of development activities (Hayman, 2015; Hayman & Lewis, 2018). Donor organizations often treat local NGOs as instruments for program implementation, forcing the local NGO to focus on partner relationships, program management, and monitoring and evaluating, instead of sustainability (Fowler, 2016).

From the perspective of a donor, an exit strategy could facilitate sustainable outcomes if they adhere to the following guidelines: Include an exit strategy from the onset of a development intervention; allow for sufficient time for the exit strategy to take place; provide adequate resources for the exit; make sure that local partners take responsibility for the sustainability of the intervention (Hayman & Lewis, 2018; Popplewell, James, & Lewis, 2016).

However, local partners often fail to grasp the importance of aid withdrawal, and the impact a donor exit would have on the future of the organization and individuals (Hayman, 2015; Lewis, 2016). Additionally, many organizations seem to lack exit strategy principles before the decision to exit have been made, leading to the organization scrambling to tie up loose ends, and creating an impromptu exit strategy (Hayman, James, & Lewis, 2016).

While aid reduction can be a monumental challenge for an organization in the short-term, funding withdrawal can also serve as an opportunity for an organization to reemphasize its core activities, and re-evaluate if current activities are in line with the organizational goal and mission (Appel & Pallas, 2018; Pallas & Nguyen, 2018). However, research indicates that most INGOs do not provide robust planning for aid withdrawal, thwarting the positive aspects of aid reduction (Hayman & Lewis, 2018).

Additionally, the main body of work done on exit strategies and aid withdrawal, focus on the perspective of INGOs and donor organizations. Little research has been done on local NGOs and civil society organizations in the recipient countries and how their experiences of aid withdrawal (Hayman, 2015).

As for Vietnam, the country achieved middle-income status in 2009 (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018). Since then, international donors have gradually reduced their funding to Vietnamese NGOs (VNGO), for example within the health sector (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018). Some donors have already completely exited the country, including AusAID from Australia, and the Dutch government (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018). According to Pallas and Nguyen (2018), VNGOs approach the reduction of international funding similar to organizations studied in previous funding withdrawal research (Hayman & Lewis, 2018). VNGOs and their donors seem to view Vietnamese governmental

funding, grant- and proposal- writing, and revenue diversification as the essential strategies to remaining sustainable (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018).

Middle-income countries such as Vietnam are trying to adapt to a changing funding environment (Fforde, 2016). To further address the challenges FFAV faced during the HOP, the next section of this literature review will highlight SDP-specific challenges and characteristics.

2.4 Sport for Development

Defining Sport for Development (SDP) can be challenging, but in essence, SDP refers to using sport as a vehicle for addressing social issues (Black, 2010; Darnell & Hayhurst, 2012; Giulianotti, Hognestad, & Spaaij, 2016). SDP is also sometimes defined as using sport to promote peace-building in areas of conflict (Lyras & Welty Peachey, 2011; Schulenkorf, 2012). SDP organizations aim to address a broad range of social issues, such as gender inequality, racism and discrimination, conflict resolution, and HIV/AIDS (Coakley, 2011). Although most SDP organizations are located in low- and middle-income countries in the Global South, SDP initiatives are also present in high- income countries in the Global North (Kidd, 2008).

The fact that SDP activities usually coexist with a plethora of other educational and cultural programs aimed at social change makes the task of measuring the impact and change generated in an SDP project extremely challenging (Coalter, 2010; Donnelly, Atkinson, Boyle, & Szto, 2011). Therefore, as mentioned earlier, the impact of an SDP program often depends on the interplay and delivery of the non-sport components (Svensson & Levine, 2017). A significant contributor to why SDP can be so difficult to measure, is how fluid the SDP borders are, in terms of what issues SDP address, and how the programs are delivered in the specific context of the program area (Darnell & Hayhurst, 2012; Giulianotti, 2011a; Hayhurst, 2009; Lindsey & Grattan, 2012).

2.4.1 Sport for Development History

Although the academic field of SDP is relatively new, the notion of sport as a vessel for development is not. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) began collaborating with the International Labour Organization (ILO) as early as the 1920s, attempting to use sport to promote development and peacebuilding (Beutler, 2008; Burnett, 2001;

Svensson, Andersson, & Faulk, 2018). It was not until the late 1980s, and throughout the 1990s that non-profit organizations using SDP began to arise, most commonly in Africa. During this period, SDP organizations on the community level received little to no attention from international funding agencies (Svensson, 2017). With the new millennium ushering in more human-centered policy objectives within the broader development field, sports began to be included in international development efforts, championed by a variety of humanitarian agencies (Kidd, 2008; Svensson et al., 2018). As former elite athletes such as Olympic speed skater, and later founder of Right to Play Johan-Olav Koss began advocating for the positive social impact of sport participation, SDP efforts became increasingly more popular (Coalter, 2010). When discussing SDP, there is no getting around the United Nations (UN) pivotal role in formalizing and putting SDP on the radar of international development agencies, corporate enterprises, and national governing sporting bodies (Beutler, 2008). With the UN recognizing sport as a useful tool for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, international funding to organizations using SDP approaches skyrocketed (Beutler, 2008). UN introduced sports to the international development calendar when April 6th was officially named the International Day of Sport for Development and Peace (United Nations, 2013).

Additionally, 2005 was declared by the UN as the International Year of Sport and Physical Education, promoting sport as a cost-effective tool for progress concerning development and peace (Hasselgård, 2015b). With the recognition of sport as a vehicle for reaching UNs Sustainable Development Goals, the SDP field has over the last two decades experienced rapid formalization, as various institutions and organizations involved in SDP need to see proof of sports efficacy as a development tool (Kidd, 2008). Sports aid was initially thought to be apolitical and with little controversy, but considering the SDPs field formalization as mentioned above and institutionalization, sports endeavors are now believed to be strongly linked to international aid politics (Hasselgård, 2015b).

The cumulative scholarship within SDP has grown significantly since the year 2000 (Schulenkorf, Sherry, & Rowe, 2016). SDP literature can be compartmentalized into two sections: understanding SDP initiatives and policies from the international perspective of donors, and understanding SDP from the local level of recipient countries (Hasselgård & Straume, 2015). As SDP has become more formalized and structured,

concerns regarding the beliefs that sports participation is inherently good, has been challenged by several scholars (Coalter, 2010, 2013; Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011; Kidd, 2008; Sugden, 2010). History has shown that even well-designed SDP programs may not lead to net positive outcomes (Coalter, 2013). Any given SDP programs outcomes, is dictated by the processes and structures of the implementing organization, and how sports is used (Coakley, 2011; Kidd, 2008; Sugden, 2010; Svensson, Hancock, & Hums, 2016). Further, outcomes could depend on the relationships between the SDP organization and the stakeholders in the community relating to the sporting program, such as community education and health promotion initiatives, and to what extent stakeholders integrate SDP into mainstream development perspectives (Black, 2010; Darnell & Black, 2011; Darnell, Chawansky, Marchesseault, Holmes, & Hayhurst, 2018; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016).

2.4.2 Sport for Development Policies and different approaches to Sport

SDP policy documents have and continue to be, of critical importance for how SDP programs are evaluated and implemented (Svensson & Levine, 2017). Naïve perceptions of the role of SDP on the policy level could make it difficult for organizations to adopt more pragmatic and realistic outlooks (Straume & Hasselgård, 2014).

Many of the policy documents advocating for SDP from the early 2000s, were guided by idealistic discourses regarding the impact of sports, and have later been thoroughly criticized (Coalter, 2010; Hayhurst, 2009). Therefore, through distinguishing between two main conceptions SDP, international SDP actors seek to understand the utility of sport in a development context (Coalter, 2010; Kidd, 2008). The first conception of sports role in SDP, Sport Plus adapts sporting activities to coexist with parallel development programs, aimed at “maximizing their potential to achieve development objectives” (Coalter, 2010, p. 298). The second approach is known as Plus Sport, “in which sports’ popularity is used as a type of flypaper to attract young people to programs of education and training, with the systematic development of sport rarely a strategic aim” (Coalter, 2013, p. 201). SDP organizations view sport participation as a hook for capturing the attention of participants to, in turn, engage them in educational programs integrated with the sport-based programs (Hartmann, 2003).

Despite recent literature regarding the limitations of sport, vague and lofty claims regarding sports potential as a for social change and conflict resolution, continue to be uttered from SDP policy-makers and practitioners (Coalter, 2010, 2013; Svensson et al., 2016). Although there is research showing SDP organizations changing their development practices in light of recent SDP critiques (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016), some SDP evangelists, believe sports participation in eradicating negative traits and strengthening marginalized participants character, a phenomenon known as the car-wash effect (Coakley, 2011; Coalter, 2010). Several scholars called for less vague and more realistic understanding of SDP role within the development field as a whole (Coakley, 2011; Coalter, 2010, 2013; Darnell, 2007; Hayhurst, 2012).

In recent years, the SDP academic field has begun to focus on organizational behavior in SDP (MacIntosh & Spence, 2012; Massey, Whiley, Blom, & Gerstein, 2016; Schlenkorf, 2017; Schlenkorf, Sugden, & Burdsey, 2014; Svensson et al., 2018; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016), as decisions and challenges on the organizational level now are deemed as critical for an SDP programme to remain sustainable (Coalter, 2013; Lyras & Welty Peachey, 2011). Adding on to this, the research within the non-profit management literature indicates that organizations with subpar organizational structures and processes are far less likely to remain sustainable when facing challenges such as internal change or implementation of new practices (Eisinger, 2002; Schuh & Leviton, 2006). Therefore, understanding organizational capacity in an SDP context could provide various SDP stakeholders with a framework for understanding SDP organizational strengths and weaknesses (Svensson et al., 2018; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016).

2.4.3 Organizational Capacity in Sport for Development

In general terms, organizational capacity encompasses a non-profit organizations ability to adequately achieve the organization's social mission, through a set of resources and structures (Christensen & Gazley, 2008; Doherty, Misener, & Cuskelly, 2014; Eisinger, 2002; Schuh & Leviton, 2006). According to (Hall et al., 2003), The overall success of an organization depends on the following three primary capacities:

First, human resources capacity relates to the ability of an organization to mobilize and deploy human capital (Hall et al., 2003). Challenges or advantages within subthemes

such as volunteer recruitment, volunteer knowledge, need for paid staff and time constraints, speak to the human resource capacity in a non-profit organization (Hall et al., 2003; Sharpe, 2006; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). In SDP, the lack of paid staff is usually an area of interest, given the resource scarcity in SDP organizations (Kidd, 2008). However, as SDP often is volunteer-centered, lack of paid staff could circumvent inherent tensions from a volunteer-professional dynamic within an organization (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). However, in their case study of a small international SDP organization, Svensson and Hambrick (2016) found organizational staff viewed the lack of professional staff and time constraints to be a limiting factor for their engagement. Further, SDP organizations need to find a balance between limited capacity as a result of few staff members, and greater capacity from higher numbers; with the added risk of conflict between paid staff and volunteers (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016).

Secondly, Financial capacity, meaning the financial sustainability of an organization, is of critical importance to all non-profit stakeholders (Hall et al., 2003; Svensson, 2017; Svensson et al., 2018; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). For an SDP organization financial resources, fundraising, revenue streams, and creating sustainable long-term funding model are some crucial aspects of financial capacity (Doherty et al., 2014; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016).

Lastly, Structural capacity consists of an organizations ability to utilize support systems, and the state of the organizational infrastructure (Hall et al., 2003). Structural capacity can be further deconstructed into three sub-capacities: Infrastructure, external partnerships, and planning and development (Hall et al., 2003). Infrastructure refers to the makeup of the organizational structure and systems needed for day-to-day operations (Hall et al., 2003). A non-profit or SDP organization degree of formalization dictates how arising challenges are met internally in the organization (Doherty et al., 2014; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). An unformalized organization could be more flexible in the face of change but also lead to a lack of ownership from members of the organization, as the establishment of formal roles might be lacking (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). The second sub-capacity of structural capacity is the organizational ability to maintain, and build relationships with external stakeholders (Doherty et al., 2014; Hall et al., 2003; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). Stable relationships and personal

connection are examples of important aspects of external partnership capacity (Doherty et al., 2014; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). Thirdly, planning and development entail the elements of structural capacity regarding strategic plans, evaluation routines, and processes for organizational development (Hall et al., 2003).

Moreover, the interplay and connections between these capacities are of importance, for example, a generous financial contribution from a donor could allow a downsizing organization to retain more paid staff, and the staff could, in turn, develop better programs for the organization. In short, financial capacity can dictate human resource capacity and structural capacity, and vice versa (Hall et al., 2003).

More stakeholders are flocking to the SDP sector, including various actors from the private and public sectors, sport governing bodies, intergovernmental agencies, and international development agencies (Black, 2010; Giulianotti, 2011c; Hayhurst, 2011; Straume & Hasselgård, 2014; Svensson et al., 2018). Thus, SDP organizations are entangled in a complex web of inter-organizational relationships (Giulianotti, 2011b). As national governments are also getting involved in SDP, organizations have to manage state politics, possibly influencing their organizational purpose and values (Giulianotti, 2011c; Kidd, 2008). In terms of capacity case studies, the norm within the sport management field has been to focus on community sports clubs (Svensson et al., 2018). Unlike sports clubs, SDP organizations typically do not have a membership structure to secure financial and human capital. Therefore, SDP organizations are usually more dependent on external fundraising and donors, as well as paid staff (Svensson, Hancock, & Hums, 2017). However, the problem with using an organizational capacity approach within the SDP field is there is not a sufficient empirical understanding of the capacity strengths and challenges facing SDP organizations (Svensson et al., 2018).

An organization's capacity usually goes hand in hand with the size of the organization, as larger non-profit organizations often have better financial performance, technologic advancements, more accurate evaluation procedures, solid human resource management, and an increased probability of engaging in advocacy (Brown, Andersson, & Jo, 2016; Carman & Fredericks, 2010; Svensson et al., 2018). However, small organizations are typically heavily reliant on being attached to a diverse set of national

and international partner organizations (Coalter, 2010; Giulianotti et al., 2016; Holmes, Banda, & Chawansky, 2016; Lindsey & Banda, 2011; Svensson et al., 2017). Further, the fact SDP organizations operate in vastly different geographical locations and contexts, also impact the organizations capacity to achieve its stated social mission (Lindsey & Banda, 2011; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). SDP organizations usually consist of individuals with strong implementing and planning skill, resulting in high planning and development capacity (Svensson et al., 2018)

Although somewhat criticized, viewing an organization as progressing from inception, maturing and finally termination, illustrates the dynamic life-cycle process of an organization (Cameron & Whetten, 1983; Chandler, 1962; Greiner, 1972). Although an organizational life-cycle could be complicated, and not limited to a set number of stages, previous research on the SDP organizational life cycle has adopted a four-stage model consisting of startup, growth, mature, and decline or turnaround (Andersson, 2011; Andersson, Faulk, & Stewart, 2016; Svensson et al., 2018). For organizational capacity in an SDP context, this life- stage approach is relevant because it spotlights how an organization's priorities, possibilities, and ultimately goals can change as an organization matures (Svensson et al., 2018). Further, being aware of an organization's current life stage can help understand capacity strengths and weaknesses, as organizational capacity needs vary by life stage (Svensson et al., 2018).

2.4.4 Entrepreneurship and Sport for Development

Throughout the SDP literature, shortages in financial capacity and the lack of financial resources, emerge as perhaps the critical challenge facing grassroots SDP organizations (Svensson et al., 2018). According to some SDP research, entrepreneurial strategies on the part of SDP organizations could impact potential power imbalances between the recipient and donor (Hayhurst, 2014). A recent review from Schulenkorf et al. (2016) noted how the SDP management research did not address entrepreneurial aspects of SDP, as this could be an avenue for SDP organizations to become more sustainable. Correspondingly, organizations in low- and middle-income countries would benefit from professional development opportunities aimed at fiscal management and revenue generation (Svensson et al., 2018).

As a result of the increased scarcity of funds, SDP leaders and decision makers now have to balance funding opportunities not aligning with organizational values, as such financial support might come with an entourage of commercial demands, and the financial sustainability of the organization (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). Thus, some non-profits want to develop more businesses like structures, as entrepreneurial non-profits often have higher financial- as well as human- resource capacity (Andersson, 2011; Dart, 2004; Svensson et al., 2018). SDP revenue sources vary from organization to organization, but some general undertakings are team building programs, product sale, and consultancy services (Svensson et al., 2018). Earned revenues could be a tool for non-profits to retain staff (Guo, 2006), and revenue diversification correlates with long-term financial sustainability (Carroll & Stater, 2009). Contrary to their expectations, Svensson et al. (2018) discovered SDP organizations earning significant revenue through commercial activities, were not more likely to have increased organizational capacity. In fact, entrepreneurial endeavors might draw on resources and time allocated initially to achieving the social mission of the organization (Weisbrod, 2004), and revenue concentration from for example funding grants being a useful short-term tactic for increasing non-profits financial capacity, could explain these findings (Chikoto & Neely, 2014).

Several SDP organizations run the risk of ongoing funding challenges, as the increased number of organizations with relatively similar goals and methodology lead to greater competition for funds (Giulianotti, 2011b). Other organizations are facing difficult decisions when delivering programs in areas with complex socio-political environments (Giulianotti, 2011a; Holmes et al., 2016; Kidd, 2008). Additionally, the full specter of activities that can come in under the SDP umbrella could prove a monumental task for organizational members, as they might be recruited to fulfill several different roles within the organization (Schulenkorf & Edwards, 2012; Svensson, 2017).

To become more sustainable, autonomous, and financially independent, many SDP organizations are now organizing themselves in a hybrid manner (Fowler, 2016; Svensson & Seifried, 2017).

2.4.5 Hybrid Organizing and Sport for Development

Innovative new practices such as organizational hybrids are created as members of an organization attempt to navigate multiple and juxtaposed institutional demands, financial uncertainty, and challenges regarding organizational capacity (Haveman & Rao, 2006; Minkoff, 2002; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016; Svensson & Seifried, 2017). When an organization is facing environmental uncertainty, creating a hybrid organization that uses different organizational tactics, it could be a sound bridging strategy where activities can go on as planned (Minkoff, 2002). Hybrid organizing refers to the ways organizations can manage and combine multiple identities, forms, and logistics (Battilana & Lee, 2014). This combination, as mentioned earlier of mission-focus, commercial-focus, and navigating state logistics are in organizational literature associated with conflict and tension (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Battilana and Lee's (2014) framework present five different organizational aspects: Organizational activities; human resource composition; organizational design; inter-organizational relationships; and the culture of an organization. A hybrid organization's greatest challenge is that of optimizing performance across multiple dimensions, as they try to meet two or more different objects at once. Thus differing from traditional forms of organizations like corporations, governmental organizations, and non-profit (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015). In their exploratory study, Svensson and Seifried (2017) conceptualized hybrid organizing by utilizing Battilana and Lee's (2014) framework, offering an approach for how it might apply to SDP programs and organizations.

Hybrid organizations within an SDP context need to have decision makers that understand the boundaries and purpose of the organization to ensure the activities undertaken lead to sustainable outcomes (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). SDP leaders in non-traditional organizational hybrids could be asked to address grassroots social issues while generating commercial revenue in order to fund said grassroots activities (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). One downside of operating a non-traditional SDP hybrid organization could be that it is time-consuming and there is a constant need to educate various stakeholders on the role of the organization (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). Adding to this, hybrid organizations face challenges working within broader institutional contexts, including having to engage with a variety of local, national, and international stakeholders (Giulianotti, 2011b; Straume & Hasselgård, 2014).

For a hybrid organization to function satisfactory, the senior leadership is critically important, as the position most likely calls upon an individual with experience and competence from several different fields, including prior development work, entrepreneurship, and commercial experience (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). Other vital themes when considering a hybrid organization are recruitment based on values and skills, where likeminded individuals integrate into the organization, all the while avoiding becoming sport evangelical (Coalter, 2010); diversity within the workforce; prevalence for for-profit discourses, where return on investment, revenues and growth are given much importance; and staff training (Svensson & Seifried, 2017).

Organizational structure, incentives, control systems, and the governance of the organization make up the organizational design (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Organizational structure entails to what degree an organization is compartmentalized, meaning specific members execute specific tasks, or if one member can have several organizational responsibilities (Skelcher & Smith, 2015). A hybrid structure supports creative ways to connect with external partners (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). While this might allow for new revenue streams, SDP organizations have, on multiple occasions, been proven to accept funding opportunities that do not align with the modus operandi (Massey et al., 2016). Therefore, mission drift could be a pitfall for SDP hybrids, as some funding opportunities might take the organization away from their social mission (Svensson & Seifried, 2017).

An organizational culture informs how members of an organization make sense of their role within a hybrid organization (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Svensson and Seifried (2017) identified four themes relating to SDP hybrids organizational culture: shared values, nonmonetary value, unified and inclusive cultures, and cultural change. Most notably, the culture of an organization can change over time, the change being impacted by the leadership style of the decision makers within the organization (Svensson & Seifried, 2017).

