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Morten Renslo Sandvik

Anti-doping as solidarity

A philosophical inquiry into anti-doping in elite sport

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Summary

Doping in elite sport is commonly understood as a moral problem. In line with this view, anti-doping work is set out to protect 'clean' athletes and 'the spirit of sport' from individual athletes' and accomplices' lack of moral rectitude. Arguably, such 'moralized' and dogmatic descriptions of doping and anti-doping have warranted the development of a sophisticated control regime of biological testing and surveillance: a regime which raises numerous ethical concerns. Moreover, these descriptions have influenced a public anti-doping discourse of scandalization, mistrust and stigmatization.

The main aim of this dissertation is to develop and examine the implications of a philosophical understanding of anti-doping that challenges the dogmatic descriptions and addresses the ethical issues of current anti-doping policy and discourse. Towards this aim, the philosophical methodology of redescription is employed. This approach draws on the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty. The main impetus of Rortyan redescription is the deepening and widening of solidarity. Thus, the dissertation endeavors to develop and examine the implications of a philosophy of anti-doping *as solidarity*.

Four individual papers contribute towards the main aim. Paper 1 places anti-doping within a wider, historically qualified and fallibilistic endorsement of liberal values. The paper develops and examines the implications of 'ironism' as a philosophical basis for anti-doping commitment. It suggests that ironism contributes to more compassionate forms of commitment: more tolerant of intentionally doping athletes as persons and more aware of sport organizations' responsibilities to all athletes.

Paper 2 develops a philosophical basis for sport organizations' anti-doping policy and rhetoric. Redescribing 'fair play' as athletes' expression of loyalty to larger groups, the paper inserts a picture of sport organizations such as the International Olympic Committee, as coordinating bodies of larger groups that appeal, through policy and rhetoric, to athletes' larger loyalty. Anti-doping policy and rhetoric, in this picture, are developed and critically scrutinized according to their potential for fostering a sense of common interest, interdependence, and reciprocal trust across larger sporting communities.

Paper 3 examines whether, and if so how, the purposes of redescription can be served by doping-related stories, playing out in elite sport, narrated through the media and enacted by celebrity-athletes. The paper discusses two stories about athletes sanctioned for doping, interpreted as redescriptive narratives challenging dogmatic descriptions prevailing in respective sporting communities. The story of Justin Gatlin is seen to communicate to the

international athletics community the idea that after serving a suspension, it makes sense for an athlete to be included as 'one of "us"'. Similarly, the paper suggests that the story of Therese Johaug conveys to the Norwegian sporting community that some of these athletes remain 'one of "us"' throughout the judicial process.

Paper 4 addresses the 'confession dilemma' faced by former elite athletes pondering upon the question of whether to publicly confess to doping. The paper sheds light on the dissertation's main aim by rendering visible ethical problems with the dogmatic, moralized descriptions and introducing the idea of redescription as a means to foster and cultivate alternative understandings of doping-related dilemmas.

Overall, the dissertation aspires to show that, conditional upon further development and refinement, there is promise to the philosophical understanding of anti-doping as solidarity. As a main contribution, the dissertation proposes the idea that for anti-doping policy and discourse to progress towards solidarity, what is needed in the current situation are 'sociological' redescriptions that draw attention to doping as a social phenomenon, playing out in social networks, fostered and made possible by the social structures of elite sport. Such redescriptions can alter the course of sport communities' conversations away from prevailing moralized descriptions of doping and anti-doping, towards a wider discourse of cultural and political change in the organization of elite sport.

Sammendrag

Doping i toppidrett anses gjerne som et moralsk problem. I tråd med dette synet er antidopingarbeid ment å beskytte «rene» utøvere og «idrettens ånd» mot andres mangel på moralsk rettskaffenhet. Slike «moraliserte», dogmatiske beskrivelser av doping og antidoping har ligget til grunn for utviklingen av et sofistikert kontrollregime basert på biologisk testing og overvåkning. Antidopingens kontrollregime er forbundet med en rekke etiske problemstillinger. Videre har beskrivelsene bidratt til en offentlig antidopingdiskurs preget av skandalisering, mistro og stigmatisering.

Hovedmålet med avhandlingen er å utvikle, og undersøke følgene av, en filosofisk forståelse av antidoping som utfordrer de dogmatiske beskrivelsene og adresserer de etiske problemstillingene knytet til rådende antidopingpolitikk og -diskurs. Til dette formål er «ombeskrivelse» tatt i bruk som en nyttig filosofisk metodologi. Tilnærmingen bygger på Richard Rortys nypragmatisme. Den viktigste drivkraften i Rortyansk ombeskrivelse er ønsket om å utdype og utvide solidaritet. Avhandlingen tar derfor sikte på å utvikle en filosofisk forståelse av antidoping som solidaritet.

Fire selvstendige artikler bidrar mot hovedmålet. Artikkel 1 plasserer antidoping som et etisk standpunkt innenfor en bredere, historisk kvalifisert og feilbarlig tilknytning til liberale verdier. Artikkelen utvikler og undersøker følgene av å forankre antidopingforpliktelser til en «ironisk» filosofi. Artikkelen viser at ironi er velegnet til å forme forpliktelser som er mer medfølende, mer tolerante overfor dopede utøvere som mennesker og mer bevisste på idrettsorganisasjoners ansvar overfor alle utøvere.

*Artikkel 2 utvikler et filosofisk grunnlag for idrettsorganisasjoners antidopingpolitikk og -retorikk. Ved å ombeskrive «*fair play*» som utøveres uttrykk for en større lojalitet tegner artikkelen et bilde av idrettsorganisasjoner, slik som den Internasjonale olympiske komité, som koordinerende enheter som appellerer til utøveres større lojalitet gjennom hensiktsmessig politikk og retorikk. I dette bildet utvikles og evalueres antidopingpolitikk og -retorikk utfra sitt bidrag til å tydeliggjøre følelsen av fellesinteresse, gjensidig avhengighet og gjensidig tillit på tvers av større idrettsfellesskap.*

Artikkel 3 undersøker hvorvidt og hvordan dopingrelaterte fortellinger, utspilt i toppidretten, fortalt gjennom media og rollebesatt av idrettsberømtheter, kan bidra til ombeskrivelsens formål. Artikkelen tolker to fortellinger om utøvere som har vært utestengt for doping, som «ombeskrivende narrativer» som utfordrer dogmatiske beskrivelser i respektive idrettsfellesskap. Fortellingen om Justin Gatlin formidler for det internasjonale

friidrettsfellesskapet at det gir mening at utøvere inkluderes som «én av 'oss'» etter endt utestengelse. Fortellingen om Therese Johaug formidler til et norsk idrettsfellesskap en idé om at dopingtatte utøvere forblir en del av fellesskapet gjennom den juridiske prosessen.

Artikkel 4 diskuterer «tilståelsesdilemmaet» idrettsberømtheter som har brukt doping kan stå overfor. Artikkelen kaster lys på avhandlingens hovedmål ved å fremheve etiske utfordringer knyttet til moraliserte, dogmatiske beskrivelser, og ved å introdusere idéen om ombeskrivelse som et nyttig verktøy for å få frem nye og mer hensiktsmessige forståelser av doping og antidoping.

Alt i alt viser avhandlingen at en filosofisk forståelse av antidoping som solidaritet kan være fruktbar. Som sitt kanskje viktigste bidrag formidler avhandlingen at antidopingpolitikken og -diskursens videre utvikling i en solidarisk retning avhenger av «sosiologiske» ombeskrivelser av doping som sosialt fenomen, utspilt i sosiale nettverk og muliggjort av toppidrettens sosiale strukturer. Slike ombeskrivelser kan bidra til å skifte ut moraliserte og dogmatiske beskrivelser av doping og antidoping, til fordel for en bredere samtale om kulturell og politisk endring i organiseringen av toppidrett.

List of papers

Paper 1

Sandvik, M. R. (2019). Anti-doping ironism. *Sport in Society*. doi:10.1080/17430437.2019.1703686

Paper 2

Sandvik, M. R. Fair Play as a larger loyalty: the case of anti-doping. In review, *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy*.

Paper 3

Sandvik, M. R. (2019). Sport, stories, and morality: a Rortyan approach to doping ethics. *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 46*(3), 383-400. doi:10.1080/00948705.2019.1622127

Paper 4

Sandvik, M. R. (2018). The confession dilemma: doping, lying, and narrative identity. *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 13*(2), 213-226. doi:10.1080/17511321.2018.1465113

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PART 1

1 Introduction

This dissertation develops and examines the implications of a philosophical understanding of anti-doping as solidarity. The study arises out of concern with numerous ethical problems associated with current anti-doping policy and discourse. Since the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999, anti-doping policy in elite, Olympic sport has been significantly intensified: there has been a trend towards severer sanctions, the quantity of biological testing has accelerated, and a sophisticated system of surveillance has been introduced to facilitate unannounced out-of-competition testing (Aguilar, Muñoz-Guerra, Plata & Del Coso, 2017; Dimeo & Møller, 2018). The intensification of policy has highlighted numerous ethical issues, including concerns with athletes' right to privacy (MacGregor, 2015; McNamee & Tarasti, 2010; Tamburrini, 2013), the principle of strict liability (Camporesi, 2017; Geeraets, 2018), and individualization of responsibility (Waddington & Møller, 2019). Moreover, with the construction of 'doping scandals' as a seemingly inexhaustible media phenomenon, the public discourse on anti-doping has been similarly intensified. The media reports of frequent 'scandals' and 'crises', anti-doping advocates campaign for the introduction of yet tougher measures, and athletes who dope or are suspected of doping are publicly condemned as the 'folk devils' of the anti-doping folklore (Dimeo & Møller, 2018; McDermott, 2016).

The intensification of policy and discourse, and an arguable tacit acceptance of the ethical problems following in their wake, relate to dogmatic descriptions of doping and anti-doping: the most explicit expressions of which pertain to what Møller (2008, p. 18) calls 'anti-doping fundamentalism'. Kreft (2009, 2011) understands the advent and popular acceptance of hardline anti-doping policy and discourse as made possible by a process of 'moralization'. Through a cultural framing process tracing back at least to the interwar era, doping has been placed, quote Gleaves (2011, p. 234), 'in an immoral category, separate from most other rule infractions […] the common view holds that doping points to an athlete's character flaw or lack of moral rectitude'. In short, the cultural and political impact of anti-doping is influenced by dogmatic descriptions of doping as a moral problem and, correspondingly, anti-doping as a moral remedy. A related description sees doping as fundamentally contrary to what is popularly termed 'the spirit of sport'[1]. Because sport is seen as aspiring to foster moral development in

[1] The view of doping as contrary to the 'spirit of sport' is established by WADA as the 'fundamental rationale' for anti-doping policy. According to the governing document, the World Anti-Doping Code (WADA, 2019c, p. 14), anti-doping policy is set out to 'preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport. This intrinsic value is often referred to as "the spirit of sport."'

athletes and beyond, athletes' use of certain biomedical technologies appears not just as a moral disease of the individual but a moral epidemic of sporting practice. Anti-doping policy, according to this view, is set out to protect ethically driven sport from an existential threat.

The present philosophical inquiry aims to explore a fruitful and viable alternative to the view that, at least in its most explicit and relentless expressions, can be termed anti-doping fundamentalism. Certainly, the sport philosophical literature already provides several nuanced and more sophisticated understandings of doping and anti-doping. In one approach, associated with authors such as Loland (2002, 2009) and Murray (2007, 2018), competitive sport is recognized as an ethically driven practice in which ideas of fairness and justice are institutionalized to allow practitioners to measure, rank and compare certain human capabilities under conditions that facilitate for uncertainty of outcome. Inequalities between athletes that are deemed non-relevant to the test of these capabilities are typically eliminated or compensated for. As, in Murray's (2007, p. 514) words, 'Excellence in sport is meant to be the product of natural talents and their perfection by hard work and other virtuous activities', the introduction of certain biomedical technologies shifts the responsibility of performance from the athlete to complex financial, scientific and technological expert systems. Inequalities resulting from doping, thus, are seen as non-relevant. Conditional upon a normative interpretation of sport as the 'virtuous development of natural talent towards human excellence' (Loland & McNamee, 2016, p. 118), the principle of anti-doping in sport is justified as a natural extension of sport's social structure.

Other scholars, commonly placed within a liberal tradition, view anti-doping as unjustifiable paternalism constraining athletes' freedom of choice which, in turn, restrains their development qua athletes (Foddy & Savulescu, 2007; Tamburrini, 2000), qua moral agents (Brown, 1980) and, what is more, qua human beings (Savulescu, Foddy, & Clayton, 2004). Whereas these accounts vary in terms of how they normatively evaluate doping—ranging from problematization and recognition of potential harms to moral recommendation—they converge on a view of the current ban as ethically problematic.

A third approach, associated with Kayser and colleagues (Kayser, 2018; Kayser & Broers, 2012, 2015), understands doping as a primarily medical rather than moral problem. From this starting point, the argument is that anti-doping should be evaluated not purely as an ethical position but according to how well it performs with regards to what is seen as the overarching objective: harm-reduction. Pointing to various shortcomings and inadvertent consequences of anti-doping policy in this regard, Kayser and Broers (2015) argue that harm-reduction would be better taken care of by relaxing the ban on doping, prohibiting only

substances and methods that are proven significantly unsafe, and implementing a sophisticated system of medical follow-up of athletes overseeing what would be their legal use of reasonably safe substances and methods.

Against this backdrop, I claim that there is a need for an alternative and pragmatic philosophical approach that challenges the dogmatic descriptions of doping and anti-doping and addresses the ethical problems associated with current policy and discourse. The restrictive accounts are carved out to provide ethical justification for the ban on doping and do not offer normative guidance as to how the ban can be ethically enforced and upheld through policy and discourse. The permissive liberalization and harm-reduction arguments similarly shed light on the ethics of the ban *per se* but do not aim at normative guidance, besides recommending liberalization or relaxation, in a context where the ban, in more or less its current form, is in place. Whereas I do acknowledge the potential in liberalization and relaxation for addressing many ethical problems associated with anti-doping policy, I have pragmatic reasons for sidestepping exploration of both liberalization and relaxation arguments. The dissertation takes departure in the current situation in elite, Olympic sport. In this situation, I view the ban as at least ethically justifiable in principle[2]. Furthermore, the ban is widely implemented, enjoys substantial political and popular support and seems unlikely to be abandoned anytime soon. I argue, therefore, that the urgent ethical problems of anti-doping are pragmatically worthwhile to explore philosophically from a starting point that takes the ban in its current form as a given—however provisionally so[3].

In this endeavor, I employ the philosophical methodology of redescription: the process of using new words or give new uses to old words, in such ways as to facilitate new understandings of the issues addressed in philosophical inquiry. Redescription is useful for studying ethical and political issues characterized by the presence in culture and politics of dogmatic and largely unchallenged descriptions. Moreover, the methodology is well-suited to inform both practical-ethical issues that can be addressed through political form, and wider issues of discourse that hinge on more complex processes of cultural change.

From this methodological starting point, the main aim of the dissertation is ***to develop and examine the implications of a philosophical understanding of anti-doping based on the methodology of redescription***.

[2] The dissertation rests on the pluralist stance that there can be more than one justifiable way of approaching doping in sport and that banning certain substances and methods is among them.

[3] I write 'provisionally so' because, in the present dissertation, this initial pragmatic and pluralist endorsement of the ban on doping can only be held provisionally and fallibilistically, conditional upon the performance of anti-doping vis-a-vis the overarching aim of widening and deepening solidarity.

CHAPTER 1

The way I conceive of redescription as an approach to the philosophy of anti-doping rests on the neo-pragmatist philosophy of Richard Rorty. The overarching impetus of Rortyan redescription is the deepening and widening of solidarity. Thus, as I over the course of the dissertation showcase the utility of this methodology to the case of anti-doping, I endeavor to develop a philosophy of anti-doping ***as solidarity***.

Paper 1 places anti-doping as an ethical position within a wider, historically qualified and fallibilistic endorsement of liberal values. The paper develops and examines the implications of 'ironism' as a philosophical basis for anti-doping commitment. Paper 2 develops a philosophical basis for sport organizations' anti-doping policy and rhetoric. Redescribing 'fair play' as athletes' expressions of loyalty to larger groups, the paper aspires to insert a picture of sport organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as coordinating bodies of larger groups that appeal, through policy and discourse, to athletes' larger loyalty. Paper 3 examines whether, and if so how, the redescriptive purpose of widened and deepened solidarity can be served by doping-related stories, playing out in elite sport, narrated through the media and enacted by celebrity-athletes. The paper discusses two stories about athletes sanctioned for doping—Justin Gatlin and Therese Johaug—and interpret these as redescriptive narratives challenging dogmatic descriptions prevailing in respective sporting communities. Lastly, the fourth paper discusses what I call 'the confession dilemma' faced by former elite athletes who ponder upon the question of whether to publicly confess to doping. Whereas this paper was developed early in the research process and does not directly convey the understanding of anti-doping as solidarity, it sheds substantial light on the research aims by highlighting ethical problems with dogmatic descriptions and introducing the idea of narrative redescription as a means to foster and cultivate alternative understandings.

The papers are presented in part 2 of this dissertation. In part 1, I introduce the framework for the study. The purpose of the following chapters is to contextualize the dissertation, elaborate on theoretical and methodological perspectives, draw together the individual contributions of the four papers, and discuss broader implications and limitations. Chapter 2 introduces the historical development of anti-doping policy and discourse and gives an overview of ethical problems. Chapter 3 introduces and discusses the theoretical and methodological framework. Chapter 4 discusses the individual contributions of the four papers towards the overall aim. Lastly, chapter 5 considers broader contributions and implications for practice and further philosophical inquiry.

2 Introducing the context

This chapter introduces the context of anti-doping in Olympic sport as movement and organization, as policy, and as a phenomenon produced and re-produced by a public discourse. In the first section, I clarify key terminology, offer a brief organizational chart of anti-doping in Olympic sport and situate the research within what I call a 'strong anti-doping culture' espousing a 'strong anti-doping discourse'. Next, I discuss the development of anti-doping policy and discourse from a historical perspective. The focus is on two related historical trends: the emergence of dogmatic descriptions of doping as a moral problem, and the intensification of policy and discourse. Lastly, I draw attention to ethical problems and inadvertent consequences of anti-doping.

Anti-doping in elite, Olympic sport: Key terms and organizational chart

There are two uses of the term 'doping' in the dissertation. In a narrow use, doping refers to athletes' use of the substances and methods included on WADA's Prohibited List (WADA, 2020a). Whenever I attach to the term normatively charged words such as 'offence' or 'violation', I have in mind this institutionalized definition of doping. The second use is wider in that it takes doping to describe a social phenomenon independent of sporting rules. In this sense, doping can be defined as the use of performance-enhancing substances and methods, primarily of a biomedical kind.

I am aware that the word doping is often used to designate a pejorative, moralizing stance and that referring merely to 'biomedical performance-enhancement', for instance, could seem more neutral. In this vein, Fost (2008, p. 337) argues:

> The use of the word "doping" to refer to a wide array of performance enhancing technologies (drugs, genetic modifications, sleeping in a hypobaric chamber, etc) contributes to the demonisation and mass hysteria that have dominated this topic for over two decades. … It is intentionally pejorative and misleading, and rational discourse would be facilitated if a more neutral term were used …

I have chosen to stick with the word doping for two reasons. First, it is an established and institutionalized term, and avoiding it often means using more complex and less accessible phrases instead of widely known terminology (e.g. '*anti*-doping', 'doping case', and so on). Second, I believe that normative connotations are not set in concrete: they are, indeed, open to

redescription. As is the word itself, of course, and I concede that it could sit well with the theoretical and methodological framework of the dissertation to pursue such a redescription.

As part of the anti-doping movement in Olympic sport, I consider not just anti-doping organizations and clearly defined stakeholders but all actors who formally or informally contribute to the public anti-doping discourse. I use the term anti-doping discourse to capture ways of speaking and acting that espouse a negative normative judgment of the phenomenon of doping in sport. On these definitions, the anti-doping movement includes, at the least, anti-doping organizations, sport organizations and stakeholders, national governments and intergovernmental organizations, but also the more or less pronounced anti-doping advocates in the popular media, academia and the general public, and among athletes, support personnel and sport leaders. At the core of the movement are the organizations responsible for developing and implementing anti-doping policy. Anti-doping policy in Olympic sport is overseen by the international agency WADA, which is composed and funded equally by the sport movement and national governments. WADA is the custodian of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC), which formalizes rules and regulations and clarifies stakeholder responsibilities (WADA, 2009).

Besides WADA, there are many important stakeholders in the anti-doping movement. National governments and intergovernmental organizations can support national and international anti-doping policy and practice through several political, legal and financial means. The IOC is responsible for testing and sanctioning in relation to the Olympic Games. Outside of the Games, International sport federations are responsible for testing, sanctioning and educating associated athletes (WADA, 2009). In some sports (e.g. cycling), independent organizations (e.g. the Cycling Anti-Doping Foundation) have been established to oversee anti-doping responsibilities on behalf of the international federations (UCI, 2020). This organizational structure is mirrored in national sport systems where Olympic and Paralympic committees and national federations are signatories to the WADC, whereas independent national anti-doping organizations (NADOs) are responsible for testing and education. WADA accredited laboratories worldwide carry out the biological analyses of doping tests. Finally, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is an international quasi-judicial body which settles disputes related to sport, including doping cases, through arbitration or mediation (WADA, 2009).