2.4.6 Recipient and Donor Relationships

The SDP power imbalances favoring funders at the expense of local stakeholders' autonomy and impact on programs is well documented by SDP scholars (Burnett, 2015; Harris & Adams, 2016). The consistency and length of an external funding source, in

combination with the recipients' financial management ability, informs the overall long-term capacity benefits from a donor-recipient relationship (Akingbola, 2004; Doherty et al., 2014; Wicker & Breuer, 2011). Adding to this, funding from various foundations and governmental institutions, is hugely beneficial for SDP organization capacity, regardless of a given organizations life stage (Svensson et al., 2018). Funding from foundations is essential for organizational capacity, and declining or turnaround organizations are particularly vulnerable to low financial capacity, primarily if located in low and middle-income countries (Svensson et al., 2018; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016; Welty Peachey, Musser, Shin, & Cohen, 2017).

Non-profit organizations receiving funding grants are more likely to develop stronger financial capacity, as donors frequently offer capacity building support, supplementing the funding grant (Crisp, Swerissen, & Duckett, 2000; Faulk & Stewart, 2017; Wing, 2004). Despite efforts from policymakers, as the number of SDP organizations continue to grow, the power imbalances between donor and recipient prevail (Burnett, 2015; Harris & Adams, 2016; Straume & Hasselgård, 2014). Interestingly, seasoned recipients of funding are often critically aware of the implications of having powerful major funders (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). Therefore, many SDP organizations try to partner with several donors and external stakeholders, as well as cooperation amongst competing SDP organizations, in the belief this will make their programs less vulnerable to environmental change and single partner dependency (Giulianotti et al., 2016; Svensson et al., 2018; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). However, there is little support for the latter (Svensson et al., 2018). Moreover, how funder dependence impact SDP hybrid organizations, is yet to be addressed by SDP and sport management literature (Svensson & Seifried, 2017).

2.4.7 Norwegian Sport for Development

The field of SDP cannot be understood independent of the national context of donor countries (Hasselgård, 2015b) The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) had several reasons to engage in sport for development projects (Hasselgård, 2015b; Straume, 2012). In the early 1980s, NIF assumed that they had expertise to share with the developing world, even though NIF and Norway were not by any means considered international sporting experts when considering elite sporting achievements. Furthermore, it was a believed that engaging in SDP projects

would benefit the domestic Norwegian sports scene, as well as contributing to social development, developing infrastructures, and health benefits in the recipient countries (Straume, 2012). Historically, it was viewed as prestigious to create mirror images of the Norwegian society in developing countries, and the reasons for engaging in development projects were often political, as a clear and visible development policy could enable NIF to make political headway both domestically and on the international scene (Hasselgård, 2015a).

For NIF, one of the goals when facilitating sport for development programs is to do so on the terms of the recipients (Straume, 2012; Straume & Steen-Johnsen, 2012). However, the relationship between the donor- and recipient- countries have changed over time (Hasselgård & Straume, 2015). A paradigm change took place in the 1990s when the donor countries went from actively seeing projects through in the recipient countries, to prefer a more hands-off approach, focusing on funding local organizations (Straume, 2012). Equal partnership is the modern term for the donor-recipient relationship. However, an equal partnership between donor and recipient is problematic because of the asymmetry in financial power and capability (Straume, 2012). In a Norwegian context, Straume and Hasselgård, (2014) pointed out that NIF viewed sport for development projects through a Norwegian lens, discarding or ignoring knowledge or opinions conflicting with NIF's solutions. Historically, several scholars and SDP stakeholders have criticized NIF for using sport as a means to civilize or westernize local participants, in line with the neo-colonial doctrine, prioritizing western ideas and values (Eriksen, 2013; Hasselgård & Straume, 2011).

As FFAV were on the back end of an exit strategy implementation, research highlighting previous challenges relating to funding withdrawal and sustainability is essential to analyze the findings presented in chapter five properly. Additionally, SDP research and the more recent focus on SDP organizational structures is relevant for the changes FFAV underwent to cope with the new challenges of the funding withdrawal, as well as highlighting SDP-specific challenges FFAV faced. Further, as FFAV was initiated by the Norwegian Football Association (NFF), Norwegian SDP perspectives will be of importance when trying to understand FFAV decisions and dilemmas during the HOP. In the next chapter, Vietnamese development and FFAV specific information will be provided, to further situate the findings in this master thesis.

3. Context

3.1 Introduction

Before discussing the research design for this master thesis, it is essential to situate the research project within the context, culture, and setting of the informants (Sherry, Schulenkorf, Seal, Nicholson, & Hoye, 2017). Therefore, to provide the adequate understanding of this master thesis, the next chapter will provide information regarding Vietnams development as a country, and what unique challenges and opportunities an SDP organization such as FFAV have faced, and continue to navigate in a one-Party political state. Further, the project itself will be fleshed out, and provide an explanation for the Handover Period (HOP) that is the topic of this thesis.

3.2 Vietnamese Development

All developmental programs and models have to be viewed in light of their historical and geographical context. Therefore, it is important to highlight what regional and national factors inform Vietnams approach to development, and how the country interacts with outsiders in bilateral and international matters. Arguably one of the critical characteristics of this region compared to other parts of the developing world is the heavy involvement of the state (Kohli, 2004). For most southeast Asian states, clear strategies and thoroughly thought out action plans are a staple of their industrialization process, usually implemented rapidly, as a form of shock therapy (Masina, 2012; Ohno, 2009). However, Vietnam with its experimental and gradual approach to reform, has chosen a road less traveled to economic prosperity (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Hansen, 2015; London, 2014), being informed by both the Washington consensus, meaning a market-based approach to development, and regional neighbours such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, where the state plays a more prominent role in regulating development (Masina, 2012). Culturally, China heavily influences Vietnam, and it is plausible that Vietnam took inspiration from the Chinese development model (Hansen, 2015). The Vietnamese government has been behind the wheel of one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world, despite employing a learning-by-doing methodology, different from other successful southeast Asian states (Hansen, 2015).

3.2.1 Historic timeline

The dominant political party in Vietnam is the Communist Party Vietnam (CPV). Founded between 1925 and 1930, The CPV's roots are traceable back to the anti-colonial opposition to the French colonial power (London, 2014). Conflict and war riddles Modern Vietnamese history, and Vietnam's prospects for development have been bleak, as an already impoverished country being devastated by war (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Luong, 2013). From 1946 to 1989 Vietnam was, either on home soil or in Cambodia, almost continuously engaged in warfare. From 1946 to 1954, Vietnam rebelled against French colonization, dividing the country in two: the north supported by the Soviet Union and China; the south becoming influenced by the US (Luong, 2013). Starting in 1955, the American war, or as it is known in the western world the Vietnam war, culminated in a once again unified Vietnam in 1976, when the American supported Saigon government collapsed following the reduction of US support in South Vietnam, as agreed in the 1973 Paris peace agreement. Following decades of conflict, Vietnam faced significant damage done to its economy, society, culture, and environment. Ruined by the highly toxic Agent Orange, South Vietnam alone experienced 10 million hectares of cultivated land damaged. In the north, U.S bombing damaged or ruined all railways, main roads, and seaports (Luong, 2013).

With the collapse of the Saigon government in 1975 and the victory of the communist cause, communist leaders approached rebuilding Vietnam with high confidence in the communist ideology and the Soviet model for development. Through rapid industrialization, with the state controlling all major commodities and labor, Vietnam would recover and develop. In Vietnam, the state consists of the CPV, the state administrative apparatus, formal representative institutions, as well as state-controlled mass organizations. Also, the state also encompasses the armed forces, police, and several security agencies (London, 2014). The state is organized vertically across four levels of authority; from the central government to provinces and major cities, further down to rural districts and urban wards, and finally down to rural communes and urban precincts (London, 2014). The organization of the state is in such a way that it works as an instrument for the Party. As the CPV slogan goes: "The Party leads, the state implements, and the people inspect" (London, 2014, p. 7).

The division of Vietnam between 1954 and 1975, meant that approximately half the population was not familiar with the command economy model of North Vietnam. Being under French rule, and later American influence, the South Vietnamese had been exposed to the world capitalist system. Hence, South Vietnamese labor population strongly resisted the command economy model, where the Vietnamese government and not the market decided what goods would be produced (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Pincus, 2015). Additionally, with the command economy model, Gross National Product (GNP) increased annually by 0.4 percent, a far cry from the target of 13-14 percent annual growth (World Bank, 2002, 2012, 2014). Foot-dragging, moonlighting, focusing on the household economy, and refusal to sell products to the state were some of the ways opposition to the command economy manifested itself during the later parts of the 1970s and early 1980s (Luong, 2013).

3.2.2 The Vietnamese development model

By 1985, Vietnam was dealing with galloping inflation, combined with the U.S- lead trade embargo, and loss of Chinese and USSR aid (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Joint Development Partner Report [JDRP], 2012; Luong, 2013; Van Arkadie & Mallon, 2003). Additionally, capitalism was booming in Southeast Asia, leading to substantial growth for other developing countries in the region (Beeson & Pham, 2012). During the 1970s and 1980s, Vietnam was one of the poorest countries in the world (London, 2014; World Bank, 2012). In short, the command economy was facing a major crisis (Luong, 2013). For Vietnam, the crisis worked as a catalyst for change (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007), and to combat the negative development trend the CVP initiated sweeping economic reforms, aimed at creating a socialist market economy. These policy changes were called Doi Moi, and the CPV introduced them at the 6th national congress of December 1986 (Beeson & Pham, 2012).

The Doi Moi replaced conservative thinking with reformist thinking and was considered a new take on development; the opportunities of the market, combined with the egalitarian ideas of socialism (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Hansen, 2015). This shift was a creative triumph for the CPV, creating Vietnam's very own development model, informed by what the Vietnamese call Ho Chi Minh thought (Hansen, 2015). Fundamentally, Ho Chi Minh thought is concerned with the development and independence of Vietnam, while being influenced by the ideas of Marxism and

Leninism approach to rapid industrialization and modernizing (Hansen, 2015). The Vietnamese model focuses on redistribution, where all resources channeled through the state and the CPV, which represent the people (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Hansen, 2015).

The changes were dramatic. During the 1990s, the State sector only accounted for 38-40 percent of the GDP, despite heavy involvement in services such as telecommunication and petroleum distribution (Luong, 2013). The implementation of the economic reform policy of Doi Moi in 1986, has attributed to remarkable Vietnamese economic growth (Hansen, 2015; Luong, 2013). In addition to focusing on export of commodities, Vietnam incentivized foreign direct investment by keeping labor cost low, opening the door to export of labor demanding products such as footwear and clothes (Luong, 2013). Factors such as the newly adopted market economy approach; political stability; the end of the US trade sanctions and Vietnams improved relation with neighboring Asian countries following Vietnams withdrawal of troops stationed in Cambodia, all facilitated economic growth (Hansen, 2015; Luong, 2013). As Vietnam's society opened up, the emergence of a private sector, allowed to coexist with the tightly controlled state sector, ensured an influx of international non-governmental organizations into the country (Nørlund, 2007).

Further, the number of small local NGOs snowballed throughout the 1990s (Nørlund, 2007). The Asian crisis of 1997, seemingly did not slow down Vietnamese development, as the economy grew at an average rate of 5,8 percent annually (Luong, 2013; World Bank, 2012). Additionally, according to the World Bank (2002), the development in Vietnam seems to have been remarkably pro-poor. However, the economic growth has come at the cost of environmental destruction, increased vulnerability for businesses facing the fluctuation of the global market prices, and increased inequalities within the population, primarily affecting specific rural, ethnic or religious groups (Hansen, 2015; Luong, 2013). Actions towards gender equality have also proven to be difficult, and female prostitution rose rapidly throughout the 1990s. Women political representatives declined severely between 1975 and 1987 but are gradually being reversed (Luong, 2013). Ethnic minorities living in the central Highlands of Vietnam, have systematically been discriminated against, often in disputes regarding land for growing coffee; a major agricultural export commodity (Salemink, 2011).

In 1990, Vietnam's GDP per capita was as low as U.S. 114 (Luong, 2013; World Bank, 2002). However, over the next decade, Vietnam witnessed exceptional growth. Vietnam's population increased with 19 percent during the 1990s. Still, the Vietnamese GDP per capita grew from U.S. 114 in 1990 to US 414 in 2001 (Luong, 2013; World Bank, 2012). From unprosperous beginnings, Vietnam's growth is considered a development success story (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Hansen, 2015). However, challenges still remain at the forefront of social and political life in Vietnam.

3.2.3 Economic and social challenges

Vietnam is the world's 13th most populous country, and after 20 years of economic growth, Vietnam is now officially classified as a middle-income country, presenting a series of new challenges (London, 2014). Vietnam's status as an Asian tiger is for some scholars reduced to that of a pussycat, on the back of inefficiencies in the state bureaucracy, and economic mismanagement (Hansen, 2015; London, 2014). Some of these issues could be rooted in the confusing and fragmented organization of the one-party system (Van Arkadie & Mallon, 2003). Another facet contributing to Vietnam's challenges could be the inability or resistance to implementing agreed-upon policies (Ohno 2009). This is not only evident in matters relating to the economy, but also in other policy arenas, as preparing implementation details delay a vast number of policies (Ohno, 2009), as individuals and ministries within the state regime seek opportunities to financially cash in as the capitalist reforms have increased the opportunities for profit (Hansen, 2015; Pincus, 2015).

One of the main factors for Vietnam's ability to reach the middle-income level has been its political stability and continuity, compared to other developing nations (Fforde, 2016; Hansen, 2015; Luong, 2013). However, as the Vietnamese constitution prohibits any other political party than the Communist Party, this stability comes with a caveat (Beeson & Pham, 2012). The Doi Moi was a move towards capitalism, and Vietnam has become much more accessible over the last two decades (London, 2014; Luong, 2013). Even though the core leadership of the CPV admits that Vietnam can never revert to the Marxist development model, they believe the values and ideas of the Vietnamese revolution still hold firm (Masina, 2006). Being a communist country, development should be under state control, and the emergence of an independent private sector is problematic both in practice and ideologically (Beeson & Pham, 2012). Despite the

Party commitment to socialism, there are no signs of this in practice, as state-sponsored safety nets are weakened or non-existent (Fforde, 2016; Luong, 2013). These realizations are putting pressure on the communist inspired ideas derived from the Vietnamese revolution (Hansen, 2015). Despite having some policies aimed at benefiting the poor and near-poor, such as affordable health insurance; Vietnam's social policies seem to be inspired by free-market capitalism, also called neoliberalism (Hansen, 2015). According to Beresford (2008) Vietnam practices market Leninism, on account of that, although Vietnam is as a far cry from a socialist country, the authoritarian one-party state structure derived from Leninist communism is evident. Further, as a consequence of the Leninist inspired political system, the presence of rigid hierarchies have created an extreme inequality of opportunity, favoring individuals within, or with connections to the top of the Party (Hansen, 2015). Actors in the private sector often need to be politically connected to succeed, as the public and private sectors intertwine in various ways (Gainsborough, 2010).

3.2.4 Vietnam's civil society

The classic definition of civil society refers to organizations separated from the state (Nørlund, 2007). One way of defining Vietnam civil society can be as "The arena outside of the family the state and the market where people associate to advance common interest" (Nørlund, 2007, p. 71). This definition derives from the Civil Society Index study. As Vietnam's society opened up, initiatives at the community level have become more commonplace (London, 2014). Still, the CPV avoid using the term civil society and has historically downplayed the existence of civil society in Vietnam (Hannah, 2007), although the CPV is becoming more comfortable with Vietnamese NGOs (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018). The paradigm in civil society research in Vietnam has refocused from the rigid definitions of what should and should not be considered a part of civil society, to what the various actors and organizations do (Nørlund, 2007; Wischermann, 2010).

Formal civil society encompasses a range of legally registered organizations. However, Vietnam also has a growing informal civil society, comprised of individual activism, social media and blogs, religious activity, and groups on the community level (Wells-Dang, 2014). Therefore, it is more informational to speak of civil society actors (CSA), as opposed to civil society organizations (CSO) (Wells-Dang, 2014). A CSO

functionality is often measured on criteria such as the CSO being non-state and non-market; A voluntary organization; Self-financed; self-managed; non-profit. Few Vietnamese organizations can live up to these standards (Nørlund, 2007).

Being a communist country, civil society in Vietnam is still viewed as a potential challenge to state authority (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Nørlund, 2007). Therefore, it is important to remember that some of the organizations deemed to be a part of the Vietnamese civil society, were consummated by the Party, intended to be a mechanism of social control (Beeson & Pham, 2012). These organizations include the Youth Union, the Women Union, and The General Confederation of Labour (Beeson & Pham, 2012; London, 2014). However, the Doi Moi was not only a seismic shift in economic strategy; it also opened up the country to social organizations similar to those in the western world and ushered in numerous foreign donors (Nørlund, 2007; Pallas & Nguyen, 2018). Although there has been an emergence of social organizations since 1986 not directly tied to the state, Vietnam's one-party politics imposes certain limitations, and create a unique framework for social organizations that differ from those found in more democratic countries (Nørlund, 2007).

Overall, based on the number of organizations at all levels in all provinces, Vietnamese civil society is considered to be wide-ranging, but not very deep or solid (Nørlund, 2007). For example, membership in a state-initiated mass organization is often mandatory, leading to shallow participation in civil society, compared to other countries, highlighting how the borders between civil society, state and private sector are fuzzy (London, 2014; Nørlund, 2007). In the late 1990s, there were less than 200 NGOs in Vietnam. Currently, there are over 1700 (Wells-Dang, 2014). However, the Vietnamese government rarely formally recognize Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOS), leaving most of the organizations to operate in a legal grey area as community-based organizations (CBOs) (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018).

There are several weaknesses associated with Vietnamese civil society. Firstly, political rights in Vietnam are limited, although it is not fair to state that Vietnam is not a free country. Despite, or perhaps because of the state's feeble attempts of censorship, social media is thriving in Vietnam, reaching a broad audience (Wells-Dang, 2014). Secondly, there is a lack of laws and regulation implementation, and corruption in the public

sector is high (Nørlund, 2007; Wells-Dang, 2014). Thirdly, even though Vietnam has a high number of organizations compared to countries with a similar form of governance, setting up an organization can be extremely challenging (Nørlund, 2007). Money and political connections are essential to traverse the time-consuming procedures. Advocacy is also difficult to practice (Nørlund, 2007). Although non-profit organizations do not have to pay tax, tax laws are not favorable for philanthropists. Finally, mass organizations are profoundly connected and policed by the state; however, grassroots organizations are often more autonomous than those at higher levels.

Civil society in Vietnam does have some strengths, such as high scores in decentralization, rapid economic growth, and members score high on literacy tests and inhabit a high level of trust and comradeship (Nørlund, 2007). Vietnam strongly promotes gender equity in civil society, and a good portion of the leaders in civil society are female. Democracy is also evident in civil society, although the term “participating” is preferred, describing the population's involvement in social activities.

According to Nørlund (2007), civil society does not have a substantial impact on social policies, as the State is still in the driver seat of the Vietnamese development. However, later research has shown how the CPV allow specific civil society individuals and organizations to inform and even oppose Party decisions, as long as said actors can do so without stepping on toes amongst the Party elite (London, 2014; Wells-Dang, 2014). In the next paragraph, FFAV, an organization situated within Vietnamese civil society, but informed by Norwegian notions of development, SDP and civil society, will be presented.

3.2.5 Football for All in Vietnam

Football For All in Vietnam (FFAV) is an organization aimed at developing grassroots football in Vietnam. FFAV was initiated in 1997 when the Football Association of Norway (NFF) reached an agreement with the Vietnamese Football Federation (VFF), and FFAV received funding from The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee (NIF) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) from 2001. Although FFAV was initiated in the capital of Vietnam Hanoi, most of its work has been done in the Thua Thien Hue (TT Hue) province in Central Vietnam, as the organization relocated to the old imperial town Hue in 2003. One reason for this move

was VFFs lack of interest in grassroots football (FFVA, 2011, P. 8). In 2006, an advisory board was formed, consisting of individuals from NFF, VFF, Provincial Department of Education and Training in Hue (DoET), and later the Vietnamese Ministry of Education and Training (MoET). According to FFAV's project description from 2011, the advisory board would serve as a management board once the FFAV activities were handed over to Vietnamese authorities. In 2010, FFAV became recognized as a CSO in Vietnam.

FFAV vision is quite simply "Football for all in Vietnam" (FFAV, 2011, p. 11). FFAV also adheres to the Norwegian principle of equal participation for girls, insisting that 50% of the participants in the clubs are girls. Additionally, FFAV mission is to empower local communities by creating sustainable grassroots soccer clubs. Through educating teachers, parents, and volunteers, children will have the opportunity to participate in engaging football activities, and at the same time, acquire important life skills (FFAV, 2011). Finally, The FFAV goal is "to train people and help to establish non-competitive football clubs for children and youth to provide them with well organized, fun, secure football activities, and include needed life skills in the clubs' activities" (FFAV, 2011, p.15).

FFAV established its first grassroots football club in Hue in 2004. In addition to the increased participation numbers and high activity level, FFAV milestones include: participating in Norway Cup in 2007; joining the Kicking AIDS Out network in 2008; establishing a training centre in 2009; conducting FFAV football cup as an international children's football festival in 2013; forming a partnership with Hue Football Federation (HFF) in 2014, and winning the 2015 and 2017 Dream Asia Award for the development of grassroots football in Vietnam.

FFAV has two main target groups for their footballing activities. The primary target group is boys and girls in primary and secondary schools, with extra emphasis on children from marginalized groups (FFAV, 2011). FFAV engages in several football activities, mainly non-competitive football training and tournaments similar to grassroots football activities in Norway, meaning that although the children play football and compete with another team on the field of play, the emphasis of the activities is participation and mastery, as well as life-skill learning. The secondary target

group is parents, teachers, and other volunteers. FFAV provides volunteers with different instructor courses, to engage with human resources on the grassroots level (FFAV, 2011). Additionally, FFAV has also built pitches for clubs to play five and seven-aside football.

As of 2016, 41,145 children regularly participated in FFAV football training, and numerous more participated in life skills activities or other FFAV activities such as football festivals and events. As of 2018, FFAV is a well rooted and recognized SDP organization, partnering with local Vietnamese partners such as the Provincial Department of Education and Training (DoET), sub-departments located in the district provinces (SUBDoET), and the national level Hue Football Federation (HFF).

3.2.6 FFAV Handover Period

In May of 2016, FFAV received news that NORAD would gradually reduce its funding of the project, with a complete stop from January 2019 onwards. Simultaneously, FFAV announced that it would be handing over the program to local partners; meaning schools, SUBDoET, and DoET would from 2018 onwards be responsible for the football activities initiated by FFAV.

Further, the FFAV management became entirely Vietnamese, as The Founder of FFAV, stepped down as director of the project. Instead, he started a role as a consultant for the NFF and represented Vietnam in the Asian Football Confederation (AFC). The FFAV organization was stripped down to a minimum skeleton of seven (7) Vietnamese employees, consisting of the project director, the vice director, and five (5) department heads (FFAV, 2016).

Additionally, as a part of VFF's football development strategy to 2020, FFAV's model had been selected by VFF, and the MoET, to be replicated to other provinces in Vietnam. However, the FFAV model was proven too costly for feasible replication. Therefore, FFAV initiated an exit strategy, where FFAV activities would be turned over to local authorities, namely DoET, SUBDoET, and the local schools, to run in a self-sustaining fashion. The exit strategy, also known as the Handover Period (HOP) ran from May 2016 to December 2018. The goal of the HOP was threefold. First, FFAV would alter its model so that it would be self-sustainable in the TT Hue province and

more applicable for national replication. Second, governmental -and local- authorities would be increasingly aware of the importance of grassroots football activities for child welfare. Third, a sustainable model for the FFAV organization would be identified and established. To address the latter, FFAV used the HOP to try to establish a social enterprise or a company, from here on only referred to as The Company, to create a financial revenue stream to replace the NORAD funding (FFAV, 2016).

4. Research design

4.1 Introduction

I reached out to the head of NFF's department of international social responsibility through email and enquired about the possibilities of basing my thesis on FFAV. The head of the department was positive in our initial meeting, and he informed me of the current state of the FFAV organization, and we discussed the framework for my master thesis. The head of the department informed me of the challenges FFAV was currently facing and how the period from August to September would be "extremely busy."

When FFAV had accommodated master- and doctoral- students in the past (Harsem, 2012; Weholt, 2012), excessive human resources and time was being used to accommodate the students' data collection. One of the reasons for said resource drainage was the matter in which the previous students conducted their research, focusing on interviewing grassroots- and community members, amounting to extra work for FFAV staff members, arranging interviews, booking interpreters, and filing for permits to Vietnamese authorities. However, the head of the department did not discourage me from pursuing FFAV focused thesis but advised me to take these realities into account when designing my research.

Further, we agreed that my stay in Vietnam should also benefit FFAV to some extent, as the organization was stretched thin trying to facilitate sustainable activities and restructure the organization itself. As the head of the department had extensive experience regarding SDP research, we brainstormed some possible solutions, agreeing that it would be most beneficial for both my thesis and FFAV if I traveled to Vietnam, working for the organization, while still maintaining adequate academic distance. We agreed on a second meeting at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, to consult with my supervisors. Further, the founder of FFAV would attend this meeting, as I still had to be vetted by him.

On the 13th of June 2018, the second meeting took place at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Oslo. Here, we discussed the fit for FFAV and my thesis, and I was asked questions from the FFAV funder regarding my skillset, command of the English language, and football coaching philosophy. The founder and the head of the

department were both favorable to me assisting FFAV's technical department, as well as helping out with grant applications.

Thus, with the information I had gathered from these initial meetings, I settled on a qualitative approach, and a constructivist epistemology to inform my research. I decided to limit my informants to the people working within FFAV, to make my research as non-intrusive as possible for FFAV. In the following paragraphs, the rationale for my research design choices will be further explored.

4.2 Epistemology

As this thesis aimed to explore the meaning of a phenomenon, namely an SDP organization on the receiving end of aid withdrawal, the research question called for a qualitative way of conducting the research (N. Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Nicholls, Giles, & Sethna, 2011; Young & Atkinson, 2012). Further, a qualitative approach was also well suited for research on organizational processes which are previously not well documented (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Svensson et al., 2016). As the literature review in this paper has exposed, there is little to none sport for development specific research done on SDP organizations engulfed in exit strategies. For this thesis, the epistemological approach chosen was constructionism (Crotty, 1998). Constructionism is a common approach to conducting an ethnography study, which is the methodology informing the research process in this thesis (Ryan, 2017). Constructionism differs from the positivist paradigm in the way a constructionist epistemology weights human interaction, perceptions, and experiences heavily, and emphasizes how subjective interpretations construct reality (Crotty, 1998). Several SDP scholars have utilized a constructionist paradigm, and according to constructionism, the world is socially constructed (Crotty, 1998). Unlike positivism, constructionism does not seek to find generalizability in the data collected, but rather thick descriptions and knowledge (Ryan, 2017). Thus, constructivism was well suited for the research question at hand, given the relatively unexplored nature of the phenomena's in question, making generalizable findings challenging to defend.

Further, applying a constructionist epistemology would provide me, the researcher, with the best understanding of my role (Crotty, 1998), and how that might manifest itself in the data collected from the fieldwork. Within the SDP field, several studies have been

carried out qualitatively, hoping to adequately monitor, investigate, or evaluate different sport-based interventions and programs (Sherry et al., 2017). Therefore, ethnographic methodology informs this thesis.

4.3 Methodology

Ethnography was the methodology viewed as best suited to answer the research question posed in this thesis. The notion that social life is meaningful forms the basis for Ethnographic research (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). Ethnography centers around fieldwork (Ryan, 2017), providing a better understanding of beliefs, motivations, and behavior within a specific group or culture (Tedlock, 2003). Ethnography stems from several different academic fields. However, some research situations are more suited to an ethnographic approach, as Angrosino (2007) demonstrated how ethnographic methods can be used to study social issues or behaviors that are yet to be researched.

Ethnographic research can also be used to document a process (Angrosino, 2007). After the initial meetings, I began planning my research design, as well as established communication with the FFAV Human Resource department. I finalized the questionnaire for my interviews and established a framework for how I would document my participant observation. I also researched publicly available documents from NORAD's, specifically documents relating to the withdrawal of funds from the FFAV project. Given that I intended to stay in Vietnam for approximately five months, several documents had to be in order before I could enter the country on a visa with adequate duration. After some initial delays related to the paperwork, I arrived in Hue, Vietnam September the 18th. FFAV underwent a considerable restructuring at the time of my fieldwork. Thus, ethnography was a suitable approach to document the changes, challenges, and opportunities uncovered during this process. Ethnographers need to understand a culture, community or situation from within, to make sense of social phenomena (Atkinson, Coffey, & Delamont, 1999; Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). In contemporary ethnography, it is commonplace for the researcher to disclose his or her own identities, background, and values, and how they might have shaped the interpretations of the data collected (King-White, 2017). My background as a white male westerner, with previous experience from SDP projects and football, definitely impacted how I collected, engaged with, and interpreted the data, and should be kept in mind when viewing my findings. In short, the next paragraphs will discuss the

implication of implementing an ethnographic approach, and how ethnography can be both advantageous and have disadvantages.

4.3.1 Strengths and weaknesses of my approach

Ethnography provided an opportunity to make sense of the everyday life within an SDP organization (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005), making it possible to assess how an SDP organizational turnover impacts the organizational structure, as well as the activities on the community level. To adequately answer my research question, I needed to be able to analyze the perspectives of the FFAV staff, and their experiences (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). According to constructivist ethnography, this may be achieved by me immersing myself in the community, and organization (Ryan, 2017), to document the social actors' realities as accurately as possible (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005).

A common challenge in ethnographic fieldwork is the demand on the researcher for committing to fieldwork for extended periods (Atkinson et al., 1999). The time it takes for a researcher to understand local social structures and cultural understandings could be a matter of weeks, months, or even years (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). Ideally, fieldwork should continue until I could no longer extract new significant information from the observations (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005; Emmel, 2013). For my thesis, I tried to maximize my time in Vietnam and Hue, spending a total of five months in the field. Initially, my intention was to spend more than six months in the field, but my starting date got postponed because of visa issues. As for my departure, I felt that after December 31st, 2018, the potency of the data I gathered from participant observation diminished somewhat, because of the lack of FFAV activities, and the low activity level at the FFAV office.

Thus, ethnography is highly dependent on long term fieldwork (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005), which is why I spent a total of 5 months in Vietnam. However, the luxury of time is not always a commodity available for the ethnographer, as institutional timelines regarding publishing and completion of theses often hamper the researcher's ability to fully immerse in the community being studied, as such a feat could take at least a year to achieve (Hammersley, 2006). For my thesis, I tried to stretch my fieldwork for as long as possible, in hopes of reaching information saturation (Hammersley, 2006).

Ultimately, my fieldwork ended up lasting five months, qualifying for what has been called short-term ethnography.

As the data accumulated from my observations and interviews is highly context-specific, and only informed by the actions of one medium sized SDP organization, the findings can not be considered as generalizable (Crotty, 1998). However, generalizability is not the objective of this thesis, as ethnographic findings are highly subjective, and aim to provide rich descriptions on a given topic or of a community (Ryan, 2017; Tedlock, 2003). A positivist informed objection of my research approach, relates to the lack of structure in the data collection, as well as the high degree of subjectivity, leading to biased findings (Ryan, 2017). However, ethnographers are not merely accumulating their personal experiences (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). Doing ethnographic research, I strived to adhere to the practice of observing with careful attention, and document these observations meticulously, hopefully resulting in a highly reflexive process (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). As I was an inexperienced researcher at the time of conducting the research, there was a risk of prejudice and the bias affecting the findings, especially since I gathered the data alone, while being geographically separated from my academic supervisors. Hasselgård (2015) and Straume (2013) both postulated that being able to have a dialogue with a fellow researcher, was critical to staying committed to reflexivity and the key to avoiding bias (Angrosino, 2007). To combat this, I frequently communicated with my supervisors per mail and had Skype conversations. Additionally, I reached out to a PhD-student from the United States, as he had conducted an ethnographic study for his dissertation in Hue, related to the FFAV activities. Finally, to gain further analytical distance, I returned to Norway in medio March, allowing for better interaction and discussions with my supervisors.

4.4 Methods

For this thesis, semi-structured interviews and participant observation were the methods of choice. Ethnographic fieldwork is not limited to a single method of data collection (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). Ethnography and participant observation often go hand in hand, but other methods also informed the research question answers (Grey, 2014). Participant observation, open-ended interviews, and documentary analysis are the most utilized methods within ethnographic research (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005; Dewalt & Dewalt, 2002). Such is also the case for SDP specific research (Schulenkorf et al.,

2016). Thus, I choose both semi-structured interviews and participant observations as methods for data collection, in an attempt to provide richness of data, triangulating, and confirming findings (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005).

4.4.1 Participant observation

Participant observation dates back to the 1920s, where it was used by anthropologist and ethnographers to study tribal cultures (Dewalt & Dewalt, 2002). Participant observation focuses on the meaning of peoples' actions, and the researcher takes part in daily activities and interactions within a group or community, studying their behavior (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005; Dewalt & Dewalt, 2002). A critical aspect of ethnographic research would be my ability to partake in the activity and participating in peoples everyday life, also called access (Silk, 2002). To be able to do this, I needed to be able to access the sites in which the research would take place (King-White, 2017). Consequently, I had to be able to develop rapport and gain favor with the individuals in the FFAV organization. I attempted to achieve this by taking an interest in the organization's challenges, gaining favors and personal connection with the staff members whom I wanted to include in my sample study.

During my stay in Vietnam, I attended a total of three Fun Football Festivals. FFF is an FFAV initiated event that takes place on the community and district level. The events are non-competitive as explained in the context chapter of this thesis, and always include some form of life skill element. In line with FFAV handover strategy, these activities are supported and run by volunteers in its entirety. Volunteers are usually parents, school teachers, and former students. Several of these volunteers had received training from FFAV to carry out different tasks concerning the FFFs. When attending these footballing events, I tried to be non-participatory, observing the activities from distance, noting down observations in a designated fieldwork notebook, or if I wanted to be less conspicuous, on my phone. However, as the events took place in communities off the beaten track, I was the only foreigner present. Consequently, I received quite a bit of attention from both players and facilitators. When attending these events, I would always be accompanied by one or more FFAV staff members, who were present to observe if the events were running smoothly. Therefore, I directed questions regarding the FFF to the FFAV staff, and the staff members also doubled as interpreters when locals wanted to strike up a conversation with me.

A weakness concerning participant observation and fieldwork, in general, could be the differences between me, the researcher, and the people I encountered in the field (Hasselgård, 2015a). Age, ethnicity, nationality, class, and gender are examples of such differences (Fangen, 2010). Before I arrived in Vietnam, I was informed that westerners have a high status in Vietnam. Additionally, Vietnamese society values seniority, and your income is also important. During my stay in Vietnam, I was frequently asked for my age, as well as my income level. As I needed to approach my research context as an open and engaged learner, it was of great importance that I tried to exercise reflexivity in all stages of my research; to reflect upon how my values, experiences, and beliefs could impact the research (Sherry et al., 2017; Spaaij, Schulenkorf, Jeanes, & Oxford, 2018; Willig, 2013). Additionally, I was engaged in a dual role, where I was both a graduate student writing a thesis and a volunteer at the organization I was studying.

Before my arrival in Vietnam, the FFAV staff were informed of my intentions, and I had sent the HR department a copy of my CV. In turn, the HR department distributed my CV to the other FFAV departments, asking them to discuss where my experience and knowledge would be needed the most. Given my coaching background, the head of the technical department proposed that I should work under him, assisting with my football expertise. Hence, I acquired the position of a technical volunteer. In reality, I worked much closer with the Vice President of FFAV, assisting her in applying for grants, and proofreading English texts for distribution. I spent several days a week at the FFAV office, but sometimes took days off, working on my thesis from home. After January 1st 2019, FFAV relocated to a smaller office and reduced its staff. Parallel to this, I started spending less time at the new office, preparing my interview-guide and analyzed the field notes I had gathered so far. One of the most effective ways for an SDP researcher to understand the contextual experiences of individuals, is for the researcher to become immersed in the new environment (Giulianotti et al., 2016; Sherry et al., 2017), but also being able to exit the field; effectively reflecting on the study situation at hand (Bray, 2008). To avoid the adverse side effects of intense immersion and to be able to remain reflexive, I spent several days a week away from the FFAV office, working remotely, allowing me to distinguish between my role as a master student and my role as an FFAV volunteer.

Throughout the fieldwork, it was challenging for me to gauge the extent to which participation was needed, or appropriate. As I am a licensed football coach, with prior experience from SDP, there were several situations where I was asked to contribute to the organization or other side businesses the SDP staff were involved. The researcher's role in the field can be placed on a continuum; stretching from full participation and interaction with the other participants, to only observe, without taking any part in the activity (Grey, 2014). Fangen (2010) presented four overlapping roles: partly participating observer, fully participating observer, nonparticipating observer, unobserving participant/go native, and intervening participant. When I was asked to help out in FFAV related matters, I chose to actively participate to the best of my abilities, as I felt this would allow me to gain trust within the organization.

Coincidentally, I made it clear to the staff members that I was in Vietnam first and foremost to write my master thesis and would allocate the majority of my time to data collection, and other thesis-related tasks, such as writing up a literature review. Therefore, my role as an observer fluctuated from situation to situation. As a coach with experience from SDP projects, some doors were opened for observation and collecting rich data, allowing me to gain greater insight into the lives of the FFAV staff. Thus, supporting the claim that qualitative researchers should actively participate in the research, taking on the role of an active learner (Sherry et al., 2017). I was also trying to understand what demands guided the different decisions, changes, and strategies, as well as the power relationship between FFAV and other stakeholders, as these connections were essential aspects of my ability to uphold reflexivity when conducting the research (Darnell, 2010; Darnell & Hayhurst, 2011; Sherry et al., 2017). Still, I can not guarantee that my dual role, did not impact the data I gathered negatively.

Throughout the last six months of 2018, FFAV arranged evaluation seminars on the district level. During these seminars, a club coach, referee, teacher or board member represented the FFAV football club situated within the district. Attending were also representatives from the SUBDoET. During these evaluation meetings, clubs elaborated on how they had facilitated activities during the HOP, and more importantly, how they were going to remain sustainable after 2018. The clubs addressed their capacity strength and weaknesses and were encouraged by FFAV representatives to exchange experiences with each other.

These evaluation seminars conducted in Vietnamese, I was dependent on an interpreter. Thus, language barriers were in play, as both the interpreter and I were communicating in our second language, possibly leading to misunderstanding (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Luckily, I was set up with an excellent interpreter who took great interest in my research. The interpreter was also present for all four evaluation seminars I attended, allowing us to connect and develop a relationship, thus enriching my understanding of the data collected (Scott, Miller, & Lloyd, 2006). However, the interpreter could also possibly have skewed my observations, by adding or admitting information based on her own beliefs, biases, and background (Fangen, 2010; Scott et al., 2006). On October the 27th 2018, FFAV invited all past and current local stakeholders to a ceremonial event. Here, FFAV work over the last 15 years was presented, as well as plans for the future of the project. Over 100 individuals were present, representing clubs, schools, previous and present volunteers, the MoET, the VFF, and Hasselgård from NFF. For the evaluation seminars and the handover ceremony, I took a more passive role, not engaging, but listening from the back of the room where the seminars were taking place, with my interpreter translating the conversation. I was paying particular attention to the clubs' challenges, opportunities, and what they perceived FFAV's role in the local communities moving forward.

4.4.2 Informants

I chose a sample size of seven (7) informants. Six of my informants were the individuals who made up the core of the FFAV staff. Namely the director Ho, the vice director Chi, and the four department heads: Minh, Ngo, Dinh, and Diem. As these staff members were the ones I observed to be the mainstays in the FFAV organization, as they had all been with the organization for a long time, were native Vietnamese and would work up until December 31st 2018, I concluded they would provide me with the most relevant data. To provide additional context, I included the founder of FFAV, who had served as the director of the organization from its conception until May 2016, to the sample population. One possible critique of my selected informants is the lack of representatives from the grassroots level, and the local authorities FFAV worked with closely. Admittedly, individuals from different governmental levels could provide valuable perspectives, but several practical obstacles kept me from including more informants to my sample. Firstly, while the staff members spoke excellent English, most

Vietnamese people are not well versed in the English language. I chose not to engage an interpreter, as this would cost FFAV time and resources.

Further, only interns and young volunteers would have been available for the interpreter role, which would be problematic in a traditional country such as Vietnam, where elders would be reluctant to speak freely in front of a younger person (Scott et al., 2006).

Secondly, FFAV already had to apply for permissions to local authorities for me to be allowed to visit schools and evaluation seminars. If I were to arrange formal interviews with officials or even teachers, I could risk facing time-consuming bureaucracy, and my informants being heavily censored (Scott et al., 2006). Therefore, to save time and resources, I kept the interview sample in-house.

4.4.3 Semi-structured interviews

There are three critical advantages to combining participant observations and interviews: Firstly, interviews can become a gateway through which I could get in touch with key informants. Secondly, cross-referencing the data from interviews, with findings from the participatory observations can increase the validity of the study. Finally, by confronting informants with observations made in the field, new in-depth answers could be provided (Fangen, 2010). For this thesis, the two latter advantages proved valuable for this thesis.

I conducted all the interviews in February 2019. The interview guide was based on my first draft from before I arrived in Vietnam, and then later informed by the information I had gathered from my observations. To get more familiar with the interview setting, my tape-recorder, and my interview guide, I conducted a pilot interview before initiating interviews with the interview objects. I interviewed my interpreter from the evaluation seminars, an FFAV intern. She was aware of the nature of my thesis, as I had informed her as to what information I was interested in during the evaluation seminars, and she knew FFAV and the handover ordeal well.

After the pilot interview, I made some adjustments to my interview guide and started interviewing my selected sample. Even more important than the number of informants, are the depth of engagement achieved when interacting with the sampled selection, as trustful relations and rapport are paramount to conducting successful qualitative

research (Janesick, 2001; Sherry et al., 2017). The interviews took place in an office meeting room (3), a café (1), a bar (1), and my homestay (2). The interviews lasted between 45 and 65 minutes, and there were no interpreters present, as I had charted the interviewees English level, and deemed it more than good enough to have a meaningful conversation. I also considered my spoken English to be adequate for an interview setting. The interviews were semi-structured and therefore, conducted differently. In semi-structured interviews, the researcher decides the focus of the interview (Fontana & Frey, 2005).