This brief organizational chart maps ‘best practice’ as defined by the WADC but, in terms of actual practice, the picture is blurred by considerable non-compliance and shallow compliance (Houlihan, 2014; Houlihan, Hanstad, Loland, & Waddington, 2019). Nevertheless,

the chart gives an indication of the organizational complexity and depth of anti-doping in sport. This dissertation is set in a geographical context where compliance is comparatively high and where policy and practice are generally supported by governments, public opinion, the media and a large majority of athletes (Critcher, 2014; Houlihan, Downward, Yamamoto, Rasciute, & Takasu, 2019; Solberg, Hanstad, & Thøring, 2010; Vangrunderbeek & Tolleneer, 2011). Moreover, my perspective as a researcher is from within what I call 'strong anti-doping cultures' of Northern Europe, and the 'redescriptive narratives' discussed in the papers are set in either a Northern European or a North American context[4]. Moreover, it is in such 'strong anti-doping cultures', I claim, that the dogmatic descriptions of doping and anti-doping are most visible.

The emergence of anti-doping and dogmatic descriptions

As Goode (2011, p. 11) observes, doping 'does not refer to a transhistorical entity or a clear-cut harmful syndrome but to a complex social and institutional construction advanced by moral entrepreneurs'. Gleaves and Llewellyn (2014) show that descriptions of doping as a moral problem emerged in the interwar era as athletes' use of performance-enhancing substances came to be seen as one among several threats against the amateur ideology of the Olympic movement. Thus, 'in the midst of fighting back against those tarnishing the spirit of amateurism', write Gleaves and Llewellyn (2014, p. 845), 'the sporting world took aim at doping'. By drawing explicitly on Olympic ideology of sport as an essentially amateur practice characterized by values of fair play and bodily purity, 'entrepreneurs' of early antidoping efforts could frame doping as a moral problem. For example, this framing informed the International Association of Athletics Federations' first anti-doping legislation of 1928 as well as the IOC's decision to prohibit doping in 1937 (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014). In 1937, IOC president Henri de Baillet-Latour stated that 'amateur sport is meant to improve the soul and the body therefore no stone must be left unturned as long as the use of doping has not been stamped out' (cited in Gleaves and Llewellyn, 2014, p. 847).

From the early 1970s, amateur ideals and regulations were steadily relaxed before formally abandoned by the IOC in the 1990s (Ritchie, 2014, 2015). However, even though the fight against professionalism eventually was lost, Ritchie (2015, p. 28) observes, 'drug use was one aspect of sport that could be controlled, or at least certain members of the IOC perceived

[4] I discuss these points at various places in the research papers and in depth in the methodological discussion in chapter 3. The cultural and geographical situatedness is a limitation of the study and the proposed understanding of anti-doping as solidarity.

it could'. Thus, moralized descriptions of doping survived the ascendancy of professionalism and, in one interpretation, would come to represent the remnants of amateurism: by committing to the fight against doping, sport organizations 'clutched at straws', so to speak, in a wider fight to preserve amateur values.

One arguable reason that anti-doping outlived amateur regulations is that the understanding of doping as a health hazard resonated with and reinforced the moralized description. In response to several incidents in the 1950s and 1960s, including the deaths of Danish cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen in the 1960s Olympic Games[5] and the British cyclist Tom Simpson in the 1967 Tour de France, concern for the effects of performance-enhancing substances on athletes' health grew stronger (Dimeo, 2008). During the 1960s, as the IOC responded to these incidents by firming up what had largely been a dormant anti-doping policy, one may say that the moralized and health-focused descriptions of doping intertwined into a hybrid, mirroring, in some ways, widespread understandings of 'deviant' drug use in society: understandings that pictured users as suffering from a health hazard whilst morally reproachable for it[6]. In this interpretation, doping in sport was seen as a different kind of drug abuse: 'morally wrong, physically dangerous, socially degenerate and legally indefensible', as the first IOC Medical Commission Chair, Arthur Porritt (1965, p. 166), wrote in 1965.

Without doubt, the convergence of moralized and health-focused descriptions of doping has been rhetorically powerful. It has informed, for example, persisting dichotomies between 'clean', 'pure' and 'natural' non-doping athletes on the one hand and 'dirty' and 'artificial' doped athletes on the other (Henne, 2009). The attachment of moral evaluations to health-related terms carrying ahistorical and essentialist connotations has played a considerable part in the development of dogmatic descriptions of doping as a moral problem. As Kreft (Kreft, 2011, p. 155) notes, 'moralization's fervour has to be rooted in a kind of argument that does not allow any refutation'. As the anti-doping campaign was successfully associated not just with the 'moral good' but with the 'healthy', 'clean', 'pure' and 'natural' athlete, refutation was at least made very difficult.

The dogmatic descriptions can be interpreted also as a response to an increase in the salience of the doping phenomenon, relating to increases in the cultural and economic

[5] Jensen's death was, and still is, widely assumed to be linked to amphetamine use. However, Møller (2005) shows that this assumption is unsupported by evidence.

[6] In 1971, as President of the United States, Richard Nixon officially declared a 'war on drugs', stating that drug use was 'public enemy number one' (Payan, 2013). Parallels, both past and present, between the war on drugs and what has sometimes been termed the 'war on doping' in sport has been discussed in several publications (Coomber, 2013; Henning & Dirneo, 2018; Hoberman, 2005; Waddington & Smith, 2009)

significance of sport, in technological sophistication of doping substances and methods, and, perhaps, in the prevalence of use. By the 1980s, sport had developed into one of the most lucrative products on the international entertainment market, was increasingly commodified and, with professionalization, as were athletes (Hoberman, 2001). With growing cultural and economic significance, sport faced growing legitimacy requirements. Thus, sport organizations would immerse not just in ideological battles about how sport was to be organized but commercial struggles about how sport and athletes were to be produced as commodities. In this landscape, an important part of anti-doping discourse has been the perception that sport, in order to be perceived as legitimate, must, as Kreft (2009, p. 11) puts it, produce 'presentations that are "for real" and not just another kind of make-believe re-presentation'. In this commercialized and commodified context, doping has been understood as a threat not only to sporting ideals *per se* but to the marketability and profitability of sport taken to rest upon these ideals (Hoberman, 2001).

In the same period, Olympic sport went through what Fouché (2017) calls a 'technoscientific revolution'. With accelerating development, institutionalization and integration of sport technology and science, performance in sport gradually turned from a solely human event to a largely technoscientific one. Pertaining to this revolution, doping developed from a preparational routine under experimental athletes' sole control into a complex social phenomenon typically involving networks of scientists, physicians, administrators, and coaches (Fouché, 2017; Waddington & Møller, 2019). Furthermore, the proliferation of doping can be seen in relation to the medicalization of wider society. During the second half of the 20th century, what were once considered normal human conditions (aging, menopause, obesity, sexual dysfunction, social anxiety, and so on) were progressively understood as treatable disorders (Conrad, 2007). Pharmacological research, manufacturing and marketing snowballed, producing not just technology but a medical discourse constructing and re-constructing popular beliefs about the potential of technology for treating disorders and improving daily life. Both the technological progress and the medical discourse influenced sport: For one, with medicine's permeation of daily life, it seems probable that athletes generally grew more prone to seek out pharmacological means for recovery and performance. For another, technologies developed for medical uses were found to have significant performance-enhancing effects relevant to sport (Hoberman, 1992). While at least before the 1950s, the most prevalent and debated doping substances had been stimulants such as amphetamines, the 50s and 60s saw the development and introduction to sport of anabolic

androgenic steroids (AAS) whilst, in the 80s and 90s, the use of Erythropoietin (EPO) and blood transfusions spread in endurance sports (Yesalis & Bahrke, 2002).

Thus, what I refer to as dogmatic descriptions of doping and anti-doping emerged as an outcome of what Goode (2011) calls 'moral entrepreneurship', informed by a complexity of social and cultural processes and made urgent by the fact that the phenomena of sport and doping in themselves reached new proportions. A wide variety of actors with various motives contributed to culturally frame doping as a moral problem and a fundamental threat to the spirit of sport and, correspondingly, anti-doping as a moral remedy and a crucial defense of sport against the threat of moral derogation. This process, which Kreft (2009, 2011) and Møller (2008) refers to as moralization and growing anti-doping fundamentalism respectively, materialized in the form of intensified discourse and policy from the late 1980s and 90s, as several high-profile incidents rendered visible to the public that doping was widespread in many sports.

The intensification of anti-doping policy and discourse

The Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson's positive test and disqualification from the 1988 Seoul Games introduced a cultural phenomenon that has come to dominated international sport politics and media coverage: the 'doping scandal'. The scandalization of doping cases that, in the 80s and 90s, hit sports such as athletics, cycling, cross-country skiing, swimming and weightlifting, combined moral condemnation of doped athletes with calls for sport organizations to act. In particular, the 'Festina affair' increased public and political pressure on the IOC to re-address the doping issue. Expectations of national governments, media and public opinion dictated a substantial firming up of anti-doping policy (Hanstad, Smith, & Waddington, 2008). As an unplanned outcome following IOCs largely unsuccessful attempt to take control of a policy reform process, WADA was established in 1999 (Hanstad et al., 2008). With the creation of WADA, the effectuation of the first WADC in 2003, and the gradual development of the organizational structure mapped in the beginning of this chapter, the anti-doping movement gained political momentum.

The massive media interest in 'scandals', the singling out of individual athletes for public shaming, and the political and popular pressure that led to the establishment of WADA, exemplify the intensification of discourse (Dimeo & Møller, 2018). In terms of policy, the evolvement of doping control is perhaps the core and most telling example of the rapid intensification that would follow from the inception of WADA. Since the first compulsory

Olympic drug-testing at the 1968 Winter Olympic Games, the anti-doping movement has relied heavily on biological testing. As Waddington and Møller (2019, p. 224) note:

> the intensification of the traditional reliance on biological testing … has been the standard approach to every major sporting drugs crisis since the 1960s: each crisis has been followed by demands for more testing and, when this fails, demands for yet more tests and further intensification of the same old policy.

In accordance with the current 2015 WADC and the forthcoming 2021 revision, athletes are obliged to give a urine or a blood sample, in any place, at any time, upon request (WADA 2019c; 2019d). Samples are analyzed for the presence of substances on the Prohibited List, or other biological markers of doping that might be detectable in single tests or, after the introduction of the 'biological passport' in 2007, through variations in an athlete's steroidal or hematological profile over time. In case new detection techniques are developed in the future, WADA guidelines recommend long-term frozen storage of samples for future analysis (WADA, 2019e).

To facilitate unannounced out-of-competition testing, the 2003 WADC introduced the so-called whereabouts system. Under the WADC, all international and national sport federations were required to establish a 'registered testing pool' of elite athletes and, for all athletes in these testing pools, anti-doping organizations were required to collect information about training time and venues, training camps, travel plans, competition schedule and disabilities relevant to the testing procedure. Upon three warnings within an 18-month period for failing to provide accurate whereabouts information and/or missing tests, athletes risked suspension from sport of between 3 months and 2 years (WADA, 2003). Extended obligations on athletes in registered testing pools have followed from the code revisions in 2009 and 2015. Under the 2015 and 2021 versions of the WADC, athletes in registered testing pools are required to provide whereabouts information for each day of the forthcoming quarter, including the name and address of where they will be living, training, competing, working or conducting any other regular activity. In addition, for each day, athletes must specify a 60-minute time slot where they will be available at a specific location for testing (nevertheless, athletes can still be tested 'at any time and place' upon the request of an anti-doping organization). Three warnings for 'filling failures' or missed tests within a 12-month period can result in suspension of between 1 and 2 years (WADA, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e).

Waddington (2010, p. 257) observes that the whereabouts system 'is—at least within liberal democratic societies—an extraordinary system of surveillance and control of people who have committed no offence'. Nevertheless, even if research shows that many athletes are critical of the system (Hanstad, Skille & Thurston, 2009; Efverström, Bäckström, Ahmadi, & Hoff, 2016; Valkenburg, de Hon & Hilvoorde 2014), the whereabouts system seems generally accepted within the anti-doping movement as an unavoidable measure in the fight against doping and calls are regularly made for various quantitative and qualitative improvements[7].

Gleaves (2011) notes a parallel trend of increasingly severe sanctions. With the effectuation of the 2015 WADC, the maximum suspension from sport to be issued for first-time offences was increased from two to four years, with double suspension periods for second-time offences and lifetime suspension for third-time offences (WADA, 2019c). The ongoing Russian anti-doping crisis has highlighted the possibility of collective punishment (WADA, 2019a). Lastly, the Russian crisis, as well as the so-called Operation Aderlass erupting during the 2019 World Skiing Championships, have rendered visible an increased intention and capability in the anti-doping movement for intelligence and investigations in cooperation with national and international policing agencies (Rathborn, 2019; WADA, 2019b).

Ethical problems and inadvertent consequences

Dogmatic, moralized descriptions, as well as the intensification of policy and discourse, can be seen in relation to numerous ethical problems highlighted in the academic literature. On one hand, the introduction and later revisions of the WADC have raised ethico-legal questions regarding the operationalization and consideration in the code of, among other things, the principle of strict liability[8] (Camporesi, 2017; Geeraets, 2018), athletes' right to privacy (MacGregor, 2015; McNamee & Tarasti, 2010; Tamburrini, 2013), the scientific integrity of biological testing and the risk of punishing innocent athletes (Pielke Jr. & Boye, 2019; Pitsch, 2011), as well as the proportionality of sanctions and the possibility of double punishment (Gleaves, 2011; McNamee & Tarasti, 2010). A different category of issues concerns governance and legitimacy in WADA and signatory organizations. In this respect, researchers problematize, among other things, low athlete representation in policy and decision-making

[7] See Borry et al. (2018) for WADA's independent ethics pannel's discussion of 'geolocalization' of athletes. As the authors refer to, calls are frequently made for measures such as GPS-tracking of athletes.

[8] According to the WADC, athletes are strictly liable for any prohibited substance found in his or her bodily specimen. This means that 'an anti-doping rule violation occurs whenever a prohibited substance (or its metabolites or markers) is found in bodily specimen, whether or not the athlete intentionally or unintentionally used a prohibited substance or was negligent or otherwise at fault' (WADA, 2020b).

processes and inequalities following from considerable non-compliance and shallow compliance to the WADC globally (Efverstrom, Ahmadi, Hoff, & Backstrom, 2016; Efverström, Bäckström, Ahmadi, & Hoff, 2016; Gleaves & Christiansen, 2019; Houlihan, 2014). The concern triggering the present dissertation springs out of the totality of ethical issues. Nevertheless, a recurring interest in the four papers are issues that cannot be strictly demarcated to ethico-legal questions or legitimacy-related questions of governance, but where both causes and consequences are of a broader, cultural kind. Of main concern are the ways in which anti-doping is seen to contribute to individualization of responsibility and sporting cultures of mistrust and stigmatization.

In a recent analysis, Waddington and Møller (2019, p. 226) suggest that biological testing and whereabouts reporting are tailored to counter individual athletes' 'moral deviance': to pick out 'the occasional "bad apple" in an otherwise good barrel of fruit' rather than to dissolve 'doping networks' and address structural problems of sports, national sport systems or teams. Quote McDermott (2016, p. 44), prevailing policy and discourse place 'the individual athlete-user outside the influence of the social structures that constitute modern sports'. Arguably, this conception underpins the WADC through the crucial operationalization of the principle of strict liability. Furthermore, whereas the WADC aspires to punish not merely athletes' but accomplices' anti-doping rule violations, in practice, sanctions are generally reserved for athletes only due to the bioscientific nature of the core evidence in most cases. A similar individualization of responsibility is visible in media discourse, in which coverage of high-profile doping cases commonly wield a strong focus on the individual athlete(s) involved (McDermott, 2016; Sefiha, 2010; Wagner & Kristiansen, 2019).

Arguably, the individualization of responsibility is problematic for several reasons. For one, researchers have increasingly converged on an understanding of doping as a social process playing out and made possible in social networks, brought about under the influence of certain social structures (McDermott, 2016; Moston & Engelberg, 2017; Waddington & Møller, 2019). As such, one may ask whether the individualistic bias has precluded consideration of alternative policies better suited to prevent doping. More generally, individualistically biased anti-doping policy and discourse contribute to de-emphasizing structural issues having to do, for example, with the precariousness of sport as an occupation for the large majority of sport's labor force (Kreft, 2009, 2011). To put the point starkly, the endeavor to protect athletes from doping-related harms can, in its current form, cloud other harms that, besides adding to the doping problem, are urgent in themselves.

A different problem is the contribution of anti-doping policy and discourse to cultures of mistrust. The connection between anti-doping and mistrust is multi-dimensional. In a first dimension, one might argue that elite athletes, especially those included in registered testing pools, are treated as suspects of wrongdoing because of being elite athletes. In contrast to what is normally the case in liberal democracies regarding, for example, criminal investigations, the opportunity for anti-doping officials to undertake testing and surveillance is not conditional upon any indication of an offence. Møller (2011, p. 187) notes what he calls the 'sad paradox' that in order to protect the majority of athletes that presumably do not cheat, testing policy 'ensures that that very majority becomes subjected to systematic suspicion … on the grounds of their talent. In other words, they need do nothing to provoke suspicion; they are by definition qua elite athletes under suspicion.' In a second dimension, suspicion arises according to performance. This dimension shapes policy as, under current regulations, high-performing athletes are likely to be tested more than the average (WADA, 2019e). What is more, outstanding performances and high placings in prestigious events, at least in many sports, commonly spark public suspicion. Frequent reports of verbal and physical insults from spectators aimed at the riders of the superior Team Sky/Team Ineos[9] during the last editions of the Tour de France (Robertshaw, 2018), as well as routine 'interrogative' press conferences for the overnight leader of the same event, exemplify how winning in elite sport often comes with a sour flavor of mistrust[10].

A third dimension is the relationship between suspicion and different kinds of prejudices: including national, ethnocultural and sexist ones. Analyzing Canadian media narratives following the high-profile Ben Johnson case in 1988, Jackson and Ponic (2001, p. 56) observe a trend of biased 'silent questioning':

> The reality is that almost all Black athletes, and in particular those from Jamaica, have lived under a microscope ever since Ben Johnson tested positive in 1988. With every new, rising star, with every victory and with every new record, two questions were being asked. The first was, in effect, silent and focused on whether or not the athlete in question was using

[9] Team Ineos is the name of a British-registered professional road cycling team, operating under the name of Team Sky from 2009 to 2019.

[10] Perhaps, the Sky/Ineos example is not just about the performance dimension of suspicion. Reports of a largely French crowd bulling a British-registered team can possibly also be seen as an illustration of suspicion tracing national prejudices (Robertshaw, 2018).

> performance-enhancing drugs, 'like Big Ben did'. The second focused on which penultimate victory would erase the memory of Ben Johnson.

If sanctioned athletes are seen to represent some loosely defined groups in ways that trace deeper ethnocultural prejudices, this ought to raise concern in the Olympic movement founded, as it is, on an ideology of internationalism and humanism[11]. In terms of sexist prejudice, several authors have argued that anti-doping practice and policy might function to uphold socially constructed gender boundaries (Burke & Roberts, 1997; Davis & Delano, 1992; Sailors, Teetzel, & Weaving, 2012). A part of this picture is the risk that doping-related suspicion of women is stirred together with social fear of perceived gender boundary transgression.

Under the dogmatic description of doping as a moral problem, labels such as 'doper' or 'doping suspect' are engrained in negative characterizations of moral deviance and 'undesired differentness': an example of what Goffman (1963) calls stigma. One group of athletes are particularly exposed to stigmatization: those that are caught and sanctioned with, or confess to, anti-doping rule violations. As Dimeo and Møller (2018, p. 116) point out, 'largly overlooked in the campaign for drug-free sport [are] the often devastating consequences of a positive test and sanction … not only for the athlete, their support personnel, and their teammates, but also for families and their broader social network'. There are few studies on athletes involved in doping cases and most of these focus on athletes' experiences before testing positive or confessing. However, the few relevant studies describe social and psychological sanctions that not just accompany legal sanctions but precede them (Georgiadis & Papazoglou, 2014; Kirby, Moran, & Guerin, 2011). This has prompted researchers to view doped athletes as sufferers and call for supportive follow-up measures throughout the sanction period (Georgiadis & Papazoglou, 2014; Hauw & Bilard, 2012; Piffaretti, 2011).