Moreover, a semi-structured format allows for flexibility (Fontana & Frey, 2005), and open-ended questions can allow for new viewpoints and themes to be brought up and discussed (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Semi-structured interviews are standard in SDP research (Schulenkorf et al., 2016; Sherry et al., 2017). For my interviews, some of the interview subjects would talk uninterrupted for 15 minutes at the time, while others needed further probing questioning. Further, given my fieldwork, I had individual specific questions related to the subjects in their FFAV department.

4.4.4 Ethical considerations

This study was approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD) and complied with their ethical guidelines (see Appendix 1). Before my arrival in Vietnam, I communicated with the HR-department in FFAV and stated the intent and nature of my master thesis. After I arrived in Vietnam and identified my informants, I presented my project in depth and emailed the informants my informed consent document (see Appendix 2). The document explained the purpose of my study, how I would conduct the interviews and the nature of my participant observation. Further, the document informed the informants that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. In the consent document, I provided my contact information, along with my supervisor's contact information. Additionally, the document explained how I would store their personal data.

My role as a researcher, but also working within the organization, was a source of many ethical considerations. My conversations with the informants, both formal and informal, gave me an inside look at personal conflicts within the organization, as well as how the informants felt about NFF, and local Vietnamese authorities. Although much of this

information could have been valuable to answer my research question; in order to avoid ethical dilemmas, I chose to forgo a lot of the information gathered that related to individuals within or outside FFAV. There were also many ethical challenges regarding my fluctuating participatory involvement as a field researcher. I could participate in a way that caused my informants extra work, confusion or frustration (Fangen, 2010). Additionally, I could also be causing my informants stress, affect their self-image, or reinforce negative self-images. To circumvent these issues, I tried to the best of my abilities to as transparent and open in my role as a researcher, asking my informants if they consented to me making a note of their statement, and I also tried to follow up on statements made.

As FFAV is a small organization, it was problematic to anonymize the informants; a common challenge in small and familiar research environments (Smith & Sparkes, 2016). Still, to ensure confidentiality, the informants were given pseudonyms to conceal their identities. The informants were provided transcripts of their interviews, as well as an executive summary of my interpretation of their challenges during the HOP. In this way, they could withdraw or alter any information they did not want to share in my master thesis (King-White, 2017; Wheaton, 2013).

4.4.5 Thematic Analysis

An ethnographer should continuously be trying to make sense of the research while it is being conducted. However, at some point during the research process, I needed to sit down and analyze the information collected (King-White, 2017). This analytical process was an ongoing one, where field notes, interview recordings, transcripts, and documents formed the basis of my analysis (King-White, 2017). For my interpretation, I was informed by a thematical analysis approach, where I first familiarized myself with the data and began coding information, as well as grouping said codes into themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Although there was a hierarchy as to my thematic analysis approach, I continually moved between the different phases typically associated with thematic analysis, rewriting and revisiting transcripts and field notes, enriching my findings (Braun & Clarke, 2006). For my interpretation, the findings presented are based on the information shared by the informants during the interviews, and my copious field notes from my participant observation.

Additionally, as my research did not seek generalizability, I was not as much concerned with triangulating my findings, as I was with crystalizing them (Braun & Clarke, 2006; King-White, 2017). Therefore, my background and biases, are integrated into the analysis and should be kept in mind when reading findings and discussion in this master thesis. My themes did not merely emerge from the data, as a positivist standpoint would suggest, but was instead produced through the concoction of my knowledge, experience, research skill, and the data itself (Braun, Clarke, & Weate, 2016).

For my thematic analysis, I tried to the best of my ability to approach my data coding and themed categorization in an inductive way, where the data itself guided the developing analysis, as appose to my analysis being driven by theoretical concepts (Braun et al., 2016). This approach is well suited for my research, as it is grounded in a constructivist epistemological framework (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Braun et al., 2016). My codes were thus not derived from any theoretical model. Consequently, my coding process was quite time-consuming, with me moving back and forth between my transcripts and field notes, as well as revising transcripts as new codes become conceptualized. As I developed my themes, I tried to group them in such a way that they would answer my research question in a robust, nuanced and detailed fashion (Braun et al., 2016). Although not presented in this thesis, I did construct thematic maps, to explore the hierarchical and lateral relationships between the identified themes. As a result, four main themes were identified: *Organizational Restructure*; *The Company*, *Sustainable Activities*; and *Replication*.

The analytical process often shifts focus between the search for meaning in the empirical data, and the incorporation of theoretical concepts (Thagaard, 2018). Therefore, the results presented in the findings chapter, is descriptive, while the discussion chapter, aims to link my findings to the contemporary sport for development literature, to illuminate where my findings correlate or juxtapose the current state of the field (Thagaard, 2018).

5. Findings

The four themes all relate to various aspects of the HOP, and the challenges FFAV faced. The first theme is named *Organizational Restructure*, and addresses how the FFAV organizational streamlining and cuts, impacted the day to day of the FFAV staff. The second theme is called *Sustainable Activities*. Here, findings related to how the staff members worked with the communities and schools, to achieve self-sustaining football activities, are presented. The third theme encompasses all the efforts made by FFAV to establish a stream of revenue, to compensate for the lost funding from NORAD. This theme is named *The Company*. The fourth and final theme, *Replication*, encompasses FFAV's efforts to replicate the FFAV model on a national level.

5.1 *Organizational Restructure*

With NORAD announcing they would gradually reduce their funding of FFAV from 2016 to 2018, with a complete stop from January 2019 onwards, FFAV had to make cuts. Staff numbers, which peaked at 17, were reduced down to a skeleton of 7 full-time employees. Simultaneously, the remaining staff had to accept salary reductions of around 10 percent. Although NORAD was FFAV major donor, the economic funds provided did not even make up half of FFAV's annual budget. The organization was well versed in applying for, and attaining grants from other funders:

Before, our major donor is NORAD not NFF; NORAD. But they just occupied about 36% of our funding. The remaining is our efforts, in fundraising. So, with NORAD cut, we don't have any adjustment in NFF relationship. We partner the same, because we keep writing proposals for such a long time. (Chi)

However, the critical difference in NORAD funding to other external resources was the amount of money earmarked for staff and salary. Typically, grants acquired from other organizations such as Streetfootballworld, UNICEF, or the AFC, were directly linked to projects and intervention programs that FFAV was contracted to implement. Further, the donors would compartmentalize the financial resources granted, only allowing for the allocation of a small percentage towards staff salary. To make an exit as smooth as possible NORAD's funding had gradually throttled down from 2016 to 2018, and seized by the start of 2019. However, as Chi stated, the gradual reduction of funds, staff, and

organizational size did not address the problematic human resource situation in the organization post-2019 adequately:

Before we have communication department, administration, and human resource department. We had finance department. Program department. Now, even the organization is so small, we still require such functions. Now, who will be in charge of the communication? Who will be in charge of finance, human resource? (Chi)

In other words, the remaining FFAV staff was backlogged with tasks and assignments previously carried out by full-time staff, and with slim opportunities to find financial support to hire the human resources necessary. Further, the implications of financial, and human resource reduction had also made the last months of the HOP turbulent:

At the very last day at work, no one sit with me, for me to like to transfer what is the things that we need to do with the communication and, how to do that. I basically just put that on paper and keep it there. (Diem)

Continuing, Diem said she had no idea who or how FFAV would continue her communication activity. Minh, the head of the technical department echoed this, describing how the handover lacked smoothness, and while the economic resources were being gradually reduced to prepare the organization for a new reality post-2018, the tasks and responsibilities were not.

5.1.1 Downsizing

As FFAV reduced its staff numbers, the workload of the remaining department heads increased. All departments experienced strain from the sudden lack of human resources, but none so much as the program department:

In my department, we used to have three project officers. But since 2016 we have had certain cut down of the funding. So, the project officer has to leave the program. So, all the burden had to fall on my shoulder. And you cannot imagine, that is over 200 football clubs. (Dinh)

Dinh's experience from the program department was an accurate representation of the workload the FFAV staff were facing from 2016 to 2018. Hence, the FFAV staff were forced to cut corners and engaged the communities with a more top-down approach, only communicating with technical experts from the SUBDoET, or school headmasters,

as appose to engaging parents and volunteers, building sustainable community activities from the ground up. Said top-down approach was a deliberate tactic form the FFAV directors board, consisting of the director and the vice director. As the human resources in the organization were stretched thin, the director board wanted to maximize the effectiveness of the FFAV staffs' engagement and to ease their workload by not conducting as many field visits. However, The Founder of FFAV doubted the effectiveness of this approach. Ngo, the head of human relations, supported The Founders views:

Because my thinking, my opinion, is really different from the director board. They think that okay this is the handover process already, so we should give the ownership to the community. So sometimes, they said that "okay, you don't need to go." Dinh, she is the one to be responsible for program department, but she rarely, she rarely follows the activities in the communities. (Ngo)

In other words, the organizational downsizing directly influenced the way FFAV approached the communities. FFAV invested heavily in the physical experts from the SUDBOET, in the hopes that they, in turn, would facilitate sustainable activities on the grass root level. However, according to some of the staff members, they were not able to adequately impact the individuals on the ground, who were the ones to conduct the activities. One way this lack of human resources was manifesting, was how FFAV were not able to train and impact new school headmasters like they had been doing before the start of the HOP:

We used to have the principle that with every headmaster we should have like a orientation for him or her at the football club. But since 2016, since we don't have much, enough human resource, so we didn't do it properly. We just invite them to the meetings and the workshop. And then they learn about FFAV, learn about our values through speeches or something like that. (Dinh)

During the interview conducted in February 2019, Chi, now the head of FFAV in Hue was asked how she viewed the human resource need in FFAV after the dust had settled from the HOP, and the new streamlined FFAV organization was operational. She revealed that as of February 2019, operations were running nicely. The clubs were still not active, as the Vietnamese new year's celebration Tet was coming up, so FFAV manly focused on report writing and other administrative work. However, as clubs were starting up their activities, Chi was worried that the organization would become so busy,

and so strained for human resources, that it would lead to mission drift, and FFAV not being able to work towards its said goal of model replication:

What I worried most, is not about everything we do every day. But we are so scared that we are so busy, and occupied by things around the office here, then I don't think we have very bright idea with the model replication. We just spent time, moving things around. And we forget our priority, our mission! And why we are here. (Chi)

Dinh, the head of the program department, revealed that the financial strain on the organization meant that the staff members on several occasions had to take on Ad Hoc activities, on the expense of their actual responsibilities.

5.1.2 The family of FFAV

Although there were many changes taking place during the HOP, the impact the funding reduction had on the organizational structure, and consequently, the staff was one of the more immediate. From 2016 to 2018, FFAV gradually reduced staff, and the remaining department heads were taken aback by the emotional toll of the downsizing:

We both reduce staff, and also the staff salary was reduced. I don't know but at the phase when there has been some change like that, it also affect the staff feeling. Yeah. When they see people who have to be together, now they leave the team. (Diem)

The FFAV staff viewed the organization as a family. Several of them had been working together for over ten years. Naturally, it was tough to see friends go. Simultaneously, the remaining staff was unsure if they would also be let go, and if so, how far down the HOP said layoffs would happen. For the FFAV staff, the HOP was not only seen as a restructuring of an organization but also as fragmentation of a tightly knitted family. Some of the staff members had been with FFAV their entire professional career. Several of the staff members, including Ho, the current director, had over ten years of experience in FFAV, entering the organization as interpreters, interns, or volunteers. The staff were all around the same age and had seen each develop from young, unmarried professionals to seasoned department veterans, married and with children. They were all grateful to FFAV and The Founder, for allowing them to grow as people and as professionals. Not only were the staff grateful toward the organization, but they had also developed close interpersonal connections. However, these connections

seemed to erode during the HOP. In several meetings, the lack of the family atmosphere, evidently present pre-2016, was often discussed. As Minh stated:

2017, and 18 is, is very hard year actually. We have been working in a not kind of the, how I say. People are really distracted. Because it is firstly we have to cut our staff, and then people feel really uncertainly about the future. (Minh)

The uncertainty surrounding their future with FFAV, as well as the emotional stress of seeing friends and colleagues leaving the organization, led to the remaining staff members looking out for their own interests and planning their future outside of the organization, post-2018. Diem took exception to the way the handover was communicated from May 2016, believing the staff members should have been closely informed as to what the purpose of the organizational restructure and the HOP was, so the staff members could more clearly see their role and fit in FFAV moving forward. Instead, the uncertainty led to staff members being distracted. When asked to elaborate on these feelings of uncertainty, Minh mentioned how he thought that the HOP lacked balance, making it difficult for the staff to prioritize tasks.

5.1.3 Organizational Restructure summary

The Organizational Restructure theme showed how The HOP impacted the FFAV staff members on a personal level. As the organization had to make cuts, they had to witness colleagues they had come to regard as family, lose their jobs. At the same time, the staff members grew uncertain of their future with FFAV, and what would happen to the organization during and after the HOP. From an organizational standpoint, the loss of NORAD as the primary funding partner meant that it was much harder to allocate funds to staff salary, as other funding partners often wanted the money spent on interventions and equipment. Even though the staff numbers were reduced, the amount of work within FFAV remained the same, or even increased, meaning the remaining staff members were working more than before the HOP, and also at reduced salaries. The vice director predicted that this lack of Human resources would impact the organization also after December 2018, leaving the remaining staff members to scramble for funding opportunities, instead of focusing on FFAV's mission.

5.2 Sustainable Activities

A key theme for the HOP, was starting from January 2019, the footballing activities and clubs in the TT Hue province would be handed over to local stakeholders; the schools affiliated with the clubs, the DoET, and SUBDoET. As FFAV no longer had the consistent funding from its primary partner NORAD, the activities needed to be self-sustained by the communities, and the local authorities. Although NORAD stepping down lead to a series of new challenges for FFAV, such as organizational restructure and model replication, the majority of the work being done by the FFAV staff members during this transitional phase, was in with the end goal of achieving self-sustainable activities in the province.

5.2.1 Mistakes of past years

The FFAV- model before the NORAD-initiated HOP took place, meant the clubs were heavily reliant on external funding to run activities. Hence, the communities and football clubs had grown dependent on FFAV in an unsustainable way. To bring to light just how financially and technically dependent the communities were, Ngo shared that the thing she feared more than anything during the HOP, was that the reduction in funding would completely halt all footballing activities in the FFAV clubs. Dinh, the head of the program department, explained:

We acted like the role of the sponsor. So, we used that money to divide it to clubs, for their regular activities, for their events, and for their district to organize the big event for the children in the area. So basically, the clubs, they only have to care about the events, how to organize for the kids, and for the funding part we are in charge. (Dinh)

Not only were the clubs financially dependent on FFAV, but they also relied on FFAV staff to provide the technical support needed to run activities. Before 2016, two project officers (POs) worked with Dinh to oversee the community activities. According to Ngo, the clubs' dependent on the POs not just for guidance, but the facilitation of footballing activities. Especially one of the POs was known as a perfectionist, who lacked the patience to let the clubs sort out matters relating to financial reports, tournament planning, or day to day activities. However, the clubs' dependency issues could not only be laid at the feet of one over- diligent FFAV staff member. As FFAV provided the clubs with substantial financial support, the clubs, in turn, were required to provide FFAV with extensive financial reports.

We provided them with financial rapport. And we requested them with a lot of reports, you know. And at as the coach, the physical teacher, I don't use the lap top. I don't use the lap top a lot. So now you ask me to make plan, you ask me to make report, how can I do? (Ngo)

Therefore, the responsibility of financial reporting would often fall on the POs, as the clubs did not have the technological literacy to cope with the FFAV reporting and monitoring demands. In summary, although the FFAV activities were running smoothly, the clubs were heavily reliant of the organizations financial- and human-resources to function. Therefore, the seismic shift in organizational capacity from 2016 onwards, would put pressure on the clubs, as well as the organization.

5.2.2 The beginning of the end

When speaking of their work between late 2015 and spring of 2016, where FFAV received news that NORAD would not renew its contract with FFAV, the interviewees spoke of a period of confusion and chaos. The core staff of FFAV was seemingly in disbelief, not being able to fathom NORAD was not coming through with development funding. Minh recalled:

I remember clearly. "Oh you have to make the handover strategy now!" One day, and then we have the supply the next day. So lacking of information the partner totally. So, then people, react. In the way that okay, now the Norway withdrew the support, financial support, and now the project will stop. (Minh)

FFAV was not unaware of how reliant the clubs were on outside help, both financially, and technically. To the contrary, the staff revealed that they were both aware of the club's dependency issue and the fact that change would soon be upon the organization. The Founder, the founder of FFAV, and the former director said:

The transition on the first of May 2016, got pushed upon us by NORAD. And if you go back five years I had several meetings with the director of NORAD, where we agreed upon a game plan for a transition... Well, that director is gone, and naturally it is difficult to plan that many years in advance, regarding finances. But we did get pushed into initiating a transition, that in hindsight I see we should have prepared for much earlier. Because we knew it was coming! (The Founder)

It seemed FFAV before May 1st, 2016, had grown somewhat content, preparing for a new organizational course they knew was coming, but not realizing just how altering said course change would be. The staff had indeed discussed different approaches to

increasing the clubs' ownership of the activities. One of the possibilities discussed was to recruit the local parents as volunteers, through several initiatives the staff referred to as social mobilization:

We already think about getting parents involved to do the volunteers or the support the club. But later on, we still discuss and discuss. And we find that "oh that is so difficult". Because the parents they are farmer, they are gardener, they do the labor work, and eight hours per day, and they almost have like time for themselves for relax. So, to get them to be the volunteer or to join the club, that is very difficult. (Diem)

Now, with the 2018 cut off point fast approaching, FFAV revisited their social mobilization idea and started introducing the strategy to the clubs through a series of information meetings. However, some clubs were so invested in the benefits they had been reaping from the all-inclusive grassroots football introduced to them by FFAV, that they not only agreed it was high time the clubs became self-reliant, they also began experimenting themselves how to engage local volunteers best:

We have a lot of seminar and meeting with clubs. And it is from the clubs who take action. Before us. Then they know the story, the future, that Norway will reduce money from the project, they will stop the funding. So, they form the club themselves. So, they organized the like, parents and teachers, and student exchange football event. (Diem)

Minh agreed with Diem, by stating that one of the positive outcomes from the abrupt HOP initiation, was that some of the older more established clubs agreed they could not receive funding forever, and it was time for clubs to take ownership of the activities.

5.2.3 Social mobilization

Midst financial- and staffing- cutbacks, the heads of the departments began to engage with the local stakeholders in a way that was meant to promote and facilitate the social mobilization model. Diem said the staff took inspiration from the clubs that were already successfully mobilizing local volunteers, and used these success stories to fuel and sharpen the outreach efforts directed at the remaining clubs. According to Chi, one of the fundamental changes for FFAV during the HOP was how they targeted parents through different marketing campaigns, in the hopes of recruiting them as volunteers. FFAV printed posters, flyers, notebooks, DVDs, and other campaign material, emphasizing the role of the community volunteer. Diem, the head of the communication

department, explained how FFAV activities were communicated differently during the HOP, compared to before 2016:

Before, then mostly we report the event as it is going on, the events. But recently we focus more on highlighting the case story of the parents of the social mobilization success story. So, we have a priority to recap the story of the, the clubs effort in sustain, like, of sustainable football clubs. (Diem)

Minh, the head of the technical department, said that before 2016, the technical department had been working more with the implementation of life skill for their coaching workshops. However, during the HOP, his work shifted more towards preparing manuals, and training of what he referred to as critical people in the different clubs and provinces, who would be able to sustain activities, and in turn train other teachers or volunteers to conduct footballing activities. Further, the head of the program department Dinh, went into how FFAV launched what they called their activity fund. In essence, the activity fund was money earmarked sporting activities were the club or clubs arranging a tournament had to meet a list of criteria set by FFAV. Dinh explained:

For example, the first criteria is they should have the local contribution. They should have parents; they [should] want to have volunteers. So, cost-effective, as long as they submit the proposal, and we will review. If they follow the idea, and if they met the criteria or not. (Dinh)

However, this phase of the HOP was still heavily dependent on FFAV injecting financial resources into the activities:

When we turn to the parents at the clubs, not the physical teachers at the clubs, then we have to have the strategy to train for the parents. That is money. And also, for the communities, to understand about the program, we have had campaigns. So, we need initial funding. (Chi)

In observations during field visits in October, Dinh visited several Fun Football Festivals arranged entirely by volunteers, parents, and teachers. Additionally, some clubs had fundraising initiatives like a donation box, where parents could contribute a sum of money if they wished. These real-life examples backed up the notion to a large extent, the social mobilization part of the HOP had succeeded:

Some of the clubs, I one hundred percent trust that they are sustainable. I when I say successful it doesn't mean that every club will be sustainable. I believe that

*in like, fifty percent of the clubs, will still going on with the good activities.
(Diem)*

The staff was especially encouraged by the fact that clubs who had initially succeeded with recruitment and training of volunteers, had passed on their knowledge to other clubs; either informally, or through workshops put on by FFAV. The success stories were multiplying, causing staff members to have optimistic outlooks on the sustainability of the activities.

5.2.4 Activity level after 2018

The social mobilization was successful, but the staff members still expected a significant drop off in the number of clubs engaging in FFAV-like footballing activities. Diem's retention number of fifty percent was optimistic compared to the other staff members predictions, which went all the way down to one-third of the clubs still operating after 2018.