Georgiadis and Papazoglou's (2014) qualitative study of five suspended Olympic medal winning athletes offer insight into the social and psychological consequences of a doping ban. One finding is that all the athletes' experienced the most severe social consequences immediately following the public announcement of the positive test. According to Georgiadis and Papazoglou (2014, p. 65), press reports about the athletes testing positive:

> reversed the previous feelings of admiration and popularity, and turned it into suspiciousness, disapproval, and even contempt. Athletes, especially during

[11] With the ongoing Russian anti-doping crisis, the existence of similar 'silent questions' surrounding Russian athletes would be an intriguing research topic, with possible lines to be drawn to East/West stereotyping of athletes' drug use in Western media narratives during the Cold War (Dimeo, 2011).

> the first days, experienced anxiety, agony, and distress about this public image change as it was really difficult for them to confront other people. They perceived the media and people around to criticize them in a harsh way.

Furthermore, the athletes listed several symptoms of mental health issues: ‘insomnia; appetite disorders; disorders of thought and memory; feelings of physical fatigue; phobias; anxiety; fear of the future; negative emotional state; low self-esteem and withdrawal from social relationships and activities’ (Georgiadis & Papazoglou, 2014, p. 68).

*

The totality of ethical problems and inadvertent consequences raise concern. In this chapter, I have attempted to show that these issues are well understood in relation to the emergence of dogmatic, moralized problem descriptions. It is against this contextual backdrop that the dissertation proceeds to develop an alternative philosophical understanding of anti-doping, well-suited to pragmatically mitigate the ethical problems and inadvertent consequences of current policy and discourse. In the following chapter, I introduce the theoretical and methodological framework of redescription, which I consider fruitful for this purpose.

3 Introducing the theoretical and methodological perspectives

I see the issues discussed in the previous chapter as distributed along a spectrum ranging from questions of what Singer (2011) calls 'practical ethics' to questions of what Rorty (2007) calls 'cultural politics'. Towards one end the spectrum are questions addressing concrete and demarcated normative challenges. Ought there be rehabilitative policies aimed at athletes suspended for anti-doping rule violations? Is the whereabouts system ethically justified? Are spectators right to boo when sprinter Justin Gatlin (twice suspended for anti-doping rule violations) wins a major, international competition? These are examples of practical-ethical questions. Towards the other end are less demarcated questions inviting more open-ended answers; questions that address normative aspects of culture, language and discourse. Is the popular distinction between 'clean' and 'dirty' athletes fruitful, or can we think of more fruitful alternatives? Is anti-doping well served by discourses of suspicion and mistrust, or could it be more fruitfully envisioned as a system based on reciprocal trust? These are questions of what Rorty calls cultural politics. As a philosophical endeavor, suggests Rorty (2007, pp. ix-x), cultural politics is to promote moral progress or 'cultural change' by contributing to a community's 'ongoing conversation about what to do with itself' through suggesting 'novelties' that alter the course of this conversation.

Against the backdrop of issues of practical-ethical as well as cultural-political significance, the dissertation aims to develop and examine the implications of a philosophical understanding of anti-doping. I am interested in a form of ethical and cultural-political pragmatism: a philosophical framework that sees it as its task to inform practice on both types of issues. Moreover, I have searched for a pragmatist framework that can come in handy on the case of anti-doping as a field where prevailing answers to practical-ethical and cultural-political questions are shaped by dogmatic and largely unchallenged descriptions. For these purposes, I have turned to the neo-pragmatism associated with Rorty and the specific methodology of redescription. Inspired by the classical pragmatism of Pierce, James and Dewey, Rorty holds that practice is primary in philosophy but, where classical pragmatism focuses on experience, neo-pragmatism is influenced by the linguistic turn and continental philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida (Rorty, 1979; Rorty, 1981; Voparil, 2010). A recurring theme in Rorty's neo-pragmatism is an anti-representationalist, historicist and pragmatic view of language, inferring that the meaning of words is a function of how they are used, rather than a function of the phenomena people intend for words to describe (Voparil, 2010). The drive to

pragmatic redescriptions built into this perspective, I claim, offers a critical edge apt for the purposes of the present dissertation.

In this chapter, I introduce and discuss my adaptation of Rorty's account of redescription for the purposes of the dissertation. Redescription can be described as a process through which Rorty's anti-representationalist ironist translates her full recognition of contingency into practice, contributes to ethical deliberation and cultural politics and, if successful, causes change. In other words, the methodology is an extension of Rorty's related ideas of anti-representationalist pragmatism and ironism, which I discuss in the following two sections. The methodology of redescription is presented in detail in the third section. Thereafter, I address a central criticism, namely the charge that redescription espouses a form of moral relativism. In the fifth section, I attend to some important theoretical and methodological differences between the fourth paper of the dissertation and the other three. Lastly, I discuss issues of reflexivity and research ethics.

Anti-representationalist pragmatism

Curtis divides Rorty's philosophical project into two subprojects. On the one hand, in a 'critical, "therapeutic" subproject', Rorty seeks to deconstruct 'traditional Philosophy ... as a discipline that seeks to identify *necessary truths*' by uncovering transcendental criteria for what counts as accurate representations of the world (Curtis 2015, p. 34). On the other hand, in a 'constructive, explicitly normative, utopian subproject', Rorty wants to describe and prescribe a political and intellectual culture that has freed itself of the dogmatic metaphor of mind, science and philosophy as 'mirrors of nature' (Curtis, 2015, p. 34). The methodology of redescription belongs to the latter subproject but builds on the former. Thus, I will begin this chapter by positioning the dissertation in relation to Rorty's critique of 'traditional Philosophy' and his alternative, anti-representationalist neo-pragmatism.

In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* Rorty (1978) surveys the historical development of what he refers to as the representationalist philosophical tradition. The central argument is that whereas this tradition has contributed significantly to the secularization of post-Enlightenment, liberal democratic societies, it may have outlived its usefulness. Rorty does not make the self-contradictory claim that representationalist philosophy misconstrues the 'real' role of philosophy or misunderstands the 'true nature' of truth-claims. Rather, he proposes two related reasons for getting out from under the mirror metaphor. The first reason is that the attempt to bridge the gap between truth-claims and 'the world out there' has proved a philosophical dead-end. In *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Rorty *(1989*, p. 5) writes that:

> Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own unaided by the describing activities of humans cannot.

To Rorty, philosophical questions of truth are not directed at the world beyond descriptive activities but concern the justifiability of descriptions. Observing a falling object, representationalists and Rortyan pragmatists alike can infer from the observation that there seems to be ‘something out there in the world' that explains the object accelerating to the ground. Both representationalists and pragmatists can make truth-claims about the event, for example along the lines of Newton’s formula for gravitational force (F=mg). The representationalist view would be that these truth-claims are valid if F=mg accurately mirrors the nature of that ‘something out there in the world’ called gravitational force. However, as long as we cannot say anything about the nature of that ‘something’ without describing it, neo-pragmatists think that there is no accessible nature beyond description to test descriptions against. Instead, Rorty would ask what we *can* say about a truth-claim and answer, pragmatically, that we can survey what uses it can be put to. Until someone transgresses the representationalist dead-end, all we can say, in the case of gravitational force, is that the truth-claims are justifiable to the degree that F=mg provides humans with a tool to get along in the world, for example by making predictions.

In the same way, thinks Rorty, the past cannot be the referent of historical truth-claims; only other descriptions, other historical truth-claims, can. Apart from its descriptive activities, the human body is not the referent of biomedical truth-claims; other biomedical truth-claims are. Ethical truth-claims do not represent, say, a special human faculty for moral reasoning but stand in relation only to other ethical and metaethical truth-claims. Ultimately, the justifiability of these claims corresponds with nothing but the purposes of history, biomedicine or ethics.

Rorty's second reason for eschewing representationalist philosophy is normative: he thinks that the mirror metaphor runs counter to the current purposes of secularized, liberal society. The problem is that in conceiving of some lines of inquiry as accurately representing the world, the metaphor, intuitively appealing as it is, lends itself to the identification of absolutist claims: ‘conversation stoppers’ that block the path of further inquiry. In contrast, Rorty wants to take seriously the idea of truth-claims as tools that help us get along in the world. From this starting point, he adopts the sociological understanding that norms for what

counts as legitimate inquiry and valid truth-claims are social and emerge from the historically and culturally contingent problem-solving purposes and activities of communities of inquirers. Contingency does not translate into arbitrariness and the relativistic argument that all forms of inquiry or all truth-claims are equally legitimate. If one attests to the importance of a purpose—predicting force, developing effective medical treatments or widening and deepening solidarity—the lines of inquiry that, at least for the time being, best helps one realize those purposes have precedence over those that fare worse.

Building on this understanding, Rorty wants to insert in the place of the mirror metaphor an openness to the idea that all inquiry is provisional. All kinds of descriptions are engrained in a thoroughgoing temporality: always open to redescription in the sense that even the 'established facts' of biology, astrophysics or history, or the strongest convictions of religion or ethics, can be replaced by alternative descriptions upon the development of better tools or the emergence of new and more legitimate problem-solving activities. The crucial question, then, is what counts as a legitimate problem-solving activity. Rorty's answer to this question can only be historically qualified, fallibilistic, and contingent. Problem-solving activities emerge in response to problems, but the legitimacy of an activity cannot follow from the nature of the problem. What is left is the normative question of which problems are most valuable to solve. As there is no non-circular argument stopping us from questioning that very question as well, non-circular, non-question begging answers are unattainable. From the historical vantage point of secularized, liberal society, Rorty suggests that a chief candidate in terms of practical ethics and cultural politics is the problem of widening and deepening descriptions and practices of solidarity. He arrives on this position through a discussion of what he calls ironism.

Ironism

Replacing the mirror metaphor with an anti-representationalist and linguistic reading of pragmatism, Rorty is in the position to promote ironism as a useful attitude to the problem-solving activities of political and moral philosophy[12]. Rorty (1989, p. xv) defines the ironist as

[12] Rorty cites Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* in support of his sociological understanding of inquiry. According to Rorty, Kuhn's account dissolves 'an epistemico-ontological hierarchy topped by the logical, objective and scientific and bottoming out in the rhetorical, subjective and unscientific' (Rorty, 1999, p. 180). Rather than re-producing this hierarchy, he argues, Kuhn lets us 'map culture on to a sociological spectrum ranging from the chaotic left, where criteria are constantly changing, to the smug right, where they are at least for the moment, fixed' (Rorty, 1999, p. 180). Thus, rather than reproducing popular hierarchies of problem-solving activities, subjects closer to the 'chaotic left', including philosophy, can simply be said to have a larger array of legitimate forms of inquiry at its disposal, at least for the time being, than subjects closer to the 'smug right'. For this reason, the experimental and fallibilistic attitude of the ironist is, at present, more at home in philosophy departments than in, say, natural science ones.

'the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires—someone sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance'. The ironist thinks that there is nothing to the self but beliefs and desires, as she has abandoned the idea of a special human faculty capable of accurately representing the world. This leaves her in an existential state of rootlessness, doubting not just her beliefs and desires but in consequence herself. As Rorty (1989, pp. 73-74) puts it, ironists are 'never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to chance, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their self'.

It should be noted that ironism is not just a different word for doubt, rootlessness or existential self-reflection, neither is it a necessary consequence of the recognition of contingency: there are non-representationalist who are not ironists (Bacon, 2005). *Facing up* to the contingency of one's most central beliefs and desires implies something more than recognizing or accepting contingency. Ironists are ironists by virtue of approaching contingency as an incitement to take responsibility for their beliefs and commitments and hence themselves: The ironist, writes Rorty (1989, p. 97), 'is trying to get out from inherited contingencies and make his own contingencies, get out from under an old vocabulary and fashion one which will be his own'. Thus, she engages in self-creation. In this project of self-creation, the ironist emerges as an incarnation of the idea running throughout Rorty's work that 'redescribing ourselves is the most important thing we do' (1978, pp. 358-359). The ironist's mode of self-creation is to redescribe her beliefs and commitments and the vocabulary in which these are phrased by 'finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking' (Rorty, 1978, p. 360). Letting herself impress by the vocabularies of fictional or non-fictional people she has encountered in books or in life, she insists at seeking out alternatives to her 'ways of speaking' and take inspiration from these alternatives in her strive to understand herself and the world in new ways.

Roberts' (1997) image of the 'sporting self'[13] provides a relevant sport philosophical example of the way that ironism can work towards and, in extension, richer and more fruitful social practices. Roberts (1997, p. 69) suggests that we 'think of a sporting practice such as cricket as nothing more than a largely coherent web of beliefs, most of which are shared by

[13] Roberts does not use the term ironism to develop his account of the sporting self and sportive self-creation. Thus, the following is a redescription of Roberts' account.

most of its practitioners'. Correspondingly, we should 'think of a developing cricketing self ... as a more or less complex web of beliefs and desires that is continually reweaving itself to accommodate new cricketing relevant beliefs and desires' (Roberts, 1997, p. 69). These beliefs, thinks Roberts, are constitutive of the practice and the practitioner: 'Any change to the collection of beliefs that constitutes the practice will reconfigure the practice and what one is, believes, and does as a rational practitioner' (Roberts, 1997, p. 70). Much of an athlete's development consists 'of progressively and, to ever more subtle levels of detail' acquiring, through perception and inference, sport-relevant beliefs (Roberts, 1997, p. 70). However, 'ironic athletes' recognize that what they perceive, and what they infer from, are contingent phenomena that could have been otherwise. What is more, they take this recognition as an incitement to fashion sporting selves that will be their own. Thus, they develop athletic capabilities not just by adapting and perfecting conventional beliefs but by experimenting 'outside the realm of existing rationality' (Roberts, 1997, p. 71). In this interpretation, high jumper Dick Fosbury and ski jumper Jan Boklöv transgressed the realm of existing rationality to redescribe conventional technique and weave the 'Fosbury flop' and the 'V-style' respectively, into their sporting selves. Accepting Roberts' Rortyan understanding of sporting progress, the stories of Fosbury and Boklöv can be interpreted as examples of the link between ironism, self-creation and cultural progress[14].

The theoretical and methodological perspectives of the present dissertation hinge on the view that ironism is useful not merely in individual projects of self-creation. Rather, I think that there is a public role for ironism that works towards cultural progress by way of redescribing political and moral beliefs. Rorty appears as somewhat ambivalent to this view. On the one hand, he admits to a problematic aspect to 'public ironism' as there seems to be nothing to hinder ironists from extending to others the doubt and urge to redescription they feel towards themselves. The notion that not just everything, but everyone, can be redescribed, thinks Rorty (1989, p. 89), can cause great humiliation in others:

> ...most people do not want to be redescribed. They want to be taken on their own terms—taken seriously just as they are and just as they talk. The ironist tells them that the language they speak is up for grabs by her and her kind.

[14] Cultural progress, in this 'sportive' understanding, stands in relation to the contingent problem-solving activity of high-performance sporting communities. The account of cultural progress as solidarity at the core of this dissertation concerns other, moral and political problem-solving activities of sporting communities. Despite the differences in terms of what counts as progress, the relationship between ironic self-creation and progress is similar for both types of problem-solving activity.

> There is something potentially cruel about that claim. For the best way to cause people long-lasting pain is to humiliate them by making the things that seemed most important to them look futile, obsolete, and powerless.

Accordingly, in one chapter of *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* ('Private irony and liberal hope'), Rorty seeks to confine ironism from overly interfering with public commitment. In this chapter, as referred to in the title, the ironist appears as ironically doubtful and self-creating in private but 'hopefully liberal' in public.

On the other hand, elsewhere in the book, the coupling of ironism to liberal values seems less as carving out a private/public split and more as constructing a solution to the problem of public ironism. In these sequences, Rorty seems to think that the ironist vocabulary needs something 'fixed' in order not to cause humiliation in others, and this something, he suggests, can be historically qualified, fallibilistic and contingent liberal values such as solidarity, tolerance, plurality and justice (1989, p. xv)[15]. Taking up on the prospect of the 'liberal ironist', commentators such as Bacon (2005, 2017), Curtis (2015) and Ramberg (2014) have argued that Rorty's abandonment of ironism was premature. Although accounts differ, the gist of their arguments is that the liberal ironist, just as she sees herself as a contingent project to be made *her*self through redescription, perceive of her public, liberal commitments as contingent, unfinished, surrounded by doubt and subjected to continuous redescription. Thus, the ironist's urge to self-creation is translated into a certain attitude to participation in public deliberation. Ramberg (2014, p. 160) characterizes this attitude in the following way:

> The characteristically ironic challenge to liberal society is not directed to its liberal values, but to our tendency to take for granted that we know what these values practically commit us to. The challenge arises from the liberal ironist's articulation, not of her doubt, but her shakenness—her experience

[15] Thus, the dissertation' theoretical and methodological approach originates in the Rortyan, political philosophical view that ironism can be set to work towards better and more fruitful redescriptions of liberal beliefs and commitments. I will take one step to avoid the impression that redescription as a philosophical methodology by necessity serves an explicitly liberal political agenda. If we take seriously the idea that the ironist commit herself to certain liberal values—anti-cruelty, solidarity, tolerance, plurality, justice, and so on—without knowing what these values practically require of her, a close association of these values with any branch of liberal political philosophy, is not immune to revision. The level of articulation at which such values can be considered at least 'provisionally immune' is, in my understanding, more basic than the level of articulation that any such association implicates. I take this to be why Rorty (1998) refers to his conception of liberalism as 'minimalist', although I think that an ironist can take this thought further and endorse the idea that future redescriptions of liberal values might transcend even minimalist articulations of liberalism. After all, it is quite commonly argued that some political philosophies that are not explicitly liberal fare better as caretakers of certain liberal values than what some philosophies that are explicitly liberal do (Fraser, 2009; Nielsen, 2012; Polanyi, 2001). An ironist is open to such possibilities.

> of not-knowing what the normative demands embedded in her own practical identity actually require of her.

An urge to reduce suffering and humiliation and increase tolerance, for example, is embedded in the liberal ironist's web-of-beliefs but ironism has her constantly on the outlook for new understandings of what it means not to be cruel or not to humiliate others, or what tolerance or justice actually entail. Ironist self-doubt gets its public expression in what Ramberg calls 'shakenness' as ironists seek to redescribe their public beliefs and commitments in better and more fruitful ways. In this endeavor, solidarity emerges as both a means and an end. As an end, solidarity figures among the commitments the ironist considers 'fallibilistically fixed' and seeks to improve. As a means, solidarity contributes to the very project of improvement. By approaching other people and other beings with a sense of interdependence, unity and common interest, one is more likely to imaginatively identify with these people and beings, and draw upon their existences, experiences or descriptions in order to arrive upon better and more fruitful descriptions of tolerance, justice, plurality or solidarity itself. The strive for improvement through solidarity, in this sense, is the impetus of redescription.

I use the terms interdependence, unity and common interest to describe solidarity. From the perspective of Rortyan ironism, a definition of solidarity can only be given in the provisional. With this in mind, Rorty (1989, p. 91) suggests that 'the ironist's sense of human solidarity is based on a sense of a common danger', namely suffering and humiliation. In other words, the strive for solidarity is intertwined with a strive to recognize, understand and counteract the various ways in which other people can suffer and be humiliated. For an ironist, of course, the sense of interdependence, unity and common interest arising from the dangers of suffering and humiliation does not follow from an accurate representation of human nature, for instance from identifying a universal capability for enduring suffering and an equally universal inclination to reduce suffering in others. To Rorty (1989, p. xvi), solidarity is not 'a fact to be recognized by clearing away "prejudice" or burrowing down to previously hidden depths [but] a goal to be achieved'. In the absence of non-question begging conversation stoppers grounding legitimate inquiry, redescription's impetus towards solidarity remains historically qualified, fallibilistic and contingent.

Redescription as cultural politics and practical ethics

Very generally, redescription can be defined as the endeavor of using new words or give new uses to old words in such ways as to facilitate new understandings of the issues addressed in all kinds of philosophical inquiry. For the purposes of the present dissertation, redescription is conceived of as a methodology that can inform both practical-ethical problems that call for political reform, as well as issues of cultural politics that hinge on more complex processes of cultural change. To introduce and discuss redescription as a methodology as such, I suggest that redescription can be seen as the ironist's methodological response to Rawls' (1971) idea of reflective equilibrium. Facing real or imagined cases of moral significance, philosophers working with the methodology of reflective equilibrium, attempt to strike a balance between 'considered judgments' or intuitions, relevant principles and underlying theoretical considerations. Working back and forth among these elements and revising them when necessary, the goal is an acceptable degree of coherence. In optimal equilibrium, coherence is such that one is uninclined to revise further because revision is likely to upset rather than consolidate equilibrium (Arras, 2007; Rawls, 1971).

Rorty (2010) discusses the relationship between redescription and reflective equilibrium in a lecture titled 'Feminism and Pragmatism'. He expresses sympathy with Rawls' general methodology but unease with the assumption it can be seen to carry 'that all the logical space necessary for moral deliberation is now available—that all important truths about right and wrong can not only be stated, but made plausible, in language already to hand' (Rorty, 2010, p. 330). Thus, redescription is envisioned partly as a supplement and partly as a corrective to the methodology of reflective equilibrium. Rorty wants to show that the strive towards coherence is a sound approach to the epistemic justification of moral beliefs, but that this approach can only work if all the factors one seeks to make coherent, as well as the questions one asks and the phenomena about which one asks them, are subjected to continuous redescription. If reflective equilibrium is conceived of not as a sole goal of inquiry but as a means to a different goal—solidarity—this correction seems vital. In this interpretation, the point of inquiry is not to achieve satisfying coherence but to move the conversation from one previously satisfying coherence towards a new coherence, yet more satisfying because encompassing widened and deepened descriptions and practices of solidarity.

Thus, Rorty installs a picture of ethical inquiry with redescription at the center, making possible advances towards solidarity that could not have been realized by piecing together already available descriptions. For the purposes of the present dissertation, redescription as practical ethics and cultural politics recognizes that all elements of RE—the phenomena and

people in question, considered judgments or intuitions, relevant principles and underlying theoretical considerations, etc.—are contingent and hide potentially more useful alternatives yet to be formulated or to catch one's attention.

The principal redescriptions in the four papers of this dissertation operate at three levels: I aspire to redescribe relevant theoretical considerations and ethical principles (such as the principle of 'fair play'), social phenomena (such as doping and anti-doping policy and discourse), as well as generalized groups of people (such as elite athletes or 'intentionally doping athletes') In the following, I use Rorty's own examples to illustrate how the methodology of redescription can be set to work at these three levels.

Firstly, extensive innovative publication in political and moral philosophy serves testimony to the claim that principles and underlying theoretical considerations are contingent and open to continuous refinement. As I argue above, a common thread in Rorty's writings is a thoroughgoing attempt at redescribing philosophy in anti-representationalist, pragmatist terms. In this endeavor, Rorty wants to endorse the Enlightenment project's political, liberal aspect while rejecting its theoretical underpinnings in representationalist notions of truth. Leaving behind the dead-end, representationalist questions, the hope is to commend a culture that allows intellectuals to invest their theoretical efforts in liberal, cultural politics: in making the world a better, more humane and tolerant place. The essay 'Justice as a larger loyalty' approximates a concrete case study of this redescription. Here, Rorty (1997, p. 16) shifts focus away from the notion of principles of justice as representations of 'a universally distributed human faculty called practical reason'. In its place, he invokes the historicist notion of justice as a larger loyalty: a set of abstract principles designed to create enough overlap between different interests for reciprocal loyalty to flourish within expansively larger and increasingly multifaceted communities. When principles of justice are invoked in the process towards reflective equilibrium, this redescription matters for the very same reason that Rorty wants to abandon representationalism's mirror metaphor: Coherences resting on principles of reason are more likely to pose as conversation-stoppers and less likely to give space for new, yet more satisfying coherences, than are principles grounded on the strive to enlarge 'the circle of beings who count as "us"'. Drawing on Rorty's conception of justice as a larger loyalty, the second paper of this dissertation aims to redescribe the principle of fair play underpinning sport organizations' principle and policy of anti-doping. A different 'theoretical redescription' is the account of anti-doping ironism, developed in paper 1.

Second, in 'Feminism and Pragmatism', Rorty (2010) conceives of feminist philosophy and social movements as a paramount example of the ethical significance of redescription of

social phenomena. In response to Rorty's paper, Fraser (1991, p. 236) provides concrete examples of 'many of the most important feminist redescriptions...: "sexism", "sexual harassment", "marital rape", "date rape", "the double shift"'. As Fraser (1991, p. 236) points out, the historical use of these new words or phrases vividly exemplifies 'how renaming things facilitates new moral assessments of them'. Some redescriptions articulate a previously unarticulated unease about a phenomenon; others, perhaps, produce and articulate unease and harm previously not catching the attention of even the most empathic among observers.

Lastly, in the essay 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality', Rorty (1993) explores the moral potential of redescribing generalized groups of people. The essay cites a journalistic report from the Bosnian War observing that '"To the Serbs, the Muslims are no longer human" … Serbian murderers or rapists do not think of themselves as violating human rights ... because they are not doing these things to fellow human beings, but to *Muslims*' (Rorty, 1993, p. 112). To convince such perpetrators of their wrongdoing, thinks Rorty, it would not be enough to contrast their case judgments with relevant principles, for example those carved out in the Helsinki Declaration of Human Rights or their theoretical underpinnings. If the perpetrators' descriptions do not allow certain people human rights or moral agency, what is needed to move from a coherence satisfying to the perpetrators to a new coherence much more satisfying from the perspective of solidarity, is redescription. Abolitionism and feminism provide paramount examples of how the use of new words or old words in new ways can help to dissolve arbitrary distinctions between 'true humanity' and 'pseudo-humanity', create new moral identities, and advance answers to practical-ethical and cultural-political questions.

To be clear, these examples of redescriptions at the two latter levels are historically groundbreaking redescriptions, contributing and potentially contributing to large advances in liberal societies. More generally, redescription at these levels should be understood broadly as a matter of envisaging all kinds of smaller and larger unrealized possibilities, ranging from the radical to the mundane, in the meaning of social phenomena or in one's descriptions of who oneself and others can be. The four papers in this dissertation promote several redescriptions of, among other things, doping, anti-doping, elite athletes, and athletes involved in doping cases. If these redescriptions are convincing, I argue, they have the potential to shift practical-ethical deliberation and cultural-political conversation towards new and more satisfying coherences on questions pertaining to anti-doping policy and discourse.

CHAPTER 3

Redescriptive narratives

The methodology of redescription draws heavily on narrative sources. Rorty (1989, xvi) believes that solidarity as a means and an end is particularly well-served by narratives that provide 'details about kinds of suffering being endured by people to which we had previously not attended' and, thus, foster our 'imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers'. To Rorty, stories carry the potential to trigger imaginative identification in readers, which is seen as contributive to the process of redescription. Despite an apparent bias in Rorty towards the stories of acknowledged great novelists perceived as particularly capable of sparking readers' sensibilities, he does not advocate a set of criteria designed to distinguish useful sources from less useful ones for redescriptive purposes. Whereas he might be criticized for tacitly applying historically and culturally contingent criteria for what counts as 'great novels' (e.g. Nelson 2001), what he advocates is a functionalistic reading where interpretation, driven by the redescriptive reading purpose—that is, the overarching impetus towards solidarity—is key. Thus, independent of literary or other qualities of a narrative, interpreting for redescriptive purposes means searching for ways in which the people acting or acted upon in a story endure suffering and humiliation, and trying to make sense of these experiences within their narrative context.

The four papers in this dissertation are informed by a variety of what I interpret as 'redescriptive narratives' presented in social research, journalistic material, sport broadcasts, athletes' affidavits and investigation reports, and in 'confessional doping autobiography'. I use the term 'redescriptive narratives' to designate narratives that inform redescription by way of overtly or covertly suggesting new words or new uses of old words and embedding these words in narrative detail about the lives and experience of fictional or non-fictional people. I have sought narratives that position themselves against the dogmatic descriptions of anti-doping discourse. In this respect, redescriptive narratives can be understood along the lines of what Nelson (2001, p. 6) calls 'counterstories'—stories that can be set to work 'against a number of *master narratives*: the stories found lying about in our culture that serve as summaries of socially shared understandings'. Thus, when I, in the third paper, draw on images from live TV broadcasting to let Justin Gatlin and Usain Bolt tell the story of the former as victim and redeemed, the interpretation is positioned against popular narratives of Gatlin—and other sanctioned dopers like him—as unwanted villains. 'As repositories of common norms,' Nelson (2001, p. 6) proceeds, 'master narratives exercise a certain authority over our moral imaginations and play a role in informing our moral intuitions' and, in this sense, we use them 'not only to make sense of our experience … but to justify what we do'. Counterstories, or in

my terminology redescriptive narratives, are purported to mitigate the authority of prevailing descriptions, enlarge the space of moral imagination and alter moral intuitions.

Redescription and justification

As a methodology of ethical inquiry, redescription works towards the justification of beliefs but stops short of *concluding* inquiry in a strong sense of the word. From a Rortyan an ironist perspective, ethical inquiry can only be a continuous process towards justified belief. As Curtis (2015, p. 35) notes, a recurring point of Rorty is that 'we should not conceive of inquiry or philosophy as having final ends or certain answers as goals'. Rather, Rorty (1989, p. 9) conceives of his philosophical methodology as following:

> [This] "method" of philosophy is the same as the "method" of utopian politics or revolutionary science (as opposed to parliamentary politics, or normal science). The method is to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways. … This sort of philosophy does not work piece by piece, analyzing concept after concept, or testing dissertation after dissertation. Rather, it works holistically and pragmatically. It says things like "try thinking of it this way" …

Neither do the papers of the present dissertation work piece by piece, analysing concept after concept or argument after argument in order to offer certain, unambiguous answers to practical-ethical and cultural-political questions. For instance, readers concerned with whether specific anti-doping policies such as the whereabouts system are ethically justified, will not find conclusive yes or no answers herein. Taking seriously the idea of justificatory claims as provisional moments in a continuous process, the contribution of redescription is to indicate the direction of this process.

To deliver on this purpose, redescription works according to three aims. The first aim is to tilt the process of justification towards widened and deepened descriptions and practices of solidarity. The second aim is to appeal to coherence and the notion that deliberation on practical-ethical and cultural-political questions is a matter of closing in on a reflective equilibrium. Prompting questions such as 'what happens to this belief or this commitment, if I take these redescriptions seriously?', the hope is to convey the value of searching for coherence in a dynamic world of continuous redescription. Thirdly, the core aim of redescription is to show that the two first aims converge. This claim is twofold. On the one hand, a given degree of coherence is seen as more satisfying if accounting for a wide rather than a small selection of

descriptions and redescriptions. Justification is a process towards coherence within a constantly evolving space of moral possibility. Without a solidarity-driven strive for continuous redescription, coherence risks resting on prejudice, ignorance and negligence. On the other hand, solidarity-driven redescription cannot produce the satisfaction of justification if not accompanied by the continuous attempt to weave and reweave redescriptions into a coherent web-of-beliefs. If not for other descriptions, there is nothing to test new ones against, no reference for their usefulness, no phenomena 'out there in the world' to let us distinguish, for example, between a description that widens solidarity and one that constrains it.

Reflective ethnocentrism

Rorty's account of ironism and redescription has been criticized for conveying, in some critics' eyes, a relativistic conception of the justification of moral beliefs (see, for example, Elshtain, 2003; Moody-Adams, 1994). Typically, these criticisms express concern that there is nothing in the redescriptive approach to ensure it from sliding into relativism and espouse a naïve apologism. In particular, Rorty's (1989, p. 7) claim that 'Anything can be made to look good or bad, important or unimportant, useful or useless, by being redescribed', has raised much controversy along these lines. If this claim is taken to mean that *anything* (e.g. holocaust, fascism, murder) can be redescribed so that it 'looks good' to *anyone*, redescription loses legitimacy as a methodology: surely, it fails to serve the problem-solving purpose it pretends to serve. Moreover, in this interpretation, redescription would require a possibility for empathetic redescriptions that is not just empirically questionable but, as Frazer (2006, p. 464) puts it, 'psychologically absurd'.

Rorty's response to this line of criticism is to stress the addendum that anything can be redescribed so that it looks good *to someone*. At the core of his philosophy is sensitivity to the notion that even the most horrible acts, ideologies or practices might have 'looked good' in the eyes of those who performed them or to others under the influence of similar vocabularies. Rorty (1992, p. 220) explains:

> Saying, as I do, that you can make anything look good (not, obviously, to … me—but certainly to yourself and a few select fellow spirits) is just to seize upon the grain of truth in Socrates' claim that nobody knowingly does evil. Everybody (usually just before doing evil, but if not, then shortly afterward) tries to whip up a story according to which he or she did the right thing, and usually succeeds.

Redescription in such cases asks that one familiarizes oneself with stories people 'whip up', remaining open to the idea that there might be forms of suffering and humiliation involved in their position that can inform alternative understandings of their actions. However, it does not ask that all such stories are taken at face value.

In this way, redescription is anchored to the vantage point of liberal ironism: not unchecked but driven by the impetus towards solidarity and guided by the strive towards coherence. Thus, the response to the charge of relativism is to embrace the sort of ethnocentrism involved in the position of the liberal ironist[16]. In the following, I aspire to show that this ethnocentric vantage point can be defended in theory but, nevertheless renders visible a limitation of the dissertation. I will offer the theoretical defence first, and then consider the limitation. The ethnocentrism involved in the methodology of redescription is defensible for two reasons: because it is self-widening and self-deepening, and because, in Morgan's (1994, 1998) terminology, it is reflective rather than vulgar. Considering the first point, redescription envisions a 'we' that seeks to expand itself not by inviting evermore people into a circle defined by answers to questions such as 'what is ours?', 'what do we believe in?' and 'what does it take to count as one of us'. Rather, by virtue of fallibilism and ironic urge to redescription, it seeks to expand that circle by encompassing new and different answers to those questions. Redescription as I use it in this dissertation seeks to follow up on Voparil's (2011, p. 115) point that 'rather than merely assimilating ["others"] to "our" conversation, Rorty's philosophy should be read as demanding that "we" start joining the conversation of others'.

The second move is to anchor redescription to an ethnocentric vantage point that is reflective rather than vulgar along the lines of Morgan's (1994, 1998) distinction. I discuss this point in more detail in the second paper. In short, following Morgan (1998, p. 83), vulgar ethnocentrism rests uncritically on 'whatever happen to be the prevailing conventions of a culture at any given time'. Reflective ethnocentrism, on the other hand, embodies the critical notion that some prevailing beliefs and desires are worse than others. In order to substantiate this notion, a reflective ethnocentrist 'stands back from particular social relations of dominance and authority, and from the dominant set of beliefs of his culture' and appeal to 'the deep, reflectively secured, critical norms of a culture ... that form a background repository of beliefs

[16] A different response of Rorty to the charge of relativism belongs to the therapeutic subproject and reads that if the mirror metaphor is successfully replaced by pragmatist metaphors of tools, relativism turns into a platitude as people are brought to accept that all truth-claims are relative to some community of inquirers and some purpose. The distinction between claims that are relative to an audience and claims that are absolute or universal would be replaced by a sociological distinction between claims that are justified to a legitimate community of inquirers and claims that are either not justified or justified only to an illegitimate community of inquirers—illegitimate because of not successfully serving the purposes they claim to serve.

that can be tapped to criticize its dominant beliefs' (Morgan, 1994, p. 190)[17]. The anchoring of redescription to an ethnocentric, reflectively secured commitment to expand solidarity provides this critical, reflective edge. Furthermore, on a vulgar reading, incoherent beliefs present no problems for an ethnocentrist as long as these beliefs happen to prevail in one's culture. Accordingly, redescriptions do not have to be reweaved into a coherent web-of-beliefs but merely enter an unhampered competition for popular appeal. In contrast, inquiry from a reflectively ethnocentric vantage point endeavors to discover and eliminate incoherencies. Thus, on the reflective reading, the methodology of redescription is crucially concerned with questions of how new words and new uses of old words challenge old coherences, create new incoherencies and expose old ones. It does so under the conviction that the re-weaving of webs-of-belief in the light of solidarity-driven redescriptions results in coherences that are reflectively securer than previous coherences.

If set at a self-widening and self-deepening reflectively ethnocentric vantage point, there is a clear incentive for the methodology of redescription to draw on as wide a set of voices as possible. A clear limitation of the present dissertation is that it can merely be considered a first step out of many that would need to be taken in order to deliver on this promise in the case of anti-doping in Olympic sport. In several ways, there is a regrettable homogeneity to the source material of the dissertation. Most of the authors and actors of all the redescriptive narratives I draw directly upon, are Northern European or North-American. Most are men, most are white, most are or have been professional athletes. To my knowledge[18], none are minors. As I discuss further in the conclusion of the first paper, many of the stories of athletes involved in doping cases are stories of athlete-celebrities and, perhaps, detail more than anything affluent and famous people's fall from grace.

Moreover, this list is probably not exclusive and there may be many relevant factors according to which the source material is more homogenous than what it could have been. On the one hand, I believe that the redescriptions emerging from the included perspectives make for a substantial contribution to the overall aim of the dissertation. On the other hand, without doubt, a much wider range of voices and perspectives could have informed the project in expected and unexpected ways. I have two remarks about this limitation. First, a more diverse range of sources could have been pursued. Second, the homogeneity of the source material in

[17] As Morgan (1994, p. 191) points out, this 'reliance on the conceptual resources of [one's] own culture ... is a historically qualified, fallibilistic, and contingent one'. In other words, beliefs are not better or worse, to a reflective ethnocentrist, on representationalist grounds.

[18] Where I draw on social research, my knowledge of the sample is restrained to the information offered by the authors.

large reflects the availability of sources. This latter observation leads to a methodological, forward-looking point, namely that there are good reasons to explore an empirically grounded form of redescription drawing on, for example, ethnographic methods. This suggestion raises a variety of new methodological and ethical questions beyond the scope of the present discussion. Nevertheless, it seems an appealing avenue for future work in the philosophy of sport.

A note on paper 4

Before concluding this chapter with a discussion of reflexivity and research ethics, I will address the theoretical and methodological perspectives of the fourth paper specifically. The paper was published relatively early in the research process and prior to the adaption and development of redescription as a methodology of practical ethics and cultural politics. The paper is redescriptive in nature but, in one important way, it is redescriptive from a representationalist rather than an anti-representationalist starting point. This difference follows from the reliance on Paul Ricoeur's account of narrative identity. This account and Ricoeur's (1988a, 1988b, 1992) wider hermeneutics of the self imply ontological constraints of normativity on contingency. Such constraints appear most notably in the narrative configuration of self-identity, the inseparability of 'the Self' from 'the Other', and the inseparability of self-description from (normative) self-prescription. In the paper, I discuss redescriptions—of doping as a social and meaningful practice involving notions of loyalty—not merely as operating within these constraints but emerging from them. When elite athletes with a history of doping narrate such redescriptions, I suggest, they do so because their self-identities are narratively configured and can be described and prescribed only through narration. Moreover, they do so because self implies otherness so that descriptive and prescriptive narration must account not just for the first-person perspective, but the second-person perspective of self-identity. Coherence between the two perspectives of self-narration, across both a descriptive and a prescriptive dimension, appear in that paper as a criterion for the success of the redescriptions. If interpreting this criterion strictly, the very argument of the fourth paper is tied up to a non-contingent normative characteristic of self-identity.

Whereas I remain sympathetic to Riccoeur's account of narrative identity and the 'small ethics' he sees as following in its wake, developing the explicitly Rortyan perspective of the three other papers has led me to believe that it in some ways is counter to the aims of the dissertation to close off some avenues of redescription as beyond constraints on contingency. This theoretical and methodological difference has implications for how I, in hindsight and

from a Rortyan perspective, look upon the argument and conclusions to the fourth paper. I address this point more in detail in the introduction to the paper in chapter 4.

Reflexivity and research ethics

Introspective reflection has been a critical part of the work with this dissertation. I have sought to be attentive to how my background, experiences and frames of reference have influenced the process from the formulation of aims to the selection and interpretation of sources through the writing of the four papers and these introductory chapters. First, reading, teaching, and doing philosophical as well as empirical research on doping, anti-doping and other topics pertaining to sport, have introduced me to certain discourses and perspectives on the field of inquiry. Second, my interest in and understandings of doping, anti-doping and sport are without doubt shaped by the fact that I have been active in organized sport for much of my life and, not least, that I have been an elite road cyclist. Furthermore, both my academic and athletic experiences are as a native Norwegian living three years in the United Kingdom and otherwise in Norway. It is safe to say that I have been—and am—situated within a what I call a strong anti-doping culture (Houlihan et al., 2019; Sandvik, Strandbu, & Loland, 2017; Solberg et al, 2010;). Whereas these experiences perhaps rightly can be thought of as having broadened and enrichened my interpretative lenses and understanding of the field, one can also argue that academic experiences and insider status may block off interpretations and understandings that could result from a 'view-from-nowhere' or, more precisely, a 'view-from-elsewhere' (Feezell, 2001; Morgan, 2003).

A similar point can be made in terms of intersubjective reflexivity. Being part of different communities of inquirers has not just enabled but shaped the study. Participation in academic conferences, seminars and courses, peer review on the papers, frequent formal meetings and informal conversation with my supervisor, teaching and discussion with students, formal seminars and informal discussion with colleagues, and so on, are among the arenas that have allowed me to test and retest my understandings, interpretations, and redescriptions against a wider set of experiences, insights, preconceptions and perspectives than my own. On the other hand, being part of these communities might have shaped my understanding at the expense of other influences that could have resulted from interaction with members of other communities. The introspective and intersubjective points of reflexivity have created an incitement to read and listen as broadly as possible, attending not just to the academic literature or the mainstream Scandinavian and English-speaking media but testing and retesting my work against the wide variety of views and opinions on doping and anti-doping that float about in

different sporting cultures. Nevertheless, the study should be seen as anchored not merely to a reflectively ethnocentric vantage point at the theoretical level but, at a more personal level, to my frames of reference.