In other words; if the activities seized to exist in their original FFAV packaging, meaning Fun Football Festivals and day to day footballing activities with life skill integrated, the impact would still be sustainable. However, this would not necessarily mean that FFAV influenced activities would completely disappear. Multi-sport events and cultural festivities could choose to include FFAV inspired activities, in the form of non-competitive football and life-skill games. Building on this less rigid understanding of FFAV sustainability, several of the staff members believed that many clubs would continue to run footballing activities, but on a more modest scale:

One hundred percent of the people I have met or have worked; they say that they will continue to organize football activity. But, at the certain level that they can afford. For example, with a lot of money from FFAV they organize a big football fun festival... But now, using their own resource, so they just organize a little bit smaller scale football festival. (Dinh)

This understanding was echoed by Minh, who did not want to give a timetable on how long he thought the clubs would sustain activities but was certain footballing activities would continue somewhat indefinitely, but on an affordable level. While incorporating the social mobilization strategy, the staff, particularly the head of the program department Dinh, seemed to be well aware of the how different provinces would require different approaches to engaging parents, and maintaining activities. In the more urban

provinces, clubs were able to draw on resources from the educational system more easily than in the more rural districts. Ngo however, shared her concern regarding the clubs who had been latecomers to the FFAV-model, and how she thought the HOP did not distinguish between newer and more established clubs:

For the handover process, it can be said long [enough] for the clubs that are ready for the handover. But can be so short for the young, or baby clubs. Why they are still not running properly, now we ask them to community volunteer. (Ngo)

Ngo went on to explain how it was almost impossible to expect newly established clubs to implement a social mobilization strategy, when they were not yet familiar with the FFAV philosophy. Ngo stated that she did not blame the head of the program department for this shortcoming, as she knew that the staff reduction had hit the program department especially hard, leaving the remaining head of department pressed for time. Lastly, some clubs were believed to fall by the wayside as FFAV lessened its support, simply because of the clubs being located in communities that were considered too poor to facilitate any social mobilization. All of these factors mentioned above contributed to the staff's somewhat conservative estimations regarding club retention. However, when asked how they felt about predicting more than half the clubs would no longer sustain FFAV activities, all of the department heads were pleased with this outcome, even stating "I think that is a high number" (Dinh). However, The Founder contested:

The clubs will survive. But again, so mechanical. If someone says "no more money" and "half the clubs will shut down." Then half the clubs will shut down! In my mind, that's way too defensive. We have to ensure the clubs keep running, but that they are run in a different manner. (The Founder)

The final factor impacting whether a club would remain operational or not, was by Diem considered to be the importance of the human resources located in the communities and school affiliated with the FFAV clubs:

Some of the club now they are running very well, but the headmaster is going to retire very soon, and he very, very dedicated one, but I do not know if the next person after that can be up that dedicated. (Diem)

With FFAV scaling down its support, including the technical training of future coaches and referees, the members of the community already trained, would become essential for the continuation of footballing activities. After over fifteen years of running activities, naturally, some of the community mainstays were set to retire. The question would be if the new headmasters, teachers, and physical experts would have the same passion and knowledge about all-inclusive grassroots football activities. Diem wondered if the schools would be able to reach to these challenges proactively, now that FFAV were no longer there to provide the training. Additionally, according to Dinh, Vietnam had anti-corruption policies in place, that prohibited headmasters from working at the same school over an extended period. Therefore, this rotation of vital community human resources could weaken an FFAV clubs affiliation with an individual school. “Vulnerable” was the word Ngo chose to describe the sustainability status of FFAV clubs.

FFAV had according to its staff, proven the FFAV-model could be run sustainably by volunteer members of the community. However, the activity was still dependent on the trained human resources on the grassroots level. Therefore, the HOP was not only aimed at parents, but also governmental institutions with the potential to organize, train, and develop the human resources readily available in the clubs and schools.

5.2.5 Working with the SUBDoET

Although prioritized, the HOP did not only involve mobilizing parent volunteers. An equally important goal was quite literally handing over the administration and follow-up of the clubs, to the sub-department of education and training (SUBDoET). Dinh explained:

So, our approach is at that time [was] to focus on the human resource development and on the more social mobilization approach. So, one of the first approaches is that we change the communication. Instead of the clubs communicate with FFAV, start with me. But they will communicate through the channel of SUBDoET. (Dinh)

Therefore, FFAV had worked extensively with the SUBDoET, training staff members within the department through workshops and seminars. FFAV also paid for a select group of SUBDoET physical experts to travel to Hanoi and receive project management training. However, the SUBDoET came- as implied by the name- under the umbrella of

the Department of Education and Training (DoET) working on the provincial level, and on the national level the MoET. Hence, FFAV still had to do advocacy work on a local policy level, as Diem stated:

We still have to work with DoET, and from DoET they delegate the SUBDoET to take care of the activities. From there, we can work closer with SUBDoET on the coordination for the training, for the visits, and for the activities that go on around the club level. (Diem)

Regardless, FFAV viewed the SUBDoET as a sustainable stakeholder, considering they worked closely with the communities and schools. The SUBDoET also distributed the funds among the school and set guidelines and templates as to what activities the schools and headmasters should prioritize. FFAV had received some encouraging signals from the SUBDoET, promising to highlight the importance of non-competitive footballing activities to the schools:

At the beginning of the school year, they have a letter. An official letter to all of the districts. Saying that in the school year, one of your responsibilities will be sustain grassroots football activity in school. So, if they put it on paper and mention just one line on that. (Dinh)

However, within FFAV, there had been staff members who were unsure of the effectiveness of a government-issued mobilization plea. The Founder revealed his skepticism towards the impact of working through SUBDoET:

If you want to do social mobilization, you have to go down on the individual level. Down on the grassroots. I don't see any impact from the SUBDoET issuing a letter to the schools reading "mobilize the parents." You have to talk to them. You have to meet them. (The Founder)

The FFAV head of human relations, somewhat agreed with The Founder, as she thought the social mobilization could have been more impactful if the FFAV had spent more time visiting clubs, as appose to spending resources on the SUBDoET advocacy work. She did, however, concede that "as long as the SUBDoET see the benefit of the activity, they will sustain it" (Ngo). Considering the importance of the SUBDoET, one of the main challenges facing FFAV, was to instill a sense of ownership for the footballing activities in the SUBDoET. Unfortunately, the SUBDoET representatives were often not in attendance when FFAV organized evaluation seminars for the footballing clubs,

where the clubs discussed the challenges they were facing, and need for support moving forward. The explanation, according to some of the staff, was simple: FFAV did not financially compensate the SUBDoET officials for their attendance. FFAV had prior to the HOP paid SUBDoET officials a management fee, to also overseeing FFAV activities. Post-2018, the goal was for the DoET to compensate the physical experts from the SUBDoET for their efforts. However, according to the interviewees, it is still unclear if the Vietnamese government has any intentions of financially supporting the physical experts engaging in FFAV activities.

5.2.6 Sustainable Activities summary

According to the data collected from the interviews, the HOP catalyzed for FFAV to address the football activities sustainability. Before 2016, FFAV's role was more similar to that of a sponsor, providing funding and resources for the activities, without the necessary ownership from the recipients. FFAV was not unaware of the lack of self-sustainability of the activities, but when the organization had tried to address this in the past, they viewed a social mobilization approach, as too demanding and challenging.

Now, when the HOP forced FFAVs hand, they found some perceived success with the social mobilization approach. According to Diem, no small part of this success was owed to some of the more seasoned FFAV clubs who, upon receiving the news that FFAV would no longer fund the activities, started mobilizing parents and volunteers on their own accord. These clubs saw the value of the FFAV activities and wanted to sustain them, a finding confirmed from observations during the evaluation seminars.

FFAV pursued the social mobilization strategy, and staff members changed their department approach, to facilitate local ownership. However, according to Dinh, the parents and clubs taking ownership of the activities, would not be adequate to sustain the activities. Therefore, FFAV also worked closely with the DoET and SUBDoET, to hand over the supervision of FFAV activities to local authorities. However, there was a problem getting said authorities to engage in FFAV activities, when they were not getting financial compensation for their time and efforts. Staff members differed in opinions on how valuable working through the local authorities was, as opposed to working directly with the recipients on the grassroots level, meaning the parents and teachers. When asked to predict the sustainability of the FFAV activities, staff members

stated that they would be happy with one third, or half the clubs were continuing activities. Further, staff members viewed thought that the impact of FFAV activities would continue in the clubs and communities, but maybe in a more informal and unorganized manner, compared to the FFAV run activities.

5.3 The Company

FFAV needed to prepare for the future. From 2018 onwards, the organization would only have two full-time employees. The director Ho would move to Hanoi to work closer to the Ministry of Education and Training, and the Vietnam Football Federation. The vice director Chi would remain in Hue, to assist the FFAV clubs in sustaining their activities. The rest of the staff would be let go. However, NFF was reluctant to let go of the remainder of the FFAV staff, as they possessed invaluable expertise, accumulated through 10 or more years of experience with implementing non-competitive grassroots football in the TT Hue province.

To address the organizations future, and secure the professional careers of the remaining staff members, FFAV and NFF decided to use the 2016 to 2018 transitional period to identify and implement a revenue-generating FFAV branch. Retaining the expertise of the FFAV staff seemed to be the main sticking point to take on such a time-consuming task, but there also seemed to be an emotional motivation. Not only had the FFAV staff members developed strong bonds with one another, but according to Ho and The Founder, prominent individuals at NFF were also proud of what FFAV had accomplished, and how the FFAV staff members had grown with the organization. The head of NFF's international development department on several accounts referred to the FFAV organization as a family and placed himself within that family. Other NFF figureheads were also- according to Ho- emotionally invested in FFAV:

You might have heard about [NFF leader figure] right? He used to be head of sport department, but now the organization of NFF, have changed, so he became head of grassroots department.... [NFF leader figure] used to be on the advisory board on FFAV, on behalf of NFF. (Ho)

In 2016, Ho, the head of NFF's international department, The Founder, and the current head of NFF's grassroots development department, met in Hanoi to discuss how FFAV should move forward to adapt to the new organizational reality. At that time, the plan

was for one staff member, most likely Ho to relocate to Hanoi as fast as possible, to start working with VFF and to promote NFF's agenda. As Ho was the current FFAV director and a native North Vietnamese, he was the obvious choice for the Hanoi position, and NFF would pay his salary. However, Ho suggested a different approach:

Knowing myself that I am the individual person who gets the benefit, while all the other knowing that 2018 would be the end. I had presented an idea. Where we should try to use possible funding from one person to work with VFF, to do something together for the staff. But still fulfill the mission of supporting VFF. You know? Because of course, to be there, in Hanoi, working directly with VFF, on a daily basis, that would be the best. (Ho)

Ho was aware of his privileged position and opted to postpone his move to Hanoi, hoping the staff could build something that would keep the core staff members of FFAV together. However, building a commercially profitable company proved to be difficult for several reasons. As of February 2019, FFAV had not established a commercial enterprise.

Naturally, for FFAV to pursue a revenue making endeavor, the organization needed to decide on how to structure said undertaking, and what activities and services that would be on offer. As for how to structure the new commercial side of FFAV, the organization fluctuated between establishing a social enterprise, or a company. Ho explained:

The reason why the first proposal was social enterprise was, the social enterprise is the only possible form where we could still apply from development funding, for example still receive funding from NFF, and to business. The only difference between a social enterprise and a regular company, is that with the business activity, minimum 50% of the, how do I say, of the profit have to go into the social project. (Ho)

However, because of what The Founder described as intricate Vietnamese organizational legislation, establishing a social enterprise would make it difficult for the staff to take out salary, especially if with NFF involved as a donor. To circumvent these challenges, FFAV considered establishing a commercial company. However, commercial companies could not apply for developmental funding, putting more pressure on what the company would provide in terms of valuable services. In meetings aimed at addressing the commercial product from an FFAV company, staff members suggested that the company could offer consultancy services, English tutoring, and pay

to play footballing activities. Other less popular suggestions included opening a bar, restaurant or coffee shop. Ultimately, none of these ideas, made it past the drawing board, to the unison frustration of everyone involved in FFAV. As The Founder stated:

The process from May 1st 2016 where the future of FFAV should be decided from 2019. People have been sitting around for two and a half years, and not managed to figure out what to do. To me, that is a complete paralysis! (The Founder)

Every FFAV staff members expressed disappointment when speaking of the lack of a commercial enterprise. Interestingly, the staff seemed excited about the possibility of still working together post-2018, but did not seem convinced they would be able to start up a company or social enterprise together.

5.3.1 Lack of belief and seeing challenges

Throughout the HOP, FFAV allocated time towards establishing a commercial enterprise. During the fieldwork, several meetings exploring the possibility of a commercial FFAV branch was observed. However, the staff members partaking in these meetings seemed to lack conviction as to the efficacy of starting up a financially profitable endeavor:

We have a lot, a lot of meetings regarding the organization level. What company, what format. We have some training as well on doing the social enterprise, but finally we... Such a pity that people do not have a strong belief, and then the willingness to continue to do it. It just like discuss, and, every time we discuss, we step back. We step back. (Diem)

The lack of belief was a reoccurring topic of discussion throughout the staff interviews. As to exactly what caused this lack of belief, the staff members gave different explanations. For Minh, the staff member with the most footballing expertise, the hesitation of his colleagues stemmed from their skepticism towards football activities as a source of revenue. Additionally, the staff members had no particular personal interest for football, in turn making it difficult the FFAV staff members to get behind a business model that would offer pay to play activities. Confirming Minh's statement, Ngo, when discussing the football pay to play route, was only seeing challenges:

We cannot do the football and life skills activities. Because you know, the weather, is a big challenge for us. Also, thanks to FFAV, a lot of clubs already

have the activities for football already, so they don't have the high demand. Even though football is the king sport, in Vietnam. When now, for primary schools, they already have the football clubs. (Ngo)

Similarly, as English classes and English tutoring is big business in Vietnam and Hue, the staff were reluctant to go down the English tutoring route, as they viewed the market as already being saturated. For Chi, the group constellation, and the starting point for forming a company was all wrong.

We group together, not because we want to do the business. So, we already have a group, before we start business. Not because we have the idea, and then group, we find relevant people together. So, the starting point is so different. (Chi)

In other words, FFAV had a group of staff members who wanted to stay together but not knowing how to achieve the feat. Additionally, the staff members possessed different skill sets, not all of them suited for the challenges facing a company in the process of starting up a business. Although the staff members attended several workshops and courses to develop their entrepreneurial skills, none of them believed they had the business background or know-how, to run a business. Next, one of the most challenging obstacles for the formation of a commercial entity in FFAV, was the willingness, or lack thereof, from the staff to invest their financial capital.

5.3.2 Money on the table

To make sure the FFAV staff would take ownership of the potential new company, the director and the vice director implored the staff members to invest in the said company with their funds. As Chi explained:

We discuss about social enterprise, about three years ago, and that point Ho and I, we discuss, and we start as long as all of us want to business, we should put our financial capital on the table. To show our willingness, our passion, our commitment. Because if we don't use our money to start business, then we just do it. But if we use our money, we have to do it. Otherwise we lost money. But if we use money from NFF, to start business, that is another story. (Chi)

Ho, agreeing with Chi's explanation, described the investment strategy as heavily contested among the staff. However, Ho believed that it was paramount for the success of any potential business avenue. Ho thought the staff, including himself and Chi,

would be much more invested in the creation of The Company, and seemed unwilling to move forward until everyone involved displayed said commitment to The Company:

The head of NFF international development and The Founder, he always say that. Why do you have to care so much about investment right away? Because you still have salary from NORAD, and NFF for 2016 to 2018, and then to set up a company, you don't need that much money, and NFF is willing to pay for that. but myself and Chi, we have discussed internally, and we have clearly opened to the staff, we have to decide, and we have to put cash on the table right away. (Ho)

However, Diem viewed the situation differently. According to her, the lack of clarity as to the company's structure, product, and the overall future of FFAV made the staff hesitant to invest in something they did not wholeheartedly believe. These feelings were shared by all the staff members whose future with FFAV were not guaranteed through an NFF paid salary; Diem, Minh, Ngo, and Dinh. Therefore, as no one invested capital in The Company, progress stalled. However, the FFAV staff already had their hands full with other tasks related to the HOP. Hence, none of the staff members felt particularly guilty for not making headway with The Company:

You are sitting there with a lot to do for the organization. Yeah because we are in the transition period, we are in the handover period, and we have a lot to do. Now you sit there with a second reason, which is all right, you don't have much expertise, you don't have much experience on that. And you sit with a task where you did not invest in it with your cash. So, whether it is done today or tomorrow, you don't lose anything yet. (Ho)

Here, Ho summed up the main reasons why the FFAV company did not come to be: busy staff, lack of business expertise, and no money invested in creating ownership. Additionally, the staff's family obligations were also a factor for why staff members were hesitant to go all in on a start-up project, without any promises of a regular payment on the immediate horizon.

5.3.3 Family situation

As previously mentioned, the FFAV staff had been with the organization for a long time. The Founder, on several occasions, spoke of how things different the staffs' current reality was to when they started in FFAV when they were all young and single. Now, all of the department heads, including the director and the vice director, were married. Additionally, all of the staff members had children, and some also cared for

their older relatives. Therefore, an uncertain future from 2018 onwards, with a prerequisite of personal financial investment, did not fit with the staffs current family obligations. Family also hindered the proposed FFAV company from being able to relocate. A football product might have been FFAV's strongest commercial selling point, but the FFAV staff viewed the Hue market potential as limited, compared to bigger metropolitan cities such as Hanoi, Danang and Ho Chi Minh City. Diem summed up the impact of the staff's family responsibilities:

They [the staff] have to think of their family future, just like for me. From when we start receiving the news that the project will stop receiving in 2018, I have to start thinking right away that, that, what should I do? To ensure that the daily life of my family will not be affected. So, if this start earlier when everyone already have less, like the other family commitment, then would it be better for them to invest their full energy into the company. (Diem)

In addition to explaining the staff members responsibilities, Diem also alludes to the fact that while the FFAV staff did not see a route from 2019 onwards with the FFAV based business as viable, they were preparing for the future on an individual level.

5.3.4 Business ventures

Except for Ho and Chi, who already had their positions within FFAV secured with FFAV, the remaining staff members would all pursue their own business ventures, when their contract with FFAV expired. It is worth noting, however, that Chi stated in her interview that she would instead “do it alone,” as appose to start up a business together with the FFAV staff. Ngo was in the process of getting her tour-guide certification, to support her husbands scooter-renting business. Dinh, all though she was still working at the FFAV office to supervise a project from a funding partner, had started an English class for the elementary grade kids in her neighborhood. Diem, seeing the uncertain future for FFAV in 2016, had begun renting out rooms in her house through platforms such as Air BnB to diversify her income. Gradually she and her husband had expanded by renovating a bed-and-breakfast with five rooms and were financially stable. They were now both full working time in the hospitality sector. Diem contributed much of her success to lessons she had learned, and traits she had developed through working with FFAV:

I really feel thankful to the project to build me up, and make me like a better version, I would say... It builds myself to be a very flexible person. And I don't

think that nothing can stop me from doing something because just try, and then you see what you can adjust. (Diem)

Minh, the head of the technical department, had come together with The Founder and formed a football club, named FC Tuong Lai (Football Club Future). Shortly after establishing the club, there were over 100 children signed up for regular football activities. FC Tuong Lai (FCTL) would be offering all-inclusive grassroots football training, in combination with English tutoring. A model FFAV had looked at, and discarded, deemed not profitable. Ngo explained: “The Founder, he only pays salary for Minh, because Minh can do administration, can do marketing, can do everything, because what the smaller scale first.”

In other words, the number of staff members who would need a piece of the revenue would make a pay to play football product none-sustainable for FFAV. The Founder and Minh however, believed they could start small, and scale up the activities if needed. The Founder, who since 2016 no longer had any formal say in FFAV matters, as the organization had been turned over to the Vietnamese staff, shared that he for several years had been considering commercial football activities, but to avoid competing with FFAV, had not put any plans in motion before he knew what FFAV would do. As FFAV had made it clear that they did not intend to create a pay to play grassroots football program, The Founder had reached out to Minh. Minh, explaining the difference between FFAV and FCTL, stated:

The FFAV approach, FC Tuong Lai is a little bit different. Inside it's the same values, and core values. And we work on based the children principle. As well as the development flows of the children. In FFAV, all the people participation for free. In FC Tuong Lai, the family have the money; you will have to pay. (Minh)

The Founder revealed he was waiting for FFAV to make up their mind, and that he had several different alternatives as to how he would approach a commercial football activity. In turn, this means that for example, FFAV went down the pay to play route, he would focus more on grassroots consultancy, or some other activity, not interfering with FFAV matters. Although The Founder had different ideas as to what he wanted to do, it seemed to start a football club based on the FFAV, and NFF values were his top priority. Ho stated:

I can't remember exactly, but I think, one, we discuss about social enterprise, The Founder already have FC Tuong Lai idea. Because he always have an idea of setting up something on his own. On football. But obviously, during 2016, to almost the end of 2018, when we still there, with company discussion, with what we are going to do. He would not do anything, in how do I say, in conflict with FFAV business. (Ho)

Contrary to the FFAV staff, The Founder saw great potential for a pay to play model in Hue and was ambitious on FCTLs behalf. A challenge like the rainy weather, previously mentioned by Ngo, The Founder viewed as an opportunity to build the only football pitch in Hue with a domed roof, keeping the pitch dry, and attracting players who would want to play football in the rainy season. The Founder and Minh invested their own money into FCTL to start up the activities. However, The Founder believed FCTL's approach to financial capital, was more pragmatic than FFAV's:

There was this mechanism in FFAV: "If we start company, we need to invest 200 million Dong [Vietnamese currency] each." Now, me and Minh, we have done what we have done with 100 million each. So, if ten people had been in on that, that would have been 10 million each. That's nothing! (The Founder)

Somewhat confirming this notion of firm organizational structures, was two observations made at the FFAV office in the latter part of 2018. Firstly, in an organization with seven staff members, an employee wanting to apply for a leave of absence, needed to have his or her permission slip signed by all heads of department, as well as the vice director and director. In other words, the entire staff would have to sign off. Secondly, the insistence of conducting regular meetings regarding the business venture, when no progress was being made, wasting hours of precious time.