A further point of reflexivity considers the research ethical dilemmas arising in the research process. One dilemma regards the use of narratives about identified persons to illustrate forms of suffering and humiliation experienced by athletes who are suspended for anti-doping rule violations or confess to doping. According to the Norwegian National Research Ethics Committees (2020, p. 14), research on the public aspects of public persons, that does not rely on these persons as direct informants, is excepted from the rule of informed consent:

> Another exception is public figures, who may find that the increased attention they meet threatens their individual freedom. However, as they have voluntarily sought public attention, or have accepted positions that entail publicity, their freedom cannot be said to be threatened to the same extent as that of other persons. Public figures must expect the public aspects of their work to be the subject of research.

Nevertheless, 'researchers must exercise due caution and responsibility … when individuals can be identified, directly or indirectly, either as participants or as part of communities recognisable in publications or in other dissemination of research' (Norwegian National Research Ethics Committees, 2020, p. 13). In identifying and describing someone, as I do, as a 'victim', a 'tragic hero', or as someone who has told stories that exemplify a need for rehabilitative policies, there is a danger that I victimize persons that do not view themselves as victims. To repeat Rorty's (1989, p. 89) point, 'most people do not want to be redescribed. They want to be taken on their own terms—taken seriously just as they are and just as they talk'. Moreover, as I suggest that some of these athletes exemplify suffering not just at the hands of policy but public discourse, I run the risk of adding to the burden by contributing to that discourse. I have approached this dilemma by ensuring that my interpretation of narratives involving identified persons are as close to their own accounts as they have presented them themselves through the media or in autobiographies. I have aspired, in other words, to take the athletes at their own terms. As Voparil (2011) argues, the point of redescription and cultural politics should not be to speak for others but to join the conversation of others. This consideration has guided my work with the narratives of identified athletes.

A different research ethical consideration follows from the choice of a theoretical and methodological framework that conceives of inquiry as not having final ends or certain answers as goals. An aspiration of the study has been to make a contribution of value not just to sport philosophy but to practitioners working with anti-doping in Olympic sport. Remaining loyal to this aspiration, I admit that there would be several benefits to adopting a traditional approach of practical ethics that raises concrete questions and aspires to offer clear answers with—if persuasive—immediate practical application. Nevertheless, I remain confident that the fallibilistic, explorative and provisional attitude conveyed by the methodology of redescription is just the kind of attitude to normative questions that would help practitioners come up with better solutions to the practical problems of anti-doping.

4 Introducing the papers and general discussion

Four individual papers make up the general discussion of the dissertation. Together, the papers work towards the aim of developing and examining the implications of a philosophical understanding of anti-doping based on the methodology of redescription. In the following, I summarize the main argument of each paper, highlight the contribution to the understanding of anti-doping as solidarity and draw attention to limitations and unresolved problems.

Paper 1: 'Anti-doping ironism'

The first paper develops 'anti-doping ironism' in contrast to 'anti-doping fundamentalism' as a philosophical understanding of individual anti-doping commitment. Anti-doping ironism is a redescription of Rorty's account of liberal ironism and shares with Rorty's ironist the liberal aspiration to widen and deepen solidarity. The anti-doping ironist is sensitive to ways in which doping may cause unnecessary suffering in athletes and commits herself to the ban because she considers it more accommodative of liberal values such as solidarity, tolerance, plurality, and justice, than any alternative policy. However, she carries this commitment to anti-doping with the ironist's characteristic doubt and urge to redescription. To improve her commitment and make it her own, she seeks imaginative acquaintance with athletes in as many situations as possible through the use of narratives.

To develop and examine the implications of anti-doping ironism, the paper explores an ironic reading of narratives detailing the experiences of two athletes caught and sanctioned for anti-doping rule violations. Reading the 'confessional doping autobiographies' of road cyclists Michael Rasmussen (Rasmussen & Wivel, 2013) and Tyler Hamilton (Hamilton & Coyle, 2012) ironically, in the Rortyan sense, is seen to cultivate two particular expressions of what Connolly (1995, p. 69) calls 'ethical responsiveness to difference'. First, the reading substantiates the ironist's awareness that what has been made to look 'bad' for her might have been made to look 'good' for others. Second, the stories alert the ironist to details of suffering. In Rasmussen's asceticism or Hamilton's sense of social exclusion within a team that distinguishes between 'insider dopers' and 'outsider non-dopers', an ironic reading emphasizes problematic aspects of the working conditions and social structures of professional road cycling. In both athletes' accounts of deep distress upon the public announcement of their anti-doping rule violations, the ironist notices the problems of stigmatization, individualization of responsibility, and lack of formalized support systems for athletes caught breaking the rules.

Through reading such stories, the ironist can redescribe her anti-doping commitments in ways she considers more compassionate, more tolerant of intentionally doping athletes as persons, and more aware of sport organizations' responsibilities to athletes—including those who dope or have done so in the past.

The paper discusses two reservations and one unresolved problem with the account of anti-doping ironism. The first reservation is that narratives invite various interpretations. Confessional doping autobiographies, for example, can probably be interpreted from a fundamentalist perspective to affirm adamant dogmatism. Thus, ironism is not an argument for the uncritical use of narratives in something akin to moral education. Rather, the ironist seeks persuasion through redescription, describing and redescribing not just her ironic interpretations but her ironic reading purposes in the hope that, eventually, others will find them compelling. A different reservation points back to the general methodological limitation discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. Imaginative acquaintance with athletes such as Rasmussen and Hamilton—both Western, male, white, successful athletes and celebrities—contributes to, but is not enough for, a full-fledged realization of anti-doping ironism. The shortage of stories about athletes sharing none or merely a few of these characteristics is a limitation for anti-doping ironism.

Finally, the paper addresses a certain vulnerability in anti-doping ironism. The ironist's commitment to anti-doping is shaped by the fact that she endorses liberal values first and anti-doping second. The problem is not that someone might come up with an alternative to the ban on doping that is more fruitful to the realization of these values. For an anti-doping ironist, this event would be nothing but welcome. The problem is that, on the current description, there is seemingly nothing to stop the ironist from shifting her focus to anti-doping or sport in general to other issues and other practices that might seem more acute from her liberal vantage point. Thus, there is a risk that her anti-doping commitment will be weakened upon the discovery of other commitments. The conciliation of ironism with a reasonably lasting, strong commitment to increase solidarity *in sport*, still needs fleshing out.

Paper 2: 'Fair play as a larger loyalty: the case of anti-doping'

Where paper 1 develops a model for individual anti-doping advocacy, paper 2 explores a philosophical basis for sporting communities' development and critical scrutiny of anti-doping policy and rhetoric. Drawing on Rorty's (2007) paper 'Justice as a larger loyalty', I ask what would happen if sporting communities started treating 'fair play' as the name of a larger loyalty that expands beyond teams or training groups to competitors and sports as wholes. Focusing

on intentional doping as a principal case of 'foul play' (Loland, 2002), I rephrase athletes' doping dilemma as conflicts between smaller loyalties—to the kinds of groups that unite in a common quest for performance—and larger loyalties—to communities such as 'professional road cycling' or 'the Olympic movement'. Principles of fair play, in this conception, are rules and norms—such as the ban on doping—that the latter, larger communities construct to secure collaboration and strengthen the sense of unity and common interest across smaller loyalties with potentially conflicting goals and purposes. In practice, fair play is the name of the kind of situation where *domestiques*'[19] loyalties towards their cycling teams and team leaders are expanded to opponents or to the sport as a whole, to the extent that they refrain from doping even when knowing that doping would be likely to benefit the team and the team leader.

The loyalty redescription of fair play is positioned against a traditional, Kantian understanding of fair and foul play as grounded in reason and sentiment respectively. By viewing fair and foul play as two expressions of the same sentiment—loyalty—the redescription rejects any appeal to reason as explanation for why athletes play, or 'ought' to play, foul or fair. Dissolving the reason/sentiment distinction, the paper can evoke a narrative conception of athletes' choices between, for example, following the rules or breaking the rules. Loyalty is configured in athletes' identification with the collective narratives of groups that they consider themselves as members of—compelling narratives that they draw on to give meaning and normative direction to their lives as athletes. In this sense, cases of conflicting loyalties, such as the doping dilemma, are narratively configured. *Domestiques* play fair because they are not just, say, Euskaltel-Euskadi[20] riders but members of the professional road cycling community, identifying not just with the narratives of Euskaltel-Euskadi or of Basque cycling but with those of professional road cycling or, wider yet: cycling.

Furthermore, the loyalty redescription of fair play aspires to alter sport organizations' self-understanding in doping-related questions. If the redescription would gain currency, organizations such as the IOC or WADA would not see themselves as guardians of a reasonable way of doing sport, but coordinating bodies of larger groups, seeking through policy and rhetoric to construct compelling narratives that strengthen the sense of unity, common interest, interdependence and reciprocal trust among its members. Anti-doping policy and rhetoric would be developed and critically scrutinized as components of such narratives.

[19] '*Domestique*' is French for a rider tasked with helping the team leader(s) in road cycling races.

[20] Euskaltel-Euskadi was the name of a men's professional road cycling team based in the Basque Country and partly funded by the Basque Government, running from 1994 through 2013.

From this perspective, the paper suggests two aspects of current anti-doping policy and rhetoric, as candidates for critical scrutiny. First, I argue that surveillance-based policies such as biological testing and the 'whereabouts' system are at odds with an understanding of athletes' loyalty as fostered through compelling narratives, inserting in its place the possibly self-contradictory understanding of loyalty as forced. Whereas the question of what precisely could be acceptable forms and levels of surveillance within a compelling narrative remain unexplored, I conclude that the picture of fair play as a larger loyalty, at the very least, supports arguments for the downscaling of current surveillance-based policy. Second, the redescription converge with a sociological understanding of doping as playing out in social networks, made possible by the social structures of sport. In this understanding, doping networks can be conceptualized as smaller loyalties constructing attractive narratives in opposition to larger loyalties' narratives of fair play.

This conception problematizes the individualistic orientation of current policy and informs fresh thinking about policy in two directions: one concerned with measures designed to make the narratives of social doping networks less compelling; and one with measures designed to make the narratives of larger sporting communities more compelling. Using the example of professional road cycling, the paper elaborates on the policy proposals of Aubel and Ohl (2014) as examples cutting in both directions. These proposals—designed 'to challenge the precariousness of the riders' careers and also that of teams' (Aubel & Ohl, 2014, p. 1101)—points to a shift in focus away from specific anti-doping measures of control towards wider social policy aimed at improving the security, health and working conditions of athletes.

Paper 3: 'Sport, stories, and morality: a Rortyan approach to doping ethics'

The third paper explores the role of what I call 'redescriptive sport narratives' in moral thinking about sport, doping and anti-doping. The paper takes elite sport's 'story-friendliness' (Kretchmar, 2017, p. 56) as a cue to suggest a turn in sport ethics towards narratives. More explicitly than for the other three papers, thus, I position this paper as a study in narrative ethics, understood as a multifaceted tradition uniting around the idea that stories are core to ethical inquiry and matter, morally, beyond their widely recognized usefulness as detailed case descriptions (Nelson, 2001). In line with the dissertation's overall methodological framework, I rely on Rorty's narrativism, conceptualizing stories as a potentially rich source to fruitful redescriptions. I examine whether, and if so how, the redescriptive purpose of increased solidarity can be served by doping-related stories, playing out in elite sport, narrated through

the media and enacted by celebrity-athletes. Towards this aim, I discuss two distinctively different cases of redescriptive sport narratives.

The story of Justin Gatlin exemplifies the potential of elite sport for staging embodied, non-verbal narratives set in a competition setting and broadcasted to large audiences with the sense of urgency associated with 'live' sport. The story plays out in the immediate aftermath of Gatlin's gold medal-winning run in the 100-meter dash at the 2017 World Athletics Championship, as large sections of the crowd inside London Stadium started booing. I suggest that the booing formed part of a powerful historical narrative communicating the dogmatic descriptions of doping as a moral problem and doping athletes as 'villains'. Against this picture, the paper offers an interpretation in which Gatlin and crowd favorite Usain Bolt played lead roles in an embodied redescriptive narrative, recasting Gatlin as a victim of misplaced or exaggerated condemnation, and as 'redeemed': re-recognized as a welcome member of the athletics community. I consider the Gatlin story not merely as fostering a redescription of Gatlin's public persona. More generally, the paper explores the story's potential for broadening sport communities' generalized descriptions of athletes sanctioned for anti-doping rule violations. The paper's interpretation of the Gatlin story proposes that at some point after serving a suspension, it makes sense for an athlete to be reconsidered as 'one of "us"'.

The story of Therese Johaug is seen to exemplify the potential of elite sport to capture the attention of a public over time and stage detailed public narratives about athlete-celebrities. Playing out to the Norwegian public over nearly a year, from the announcement of a successful skier and 'popular sporting hero's' positive test through the announcement of the final CAS verdict, the Johaug story was brought forward by traditional news coverage, live sport broadcasting, interviews, and documentary style reality television. The paper offers an interpretation of this media story that recasts Johaug as a 'tragic sporting hero', victim to a personal tragedy playing out in public. Two aspects of the story facilitated this redescription: first, a strong emphasis on Johaug's personal reactions and emotional distress; and, second, a thoroughgoing, unresolved tension in descriptions of the anti-doping rule violation *per se*, between striking negligence and understandable trust in medical advice or, in other words, between harm brought upon oneself and harm occurring through no fault of one's own. Together, I argue, these aspects enabled the recasting of Johaug as a characteristically relatable and ambiguously tragic hero: good, yet imperfect; unlucky, yet reproachable. As with Gatlin's case, the recasting of Johaug's public persona is seen as carrying a potential for generalization, broadening the Norwegian sporting community's descriptions of athletes who test positive and

are sanctioned for anti-doping rule violations. The Johaug story conveys the idea that some of these athletes remain 'one of "us"' throughout the process.

The paper concludes with a methodological discussion where I stress that the interpretations of the Gatlin and Johaug stories are mine. In line with the methodological discussion of redescriptive narratives in chapter 3, narratively redescribing 'doped athletes' through the stories of Gatlin and Johaug does not, in and of itself, produce new answers to old questions about the ethics and cultural politics of doping and anti-doping. Rather, the point is that by offering redescriptive narratives, throwing them into a community's conversation and coupling them with philosophy's strive for coherence, new questions arise whereas deliberation on old questions thrive on new insights, new considerations and new perspectives. By prompting new questions about sport organizations' responsibilities to athletes who have broken rules, and by enrichening deliberation on old questions about stigmatization or the principle of strict liability, narrative redescription is but a first step towards moral progress.

Paper 4: 'The confession dilemma: doping, lying, and narrative identity'

The fourth paper questions the commonly held view in strong anti-doping cultures that former elite athletes, who doped during their careers, are morally obliged to publicly confess. I take departure in Sissila Bok's (1989, 1999) utilitarian model for evaluating the moral status of a lie or a secret. Bok anchors a calculus of harms and benefits to an initial principle of veracity: that is, a presumption in favor of confessing. The paper's ambition is not to map all possible harms and benefits but to inform a utilitarian calculus by showing that elite athletes' doping lies and secrets belong to a special group of lying and secrecy that gives rise to a special kind of consequences. These are lies and secrets about actions and experiences that take up a central place in a person's 'life story'. In a narrative approach to personal identity associated with Ricoeur (1988b, 1991, 1992), concealing core actions or experiences liken to concealing core aspects of who one sees oneself as. With this particularity in mind, the paper explores the consequences of confessing to and concealing doping from the perspective of a descriptive and a prescriptive understanding of narrative identity.

On the descriptive understanding, athletes, by confessing to doping, offer descriptively truthful accounts about who they are: accounts that are coherent across the first- and second-person perspectives of narrative identity ('Who am I to myself?' and 'Who am I to others?'). On a prescriptive understanding, narrative identity involves value judgments of the description—a scrutinising aspect of, 'Who should I be?' besides the descriptive, 'Who am I?'. Including the prescriptive understanding adds to the requirement of coherency: a clear sense of

who one is depends not just on coherent descriptions of core actions and experiences but on some degree of coherence—across the first- and second-person perspective of narrative identity—concerning the moral evaluation of these actions and experiences. To Ricoeur (1992, p. 172), prescriptive incoherence calls into question one's ability to pursue life with *ethical intention*: 'aiming at the 'good life' with and for others in just institutions'.

I draw on the example of professional road cyclists who doped during the so-called 'blood doping era' of the 1990s and 2000s, to show why prescriptive coherence is a difficult accomplishment in the case of doping confessions within strong anti-doping cultures. By contrasting popular moral evaluations of doping to evaluations conveyed in intentionally doping cyclists' accounts, the paper argues that by confessing to doping, athletes face a challenge of being made sense of by others as moral agents. Thus, the prescriptive understanding of narrative identity is a gateway to understand significant harms likely to result from doping confessions. Whereas these harms are largely reserved for the athlete him or herself and his or her closest ones, I argue that they are potentially so serious that they put into question the justifiability of a moral obligation to confess.

Methodologically, the paper is, in some senses, the dissertation's odd one out. Surely, the use of professional road cyclists' accounts to contrast popular understandings of doping, can be rephrased as redescription through the means of redescriptive narratives. However, rather than attempting to rejoin the Ricoeurian argument of this paper with the Rortyan perspective of the other three, I proceed to highlight a significant difference. My aim is to show that where I in the fourth paper seek to come closer to a solution to a difficult ethical dilemma, Rortyan redescription could be set to work pragmatically towards dissolving the dilemma and moving the conversation forward. The significant difference is located in how I, within the different perspectives, approach the phenomena that feed into moral deliberation. Paper 4 maintains that concealing doping belongs to a special group of lies and secrets told to cover important aspects of who a person sees him- or herself as. In other words, I premise that, at least for elite athletes, doping tells something important about a person and unavoidably marks his or her narrative identity. This assumption springs partly from the Ricoeurian ontological constraints on the normativity of the self, discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation, and partly from empirical observations of dogmatic descriptions of doping within strong anti-doping cultures. This premise is decisive for the discussion of harms and benefits within both the descriptive and prescriptive understanding of narrative identity and, as such, it is decisive for the conclusion.

A different approach would be to redescribe the premise. New words or new uses of old words could challenge the idea that doping is a particularly problematic thing to conceal from others within a narrative identity perspective. Perhaps, by redescribing doping within an ironist vocabulary, one could replace the idea that doping tells something important about who a person is as a moral agent with the idea that doping tells something about where a person has been and which vocabularies she has been influenced by. If these redescriptions were to be successful, I argue, the most severe harms associated with doping confessions would disperse.

Despite these differences, the Ricoeurian and Rortyan perspectives on the confession dilemma would not run into conflict at the level of conclusion. In some respect, as I have showed, they would differ from the outset for focusing on different questions. However, they would converge on one conclusion: namely, the importance of challenging and altering dogmatic descriptions of doping as a moral problem. Where the Ricoeurian perspective concludes by highlighting the problems of relying on athletes' confessions to do this job, the Rortyan approach would focus, perhaps, on the redescriptive potential of confessions already available.

5 Concluding discussion

Against the backdrop of numerous ethical problems with current anti-doping policy and discourse, the dissertation set out to develop and examine the implications of a philosophical understanding of anti-doping based on the methodology of redescription. In the previous chapter, I discussed the individual contributions of each paper towards this aim. In the following, I draw attention to some general contributions and broader implications of the study.

The four papers develop the cornerstones of a philosophical understanding of anti-doping as solidarity: anti-doping ironism, the conception of fair play as a larger loyalty, and narrative redescription. The account of anti-doping ironism, sketched in paper 1, places anti-doping commitment within a wider endorsement of liberal values. As, for an ironist, these values can only be described fallibilistically, with awareness of endless alternatives yet to be formulated, anti-doping is seen as part and parcel of a redescriptive endeavor in which solidarity is both a means and an end. The image of fair play as a larger loyalty, explored in paper 2, aspires to redescribe the self-understanding of sport organizations in doping-related questions. Understanding foul play as an expression of loyalty to smaller groups and fair play as an expression of loyalty to larger groups, is seen to dissolve the picture of organizations such as the IOC or WADA as guardians of a right and reasonable way of doing sport. Its replacement is a picture of these organizations as coordinating bodies of larger groups, seeking through policy and rhetoric to construct compelling narratives that strengthen the sense of unity, common interest, interdependence and reciprocal trust among its members. Anti-doping policy and rhetoric, in this picture, aims at fostering solidarity across larger sporting communities. Lastly, papers 1 and 3 and, albeit in a different terminology, paper 4, develop the dissertation's third cornerstone, namely the reliance on redescriptive narratives to continuously improve one's descriptions and practices of anti-doping. Under the overarching impetus towards solidarity, stories are used as a means to notice and imaginatively identify with possible forms of suffering and humiliation. In particular, these papers have stressed that, in the current context of strong anti-doping cultures, descriptions and practices of anti-doping can be greatly improved by taking seriously the stories told by athletes involved in doping cases.

With reference to each cornerstone, the papers examine numerous specific implications for current anti-doping policy and discourse. Anti-doping as solidarity constitutes a critique of the prevailing reliance on individualistically biased policies such as biological testing, surveillance-based policies such as the whereabouts system, as well as the lack of rehabilitative and reintegrative policies aimed at those sanctioned for ant-doping rule violations.

Furthermore, anti-doping as solidarity problematizes the use of binary rhetoric such as the distinction between 'clean' and 'dirty', 'pure' and 'impure', 'natural' and 'unnatural' or 'true' and 'fake' and recommends anti-doping policy designed to protect *all* athletes rather than only those considered 'clean'. Lastly, anti-doping as solidarity works to counteract cultures of mistrust and stigmatization.

I have stressed that rather than having certain answers or specific policy reform proposals as goals, the methodology of redescription merely inclines one to nod in the direction of political reform or cultural change. Towards concluding, I will make one further and perhaps firmer nod in the direction indicated by the dissertation, by elaborating on what I believe to have been its most significant contribution.

In different ways, ironism, the image of fair play as a larger loyalty, and the reliance on redescriptive narratives, have contributed to substitute descriptions of doping as a social issue for what I have called dogmatic descriptions of doping as a moral problem. The latter descriptions have paved the way for anti-doping conceived of as moral remedy, warranting an individualistically oriented control regime. To be clear, descriptions of doping as a moral problem are not rebutted on representationalist grounds (e.g. for not being accurate representations of what doping 'really is' as, say, a social psychological phenomenon) but sidelined for being counterproductive to the overarching purpose of widening and deepening solidarity. The dissertation has conveyed the idea that for anti-doping policy and discourse to progress according to this purpose, what is needed, at least in the current situation, are 'sociological' redescriptions that draw attention to doping as a social phenomenon, playing out in social networks, fostered and made possible by the social structures of elite sport. Such redescriptions carry the potential to alter the course of sport communities' conversations away from the present anti-doping discourse of control and punishment, mistrust and stigmatization, towards a wider discourse of cultural change in the organization of elite sport in which specific anti-doping policy is subordinated to wider social policy.

To illustrate, I return once more to the case of professional road cycling and the autobiography of American athlete Tyler Hamilton:

> Here's an interesting number: one thousand days. It's roughly the number of days between the day I became professional and the day I doped for the first time. Talking to other riders of this era and reading their stories, it seems to be a pattern: those of us who doped mostly started during our third year. First year, neo-pro, excited to be there, young pup, hopeful. Second year,

> realization. Third year, clarity—the fork in the road. Yes or no. In or out. Everybody has their thousand days; everybody has their choice.
>
> In some ways, it's depressing. But in other ways, I think it's human. One thousand mornings of waking up with hope: a thousand afternoons of being crushed. A thousand days of Paniagua[21], bumping painfully against the wall at the edge of your limits, trying to find a way past. A thousand days of getting signals that doping is okay, signals from powerful people you trust and admire, signals that say It'll be fine and Everybody's doing it. And beneath all that, the fear that if you don't find some way to ride faster, then your career is over. Willpower might be strong, but it's not infinite. (Hamilton & Coyle, 2012, pp. 33-34)

Surely, Hamilton's 'thousand days' narrative allows for various interpretations, including, perhaps, moralized ones. From the perspective of anti-doping as solidarity, what stand out are the ways in which Hamilton relates the decision to dope to various forms of suffering fostered and made possible by the social structures of professional road cycling. In this interpretation, the third-year 'fork in the road' speaks to the precariousness of professionalized and commercialized sport as a profession (Aubel and Ohl, 2014; Kreft 2009, 2011). Somewhat paradoxically, elite sport is routinely narrated as an extremely attractive career path and demands and attracts a highly organized, controlled and dedicated way of life. Yet, among the many dedicated only a small minority are offered employment and nearly none enjoy the security of long-term contracts. Understanding anti-doping as solidarity means problematizing this precariousness. Furthermore, Hamilton's 'painful bumping against the wall' speaks to the physical and mental demands of sporting practices that pride themselves on measuring 'toughness' and 'self-sacrifice', warranting a lack of clear restrictions on athletes' training and competing loads. Understanding anti-doping as solidarity means recognizing the risk that the 'sportive suffering' and self-sacrifice of training and competition is confused with other kinds of suffering and self-sacrifice jeopardizing the health and wellbeing of athletes. Lastly, the signals from 'powerful people' speak to the compelling narratives of smaller loyalties and the relative absence of larger loyalties as allies in questions of athletes' day-to-day working conditions. Understanding anti-doping as solidarity means recognizing the importance that

[21] '*Paniagua*' is Spanish for 'bread and water', however intentionally misspelled by the authors.

policy builds on a sense of unity, common interest and interdependence between athletes and sport organizations.

In this vein, anti-doping as solidarity can find its political operationalization in a shift in focus away from specific anti-doping control measures towards wider social policies designed to meet athletes' needs for security, health, wellbeing and political representation. Exploration of the precise content of such policy implications is beyond the scope of this paper and, in most questions, specific sports and specific national contexts call for specific measures. To provide some examples, further exploration of the practical implications of the dissertation could point to measures set out to increase the power and presence of athlete associations, strengthen sport organizations' employer responsibilities and improve athletes' employee rights by way of regulating, for example, minimum salaries, duration of contracts, and workload restrictions.

In this vein, further philosophical inquiry could explore the potential of solidarity-driven redescriptions to alter the course of sport communities' conversations on the social structures contextualizing doping and anti-doping. This points to a last word about the dissertation's contribution to the philosophy of sport. The present study is but a first and modest step towards the development of a philosophy of sport that aims to redescribe various aspects of sporting practice under an overarching, yet fallibilistic, impetus towards solidarity. Focusing on the case of anti-doping in Olympic sport, I have aimed to show that, conditional upon continuous redescriptive refinement, there is promise to this approach.

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PART 2

Paper 1

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Anti-doping ironism

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the potential of anti-doping ironism. It identifies anti-doping fundamentalism as a serious ethical problem producing unnecessary harms, not least for athletes accused, caught or sanctioned in connection with doping offences. Ironism is introduced as a welcome contrast to fundamentalism, encouraging the development of more compassionate and just policy and rhetoric. Building on Richard Rorty's account of liberal ironism, the anti-doping ironist is presented as a person that supplements anti-doping commitment with an idiosyncratic ethical responsiveness to people with different beliefs from hers. In line with this idiosyncrasy, she seeks to learn from the experiences of 'doped athletes' and draws on these in order to redescribe her commitments in more fruitful ways. Narratives are principal sources for the ironist. Accordingly, the paper explores two road cyclists''confessional autobiographies' as narratives that speak to the anti-doping ironist's ethical responsiveness to difference.

KEYWORDS

Doping; anti-doping; ironism; liberal ironism; Richard Rorty; narrative

Introduction

During the 2019 World Nordic Skiing Championships in Seefeld, Austria, five cross-country skiers were arrested on doping allegations. In an interview with a Swedish newspaper, a fellow skier and outspoken anti-doping advocate was asked to comment on the allegedly implicated father of one of the arrestees, himself a retired top-level skier. Outraged, the skier responded: 'I want to shoot him! He must disappear!' (*Expressen*, March 2, 2019). Several media outlets published and re-published the quote. Although some journalists and pundits expressed reservations about a literal interpretation (rightly, one would think), the remark received little or no critical attention. Rather to the contrary, the athlete's statement contribute to an optimistic framing of cross-country skiing as, despite the emerging revelations, a generally 'clean' sport with a predominance of athletes committed to anti-doping.

The remark can be seen as a symptom of the ethical problem that marks the point of departure of this paper: what Møller (2008, 18) terms the 'anti-doping fundamentalism' of the official sport world, the media and sections of the general public (Solberg, Hanstad, and Thøring 2010; Vangrunderbeek and Tolleneer 2011; Houlihan et al. 2019). Since the intensification of anti-doping policy in Olympic sport in the 1960s, morally loaded rhetoric

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has increasingly fuelled policy and discourse as well as public perceptions of doping (Jedlicka 2014; Dimeo and Møller 2018; Møller 2008). In many Western countries at least, the vast majority of the general public, media and sport organizations seem to share the assumption that doping is a serious moral problem calling for drastic action. The outcome is the support for and emergence of hard-line policy as well as a lack of policy aimed at the support and rehabilitation of sanctioned athletes. In addition, anti-doping fundamentalism is associated with moral condemnation and stigmatization of those – primarily athletes – that are exposed as the 'folk devils' of the anti-doping folklore (Critcher 2014).

Anti-doping fundamentalism is an ethical problem because it produces unnecessary harms. These harms are most overt in the case that will recur throughout this paper, of athletes that are accused, caught or sanctioned in connection with doping. Dimeo and Møller (2018, 116) note the 'largely overlooked' issue of 'the often devastating consequences a positive test and sanction can have in the short term and long term not only for the athlete, their support personnel, and their teammates, but also for their families and broader social network'. In a chapter entitled 'Social stigma and de-humanization', with sub-chapters devoted to 'Suicides' and 'Depression', the authors draw on a wide range of sources to paint an alarming picture of the social and psychological consequences of being publicly labelled as a doping cheat (Dimeo and Møller 2018, 116–132). What is probably best described as a tacit acceptance of such harms stands in contrast with cultural and political developments concerning related phenomena such as recreational drug use in society. In many Western countries at least, the issue of recreational drug has seen a shift in policy and discourse away from the rhetoric of the 'fight against drugs' towards more tolerant, compassionate and recovery-based approaches (Duke 2013).

This paper presents ironism as a welcome alternative to fundamentalism and, thus, a position that athletes, representatives of sport organizations, media and members of the general public would do well by adopting towards doping and anti-doping. This is not to say that all anti-doping advocates are fundamentalists that ought to become ironists. Rather, I see fundamentalism and ironism as located towards each end of an anti-doping spectrum. What I argue for is a considerable shift in attitude away from the former end towards the latter. The harms associated with fundamentalism and the benefits of ironism can be seen across a wide spectrum of issues relating to doping and anti-doping. To make its case, the paper focuses on the issue of athletes, and in particular professional road cyclists, that have been accused, caught or sanctioned in connection with doping (I sometimes refer to these athletes, somewhat haphazardly, as 'doped').

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I discuss Richard Rorty's account of liberal ironism. I identify two aspects of the liberal ironist's idiosyncratic responsiveness to difference as key virtues of anti-doping ironism. In the subsequent section, I explore what anti-doping ironism might entail in practice. I envision the anti-doping ironist as a person that seeks imaginative identification with doped athletes, identifies forms of suffering and humiliation in their situation and commits herself to reducing these. This section also discusses the compatibility between ironism and commitment to anti-doping in the original sense of being *anti*-doping. Towards the end of the paper, I discuss the key role that narratives can play in anti-doping ironism. I point to professional cyclists' 'confessional autobiographies' as narratives that speak to the ironist's search for imaginative acquaintance with unfamiliar others. I conclude that anti-doping ironism is a theoretically promising idea

which is, however, hampered by the lack of a wide variety of narratives detailing the experiences of a wide variety of athletes.

Liberal ironism

Rorty (1989, xv) presents the ironist as 'the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires – someone sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance'. The ironist is a person that builds her practical identity around a sense of self-doubt or 'shakenness' stemming from awareness of contingency (Ramberg 2014, 160). The irony consists in how she responds to this shakenness: as an incitement to take responsibility for herself, her beliefs, desires and ways of speaking, making inherited contingencies *her* contingencies. Her method is redescription. Thus, she seeks out a wide variety of alternatives to her *de facto* beliefs, desires and ways of speaking, and take inspiration from these in her strive to redescribe herself and the world in new, better and more fruitful ways.

Rorty's ironist is not just any ironist but a liberal ironist: a person who combines ironism with a permanent, albeit never finally articulated, commitment to liberal beliefs and desires. Rorty's claim is not that ironism disposes one by necessity to taking on liberal commitments, but that an ironic practical identity is conducive to the continuous refinement of such commitments because accommodating a certain ethical responsiveness to difference. In the following, I discuss two related aspects of this claim. First, the ironist's awareness of contingency inclines her to adopt a critical curiosity towards the social and historical contingencies that constitute her identity. As Connolly (1995, 69) puts it, by 'working patiently on specific contingencies in oneself, one may become more appreciative of the crucial role of contingency in identity and desire'. Thus, the ironist reflects curiously and critically about how she has become who she is and how she has developed her most central beliefs and desires, learning in the process to appreciate the contingencies themselves as meaningful narratives. 'And this in turn', argues Connolly (1995, 69), 'opens up new possibilities of ethical responsiveness to difference'. When one realizes that one's identity rests on meaningful narratives of social and historical contingencies, one is better equipped to see different identities as fellow contingencies resting on different narratives, similarly meaningful to the beholder as one's own are to oneself.

In the case of anti-doping, a highly relevant expression of this responsiveness to difference is the preservation of what Adams (1999, 338) calls 'the morality of conflict'. As the ironist becomes aware of the meaningful narratives surrounding unfamiliar identities, she is exposed to 'the power of redescription' (Rorty 1989, 89) and the notion that what looks bad or wrong to me can look good or right to others under the influence of other, persuasively powerful narratives. 'The possibility of virtues being manifested in the service of the wrong cause', Adams (1999) maintains, 'is crucial for the morality of conflict. Conflict is dehumanized when we lose the sense that our enemies can be admirable in opposing us, even though we think them wrong'. One way that we foster and maintain respect and tolerance for people we are in deep disagreement with is by recognizing that even though certain of their beliefs, desires and actions may be very different from ours, it is possible for those same things to appear morally right to them. For Rorty (1992, 223), the ironist's awareness of contingency can produce this attitude because it allows her to see that 'with the wrong

parents in the wrong country at the wrong time' she might have been that person she finds herself in deep disagreement with. 'Making such ironies vivid', Rorty (1992, 223) argues, 'is important for the inculcation of tolerance and sensitivity'.

Some reservations are appropriate here. First, the realization that conflicting beliefs can be held with moral conviction does not lead to the view that all beliefs that are held by someone somewhere with moral conviction are thus defensible. After all, a belief might be understandable without being morally right for that reason. Relatedly, Rorty does not speak of tolerance of beliefs in themselves, but of the people holding them. This distinction is vital. Understanding that oneself could have been in the shoes of perpetrators is not taken by Rorty to imply that one becomes more tolerant of the acts perpetrated, but of the humanness and rights of perpetrators. Second, Rorty would not universalize the inclination to imaginatively identify with enemies and maintain the morality of conflict to every person, every conflict and every enemy. For example, that victims of grave wrongdoing should seek imaginative identification with their victimizers is not just a tough ask but one that seems difficult to reconcile with liberal aspirations.[1]

The second way in which ironism cultivates ethical responsiveness to difference stems from the ironist's inability to articulate a final description of her beliefs and desires. As Ramberg (2014, 160) notes, the ironist is 'shaken', in the sense that she cannot give a full and permanent account of 'what the normative demands embedded in her own practical identity actually require of her'. As a liberal, she shares liberal aspirations to be more tolerant and reduce the amount of suffering and humiliation in the world, but as an ironist she is never in a position to know the actual and possible forms these aspirations might take. Thus, whereas the ironist can commit fully to prevailing liberal agendas of, say, opposing gender or sexual discrimination, she cannot rid herself of the idea that there are other, unnoticed forms of intolerance, suffering or humiliation that are as pressing and as deserving of her concern. Continuously and anxiously on the outlook for improving her commitments, her main concern is the practical one of *noticing* forms of intolerance, suffering or humiliation. As Rorty (1989, 91–92) puts it, being a liberal ironist 'requires me to become aware of all the various ways in which other human beings whom I might act upon can be humiliated'. Thus, the ironist seeks 'imaginative acquaintance' with as many unfamiliar people as possible, 'not just for her own edification, but in order to understand the actual and possible humiliation of [those] people' (Rorty 1989, 92).

Anti-doping ironism

Exploring Rorty's philosophy in the context of sport, Roberts (1997, 76) encourages sporting communities to pay 'closer attention to the movements and noises of the cheats […] and the excluded, that is, to those who may be doing and saying "irrational" things outside existing language, logic, rationality and orthodoxy'. If they do so, Roberts (1997, 76) argues, 'we will be more able to keep alive not only the possibility of transcending our games and ourselves, but of making both more just and maybe even more interesting'. Leaving the interestingness of our games and ourselves aside for the time being and focussing on their justness, Roberts' point can be read as a call for anti-doping ironism. By seeking imaginative acquaintance with doped athletes, for example – by paying closer attention to what Roberts calls their seemingly irrational 'movements and noises' – ironism can help sport communities redescribe themselves and their anti-doping commitments in more compassionate

and just ways. The contrast between anti-doping fundamentalism and ironism rests on the observation that the ironist's responsiveness to difference is what fundamentalism critically deprive anti-doping of. In the following, I consider the contrast between the fundamentalist lack of responsiveness to difference arguably shaping present anti-doping policy and rhetoric, and an ironist responsiveness to difference that could make for better, more liberal anti-doping in the future.

To reiterate, the first facet of the ironist's responsiveness to difference is her inclination to retain the 'morality of conflict' by recognizing that her opponents can be admirable in opposing her. It seems no exaggeration to claim that this inclination is absent from most anti-doping advocates' considerations of doped athletes. At first glance, this absence might seem understandable. After all, doping is against the rules of sport. Rules are a construct that allows one to distinguish quite clearly between right and wrong. As such, one might reason, the possibility of virtues being manifested in the service of rule-breaking verges on a contradiction in terms. Moreover, doping is commonly considered not just one among many forms of cheating but a particularly problematic one with harmful consequences to oneself, others and sport itself. From an ironist's perspective, these representations can be said to oversimplify the issue at hand. A minor point to this effect is that by paying close attention to the stories of the likes of tennis player Mariano Puerta,[2] cyclist Alberto Contador[3] or cross-country skier Therese Johaug,[4] the liberal ironist will discover that what she saw as moral opposition might in fact have been a case of negligence or pure accident. Due to the principle of strict liability, the relationship between rule-breaking and moral belief is not always clear in anti-doping. There is a large difference between accident, negligence and deliberate cheating – and this point is unlikely to go unnoticed for the ironist.

More important and characteristic of the ironist, however, is that by paying closer attention to the perspective of intentionally doped athletes, she will find stories that complicate the black-and-white picture of moral rule-adherence and immoral cheating. Imaginatively identifying with these athletes, the ironist is likely to experience that their stories substantiate her awareness of the possibility of virtues being manifested in the service of the wrong cause. For example, making acquaintance with the stories of intentional dopers can expose her to redescriptions of virtues such as loyalty, determination or purposefulness. To this effect, in an earlier paper, I show that accounts of professional cyclists describe loyalty to a team, a team captain or a trusted coach as a factor in the decision to dope (Sandvik 2018). Similarly, where some might see doping as a threat to the very purpose of sport, these cyclists' accounts expose the ironist to redescriptions of doping as a natural consequence of athletes' purposeful pursuit of excellence. To reiterate, the point is not that the ironist is drawn to revert to moral relativism – that she is likely to be convinced by and adopt the redescriptions offered by any story told by any doped athlete. Rather, she is impressed by such stories in the sense that she understands that – and why – athletes themselves might have been convinced by the redescriptions. This realization makes her less likely to dehumanize, stigmatize and be intolerant towards these athletes as persons. Furthermore, she is impressed in the sense that she lets athletes' redescriptions influence her continuous redescription of her own, liberal anti-doping commitments. Whereas she might not find professional road cyclists' redescriptions of doping as an expression of loyalty or purposefulness particularly good or helpful in themselves, learning that these redescriptions have been made to look good for someone is a valuable realization for her project of making her own descriptions look more attractive and more convincing.

Moreover, anti-doping ironism carries the inclination to improve one's liberal commitments through learning from the meaningful narratives of unfamiliar others, particularly by noticing forms of suffering and humiliation in their experiences. The ironist's anti-doping commitment arises from her sensitivity to ways in which doping may cause suffering and humiliation in athletes and beyond. As an ironist, however, she admits to her inability to give a full account of the possible and actual forms that doping-related suffering and humiliation might take. Thus, she is driven to imaginatively identify with athletes in as many kinds of situation as possible, trying to notice unfamiliar ways in which their situation involves actual or potential harmful experiences. Acquainting herself with the stories of doped athletes can point her in at least two directions. First, she might discover forms of suffering and humiliation in their experiences as athletes prior to the decision to dope. For example, stories of professional cyclists in the 1990s and 2000s describe the sport's lack of financial stability for riders (normally on short-term contracts) and teams (whose existence normally depends upon short-term sponsorships). According to several sources, including sociological studies (Aubel and Ohl 2014; Ohl et al. 2015), investigations (e.g. Marty, Nicholson, and Haas 2015) and autobiographical materials (e.g. Hamilton and Coyle 2012, Millar 2012, Rasmussen and Wivel 2013), such financial instability and insecurity contributed to an environment that pushed riders to take substantial risk in order to achieve results and renewed short-term contracts. Learning about such shadowy sides of the organizational structure of professional sport, the ironist might broaden her commitments in ways that potentially benefit the prevention of doping. To put the point starkly, she might commit to the view that an important element of doping prevention is the development of financially stable sport organizations and secure working environments for professional athletes.