5.3.5 Time wasting

Possibly the biggest regret of all the FFAV staff members during the HOP was all the time wasted in meetings.:

I know that the human resource is limited. And also the workload. I hate the paper works and meeting! You know? FFAV spent I think, a half time. A half time of three years for meetings! For meetings! And also to prepare for the social enterprise, and the, and the businesses! (Ngo)

Although not all of the time spent in fruitless meetings was related to the business side of FFAV, it was most certainly a significant contributor. As mentioned previously, the

staff had their hands full with tasks relating to the replication and sustainability of the FFAV's work. Additionally, now that several staff members had started up their businesses, they were also taken aback as to how long the FFAV business start-up had dragged out. The process of establishing a social enterprise or company was plagued with inefficiencies. Now, with the HOP finished, the staff was contemplating what could have been, and how they missed out on their chance of doing something together.

5.3.6 Missed opportunities

During the last months of HOP, the FFAV staff participated in an entrepreneurial workshop. One of the exercises the staff members were asked to do, was to point out something they would have liked to spend more time on in the years past, and what they would have spent less time doing. The director Ho revealed that if he could redo the last ten years, he would have devoted less time to FFAV activities, and allocate more time to side projects, that in the long term could be incorporated into FFAV. He went on to state that before the HOP, there was an understanding amongst the FFAV staff, that NFF would like for them to only focus on the implementation of FFAV activities. Ho stated that through his experience with FFAV, Ho had been fortunate to travel abroad since 2004, and see business and commercial activities that were now becoming popular in Vietnam. He thought him personally, and the organization as a whole had missed out on business opportunities that could help them sustain FFAV activities. Additionally, services such as pay to play football activities were now commonplace in the bigger Vietnamese cities, also for young people with limited economic funds.

Ho felt that the organization had been stuck in the NGO mindset for too long; receiving funding, and implementing football activities without paying adequate attention to the self-sustainability of said activities. Speaking of the business venture of FFAV, Ho stated that a commercial revenue-generating branch of FFAV could have been achieved ten years ago. Concurring with Ho, Chi, also believed that a commercial business could be viable, but that FFAV should have made an outside hire to oversee the commercial developments:

If NORAD for example, they invest money for FFAV to set up the social enterprise or company, we would. I suggest that we would hire a CEO, who have a very strong business background. And then would combine with us who have the social background. We need new people, and they have the new thinking.
(Chi)

In October 2015, the head of NFF's international development department visited the FFAV offices. During his stay, he announced that FFAV would no longer pursue The Company idea, and presented a new organizational structure. The now soon to be former staff members, could be hired as contractors for FFAV, depending on the funding the organization received from NFF, or other partners. From NFF's standpoint, the idea behind giving the okay to establish commercial activities was to retain the staffs' expertise post-2018. Now, with the company scrapped, NFF and FFAV hoped to do so through contract work.

5.3.7 Human resource retention

As the interviewees were becoming more accustomed to their new life, either working in the new FFAV organization or being on the outside looking in, it seemed unlikely for those no longer affiliated with FFAV to work for the organization. Diem stated:

I also see that for the future, if the project is going to call for the support of the previous staff, without any clear plan for now, it will also be a big challenge for the remaining structure. because there are, people have their own work. They are occupied with different tasks to do. From the bottom of my heart, I still love the project, because this is where I grow, where I started and also, give me a lot of opportunity for development. (Diem)

When asked if she would consider working for FFAV, Diem stated it depends on if she could get time away from work and family, but that she would try to do sporadic volunteering, as Diem was still emotionally invested in FFAV. Minh, who expressed his affection for FFAV, and grassroots football, made a similar statement to Diem, emphasizing his willingness to support FFAV with grassroots development if he could find the time. Ngo stated:

When the head of NFF's international department, decided that we don't work with the business anymore, I think that it is the really good, right decision. And that decision should have come earlier. I know he really wants to support us, and try to keep everyone together. (Ngo)

With the privilege of hindsight, Ho said he thought NFF should have gone ahead with their original strategy in 2016, to start working directly with VFF, and moving some of FFAV's operations to Hanoi. He was adamant about not blaming any of The Company's shortcomings on an individual in specific but viewed the HOP as a learning opportunity for everyone involved.

5.3.8 The Company summary

The Company referred to FFAV's effort to establish a commercial business during the HOP. The Company was the brainchild of both FFAV and NFF, and the motivation for The Company was to make enough profit to be able to retain staff, who would otherwise be let go from FFAV at the end of 2018. The Company did not end up coming to fruition, and as of February 2019, there was no commercial branch of the FFAV organization. The Vietnamese staff members cite a lack of belief in The Company being profitable. This lack of belief stemmed from uncertainty regarding the staff future, the lack of business experience among the staff members, weak outlook on a profitable product or service, and the prerequisite that the staff had to invest their own money to provide The Company with capital. Further, various tasks related to the HOP swamped the staff members, and even though FFAV allocated time to explore business ideas, the staff manifested none of them.

The FFAV staff were not young and single, as they had been when they joined FFAV in the early 2000s. The staff's family commitments made them inclined to pursue other business- and job- opportunities both during and after the HOP, with perceived lower risk. Of the 6 FFAV staff members interviewed, the director and the vice director stayed with FFAV through NFF funding, and the remaining four pursued their business ideas outside of FFAV. Most notably Minh, who joined forces with the former director of FFAV The Founder, to start a football club, built on the same values as FFAV and NFF grassroots football, but with an incorporated pay to play model. As for the retention of staff, or signing former staff on a contract basis after December 2018, the four staff members who were let go by FFAV from 2018, said that they would like to stay involved in the organization, but thought they might be too busy in their new lines of work.

5.4 Replication

For FFAV, the transitional phase of 2016-2018 was forced upon them by their main sponsor NORAD pulling their development funding. Naturally, when preparing the organization for the new reality of 2019 onwards, considerations as to what role FFAV would have in Hue and Vietnam needed to be made. From the interviews, one goal of the handover strategy seemed to be of paramount importance moving forward; FFAV should make serious of their replication strategy. All of the interviewees emphasized the

importance of replication, summed up by the statement “The goals of FFAV at this stage is to work with related partners on a national level and to make the replication come true” (Diem). The interviews identified two main justifications for the replication-focus. Firstly, FFAV had played its role in the TT Hue province. Grassroots football seemed to be accepted, celebrated, and appreciated by local stakeholders; players, parents, teachers, and provincial authorities were more or less on board with the FFAV approach. Therefore, after more than fifteen years, it was time for FFAV to move on:

If this organization come to the end, and our mission in Hue finish, what it is the point that we have to be here? When I have a very strong argument with [head of international development NFF] that we shouldn't have Hue office here. We should move to Hanoi as soon as we can. (Chi)

From the above quote, Chi seemed willing to forgo her job position in Hue. She also indicated that she also would be open to leaving FFAV entirely. However, there were several reasons for both FFAV and NFF to keep an office open in Hue, mainly to try to retain human resources, and also to show a best practice to national level stakeholders as to how to run the FFAV model.

Additionally, NFF’s approach to SDP imposed prerequisites for FFAV as they moved forward with the new, smaller FFAV organization with only two full-time employees. As Ho explained, “That is the way that NFF is doing all over the world. Once they start to work in any country, they work directly with the national football federation”. The want to work on a national level with the Vietnamese Federation was further emphasized when the head of NFF’s international development department and a special advisor from NFF visited FFAV in October 2018. During their stay, they met several times with the FFAV department heads, both individually and in groups. One of the most important takeaways from these meetings was how NFF wished to push FFAV work to the national level, working directly with VFF, for replication and advocacy work for the Norwegian grassroots development model. The replication work, also directly impacted the restructure of the organization. Both the VFF and the MoET have their main offices in the Vietnamese capital, Hanoi. Therefore, FFAV restructured with Hanoi in mind. FFAV needed to be closer to the policymakers, and the football federation, to work with their goal of national-wide replication of the grassroots football model operating in the TT Hue province for the last fifteen years.

5.4.1 The need to work on a policy level

FFAV needed to reach the big players in terms of who influenced national footballing policymaking; namely the VFF, and the MoET. Although there was an evident consensus among the interviewees of the importance of replication, the HOP itself, seemed to have come and gone without prioritizing policy efforts:

We have to do a lot [more] in term of the advocacy work. To work with MoET and VFF. Because you had over there, make sure that the people there know. And they will contribute, and take this model to do themselves. And that is good. You really effective for the future. And we just hand over and focused on the ground. (Minh)

Time constraints during the handover process, a reoccurring topic of conversation in interviews, also impacted the quality of work put towards efforts to facilitate the replication work after December 2018. The social enterprise initiatives, and the work to ensure sustainable activities in the TT Hue province, took up a considerable amount of the time and resources the staff could put towards advocacy work directed at MoET and VFF. To illustrate this notion, Minh spoke of how representatives from MoET and VFF gave speeches during the official handover ceremony, seemingly showing interest in the replication of the FFAV model. However, Minh seemed to believe this was more talk than walk as “in reality, it takes a long time and effort to do a small thing on that level (national)”, indicating that FFAV had not put in the time and effort required to make a significant impact on MoET and VFF officials regarding national policymaking.

5.4.2 Challenges working with national level-stakeholders

According to Ho, the FFAV model should be of great interest for MoET and VFF. For MoET, the FFAV model was appealing because of the importance of life skills, gender equity, and alignment with national development goals. The interviewees all viewed girl’s participation, the footballing activities in combination with life skills, and the heightened focus on child rights among local stakeholders in the TT Hue- province as the most noticeable ripple effects of FFAV’s activities. However, several of the staff members warned against granting FFAV all of the credit for these positive development trends. Still, the impacts seemed especially potent, since Hue city and the TT Hue- province, in general, is home to quite traditional takes on gender roles and women place in society.

Additionally, MoET was a key stakeholder for FFAV. Vietnam does not allow for organizational freedom (Hannah, 2007; Wells-Dang, 2014), so the footballing clubs needed to be under the umbrella of the educational system. Therefore, to achieve replication, working with MoET would be of utmost importance. For VFF, Grassroot football development is addressed in Vietnams national strategy and the state of a nations grassroots model and policy. Further, grassroots activities are one of the more critical parameters when international bodies such as AFC and FIFA consider a nation footballing membership- tier. The Founder, working for AFC as an advisor, and representing Vietnam on the AFC board, naturally had excellent insight into the importance of grassroots development.

Further, The Founder acknowledged that it was “completely unheard of” that he, a white westerner, represented a one-party communist state in matters regarding foreign policy. The Founder revealed that he had on more than one occasion been asked to apply for Vietnamese citizenship, but refused as he did not see it being beneficial. When The Founder left FFAV in 2016, as requested by NORAD, several of the department heads spoke of how suddenly, the Vietnamese FFAV leadership found it harder or outright not doable to get in touch with prominent members of VFF and MoET. Vietnam, especially the northern part, is quite traditional, and factors such as age, sex, and race can impact individuals access to matters of importance. Therefore, The Founder exit as FFAV director meant that doors that were previously open, the new director Ho found closed, as a young native North Vietnamese.

Although VFF did have a grassroots-department, the federation itself was- according to the data gathered from the interviewees- mainly focused on the performance of the male national team. As Minh, the FFAV staff member with the most footballing insight explained:

The operation of the VFF here in Vietnam is totally [different] to the way in Norway... When they have one national team for example, playing and traveling to the Asian Cup. The whole VFF people, they just focus on and do a lot of things there. Logistics, and travel, and accommodation, and blah blah everything! Its like its VFF club, not federation! (Minh)

Expanding on this, both Minh and Ho spoke of how VFF was unwilling to spend money and resources on grassroots football, as they did not see the link between grassroots

activities, and elite talent development. As Minh said: “VFF, they have the human resource, they have the money there, but they have different priority.” The main reason for this lack of grassroots involvement from VFF was according to Ho difficulties of seeing how football engagement amass, would lead to elite talent. Therefore, a long-term commitment to grassroots activities was a difficult sell to short-sighted, elite-focused VFF personnel.

Another critical factor making advocacy work towards VFF and MoET officials difficult mentioned was the prevalence of corruption. Previous to 2016, when FFAV had most of its financial backing from NORAD, and to some extent NFF, the organization could with ease implement a zero-corruption policy, as mandated by both of the Norwegian donors. Post-2018 however, Ho foresaw cultural clashes between the Norwegian anti-corruption stance from NFF, represented by himself, and national-level policy makers in VFF and MoET. During a breakfast meeting, Ho used the analogy of a traffic light: In Vietnam, everybody jail-walks. The mopeds expect it, the pedestrians expect it, and everyone acts accordingly. The mopeds and cars swerve around the pedestrians, and the pedestrians, in turn, keep a steady pace, walking straight ahead, not stopping or backing up. If you tried this in Norway, it would be chaos. Likewise, if one were to abide by Norwegian traffic-rules in Vietnam, there would be no progress. You would be left on the sidewalk forever, illustrating the cultural differences between Norway and Vietnam when it came to greasing, financial donations, and expensive dinners. Ho later recalled the analogy in the February interview by saying, “Corruption is still a big thing in Vietnam, you know.”

However, during his later interview, Ho was noticeably more optimistic regarding VFF’s and MoET’s involvement in grassroots development, and his role in within the VFF organization, than during informal talks recorded in the later months of 2018. When pressed as to why this was Ho admitted to being previously worried about VFFs willingness to receive NFF’s and FFAV’s support, but now believed that even though NFF and NORAD could not directly pay for replication efforts as they had done in previous years, NFF would pay Ho’s salary for the next four years. Additionally, Ho added:

It doesn't mean that they [VFF] have to spent their own pocket money. Because in our strategy we would also work with VFF, in trying to capitalize on as much funding from the outside as possible. Meaning we still for example under the angel of VFF, apply for development fund. (Ho)

In summary, Phung laid out how he and Chi could use their experience applying for development funds to finance a push for grassroots football replication in Vietnam, under the VFF umbrella, theorizing donors would be more willing to work with FFAV now that they were so closely linked to VFF. Also, FIFA and AFC allocate funds for national federations to develop grassroots football, potentially making the replication a low-cost endeavor on VFFs end. This optimism was shared by The Founder, who stated: “I am quite pleased with the current situation around FFAV.”

The combination of prominent individuals within national level organizations taking an interest in grassroots football, and footballs enormous popularity in Vietnam, most recently showcased by the national team doing very well in the Asia cup leading to riot-like behaviors in the streets of the country's largest cities, The Founder saw “enormous potential.” Both Minh and Ho dovetailed this notion of potential, speculating what could happen if the VFF brass could see how mass access to non-competitive football for all, almost by default would lead to talent development. However, the lack of technical expertise in the current FFAV staff could prove to be a challenge. The FFAV skeleton did now consist of three people with an extensive fundraiser, program, and management experience. The technical expertise, mainly from Minh and his department, was not officially associated with FFAV anymore:

We do have technical expertise in place. And that lies within our manuals, and all our training materials. And especially our human resources that we have built in Hue. Of course, the challenge there is that those people, are not ours any more. But the important thing is that they are there, and they have been trained. Someone somewhere can mobilize them one way or the other. (Ho)

Ho did acknowledge the lack of technical expertise within the current FFAV staff. However, he mentioned how the technical expertise was not only within individuals previously employed by FFAV, but also manifested in manuals, guidelines, and human resources in schools, such as teachers and headmasters. Ho further explained how “MoET can easily mobilize people from one province to another,” meaning the teachers

and headmasters. It seemed that in a one-party state, moving teachers across the country to implement government policy, is a valid approach.

5.4.3 The need to show sustainable activities to prove replication is achievable

The HOP was not the first time FFAV has tried to replicate the model of non-competitive grassroots football to other regions of Vietnam, or other southeast-Asian countries. According to The Founder, FFAV is a critically acclaimed organization, and its approach to inclusive grassroots football has been recognized by leading SDP players such as the AFC, FIFA, Streetfootballworld, Women Win, and UNICEF. At the FFAV office, several trophies, placards, and diplomas from these organizations were on display. However, according to Chi, the main critique of FFAV-model was its significant cost:

I think we really want to replicate model, I think four years ago. But whenever we bring the model up to the public, they always say it's so costly. How can they have one million us dollar? For this. So, that is why we need to have like zero cost, or minimal cost model. And they look at that and say okay, it is very easy to do. That is where replication start (Chi).

Therefore, FFAV's work to mobilize resources in the schools and local communities attached to the FFAV footballing clubs were not only essential to sustain the activities themselves, but it was also imperative to showcase the feasibility of the FFAV grassroots model. So much so, that Chi, the head of the Hue branch of FFAV stated: "The model here is just to provide support for the office in Hanoi." Dovetailing the importance of showcasing replication feasibility, Ho insinuated that the want to replicate the model, was one of the main reasons for initiating social mobilization efforts and "to show that it is doable and cost-effective," Chi summed up the intricacy of replication with the following statement:

Social mobilization is the foundation for replication. Because if we don't use the social mobilization, it means that we don't mobilize participation, or fundraising, or potential in the community. And we just continue to invest money. If there is no money, we can't replicate the model, because the model is very costly. (Chi)

Furthermore, after the HOP, all of the staff members viewed the cost-level of the model as a strength- as appose to the weakness categorized as before the HOP begun-

prompting several staff members to wonder why they had not initiated the social mobilization sooner. Chi stated: “replication is not only replication,” alluding to the fact that the organizational restructure, the sustainability of the local activities, and the replication, are all intertwined.

5.4.4 Replication summary

The replication of the FFAV model on a national and even regional level was the primary goal of FFAV coming out of the HOP. For NFF, FFAV needed to move up to a national federation level, to align FFAV with NFF’s SDP practices elsewhere in the world. However, there were several obstacles on FFAV’s road to replication. The most pressing was the high cost of the FFAV model, making it undesirable to replicate. Therefore, a substantial amount of the work done during the HOP to address replication was to rework the FFAV-model to be self-sustainable, and low cost. According to some staff members, the consequences of this approach was that FFAV did not adequately promote its advocacy to national level stakeholders, such as VFF and MoET.

Although a lot of the paperwork for replication efforts were in place in the form of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between NFF, VFF, FFAV, and MoET, FFAV struggled to reach essential individuals within the Vietnamese stakeholder organizations. The loss of a white, older, westerner as the head of the organization, meant FFAV lost some standing amongst the Vietnamese national level organizations. NFF’s zero tolerance to corruption, also meant that FFAV were not gaining the desired accesses to policymakers.

Additionally, VFF were mostly concerned with the performance of their elite tier male teams and had historically shown little interest in grassroots football. However, both the former and current director of FFAV was seeing a change in discord regarding grassroots football and was optimistic regarding the replication efforts moving forward. The current director added the caveat that VFF would most likely not be interested in spending money on grassroots efforts, but if FFAV could find the funding to do so, the FFAV model could be replicated; if FFAV also were able to drum up the necessary technical expertise.

6. Discussion

During the HOP, FFAV faced challenges related to the organizational restructure to the organization; the sustainability of the FFAV activities; the establishment of the commercial entity The Company; and the replication of the organizational model on a national level.

In this chapter, the challenges FFAV faced during the HOP will be discussed and connected to prior research within the SDP field and on the topic of aid withdrawal. Firstly, challenges that arose during the HOP will be discussed. Secondly, the perceived challenges for the organization moving beyond 2018 will be illuminated. Third, limitations, avenues for future research, and practical implications from the findings will be presented. Finally, concluding remarks regarding this thesis contributes to the SDP- and funding withdrawal- research is highlighted.

6.1 Challenges during the HOP

During the HOP, FFAV shifted from what the staff members referred to as an NGO-mentality, to more of a hybrid organizational orientation where FFAV attempted to optimize organizational performance across multiple dimensions (Battilana et al., 2015). According to The Founder, AFC viewed FFAV as one of the best grassroots football organizations in Asia. However, the organization had grown complacent, and were not addressing the organizational weaknesses before NORAD's withdrawal, forced FFAV into action. These findings are similar to findings in exploring the inertia of NGOs prior to exit strategies (Hayman, 2015). The organization faced challenges relating to all three of the subcategories of organizational capacity (Hall et al., 2003), but according to the data collected from the semi-structured interviews and the participant observation, the main challenge FFAV faced during the HOP, was the reduction of financial and human resource capital. These findings support previous research regarding the success parameters for a non-profit organization (Hall et al., 2003; Svensson et al., 2018; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016).

FFAV's organizational activities during the HOP were aimed at ensuring sustainable outcomes for FFAV after the HOP, coinciding with previous SDP organizational research (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). In the following paragraphs, this thesis will show

how a lack of human- and financial- capacity (Hall et al., 2003) impacted the way FFAV approached the four themes identified as challenges during the HOP. The first two themes presented will be Organizational Restructure and The Company, as they showcase how FFAV cut expenditures while simultaneously attempting to establish an organizational branch that would generate revenue (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). The final two themes, Sustainable Activities and Replication spotlight how FFAV needed to revamp and reimagine how they provided their SDP activities. Finally, perceived challenges after the HOP will be discussed.

6.1.1 Organizational Restructure

In line with the life-cycle approach to SDP organizations (Svensson et al., 2018), FFAV's priorities and goals shifted during and after the HOP. Although the organization did not waiver from its original vision of "Football for all in Vietnam" (FFAV, 2011, p 13), the HOP goals were to alter the FFAV model, engage in more advocacy work on both the local and national level, and identify and establish a sustainable organizational model (FFAV, 2016). After the HOP, according to the analysis in this thesis, FFAV's primary goal is to replicate the FFAV model on a national level. Hence, a HOP for an SDP organization, suggest a flexible and hybrid-like organizational approach (Svensson & Seifried, 2017), to cope with the institutional demands, financial uncertainty, and challenges regarding the organizational capacity of the HOP (Haveman & Rao, 2006; Minkoff, 2002; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016; Svensson & Seifried, 2017).

Inefficient organizational processes and structures can sink an SDP organization in times of change, and implementation of new practices (Eisinger, 2002; Schuh & Leviton, 2006). Therefore, the organizational restructure of FFAV was one of the main challenges during the HOP. When the HOP initiated, FFAV structure drastically changed, with new leadership, reduction in staff, and a commercial pursuit. From the interviews and participant observation, the new tasks and challenges, in combination with fewer resources, hindered the effectiveness of the HOP, correlating research stating that the challenges on the SDP organizational level could be critical for the sustainability of an SDP organization (Coalter, 2013; Lyras & Welty Peachey, 2011). However, FFAV did show adaptability when facing challenges, a characteristic more recent development literature correlates with sustainability (Fowler, 2016).

An intriguing finding from the analysis was the additional challenge of an increased workload during the HOP. FFAV was not only challenged by the depletion of human and financial resources; the workload on the remaining staff also increased during the HOP. The staff members were not only asked to fulfill their current roles in their respective departments, with considerably fewer resources, they were also given additional tasks and roles to facilitate activity sustainability, and the establishment of The Company. Further, the prevalence of time wasting in FFAV during the HOP correlating with previous findings regarding the downside of operating a non-traditional SDP hybrid organization (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). Additionally, the downsizing seemed to have impacted staff members negatively, as their future with FFAV seemed uncertain (Saqib et al., 2017).

In short, the staff members were asked to fulfill several different roles within FFAV, conventional for staff members of an organizational hybrid (Schulenkorf & Edwards, 2012; Svensson, 2017), but also, according to the data from the interviews, the workload of their position increased.

Therefore, critical issues related to the organizational structure, and the unsustainable aspects of the FFAV activities themselves, could have been addressed before the initiation of the HOP. If FFAV approached the HOP in this manner, the organization would possess both the personnel capacity and the financial support often found in larger SDP organizations (Brown et al., 2016; Carman & Fredericks, 2010; Svensson et al., 2018). However, FFAV's dependency on NORAD and NFF more aligns with the capacity tendencies of a smaller SDP organization (Coalter, 2010; Giulianotti et al., 2016; Holmes et al., 2016; Lindsey & Banda, 2011; Svensson et al., 2017). These findings suggest that FFAV might not have had the desired organizational size, even when operating at its highest organizational capacity, to solve all the goals set during the HOP adequately.

6.1.2 The Company

The decision to pursue entrepreneurship was an attempt to increase the organizational capacity of the organization and ensure long term sustainability (Andersson, 2011; Carroll & Stater, 2009; Dart, 2004). Usually, business branches of non-profit organizations are used to increase financial capacity (Svensson et al., 2018). However,

as all the three main aspects of organizational capacity can influence one another, The Company was, according to the informants, mainly seen as an attempt to retain the staff of FFAV after 2018; increasing, or at least maintaining the human resource capacity in the organization (Guo, 2006; Svensson et al., 2018). As made evident in the analysis, FFAV was not financially dependent on NORAD to run activities, but to pay the staff, as other fundraised support, usually allocated only a fraction of the resources provided to staffing.

NFF and FFAV wanted to keep the expertise in house, and it seemed that powerful emotional connections and friendships, not only amongst staff members but also between FFAV staff members and NFF department heads, motivated the hastily planning of The Company. The potential revenue sources for The Company were seen as not profitable, although products such as consultancy services are standard among other SDP organizations with a commercial branch (Svensson et al., 2018). Further, the director and the vice director, who had their foreseeable future with FFAV secured, seemed to push for The Company. Both of them seemed to possess feelings of guilt towards the other staff members, who would not be able to continue their journey with FFAV after 2018, highlighting the challenges of balancing staff members with different salary outlooks and professional versus volunteer positions (Fowler, 2016). These findings support previous claims to be mindful of the individuals on the receiving end of an exit strategy (Hayman & Lewis, 2018), as their experiences could impact the overall success of a donor exit.

The Company seemed like an endeavor that does not coincide with NIF, NFF, and FFAV's values regarding sports participation (Straume & Steen-Johnsen, 2010). For The Company to pursue a pay to play football club model like FCTL, would be at odds with NFF's "football for all" policy, as not all have the financial means to pay for sporting activities. However, as Vietnam is now a middle-income country, SDP efforts should take context-specific considerations into account when addressing the sustainability of an organization. A pay to play model with social inclusion policy, such as FCTL, could be seen as a Vietnamese context-specific approach to a financially sustainable SDP initiative, as pay to play practices are commonplace in contemporary Vietnam, according to observations made during the fieldwork in Vietnam. However, pay to play is at odds with NFF and NIF values.

When considering all of the department heads did pursue their entrepreneurial businesses, either alone or with family members, the failure of The Company cannot all be the consequence of the staffs' lack of motivation and skill, as they inhabited some entrepreneurial skill set and business savviness. Therefore, the rigidity of FFAV proceedings and formalities, also need to take some of the blame for the inability of the FFAV staff to come together for a common goal. These findings correlate with some of the negative traits of overly formalized SDP hybrid organizations, who often lack the organizational flexibility to find pragmatic solutions to challenges (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). The insistence from the director and the vice director that all of the FFAV staff members needed to put up their financial capital if they wanted to make serious of their plans for The Company, clearly halted the exploration of commercial activities. Again, it seemed that FFAV displayed some of the negative characteristics of a formalized hybrid organization (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). Now, this does not necessarily imply that it was unwise of the director and vice director to make self-investment a prerequisite for The Company, as they both made valid points regarding ownership and commitment to the commercial venture. What can be stated with some degree of certainty, however, was that none of the five department heads, were willing to jeopardize their ability to support their family, by investing money into an uncertain, joint owned company.

Additionally, although he was no longer the director of FFAV, the Vietnamese FFAV staff were painstakingly aware of The Founders intent to begin a commercial activity on his own, once he knew the direction of The Company. However, as was stated both from the FFAV staff and The Founder himself, The Founder did not want to compete with FFAV. Still, the knowledge that The Founder was passionate about starting up his pay to play football activity may explain some of the hesitations on the part of the FFAV in pursuing commercial football activities on their own, especially when considering The Founder had dreamt of starting a football club even before the start of the HOP. These findings highlight the complexities of relationships and connections a long-running SDP program might have to consider in the face of funder withdrawal.

The FFAV staff seemed to lack belief in commercial avenues to explore in Hue, suited for an organization rooted in non-competitive grassroots football. The staff members, except the director, were also less than willing to relocate, as they were all connected to

Hue through family and friends. The staff was only seeing obstacles and challenges for The Company: no market for pay to play footballing activities, saturated market for English tutoring, and unfavorable seasonal weather to outdoors activities. In stark contrast, The Founder saw opportunities. Here lies one of the critical differences between The Company and the staff members own business ventures. These individual entrepreneurial pursuits commenced operations, and dealt with challenges as they arose, while The Company never made it past the FFAV drawing board.

The family situation of the FFAV staff members further supports the notion that the establishment of The Company, should have been introduced earlier. The FFAV staff members were all relatively the same age, and all of them were at the time of the HOP parenting small children, some of them also caring for elder relatives. Therefore, they were not in any position to speculate with their financial means. However, several of the informants revealed they would have been more optimistic about a start-up venture if their family situation had been different. Also, the informants believed a commercial start-up could have been more enticing when they were younger, and more risk tolerant.

There is an argument to be made, that if FFAV before the immediate initiation of the HOP, had a clear action plan as to what sort of commercial activities they wanted to pursue, they could have utilized the time window between 2016 and 2018 to try out one or more of these ideas. Further, as staff members themselves suggested, FFAV should have considered hiring an individual with commercial and entrepreneurial experience. However, one potential pitfall of FFAV hiring staff with a more commercial background is the threat business, and the for-profit minded individual could pose to the organizational culture of FFAV (Battilana & Lee, 2014). FFAV consisted of individuals who shared values and placed high importance on the nonmonetary value of the FFAV activities (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). Still, organizational culture could be subjectable to change with a new leadership style of the decision makers within the organization, but then again, there is the issue of mission drift (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018; Svensson & Seifried, 2017). Additionally, even though the FFAV staff members believed that an earlier start on The Company could have led to positive outcomes, current literature suggests that organizations that do not have aspirations of being self-financed from the onset, struggle to do so (Fowler, 2016).

Lastly, as shown by other SDP organizations with successful commercial pursuits, there is no guarantee that The Company would increase FFAV organizational capacity (Aldaba et al., 2000; Saqib et al., 2017; Svensson et al., 2018). While FFAV never went ahead with The Company, the resources allocated to its creation during the HOP, suggest The Company could have been detrimental to FFAV's social mission, even if The Company got off to an earlier start (Svensson et al., 2018; Weisbrod, 2004).

6.1.3 Sustainable Activities

For the FFAV activities, the HOP functioned as a catalyst, where FFAV initiated a self-sustainability strategy they had previously deemed too challenging. Therefore, according to the informants, the HOP could arguably have had a net positive effect on the sustainability of FFAV activities, dovetailing literature within the development field that addresses the possible positive sustainability outcomes of funding reduction (Appel & Pallas, 2018; Hayman & Lewis, 2018). Information derived from the interviews and observations seems to suggest that if the HOP had not forced FFAV's hand, the football activities in the communities and schools, would still be conducted in the same fashion as before 2016, with FFAV as the driving force for the execution of said activities. This finding is strengthened by the fact that CSOs' historically have been seen as an instrument for implementation by international donors, with little regard for the sustainability of activities or the organization itself (Fowler, 2016; Holloway, 1997). Like many other NGOs' who were not prepared for a donor withdrawal, The HOP forced FFAV to rediscover shelved sustainability tactics (Hayman et al., 2016).

However, the social mobilization approach was not without faults, as the clubs were not convinced of its efficacy, and pushed back against the social mobilization for several reasons. Firstly, as observed during the evaluation seminars and from informal talks with FFAV staff around the office, the abrupt change in FFAV strategy without including the clubs, schools, and local individuals in the initial phases of the handover strategy was not well received.

Secondly, as FFAV economical support was decreasing, the clubs were asked to initiate fundraising locally, to be able to put on events. According to Dinh, one unfortunate Vietnamese corruption practice involved teachers and headmasters collecting money from parents, under the presumption that the funds would be allocated to academic

endeavors. Naturally, clubs had concerns. Lastly, the clubs were unsure if they would be able to sustain footballing activities without the technical and logistical support from FFAV.

More newly established football clubs struggled more compared to older clubs during the HOP. The older clubs were more receptive for a social mobilization strategy, as individuals within the clubs had seen and felt the benefits of running non-competitive grassroots football activities. Therefore, they were more willing to volunteer and fundraise for the footballing activities to continue. Thus, the FFAV approach of implementing and running activities for the communities was beneficial but should have been placed on a time continuum. Initial implementation and financial support could gradually give way to social mobilization, fundraising, and more modestly run football activities. In doing so, FFAV would be echoing research stating that it is never too early to start planning for a sustainable exit (Hayman & Lewis, 2018).

When addressing the timing of the social mobilization strategy, the strategy should have initiated before 2016, according to the data from the analysis. A two-year period could have been sufficient time to root an exit strategy (Hayman & Lewis, 2018), but the lack of human resources in FFAV during the HOP impacted the effectiveness of the social mobilization strategy. As the program department saw significant cuts in staff during HOP, the remaining staff members were not able to meet and engage with volunteers on the grassroots level. Instead, FFAV opted to focus resources and time on the technical experts from the SUBDoET. The directors' board chose this approach to encourage ownership of the FFAV activities from the SUBDoET. However, the technical experts' interest in FFAV activities, seemed to be motivated by a small management fee provided by FFAV, and not any intrinsic sense of commitment to the activities. As FFAV post-2018 is no providing the technical experts with the management fee, it remains uncertain if the SUBDoET will take on the FFAV activities, as the department is already managing several other cultural activities connected to the schools. These findings could showcase how FFAV needed an increase in organizational capacity during the HOP and how the different sub-categories of organizational capacity affect one another (Hall et al., 2003).

Before 2016, FFAV had opportunities to improve either the sustainability of the community activities through exploring and implementing the social mobilization strategy, or the planning and establishing a commercial enterprise. Further, it seems reasonable to conclude that FFAV, because of the heavy workload put on its staff members, were not able to set up the organization to pursue the replication of the FFAV model on a national level. First, because FFAV needed to address the high cost of the model they aimed to replicate, and secondly because the organizational sustainability was still uncertain as of 2016. Therefore, FFAV was spending time and resources that were not directly related to the replication on the national level but still needed to support said replication efforts.

If FFAV had allocated more resources at training parents, the HOP would have been even more successful, as parents are less likely to need financial motivation to organize football activities for their children, according to The Founder and Ngo. FFAV seemed to have achieved some formal handover of activities to the SUBDoET, as the department had proposed they would start issuing letters to schools, ordering the schools to accommodate for grassroots football in their annual budget planning. However, like the MOUs between FFAV and VFF, Vietnamese agreements do not always lead to implementation (Ohno, 2009).

Seeing as how football clubs themselves initiated the social mobilization efforts and showing its feasibility, FFAV should not have been afraid to communicate the want for the communities to own the activities themselves, according to the observations during the evaluation seminars. FFAV was worried about how clubs would react to being told that they were the ones tasked with coming up with the money and run the activities. Additionally, parents were distrusting of schools collecting money, fearing money will end up in the pockets of headmasters and teachers, as corruption in Vietnam is present on all levels (Hansen, 2015; Nørlund, 2007; Ohno, 2009).

The HOP process might have doubled as a wake-up call for NFF as well. The HOP served as an opportunity to align the NFF and FFAV efforts in Vietnam more with how NFF operated in other parts of the world. There is an argument to be made that FFAV needed to push its work up on a national level, to give NFF the access to the VFF, as working directly with federations have been NFF's *modus operandi* in their other SDP

efforts in other parts of the world. However, FFAV had been one of NFF's longest running projects, and the organization was conceived at a time where NFF's SDP policy differed from the ones NFF adhered to in 2016. Further, FFAV was unquestionably a very successful and revered project, regardless of the organization's adequate connections, or lack thereof, to the national football federation.

FFAV did through extensive experience within the SDP field, have monitoring and evaluation mechanism in place, to adequately report the impact of the FFAV model to its partners; not adhering to the sports evangelist doctrine (Coalter, 2010). However, as SDP activities and outcomes can be challenging to measure (Darnell & Hayhurst, 2012; Giulianotti, 2011a; Hayhurst, 2009; Lindsey & Grattan, 2012), it seemed FFAV monitoring, evaluating, and financial reporting procedures were too demanding on the individuals on the recipient end of their grassroots activities. Consequently, the clubs grew dependent on FFAV, not just for economic support, but for reporting, and organizational help, leading to FFAV working more as an instrument for implementation (Fowler, 2016; Hayman, 2016; Holloway, 1997), than a cooperative endeavor with the football clubs.

In short, the organizational downsizing and restructure impacted the effectiveness of FFAV's efforts towards achieving self-sustainable activities and replication.

6.1.4 Replication

One of the most significant challenges for FFAV was the share number of stakeholders the organization had to engage with on a local, national, and international level (Giulianotti, 2011b; Straume & Hasselgård, 2014). In terms of replication, FFAV were not able to influence the national level governing bodies as much as the organizational staff would have hoped. The causes for this inability to establish closer relationships with national stakeholders such as VFF and MoET seemed to be threefold. First, VFF rightfully deemed the FFAV model too expensive and resource exhaustive. Therefore, FFAV needed to adjust the model, to show it could be suitable for replication.

Second, FFAV was pressed for time and resources to allocate to advocacy work. Coincidentally, when FFAV did try to connect with national-level stakeholders, the organization was not as effective as in the past. As the former director, a white, older

westerner, was no longer spearheading the organization, FFAV now struggled to reach influential individuals in VFF and MoET. The Founder unique standing in the AFC, representing Vietnam as a foreigner, was not as helpful to FFAV, compared to before 2016, as The Founder did not run FFAV anymore. Additionally, access to national level stakeholders was also hindered by the current director not living in Hanoi as initially planned, because of the efforts with The Company.

Finally, VFF did not fully grasp the perceived benefits of grassroots football and seemed unwilling to allocate time and resources to activities that according to VFF, did not impact the elite performance of the male national teams. Even though VFF had selected FFAV's model for replication in VFF's strategy plan for 2020, with a vision to 2030 (FFAV, 2016), there seemed to be a discrepancy between stated the long-term visions of VFF, and the short-sighted realities of the individuals operating within the federation. These findings echo previous research regarding the difficulties of advocacy work in Vietnam (Ohno, 2009; Pallas & Nguyen, 2018). Further, NFF's and FFAV's zero tolerance for corruption also hindered advocacy work, as money gifts, dinners, and other greasing techniques, seemingly were to be expected, especially when a westerner no longer ran FFAV.

6.2 Perceived challenges after the HOP

As Vietnam joined the ranks of other middle-income countries (London, 2014), the funding difficulties facing other NGOs located in middle-income countries also become apparent for FFAV. Juxtaposed, the SDP field has seen an increase in stakeholders the last decade (Black, 2010; Giulianotti, 2011c; Hayhurst, 2011; Straume & Hasselgård, 2014; Svensson et al., 2018). However, as Ho alluded to, funding opportunities might be fewer and far between, as the international development spotlight falls on the world's lower-income countries (London, 2014; Pallas & Nguyen, 2018; Pincus, 2015).

Therefore, this thesis argues that FFAV is more vulnerable than ever, as they can no longer rely on NORAD for economic support, and NFF's financial means could be subject to change as well.

Although the literature has shown SDP organizations and decision makers changing their practices (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016), the perceived success of the HOP could

be informed by naïve perceptions of what sustainable SDP impacts and outcomes look like (Coalter, 2010; Svensson & Levine, 2017), on the part of the FFAV staff.

As FFAV was established around the early 2000s, there is an argument to be made that the idealistic discourses regarding the impact of sports prevalent around the millennium (Coalter, 2010; Hayhurst, 2009), influence the FFAV staff members perception of what is a sustainable outcome of an SDP program. From the analysis, several staff members seemed to suggest that FFAV's impact was observable, as long as there were football activities in the communities. However, as football is hugely popular in Vietnam, it is questionable that there would not have been football activities in the communities regardless of FFAV activities. The prevalence of girls playing football could be an argument for the FFAV impact. However, as FFAV staff members themselves stated: Vietnam is becoming increasingly more progressive (London, 2014; Nørlund, 2007), and for FFAV to take all the credit for girls being able to participate in sporting activities, would be fallacious.

The FFAV activities seemed to -and continue to be- highly dependent on critical human resources located in the districts, who have bought into the FFAV model and received training as to how to organize and run football activities. However, with FFAV no longer being able to supply headmasters, teachers, and other community resources with the proper training, the sustainability of the FFAV activities remain uncertain. When headmasters and teachers retire or move to other schools, the robustness of the FFAV activities will be tested. Hence, there is some merit in claiming that the efforts to support the activities in TT Hue, still very much dependent on external funding, as other CSOs within Vietnam (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018).

As for the retention of human resources, it seemed that the staff members who were let go by FFAV at the end of 2018, could be interested in for working with FFAV. However, the staff seemed more interested in being involved on a volunteer basis, given the staff members new careers might not allow for them to become contracted by FFAV, even if they were to receive a salary. If the former staff members were to contribute as unpaid volunteers, FFAV needs to keep in mind the possible conflicts that can arise in SDP organizations that utilize both paid and unpaid staff (Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). FFAV is no stranger to having volunteers or interns working at the

organization, but welcoming back former full-time staff members as volunteers could challenge the dynamic between the individuals within FFAV, especially considering that the vice director and the director showed some concerns regarding how their colleagues received their paid future with FFAV. However, the analysis of the interviews and field notes did not suggest any animosity from staff members towards the leadership of FFAV.