The other discovery the ironist is likely to make relates to the experiences of athletes subsequent to being caught or sanctioned for doping: Dimeo and Møller's aforementioned stories of suicides and serious depression should catch her eye. Along these lines I argue in an earlier paper that stories of sprinter Justin Gatlin[5] and skier Therese Johaug help to redescribe sanctioned athletes as members of the 'we' that anti-doping organizations seek to protect (Sandvik, 2019). The anti-doping ironist translates these insights into commitment. For example, listening to the likes of Gatlin or Johaug, she might commit to the need for supporting procedures for sanctioned athletes that aid their healthy rehabilitation into sports or other lines of employment.

Before concluding this sketch of anti-doping ironism, I will address one likely objection: Whereas Rorty shows how an ironist practical identity accommodates liberal commitment, the same cannot be said about ironism and anti-doping commitment in the most basic sense of being *anti*-doping. To put the objection starkly, what is there to guarantee that the anti-doping ironist never becomes persuaded by the views of doped athletes or by arguments for the liberalization of doping in sport, or if she is an athlete, what is there to hinder her from doping herself? The principal answer, I think, is that anti-doping ironism is liberal first and anti-doping second, meaning that my protagonist's commitment to anti-doping will fade at the point where she considers other alternatives to be more liberal according to her continuously evolving descriptions. In other words, the liberal aspirations of anti-doping – e.g. its perceived aptitude, from the ironist's perspective, for increasing tolerance and reducing suffering and humiliation – is the key to her commitment. However, this response exposes a different vulnerability in anti-doping ironism. Whereas the ironist's anti-doping commitment indicates a special interest in sport (as it focuses her energy here, perhaps at

the expense of other issues that might seem more pressing from her liberal perspective), it is not, on the current description, this sport interest that shapes her commitment. Thus, the argument has the potential to eventually turn the ironist against her commitment to sport and by extension to anti-doping. The vulnerability seems to be that the ironist's continuous efforts to redescribe her liberal commitments might have her substitute other, liberal aspirations for her involvement in sport and anti-doping. It remains largely unexplored how ironism might accommodate various kinds of sport commitment; how values and virtues in sporting practices can find a more or less stable home within an ironic practical identity. Can you be a full-fledged ironist, on the Rortyan account, yet commit yourself in the idiosyncratically ironist manner to the unwritten rules of cycling, the ethos of football or to more general conceptualizations of the meaning(s) of sport? The answer to these questions belongs to a different paper. For now, I can only suggest that the kind of ironist sport commitment called for here might find its allies or inspiration in Olympism and related ideas of sport as an arena for the cultivation of human solidarity.

Ironism and narratives

> I have raced to win, not to participate. Like Jacques Anquetil said: 'There are no small trees in the jungle'. I wanted to be among the tallest trees in the jungle.
>
> I believe that one should be fully present in one's endeavours. People who wish for an easy life swim with the tide. I have not had an easy life but my great setbacks have been made up for by my great victories. Nobody can take those away from me.
>
> When I was out riding the other day, I thought about wishing I were twenty again. Would I have done it differently? I know myself well enough to know that if someone had told me to stay away from doping I would probably not have listened.
>
> The only advice I would have listened to would be to do what is best for myself. Thus, during the 2005 Tour, I would have taken blood bag number two and battled Lance Armstrong all the way to Paris.
>
> (Rasmussen and Wivel 2013, 321–322, author's translation)

Thus ends the autobiography of Michael Rasmussen, the cyclist who was about to win the 2007 Tour de France when news broke that he had fooled the anti-doping authorities prior to the race: reporting that he was in Mexico when he was in fact in Italy. Rasmussen was pulled out of the Tour by his Rabobank team, received a two-year ban from the International Cycling Union, and never returned to the top level of the sport. In 2013, he publicly confessed to doping and published the 'confessional autobiography' *Gul feber [Yellow Fever]* detailing his career as a professional cyclist. In the 2005 Tour de France, Rasmussen was second in the general classification at the race's halfway point, 38 seconds behind Lance Armstrong. He recounts:

> Rabobank was a strange team. Doctor Leinders and the others in the management would naturally love to achieve the ultimate cycling triumph but when it came close, they got nervous. Doctor Leinders knew well that I had blood bag number two ready at home in the fridge but now I was told not to use it. […] Ivan Basso rode past me. […] Jan Ullrich rode past me too. Lance was still going strong. I could not follow the three anymore.

> […] It was irritating to know that I had that blood bag ready, which I was not allowed to use, when I found myself in a nuclear war zone. I had had my weapon taken away from me – by my own team. They would not have rode past me if I had been allowed that blood bag number two.
>
> (Rasmussen and Wivel 2013, 153)

Rasmussen clearly seems to think that in a second attempt, he would have done the same thing all over again, only better – or more. In *Gul feber,* doping fits seemingly well within the story of a single-minded, cynical and formidably ascetic athlete. 'I have wanted to be a cyclist since I was five', he recounts. 'It is the only ambition I have had in my life. […] And I *wanted* to win' (Rasmussen and Wivel 2013, 32–33). We learn that Rasmussen raced to win – for his own sake – and that it was just about the only thing he did, thought about or cared for: 'I was born with tunnel vision' (Rasmussen and Wivel 2013, 37). Whereas the single-mindedness, cynicism and asceticism is straightforwardly evident throughout the book, a certain gloominess in Rasmussen's character relating to these traits seethes tacitly under the surface. Arguably long before the story reaches the events of the 2007 Tour, an impression of Rasmussen as a troublesome and distressed character is persistently, however tacitly, communicated to readers.

In contrast to Rasmussen's lone-wolf character in *Gul feber,* the autobiography of Tyler Hamilton presents a sociable protagonist on something akin to an extended group journey of American riders exploring the unfamiliar world of professional cycling in Europe. Hamilton was among Lance Armstrong's most accomplished and trusted teammates during the first two Tours de France that Armstrong won. In 2004, after winning gold at the Olympic time trial in Athens, Hamilton failed a doping test at the Vuelta a España and was suspended from the sport for two years. He returned to competition in 2007, but in 2009, he was handed an eight-year suspension for a second-time offence after testing positive for a banned anti-depressant. In his autobiography, *The Secret Race* (Hamilton and Coyle 2012), Hamilton's initiation of doping is described in a chapter titled 'Eurodogs'. Eurodogs is Hamilton's term for a group of American riders in the US Postal Team moving to Girona, Spain, to live together in a small apartment.

> We quickly became friends, and discovered a truth about our sport: there is no friendship in the world like the friendship of being on a bike-racing team. The reason is one word: give. You give all your strength: during the race, you shelter each other, you empty yourself for the sake of another person, and they do the same for you. You give all your time: you travel together, room together, eat every meal together. You ride for hours together every day, knuckle to knuckle. […] Other sports teams like to call themselves 'families'. In bike racing, it's close to true.
>
> (Hamilton and Coyle 2012, 51)

Together, the Eurodogs experienced the 'reality' of cycling professionally in Europe. The team struggled throughout the 1996 season: 'Pack-fill, we called ourselves, because our only function was to make the back group of the peloton bigger. We had no chance to win, no chance to attack or affect the race in any meaningful way; we were just grateful to survive. The reason was that the other riders were unbelievably strong' (Hamilton and Coyle 2012, 31). By the spring of 1997, Hamilton seems increasingly alone in the experience of inferiority vis-a-vis the European peloton, as some of the Eurodogs had emerged stronger than ever.

Hamilton became suspicious of his roommates and figured that something was going on when he discovered syringes and ampules of EPO packed in foil in the back of the apartment's refrigerator. From this point, signs of doping were everywhere, not least in the form of the US Postal Team's infamous 'white bags' handed out to select riders by the team management. Hamilton's realization that doping was going on in half-secrecy on his own team and among his closest friends led to an overwhelming experience of injustice and social exclusion. He recounts the experience of being beaten at Liege-Bastogne-Liege by fellow Eurodog Marty:

> Marty used to be a few groups behind me; now he was a few groups ahead. I could count the number of seconds those white bags contained. I could see the gap between who I was and who I could be. Who I was supposed to be.
>
> This was bullshit.
>
> This was not fair.
>
> (Hamilton and Coyle 2012, 54)

Now Hamilton found himself seeking justice and social inclusion. He found the key to both in the form of Pedro, the team doctor. His first encounter with Pedro had been at a team party in January 1997:

> At some point in the party, I spotted a plate of chocolate chip cookies. […] I couldn't resist. I reached for one, munched it slowly – perfection. Then I took another. As I chewed, I got a strange feeling I was being watched. I looked up to see the new team doctor, Pedro Celeya, watching me closely from across the room, measuring the moment as surely as if he were taking my temperature. Pedro smiled at me, and slowly waggled a finger in a humorous but firm way: No no! I smiled back, pretending to hide the cookie under my shirt, and he laughed.
>
> I liked Pedro immediately. […] Pedro was like your favorite uncle. He looked you in the eyes; he asked how you felt; he remembered little things.
>
> (Hamilton and Coyle 2012, 41–42)

The chapter describes two athlete-to-doctor conversations after Hamilton had been struggling at races. It is clear that Hamilton found assurance and trust in the sympathetic and caring character of Pedro. A few days after the Liege-Bastogne-Liege race where Hamilton lost out to Marty, it was Pedro that gave Hamilton his first vials of EPO.

The rather different stories of Rasmussen and Hamilton come together in one specific sense when the inevitable happens – the raison d'être of the autobiographies: when the athletes are exposed to the public as cheaters. Rasmussen describes his experience in a chapter titled 'If there had been a big, thick rope'. After receiving the message from the Rabobank team management that he would be taken out of the Tour de France and have his contract with the team terminated, Rasmussen found himself alone in his hotel room: 'If there had been big, thick rope there, I would probably stay there hanging. I was looking for that in the room. If the curtains were mounted on a string instead of a rod, it might have turned out differently' (Hamilton and Coyle 2012, 266). Three years earlier, Hamilton had had a similar experience, returning to his Girona apartment after a press conference where he had denied any wrongdoing relating to the positive doping test from the Vuelta a España.

Like Rasmussen, he found himself alone, sitting down on a kitchen stool: 'I don't know how long I sat there. A day? Two days? I didn't eat. I didn't sleep. I didn't cry. I felt dead inside, like a zombie. I stared at the floor for hours, trying to accept that this was happening'.

Why these brief introductions to the autobiographies of Rasmussen and Hamilton? Rorty's ironist shares an intimate relationship with stories. Rorty's narrativism as it relates to ironism is not an account of how stories can be used in moral educational settings to teach or cultivate ironism or liberal aspirations. Stories are not seen to provide a quick-fix to anti-doping fundamentalism. After all, stories are ambiguous and invite various uses, interpretations and redescriptions. A story interpreted by the ironist for her purposes of liberal edification could, I suppose, be interpreted by a fundamentalist in ways that confirm his unwavering attachment to a given set of beliefs. Thus, the ironist cannot tell the fundamentalist or any other person to read a story and expect them to have their webs-of-beliefs challenged and improved in ways similar to hers. Rather, she must keep describing and redescribing her ironic and liberal reading purposes and interpretations and hope for her interlocutors to eventually be persuaded by their attractiveness. This is my rationale for introducing Rasmussen and Hamilton's stories.

The ironist approaches the stories of unfamiliar people with the lens provided by her idiosyncratic ethical responsiveness to difference. Seeking imaginative acquaintance with Rasmussen's single-minded striving for athletic enhancement or Hamilton's experiences of being socialized into a permissive environment, she adds content to her notion that what has been made to look bad for her might have been made to look good (or at least better) for others. Familiarizing herself with these redescriptions of doping as 'good' or 'necessary' – as well as the persons presenting these redescriptions – serves to make her more tolerant and less dogmatic. Rasmussen and Hamilton are 'humanized' in the eyes of the ironist as she is brought to reflect upon the question of 'what would I do – what descriptions would be available to me – if I was in their shoes?' Furthermore, the ironist reads with an eye open to unfamiliar kinds of suffering and humiliation in the athlete-authors' experiences. Her interpretation spots and emphasizes the gloominess of Rasmussen's single-mindedness and asceticism in *Gul feber*. Likewise, the humiliation of Hamilton's experiences of feeling unjustly excluded from the fellowship of select riders and friends does not go unnoticed. Most importantly, perhaps, the sequences in which the athletes are alone, vulnerable and highly distressed are not just noticed in passing or dismissed but stand out as accounts of serious problems with anti-doping policy and rhetoric, fully worthy of one's liberal commitment. Thus, confessional autobiography (but also other narrative resources such as journalistic reports, documentary books or films, social research, and more) seem to carry a potential for facilitating a turn towards ironism in anti-doping. What is needed beyond such stories are ironists' voices to promote their idiosyncratic reading purposes and interpretations and hope for others to be persuaded by their attractiveness.

A pressing question arising from this idea concerns what narrative resources are available to influence and shape anti-doping ironists' commitments. One problem seems to be that confessional autobiography as well as most other kinds of published stories about doped athletes are inseparable parts of sport celebrity culture. They typically depict the fall of famous athletes: athletes that are elevated, mainly through media stories, to the status of heroes and role models. Yar (2014, 11) observes that in the face of doping accusations, revelations or sanctions, 'this elevation creates the preconditions for the catastrophic collapse of the star's social standing'. Thus, what the anti-doping ironist is imaginatively acquainted

with is the subjects of 'doping scandals': the fallen stars whose suffering and humiliation post-exposure probably relate more than anything to their 'fall from grace' as it plays out before the eyes of the public. Without a doubt, these stories are important and introduce several considerations that anti-doping ironism needs to take into account. For example, there should be no doubt that celebrity status carries the potential to amplify the social and psychological consequences of exposure, raising questions about confidentiality, stricter regulations on the public announcement of positive tests, and supportive and rehabilitative policies tailored for athletes at different levels. However, the stories of athlete-celebrities are not the only stories that ironists would want to take into account. There can be no doubt either about the abundance of unexposed stories in the vast parts of elite sport that are not part of celebrity culture. What the ironist needs in order to expand the circle of 'we' that she concerns herself with is more stories from more perspectives.

A different point to the same effect concerns the cultural and geopolitical biases affecting the narrative resources available to an ironist in a given location. The autobiographies of Rasmussen and Hamilton probably find most of their readership in the athlete's native countries and in the hotbed of professional cycling in Western Europe. For an ironist in any of these locations, imaginative acquaintance with Rasmussen or Hamilton or many of their athlete-author compatriots is made highly accessible, whereas the same sort of engagement with, say, the stories of athletes involved in organized doping in Russia, is not. This is a significant concern to the ironist project, not least due to the danger that stigmatization of doped athletes, if culturally and geographically biased, obtains a wider cultural and geopolitical impact. Again, the ironist needs more stories from more perspectives.

Conclusion

This paper has presented and discussed anti-doping ironism as a contrast to anti-doping fundamentalism. Its argument has been that the harms of fundamentalism are mitigated if representatives of sports organizations, media and the general public begin to treat anti-doping, to cite Connolly (1995, 180), 'in a more ironic, humorous way, laughing occasionally at one's more ridiculous predispositions and laughing too at the predisposition to universalize an impulse simply because it is one's own'. Should or could this argument lead to change? To answer this question, I can only paraphrase Burke and Robert's (1997, 101) insistence that, from a Rortyan perspective, 'Change will occur only if the sport community is touched by the stories it hears and is swayed to believe that the drug ban produces enough pain to warrant change'. Whereas this paper does not take charge at the ban *per se*, but the fundamentalist rhetoric claimed to fuel policy and discourse, it shares the insistence of Burke and Roberts. The ironist can do little but keep describing and redescribing her liberal commitments and reading purposes and hope for others to realize their desirability. This paper has been an exploratory attempt at such a (re)description.

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Notes

1. An anonymous reviewer for *Sport in Society* alerted me to the argument that, for some, intentional doping may be experienced as 'grave wrongdoing' and past the mark at which one can expect certain 'victims' to seek imaginative identification with wrongdoers. I agree that this might be the case, for instance, for athletes who miss out on an Olympic medal to intentionally doped competitors. I concede that there might be people from which one probably should not expect or encourage an ironist approach to anti-doping. Perhaps some lean towards the fundamentalist side of the anti-doping spectrum for very understandable reasons. In such cases, the anti-doping ironist can do nothing but approaching these people in her idiosyncratically ironist manner, seeking to learn from their meaningful narratives and re-weave her web-of-beliefs accordingly.
2. Mariano Puerta is a former Argentinian tennis player who, in 2003, tested positive for clenbuterol and was suspended for nine months, claiming that he had ingested the substance via asthma medication administered to him by his doctor. In 2005, he was suspended for eight years after testing positive for a small amount of etilefrine. Puerta appealed claiming he had ingested only trace amounts of the substance through accidentally drinking from his wife's glass. In 2006, the suspension was reduced to two years (Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 2006).
3. In 2010, Spanish road cyclist Alberto Contador tested positive for a small amount of clenbuterol, blaming food contamination. After a long-running legal process, in 2012, CAS arbitrators ruled that Contador had been negligent and suspended him for two years with retrospective effect (CAS 2012).
4. In 2016, Norwegian cross-country skier Therese Johaug tested positive for a clostebol metabolite which she claimed to stem from Trofodermin, a lip balm, handed to her by the national team doctor to treat a severely sunburnt lip. Failing to notice a 'doping warning' on the packaging, Johaug used the product for twelve days. She was suspended for 18 months (CAS 2017).
5. Justin Gatlin is an American sprinter who, in 2001, tested positive for amphetamines and was banned from competition for two years for violating anti-doping regulations. Gatlin appealed on the grounds that the positive test was due to medication for attention deficit disorder, and he was allowed an early reinstatement (United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) 2002). Then, in 2006, he tested positive for synthetic testosterone, maintaining that he was the victim of sabotage by a massage therapist. Gatlin was banned from competition for eight years. Because the circumstances of his first violation indicated no intent of doping, the ban was reduced to four years after appeal (USADA 2008).

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Paper 2

Sandvik, M. R. Fair Play as a larger loyalty: the case of anti-doping. In review, *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy*.

‘Fair play’ as a larger loyalty: the case of anti-doping

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‘Fair play’ as a larger loyalty: the case of anti-doping

This paper explores a redescription of ‘fair play’ as a larger loyalty. Focusing on the context of elite sport and the case of anti-doping, the paper develops an adaptation of Richard Rorty’s call to dispense with the opposition between loyalty and justice. The gist of the loyalty redescription of fair play is twofold. First, the redescription aligns with a conception of moral athlete identity as starting with thick narratives of closely-knit small groups (e.g. teams) and expanding outwards to embrace the thinner narratives and abstract principles of larger groups (e.g. ‘the Olympic movement’). Thus, moral progress occurs when an athlete’s loyalty towards her team is balanced by her loyalty to competitors or to the sport as a whole, to the extent that she plays fair even when she knows that cheating will benefit the team. Second, the redescription places the burden on the shoulders of larger sporting communities, such as the ‘Olympic movement’, of recreating themselves as inviting and attracting more and more athletes’ loyalty. The latter point has implications for anti-doping policy and rhetoric that I discuss towards the end of the paper. In brief, I argue that the loyalty redescription of fair play substantiate a philosophical critique of surveillance-based policies such as the whereabouts system and the wider individualization of responsibility shaping policy and rhetoric.

Keywords: Anti-doping, fair play, loyalty, Rorty, whereabouts

Introduction

What happens if we start treating 'fair play' as the name for loyalty to a certain very large group, for example 'the Olympic movement' or 'the international sporting community'? Richard Rorty (2007, 42-55) has suggested that we redescribe dilemmas between loyalty and justice as conflicts between loyalty to a smaller 'community of trust' (e.g. a family) and loyalty to larger community of trust (e.g. a nation or a Rawlsian 'society of peoples'). Focusing on the case of anti-doping, this paper develops an adaptation of Rorty's redescription to the context of sport and the concept of fair play.

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the redescription of fair play as a larger loyalty, drawing on the example of anti-doping. As is the case with Rorty's moral and political philosophy in general, the loyalty redescription triggers a number of possible objections concerning the threats of relativism and ethnocentrism. These objections are discussed in the second section. Thereafter, I explore the implications of the redescription for anti-doping policy and rhetoric. I suggest that the redescription stipulates a shift away from surveillance-based policies and individualization of athletes' responsibility for doping. From the discussion of implications, a new possible objection arises, namely that the redescription challenges the 'anti' in anti-doping. Towards concluding, I discuss this objection and partly accept it, arguing that the redescription of fair play as a larger loyalty is no less defensible for it.

'Fair play' as a larger loyalty

In 'Justice as a larger loyalty', Rorty (2007, 54) addresses what he describes as the non-West's scepticism toward 'Westerners who suggest that they should adopt Western ways in order to become more rational'. Loyal to the anti-foundationalist 'cultural politics' at the core of his work, Rorty advocates dropping the universalist and rationalist rhetoric of Western

culture in general and Western philosophy in particular. One way of overcoming this rhetoric, he thinks, would be to rephrase dilemmas between loyalty (a sentiment shared by people everywhere) and justice (a concept shared – according to the rationalist rhetoric – only by the reasonable 'community of Peoples') as conflicts between loyalties to smaller groups and loyalties to larger groups.