Further, as the financial capacity from fundraising is more project based in nature (Svensson, Andersson, & Faulk, 2018), FFAV will continuously be looking for funds to continue activities. As the organization aims to continue its social mobilization model, the lack of technical expertise in-house discussed above could entail a reversal to FFAV's previous sponsor role. The reason being that it is less demanding to provide the funding for football activities than make sure the activities run in a self-sustaining manner. Therefore, FFAV could be more vulnerable to mission drift, as stated by Chi, because the pursuit of funding opportunities, in an SDP and middle-income landscape where funds are becoming more limited (Aldaba et al., 2000; Arhin et al., 2018; Giulianotti, 2011b), might force FFAV to take on funding partnerships with that do not align with FFAV's values or mission (Massey et al., 2016; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016).

FFAV does seemingly possess a high level of structural capacity (Hall et al., 2003), as the organization has, and presumably will continue to have healthy relationships outside of Vietnam's borders, cooperating with major international SDP players. However, the structural capacity as it relates to relationships with Vietnamese governing bodies and federations, are more uncertain. Therefore, FFAV organizational sustainability is still dependent on the organization's ability to interact with various stakeholders to fulfill the organization's mission (Aldaba et al., 2000). However, FFAV is hoping that if the organization could show to national level stakeholders that the FFAV model is cost-effective, VFF and MoET would want to pursue a grassroots-oriented football model. Alas, previous research regarding VNGOs seems to undermine such assumptions of Vietnamese government taking ownership of NGO initiatives (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018).

Even though paperwork and MOUs are in place to facilitate the replication of FFAV, as well as the self-sustainability of the activities in the TT Hue province, Vietnam as a

nation has a proven track record of not carrying out agreed-upon policies and strategies (Ohno, 2009). Coincidentally, personal connections with individuals within external partnerships also factor in the structural capacity of an organization (Doherty et al., 2014; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016). FFAV and NFF's zero tolerance for corruption, as well as The Founder stepping down as FFAV director, might impact the current FFAV leaderships ability to make fruitful acquaintances. Moreover, a westerner could be met with more respect from local Vietnamese authorities when taking a zero-tolerance stance towards corruption. However, the director Ho, as he alluded to in his interview, would be expected to conform to local practices, as he is Vietnamese.

According to their statements, the leadership in FFAV did not possess all the qualities to successfully lead a hybrid SDP organization with multiple agendas (Svensson, 2017). Although the director and vice director were excellent fundraisers, supervisors, networkers, and exuberated extensive developmental knowledge; they lacked the commercial, and entrepreneurial experience often required by hybrid-organizational leaders (Hayhurst, 2014; Schulenkorf, 2017; Svensson, 2017). As for FFAV post 2018, although the FFAV's finances were not as impacted by NORAD's withdrawal as one might expect, the ripple effects on the human resources (Hall et al., 2003), in the form of FFAV activities vulnerability to a lack of technical expertise, will pose a challenge for the organization moving forward. Even if the organization has identified and developed technical expertise in the TT Hue province, FFAV could find it challenging to mobilize adequate technical expertise, both from the former FFAV staff and the grassroots level in the form of parents and teachers. Therefore, the organizational sustainability of FFAV is questionable (Aldaba et al., 2000).

Additionally, even though The Company route does not occupy any more time or resources, the two remaining FFAV staff members could still be pressed for time, leaving the organization in need of additional human resources capacity. This human resource capacity could very well be made up of volunteers and interns, but FFAV will most likely at some point, require professional staff. In other words, FFAV will depend on financial capacity to hire staff. As there is no more financial support from NORAD, nor any prospect of a commercial FFAV branch, the financial capacity will most likely be derived from fundraising.

As highlighted earlier, the director and vice director of FFAV were well versed in fundraising, and FFAV had many more benefactors than just NORAD, possibly in an effort to be less vulnerable to environmental change and single donor dependency (Giulianotti et al., 2016; Svensson et al., 2018; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016; Svensson & Seifried, 2017). However, there is no research to suggest that FFAV will be less donor dependent in its post-2018 form (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018; Svensson et al., 2018).

6.3 Practical Implications

Some tentative practical implications for SDP practitioners can be derived from the findings and discussion.

Firstly, as a HOP seemed to entail a workload for SDP organizational staff, an SDP organization should strive to address its perceived organizational capacity weaknesses, before significant donors and funders withdrawal. For FFAV, this could have meant handing over the football activities to local stakeholders sooner, rather than later. Building on this, donors such as NORAD, should reconsider a gradual reduction of funds to the recipient organization, as the demands of a HOP could lead to the organization tackling a more significant workload than earlier in the organizational lifecycle. Therefore, donors could consider funding the organization they wish to withdraw from at their prior level until the funding stops completely after an agreed upon period of time. Such an approach could allow an organization to maintain high levels of organizational capacity, hopefully setting the organization up for a more sustainable future, after the funding disappears.

Thirdly, SDP organization's activities should be placed on a continuum, where initially funding is high to kickstart activities and gain interest, before gradually mobilizing human resources in local communities, culminating in self-sustainable activities. Lastly, when planning an exit strategy, and restructuring an SDP organization, keep the realities of staff members in mind. A core staff of older, established members with family obligations, face a different set of challenges compared to young volunteers.

6.4 Limitations and Future Research

The purpose of this study was to identify the challenges facing a Vietnamese Sport for a development organization when its major donor withdraws its funding. The interviews

and participant observation provided rich data for exploring these challenges, as mentioned earlier, and the inner workings of an SDP organization. Even though the interviews and observations from the participant observation crystalized (King-White, 2017) the findings presented, seven informants all affiliated with FFAV could be regarded as a limitation. Informants from different governmental levels within Vietnam; and from the grassroots where the FFAV conducted activities; and from Norwegian partnering organizations such as NFF and NIF, could have provided even more valuable data and provided context as to why FFAV went about the HOP as they did.

Some of the frustrations regarding the HOP could be traced back to differences in opinions regarding what is considered sustainable activities or FFAV operations. From the interviews, the local staff seemed to have a take on sustainability, that could differ with NFF's and NORAD's perceptions of sustainability. Alas, this master thesis does not provide, nor did it aim at giving, an adequate perspective from these two partnering organizations to provide a meaningful answer. Additionally, as the data in this thesis stems from only one SDP organization, it is difficult to predict that all SDP organizations in the same situation, face the same challenges.

For future research, it could be of interest to compare NFF's perception of their attentiveness to staff care during an exit strategy, and the experience of the staff members partaking in an exit strategy. The findings in this thesis show that staff members struggled with feelings of uncertainty and emotional distress. The FFAV staff had well reasoned personal agendas for securing their financial futures first in the face of the donor withdrawal. Because of family obligations, staff members deemed it necessary to pursue other business opportunities outside of FFAV activities. Coincidentally, the workload in FFAV increased, and staff salary decreased. Therefore, the staff members were less willing to pursue an FFAV commercial enterprise, as well as pressed for resources to meet the demands of the HOP. It would be interesting to uncover if this dynamic between the needs of the organization, and the needs of the individuals within the organization, is present in other organizations experiencing aid withdrawal. Additionally, NFF's approach to deal with these challenges during the HOP could provide new data for exploring a facet of power North-South power dynamics.

Further, looking at the social mobilization approach to sustainable activities more closely could provide valuable contributions for practitioners on how to move beyond theorizing about sustainable activities, and show a real-life example of how an SDP organization tried to improve the sustainability of their program activities.

There is also a gap in the current literature regarding how long-running organizations such as FFAV adopt to exit strategies that were not in place when the organization was established. Comparing CSOs or SDP organizations with an organizational life-span of over ten years could highlight the challenges facing older organizations when experiencing funding withdrawal.

6.5 Summary of Central Findings and Concluding Reflections

This master thesis explored the challenges facing an SDP organization when its primary donor withdrew its funding, and tied these challenges to current relevant literature within the SDP field, and aid withdrawal. In short, FFAV's main challenge during, and possibly after the HOP was a reduction in organizational capacity (Hall et al., 2003), combined with an increased workload on the remaining staff members, which ironically was brought on in an attempt to improve the organizational capacity. For the organizational restructure, FFAV's main challenges were downsizing, and adapting to a hybrid organizational form, to cope with the financial uncertainty, and challenges regarding organizational capacity (Haveman & Rao, 2006; Minkoff, 2002; Svensson & Hambrick, 2016; Svensson & Seifried, 2017). For one of the suggested solutions to continue FFAV's work- The Company- the primary challenges were related to the lack of commercial expertise and a lack of belief in a commercially viable product.

For organizational sustainability, the challenges were related to adequately transferring the ownership of the activities to the local stakeholders, through a social mobilization strategy. For the replication of the FFAV model, the main challenges were the lack of a feasible FFAV model for replication and difficulties with advocacy work.

All of the four themes were challenges FFAV faced during the HOP. However, after the HOP, most of the challenges would be related to the replication of the model.

Consequently, the sustainability of the activities in TT Hue would also be a priority, as proving the FFAV model was feasible with a low- cost approach, would be paramount

for the model replication. Regarding The Company, the idea of starting an FFAV based business seemed to have run its course. As FFAV and the former staff members find their stride from 2019 onwards, time will tell if FFAV and NFF succeeded in their efforts of retaining the staff expertise. However, the minimum skeleton version of FFAV could prove to be the most beneficial organizational structure for FFAV moving forward; a realization FFAV could have embraced earlier in the HOP, to downscale the organization in a more responsible manner (Hayman & Lewis, 2018)

As of writing this thesis, it is too early to speculate in the organization's long-term sustainability. Sustainability is not an end-state but a process (Hayman, 2016). FFAV has already been around for almost two decades, a feat in of itself within the field of Sport for Development. Factors outside of the organization's control seem to dictate how long the organization will continue to exist, such as NFF's involvement in Vietnam and Asia; VFF's interest in grassroots football; and the prevalence of economic funding. Additionally, Vietnam's political trajectory could have an immense impact on FFAV's future (Pallas & Nguyen, 2018).

Given the lack of research concerning exit strategies and aid withdrawal (Hayman & Lewis, 2018), this research paper contributes to the current development research field with the following insights: Firstly, not only is funding withdrawal and exit strategies topics that lack academic depth, most of the research that has been conducted, is from the perspective of INGOs or large-scale donors (Hayman, 2015; Hayman & Lewis, 2018; Holloway, 1997). Thus, this thesis provides meaningful insight from a local NGO on the receiving end of an exit strategy, and what organizational capacity challenges an SDP organization in a funder withdrawal situation could be facing (Svensson et al., 2018). Secondly, FFAV faced challenges relating to organizational restructure, sustainable activities, the establishment of a revenue-generating enterprise, and replication of activities. During the HOP, FFAV's organizational capacity (Hall et al., 2003) was depleted, and the workload of the organizational members increased. These findings illustrate how donor dependency can impact how an SDP organizational hybrid is conceptualized to address the challenges of a donor withdrawal (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). Finally, this thesis highlights the perspectives and realities of local staff (Hayman & Lewis, 2018). The staff members were now older professionals with family commitments, not young volunteers with minimal responsibilities.

Acronyms

AFC	Asian Football Confederation
CSA	Civil Society Actor
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CPV	Communist Party Vietnam
DoET	Department of Education and Training
FCTL	Football Club Tuong Lai (Football Club Future)
FFAV	Football for All in Vietnam
HFF	Hue Football Federation
HOP	Hand Over Period
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Money Fund
IOC	The International Olympic Committee
INGO	International non-Governmental Organization
MoET	Ministry of Education and Training
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
NIH	Norwegian School of Sport Sciences
NFF	Football Association of Norway
NIF	Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development
NSD	Norwegian Social Science Data Service
SDP	Sport for Development and Peace
SUBDoET	Sub-Department of Education and Training
TT Hue	Thua Thien Hue (the name of the province)
UN	United Nations
VFF	Vietnam Football Federation

VNGO Vietnamese non-governmental organization
YSEP Youth Sport Exchange Program

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Appendix 1 NSD declaration

5/25/2019

Meldeskjema for behandling av personopplysninger



NSD sin vurdering

Prosjekttittel

Football For All in Vietnam: exploring the sustainability of sport for development projects

Referansenummer

602950

Registrert

19.09.2018 av Jesper Møller - jespemoller91@gmail.com

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon

Norges idrettshøgskole / Seksjon for kultur og samfunn

Prosjektansvarlig (vitenskapelig ansatt/veileder eller stipendiat)

Åse Strandbu, ase.strandbu@nih.no, tlf: 23262327

Type prosjekt

Studentprosjekt, masterstudium

Kontaktinformasjon, student

Jesper Møller, jespermo@hotmail.no, tlf: 92695918

Prosjektperiode

20.09.2018 - 30.05.2020

Status

19.12.2018 - Vurdert

Vurdering (1)

19.12.2018 - Vurdert

Det er vår vurdering at behandlingen av personopplysninger i prosjektet vil være i samsvar med personvernlovgivningen så fremt den gjennomføres i tråd med det som er dokumentert i meldeskjemaet med vedlegg den 19.12.18, samt i meldingsdialogen mellom innmelder og NSD. Behandlingen kan starte.

MELD ENDRINGER

Dersom behandlingen av personopplysninger endrer seg, kan det være nødvendig å melde dette til NSD ved å oppdatere meldeskjemaet. På våre nettsider informerer vi om hvilke endringer som må meldes. Vent på svar før endringer gjennomføres.

TYPE OPPLYSNINGER OG VARIGHET

<https://meldeskjema.nsd.no/vurdering/5ba22e2c-0f4d-4af8-8325-04bac16549a0>

1/2

Prosjektet vil behandle alminnelige kategorier av personopplysninger frem til 30.05.20

LOVLIG GRUNNLAG

Prosjektet vil innhente samtykke fra de registrerte til behandlingen av personopplysninger. Vår vurdering er at prosjektet legger opp til et samtykke i samsvar med kravene i art. 4 og 7, ved at det er en frivillig, spesifikk, informert og utvetydig bekreftelse som kan dokumenteres, og som den registrerte kan trekke tilbake. Lovlig grunnlag for behandlingen vil dermed være den registrertes samtykke, jf. personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav a.

PERSONVERNPRINSIPPER

NSD vurderer at den planlagte behandlingen av personopplysninger vil følge prinsippene i personvernforordningen om:

- lovlighet, rettferdighet og åpenhet (art. 5.1 a), ved at de registrerte får tilfredsstillende informasjon om og samtykker til behandlingen
- formålsbegrensning (art. 5.1 b), ved at personopplysninger samles inn for spesifikke, uttrykkelig angitte og berettigede formål, og ikke behandles til nye, uforenlige formål
- dataminimering (art. 5.1 c), ved at det kun behandles opplysninger som er adekvate, relevante og nødvendige for formålet med prosjektet
- lagringsbegrensning (art. 5.1 e), ved at personopplysningene ikke lagres lengre enn nødvendig for å oppfylle formålet

DE REGISTRERTES RETTIGHETER

Så lenge de registrerte kan identifiseres i datamaterialet vil de ha følgende rettigheter: åpenhet (art. 12), informasjon (art. 13), innsyn (art. 15), retting (art. 16), sletting (art. 17), begrensning (art. 18), underretning (art. 19), dataportabilitet (art. 20).

NSD vurderer at informasjonen om behandlingen som de registrerte vil motta oppfyller lovens krav til form og innhold, jf. art. 12.1 og art. 13.

Vi minner om at hvis en registrert tar kontakt om sine rettigheter, har behandlingsansvarlig institusjon plikt til å svare innen en måned.

FØLG DIN INSTITUSJONS RETNINGSLINJER

NSD legger til grunn at behandlingen oppfyller kravene i personvernforordningen om riktighet (art. 5.1 d), integritet og konfidensialitet (art. 5.1 f) og sikkerhet (art. 32).

For å forsikre dere om at kravene oppfylles, må dere følge interne retningslinjer og/eller rådføre dere med behandlingsansvarlig institusjon.

OPPFØLGING AV PROSJEKTET

NSD vil følge opp ved planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.

Lykke til med prosjektet!

Kontaktperson hos NSD: Silje Fjelberg Opsvik
Tlf. Personverntjenester: 55 58 21 17 (tast 1)

Appendix 2 Consent form

Name of researcher: Jesper Møller

Norwegian School of Sport Sciences

Graduate student

Invitation to Participate: I am invited to participate in a research study entitled: Football For All in Vietnam: exploring the sustainability of sport for development projects conducted by Jesper Møller for his Master thesis at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences.

Purpose of the Study: I understand that the general purpose of the study is to explore the challenges facing a sport for development program, before, during and after a hand over process.

Participation: My participation will consist of taking part in one (1) individual interview lasting approximately 30-45 minutes during which I will discuss matters related to my area of expertise. The interview will be audio-recorded (with my prior consent) and occur at a time and place of my convenience.

All personal information and other information I give will be anonymized, it will not be possible to know that the information comes from me. All collected data will be stored electronically and password protected, without name, age, or other personal information. Only the researcher (Jesper Møller) and the researchers supervisor (Professor Åse Strandbu) will have access to the data and codes (instead of names) will be used to ensure anonymity.

Observation: From 20th of September 2018, until 28th of February, the researcher Jesper Møller will be present at Football For All in Vietnams office, participating in daily activities. The purpose is for the researcher to observe what tasks are being prioritized at the office, during the final stages of the 2016-2019 hand over process.

The researcher will also be present at district evaluation seminars, to observe the different sustainability tactics taking place in the communities.

Conservation of data: The data collected (both hard copy and electronic data) will be kept in a secure manner on a password-protected computer. All physical and electronic data will be stored and conserved by the researcher (Jesper Møller) in a secure manner.

The project is scheduled to finish 30th of May 2019. In case of delays during the process the researcher will, if needed, keep the data stored safely for another year, until 30th of May 2020. After this date all personal information will be deleted, including audio recordings. At any point, I can be given access to all data the researcher Jesper Møller has collected regarding my personal information. I also have the right to copy said information to a personal electronic device for personal use.

My Rights: As long as I can be identified in the collected data, I have the right to:

- Access personal data
- Request personal data is deleted
- Request that incorrect data about me is corrected/rectified
- Request a copy of personal data
- Send a complaint to the Data Protector Officer or the The Norwegian Data Protection Authority regarding the processing of my personal data

What gives the researcher the right to process my personal data?

My consent is the basis for processing my personal data.

Voluntary Participation: Through me agreeing to participate, the researcher Jesper Møller is permitted to handle the information I chose to share during the interview. I am under no obligation to participate and if I choose to participate, I may withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions. If I choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed and not used for any research purposes.

Acceptance: I, _____, agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Jesper Møller of the Norwegian School of Sport sciences, under the supervision of Professor Åse Strandbu. I understand that by accepting to participate, I am in no way waiving my right to withdraw from the study.

If I have any questions about the study, I may contact:

- Jesper Møller: jespermo@hotmail.no
- Supervisor from The Norwegian School of Sport Science, Åse Strandbu on e-mail: ase.strandbu@nih.no
- NSD – Norwegian centre for research data: e-mail: personvernombudet@nsd.no or phone: + 47 55 58 21 17.
- Norwegian School of Sport Science Data Protection: personvernombud@nih.no

Declaration of consent

I have received and understood information about the project *Football For All in Vietnam: exploring the sustainability of sport for development projects* and have been given the opportunity to ask questions. I give consent to participate in an interview regarding this topic.

I give consent for my personal data to be processed until the end date of the project, approx. 30th of May 2020.

There are two copies of the consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

Participant's Signature: _____

Date: _____

Researcher's Signature: _____

Date: _____

Appendix 3 Interview guide

1. Could you tell me a little bit about yourself?

- 1.1 How long have you been involved in the FFAV project?
 - 1.1.1 Are you currently working for FFAV
 - 1.1.2 Any plans of working for FFAV in the future
- 1.2. What sort of training has FFAV provided you?
- 1.3 Have you developed any skills whilst working for FFAV?
- 1.4 What are/were your tasks and responsibilities for FFAV?
- 1.5 Is there anything you would like to add?

2. Could you tell me a little bit about FFAV?

- 2.1 What is FFAV's goal?
- 2.2 Where has FFAV been most successful?
- 2.3 Where could FFAV improve?
- 2.4 Who are the most important stakeholders for FFAV?
- 2.5 What are the biggest challenges facing FFAV?
- 2.6 What are FFAV's strengths?
- 2.7 Is there anything you would like to add?

3. Could you tell me a little bit about the district?

- 3.1. What sort of relationship do you have with the Province?
- 3.2 How is FFAV viewed by the communities?
- 3.3 Is there anything you would like to add?

4. Could you tell me a little bit about the transition phase and hand over process FFAV is currently involved in?

4.1 What does the hand over process mean for you?

4.2 Have your responsibilities changed?

4.3 What sort of tasks do you spend the most time on? Are they different than before the handover process started?

4.4 FFAV has seen some budget cuts recently. Could you explain how that has impacted you, and your work?

4.5 Working for FFAV- Biggest difference now compared to before

4.6 The hand over process is finished. How successful do you think it was overall?

4.7 Do you think FFAV will be sustainable after the handover process?

4.8 How long do you see yourself working for FFAV?

4.9 Is there anything you would like to add?