With this redescription, Rorty seeks to dissolve the Kantian distinction between sentiment (as a source of loyalty) and reason (as a source of justice) and renounce the associated image of moral progress as resulting from some peoples' improved use of reason to access universal moral principles (e.g. justice). In its place, Rorty inserts a historicist image of moral progress as a story of expanding loyalties. Conceptualising justice as loyalty allows Rorty (2007, 45, note 3) to conclude that, if some Western communities did become more just during the course of the 20th century, they achieved this not by making better use than other communities of a universal capacity for reasoning but by expanding 'the circle of beings who count as "us"'.

The aim of the present paper is to develop an adaptation of Rorty's redescription to the context of sport and the concept of fair play as discussed by Loland (2002) and others in relation to Rawls' concepts of justice and fairness. To paraphrase Rorty (2007, 44): Would it be a good idea to treat fair play 'as the name of loyalty to a certain very large group rather than the name of something distinct from loyalty?'. I approach this question by focusing on deliberate doping as a paramount case of 'foul play'[i]. At its core, the redescription I suggest entails viewing athletes' doping dilemma – the dilemma of whether to dope or not; whether to 'play foul' or to 'play fair' – as a conflict between smaller loyalties and larger loyalties. With the term smaller loyalties, I have in mind the kind of groups that unite in a common quest for performance and results, such as teams or athlete-coach relationships. The larger loyalties I have in mind can perhaps be given names such as the 'Olympic movement' or 'professional

road cycling'. It should be noted that smaller and larger are relative terms and that depending on the case at hand, some types of communities can represent the smaller loyalty that encourages foul play in one example and the larger loyalty that fosters fair play in another. For instance, this holds for national elite sport systems (consider, for example, Russian sport as a smaller loyalty opposed to the larger loyalty of the Olympic movement prior to the 2014 Olympics; and the elite sport systems of some European countries as larger loyalties opposed to the smaller loyalties of professional road cycling teams in the 1990s and 2000s).

For the sake of clarity, I will stick with the Olympic movement and present-day professional road cycling as examples of larger loyalties. The International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Cycling Federation (UCI) and, in terms of anti-doping, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), see themselves as coordinating these communities. What would be the consequences if we viewed these organizations' efforts to universalise anti-doping policy and rhetoricas an attempt not to persuade athletes everywhere to 'play fair' but to reinvent themselves as the coordinating bodies of larger sporting communities inviting the loyalty of more and more athletes.

One place to start looking for answers is in the link between the loyalty redescription of fair play and a narrative and historicist picture of moral athlete identity. In the picture of moral identity underlying the Kantian anchoring of fair play in reason, Rorty would suggest, moral development begins with access to universal moral principles through reason and progresses as one learns to apply these principles in real-life situations, through the use of reason. Considering an athlete in a doping dilemma, developing a moral athlete identity entails looking beyond the expectations and encouragements of certain smaller loyalties (e.g. teams, athlete-coach relationships, or certain national elite sport systems) to discovering, through reason, some universal principles of justice and fairness underlying the ideal of fair play. In this picture, larger sporting communities can appeal to athletes' capacity for

reasoning through rational arguments about what sport ‘really’ is supposed to be – summed up in capitalised terms such as ‘the Spirit of Sport’, slogans such as ‘Play true!’ and distinctions such as ‘clean sport’ versus ‘dirty sport’. If the athlete plays fair, he does so, presumably, because there is something appealing or satisfying about being ‘rational’, acting in line with ‘the Spirit of Sport’, ‘Playing True’, or ‘being clean’. Supposedly, he finds this appealing, even if it means being disloyal to a group to which he ‘cannot be disloyal and still like [himself]’ (Rorty 2007, 45).

In the place of this picture, Rorty inserts a picture in which moral development starts within the smaller, closely-knit loyalties such as families, that are woven together by relations of reciprocal trust, common interest and interdependence. At this early stage, morality typically corresponds with ‘what comes naturally’ in one’s interactions with other members of the group. Then development progresses as people expand ‘the circle of beings who count as “us”’ and develop larger loyalties: as families merge into tribes, who merge into nations, who merge, perhaps, into a global community. Such larger communities are knit together more loosely: reciprocal trust must be built, common interest and interdependence created and loyalty fostered. In these larger communities, morality sometimes require that we go against ‘what comes naturally’. In order to hold increasingly multifaceted constituencies together as communities of trust, larger communities construct abstract principles designed to secure sufficient overlap across wide ranges of different beliefs and purposes. Choosing a larger loyalty when it stands in conflict with a smaller one amounts to abiding by such principles even when the principles run into conflict with ‘what comes naturally’ in one’s close relations within the smaller group. This is the sort of thing that happens, says Rorty (2007, 45), when you ‘rule against your own village in your capacity as a federal administrator’.

To Rorty, the capacity of larger communities to attract individuals’ adherence to abstract, overriding principles rests not on the reasonability of the principles but on the

communities' identifiability in the eyes of individuals. In a narrative conception of moral identity, the communities that we consider ourselves members of provide the kinds of compelling narratives that we draw on to give meaning and normative direction to our lives. 'In non-traditional societies', says Rorty (ibid., 45), 'most people have several such narratives at their disposal, and thus several different moral identities. [...] Moral dilemmas are not, in this view, the result of a conflict between reason and sentiment but between alternative selves, alternative self-descriptions, alternative ways of giving a meaning to one's life'. Thus, the appeal of the larger communities rests on the stock of compelling narratives they have at their disposal and the capacity of these narratives enter into the moral identity of individuals. Abstract and overriding principles, then, work when they align with a compelling narrative or web-of-narratives that people draw upon to identify themselves *as* members of a community. For example, one is committed to principles of justice and equality because one finds the narratives offered by social democrats or democratic socialists attractive, and thus one is, in some sense, a social democrat or a democratic socialist.

On this reading, athletes commit themselves to principles of fair play because they find the narratives offered by for instance the Olympic movement or professional road cycling attractive, and thus they are Olympic athletes or professional road cyclists. On the conception I propose, the development of an athlete moral identity starts in the closely-knit communities of trust in which athletes live and share their sporting experiences: clubs, teams, training groups, and athlete-coach relationships. In an early stage of the development of a moral athlete identity, loyalty to these smaller communities' uniting purposes of performances, teamwork, and results appears as 'what comes naturally' to the athlete. In this stage, athletes might identify themselves as (some haphazardly chosen examples follow) 'Lance, the US Postal Team cyclist' or 'Alexander, the Russian cross-country skier'. Moral development progresses as athletes expand their loyalties to direct competitors, other practitioners of the

sport, and ultimately to the larger, international or even global sporting communities such as professional road cycling or the Olympic movement. Like Rorty's larger communities, the sporting communities coordinate through the creation and enforcement of abstract principles designed to balance potentially conflicting beliefs and purposes among their constituencies. In this view, progress has occurred when the footballer's compassion for his teammates extends to his rivals to the degree that he abides by a principle of fair play and kicks the ball out of play rather than pursuing a clear goal-scoring opportunity upon noticing a rival player laying down injured.[ii]

The conception Rorty would fend off is that these abstract principles gain traction because of their reasonability. Rather, Rorty would ask how – in a hypothetical scenario, I should add – 'Lance' came to see himself a little less as 'the US Postal Cyclist' and a little more as 'the professional road cyclist'. Understanding moral athlete identity in this way, we can yet again rephrase the athlete's doping dilemma. Now the dilemma becomes a conflict between, on the one hand, 'Lance, the US Postal Team cyclist' or 'Alexander, the Russian Olympic cross-country skier', and on the other hand, 'Lance, the professional road cyclist' or 'Alexander, the Olympic athlete'.

What can provide the larger loyalty of professional road cycling or the Olympic movement with sufficient appeal to individual moral athlete identities for more and more athletes to abide by these communities' principles of fair play? The answer, I suggest, lies in the capacity of the communities to supply athletes with a range of compelling narratives at their disposal to give meaning and normative direction to their lives as athletes. The catch of this way of looking at things is that the coordinating bodies of these communities – e.g. the IOC, UCI, or WADA – must take on the burden of building appealing communities of trust, creating and highlighting a sense of common interest and interdependence, and, hence, attracting more and more athletes' loyalty. As I will discuss more below, this is not merely a

matter of telling stories (even though storytelling is important and, to be clear, something larger sporting communities already tend to be very good at). Rather, what is centrally at stake is the creation of a social and political culture conducive to the nurturing of reciprocal relations of trust, common interest and interdependence. In order to explore this point in more detail, and discuss its implications for anti-doping policy, I will take a detour through a possible objection to the loyalty redescription, namely that of relativism and ethnocentrism.

Fallibilistic, reflective ethnocentrism

The objection of relativism and ethnocentrism stems from a vulgar interpretation of the loyalty redescription. On this interpretation, larger sporting communities such as the Olympic movement or professional road cycling can be constructed around just about any principle or belief and still count as progressing morally as long as their current constituencies vouch for their beliefs and the communities carry sufficient appeal for others to join in. In the following, I suggest two steps to hinder this vulgar interpretation and to allow the loyalty redescription to foster the kinds of communities of trust envisioned above. The first step is to go with Morgan and envision sporting communities as reflectively ethnocentric; the second is to follow Rorty and create sporting communities whose ethnocentrism is not merely reflective but explicit in a fallibilistic endorsement of values such as solidarity, tolerance and, in sport, fair play.

Morgan (1998, 1994) introduces the first step when he distinguishes between vulgar and reflective ethnocentrism and attaches his social criticism of sport to the latter. He sees three key differences between vulgarly ethnocentric cultures and reflectively ethnocentric ones, concerning the relationship between what he calls ‘second-order, justificatory beliefs’ and the application of these to ‘first-order, actual beliefs’ (where ‘second-order, justificatory beliefs [concern] what kinds of first-order, actual beliefs it is rationally and normatively acceptable to hold’ (Morgan, 1998, 83)). First, for vulgar ethnocentrists, second-order beliefs ‘are simply read off whatever happen to be the prevailing conventions of a culture at any

given time' (Morgan, 1998, 83). Reflective ethnocentrism, on the other hand, implies awareness that some prevailing beliefs are bad and supported by bad reasons. Thus, reflective ethnocentrist social critics subject second-order beliefs to reflective scrutiny and work back-and-forth between present, prevailing beliefs and 'the deep, reflectively secured, critical norms of a culture (such as the present belief in equality and fairness) that form a background repository of beliefs that can be tapped to criticize its dominant beliefs' (Morgan, 1994, 190). As Morgan's (1994, p. 191) points out, this 'reliance on the conceptual resources of [one's] own culture ... is a historically qualified, fallibilistic, and contingent one'.

Second, where vulgar ethnocentrism has no issue with inconsistent and incoherent beliefs, Morgan writes, 'the identification and elimination of inconsistent beliefs is a central preoccupation' of reflectively ethnocentric social critics: 'Looking at gaps, fissures, and inconsistencies between reflectively secured ideals and our actual forms of life ... is one of the central things a social critic does.' (1999, 84). The third difference concerns the space made available for argument and deliberation. In vulgarly ethnocentric cultures, the role of argument and deliberation is all but negligible as there are no standards to evaluate a belief beyond the currency it holds in the present situation. By contrast, Morgan (1999, 84) maintains that argument and deliberation 'play a large and defining role' in reflectively ethnocentric cultures as the means through which critical scrutiny of beliefs as well as the identification and elimination of inconsistencies enter the public realm.

The second step I suggest is to conceive of reflectively ethnocentric sporting communities as explicitly liberal in a Rortyan, fallibilistic and 'ironic' sense (Rorty, 1989). Like Morgan, Rorty sees no non-question-begging way around ethnocentrism that allows members of a community to evaluate its beliefs or the beliefs of others. Thus, political and ethical deliberation starts from 'somewhere' and, in Rorty's case, from an idiosyncratically liberal, fallibilistic endorsement of values such as solidarity, tolerance, equality and justice.

Rorty's utopian liberal and fallibilistic communities can only evaluate beliefs from within this liberal and fallibilistic vocabulary.

Out of fallibilism, thinks Rorty, grows an urge to continuously redescribe beliefs in the search for better, more fruitful descriptions. Rorty's preferred means of redescription is the kind of stories, great novels primarily, that foster imaginative identification with unfamiliar others (2016, 1989). I think that the fallibilistic urge to (imaginatively) identify with unfamiliar others favourably can be associated with a much wider range of sources, ranging from fiction through documentary, social research, and journalistic reports to interaction and conversation, and so on. Nevertheless, if one accepts the loyalty redescription and the view of moral progress as expanding loyalties, the liberal and fallibilistic vocabulary is at an advantage because of its urge to continuously reweave itself in search of better, more encompassing descriptions of values such as solidarity, tolerance, equality and justice (or, in sport, fair play). By securing space for the sources of (imaginative) identification that drive such continuous redescription, liberal, fallibilistic and reflective communities can make themselves look more attractive to more and more people by letting these people's experiences feed into their deliberative ponderings about what their beliefs actually entail and require from them.

I believe that anti-doping offers a good case study for why this holds. I move forward, thus, with an image of fallibilistically liberal, reflectively ethnocentric sporting communities seeking to continuously redescribe themselves as inviting and attracting more and more athletes' loyalty.

Implications: The case of anti-doping

The loyalty redescription of fair play starts out as a rhetorical shift that in practical terms places emphasis on larger sporting communities' task of constructing meaningful narratives for athletes to draw upon in the narration of their identities as athletes. As previously

suggested, this endeavour is not just a matter of telling stories. Meaningful redescription cuts deep into practice. What is practically at stake is the willingness of communities to continuously seek better descriptions of themselves, come up with more encompassing interpretations of their beliefs and adopt better versions of their practices. Concerning anti-doping, there are numerous prevailing beliefs and practices to put forward for critical scrutiny. In the following, I will merely sketch some preliminary questions and preliminary criticisms that social critics of sport would need to raise upon accepting the loyalty redescription. Specifically, I address two prevailing aspects of current anti-doping policy and rhetoric: The reliance on surveillance-based policies, and the individualization of athletes' responsibility for doping.

Loyalty and surveillance-based policy

At present, anti-doping policy in Olympic sport is heavily biased towards measures of control and surveillance, notably biological testing of athletes' blood and urine and the so-called 'whereabouts' system, designed to facilitate efficient unnoticed out-of-competition testing (Moston and Engelberg 2017; WADA 2019). Critics of these policies typically talk in terms of a conflict between athletes' rights to doping-free competition and their privacy rights (Hanstad and Loland 2009; MacGregor 2015; Tamburrini 2013), or problematize their effectivity vis-à-vis the purpose of detecting and deterring doping (Moston and Engelberg 2017). For the present purpose, I will focus on a different line of criticism raised by the loyalty redescription, namely the notion that high levels of surveillance risk changing the meaning of the term loyalty in a manner that strips the loyalty redescription of its liberal anchoring.

The first part of this argument reads that as the level of surveillance increases beyond a certain tipping point, the meaning of loyalty shifts from something that is fostered, in

communities of trust, to something that is forced as coordinating bodies develop and act on a certain mistrust of the members of a community. Consider for example a scenario in which the whereabouts system so effectively facilitates reliable out-of-competition testing that the chance of doping without testing positive are near zero. This scenario is way beyond the tipping point just mentioned, as surveillance has developed into a means of making loyalty as sentiment superfluous and 'loyalty' as a form of dictated behaviour all but inevitable. Beyond the context of sport and anti-doping, George Orwell's *1984* is a familiar depiction of such a scenario and vividly describes the discrepancy between high levels of surveillance and the image of communities built on trust, common interest and interdependence. In brief, *1984* underlines the unlikelihood that 'loyalty' understood as behaviour heavily influenced by the presence of surveillance measures, and decoupled as such from its relation to sentiment and reciprocal trust, is the kind of loyalty that larger sporting communities should seek – the kind of loyalty at play when members take on the narratives of the communities in the narration of their moral athlete identities. It seems highly doubtful, that is, that Winston Smith would narrate himself as loyal to Big Brother in the same sense that sporting communities would want Alexander to narrate himself as a loyal 'Olympic athlete' or Lance as a loyal 'professional road cyclist'.

It can be objected that WADA's whereabouts system is neither very invasive nor 'extremely efficient' and hence that the parallel to *1984* is exaggerated at least. However, conceiving of 'Olympic sport' or 'professional road cycling' as communities of trust inviting of athletes' loyalty through narratives of identification leaves, I think, relatively little space for surveillance and mistrust Rather, the loyalty redescription points towards an ideal state in which surveillance is rendered redundant as athletes throughout the large, international, or even global sporting communities understand themselves on and off the field within the boundaries set by the loyalties woven into their moral athlete identities. If, in the non-ideal

states of today and tomorrow, surveillance-based policies still appear a good idea for reasons not considered in the present discussion, sporting communities that buy into the loyalty redescription will have to balance their use with close consideration of the relationship between loyalty and trust. In such considerations, the loyalty redescription, at least, provides a philosophical basis for arguments in support of a considerable downscaling of surveillance-based measures.

Loyalty and individualization of responsibility

A second aspect of current anti-doping policy and rhetoric to put forward for critical scrutiny with the lenses provided by the loyalty redescription, is the individualization of athletes' responsibility for doping. As Waddington and Møller (2019, 225-226) observe, 'anti-doping policy has been based on a highly individualized conception of the elite athlete, who is presented as an asocial, isolated individual who is able to make more or less free and unconstrained choices' and of doped athletes as 'isolated and deviant individuals, the occasional "bad apple"'. This 'individualistic bias' is reflected in a pervading prioritisation of control measures aimed at deterring and detecting doping by testing the individual athletes – that is, collecting evidence from their bodies. Arguably, the bias in policy is paralleled by a public discourse, salient in many Western sporting communities at least, in which individual athletes involved in doping cases are regularly singled out for public condemnation and stigmatization (Dimeo and Møller 2018). Dimeo and Møller (2018) document a wide range of scientific and anecdotal evidence of the harmful consequences that such condemnation and shaming can cause for athletes, including a relatively high risk of severe depression and even suicide. Several authors have highlighted the ethical problems of these practices (e.g. Macedo et al. 2019; Sandvik 2019; Dimeo and Møller 2018).

Contrast to the individualistic bias, sociological research paints a picture of doping as a predominantly social phenomenon that occurs within networks of social relationships (Brissonneau 2015; Waddington 2000; Ohl et al. 2015; Hoberman 2003). Research describes such smaller loyalties of athletes and, typically, coaches, physicians, dealers and so on, as important both practically, in order to organise, administer, and cover doping, and psychologically, to encourage, rationalise, and support it. On the basis of this growing body of research, Waddington and Møller (2019, 212) argue that the individualistic bias restrains 'fresh thinking and new approaches to anti-doping' more suited to the social network picture of doping practices. The question 'how to describe anti-doping, if doping is described as a predominantly social rather than individual phenomenon?' is not sufficiently addressed by policy makers and the result seems to be a steadily intensified focus on seemingly ineffective biological testing and surveillance-based policy.

By itself, I would argue, the clear findings of social scientific research make the individualistic bias an unlikely survivor of critical scrutiny in a fallibilistically liberal, reflective ethnocentrist sporting community that draws on research – among other sources – to distinguish useful beliefs from less useful ones. Nevertheless, I argue that the loyalty redescription of fair play adds significant pragmatic force to the critique of individualization of responsibility and, correspondingly, to arguments for more socially oriented approaches to anti-doping. Viewed through the lenses of the loyalty redescription, the social network picture of doping appears less as a vaguely complex disturbance to the straightforward picture of the isolated and deviant cheater, and more as a direct challenge to sport communities' project of reinventing themselves as inviting of more and more athletes' loyalty. With the loyalty redescription, social doping networks are conceptualised as conflicting loyalties to the larger ones – as smaller communities spread throughout the sporting world, often appearing more compelling to many athletes.

Viewing the social network conception of doping through the lenses of the loyalty redescription can inform fresh thinking in two directions: one concerned with measures designed to make doping networks less attractive; and one with measures designed to make larger loyalties to sporting communities more attractive. A study by Aubel and Ohl (2014) concludes with policy proposals that cut in both directions. In a project funded by the UCI with a view to reforming its anti-doping policy, the researchers found that the working environment of top-level athletes in road cycling in the 1990s and 2000s increased the risk of doping. The organisational structure of road cycling involved a majority of riders on short-term contracts with a majority of employers (i.e. teams) financially dependent on short-term sponsorships, low wages, a norm of a painstaking 80-120 racing days a year per athlete, little follow-up in training and preparation, no representative body to protect athletes' interests, and so on. Unsurprisingly, this organisational structure put many riders in a vulnerable and precarious situation and many found their loyalties not in the team or in the larger professional road cycling community, but in external networks of physicians, coaches, and other riders in similar situations.

Surveillance and biological testing do not pull such structural issues up by the roots. Rather, as Aubel and Ohl (2014, 1101) suggest, in such a situation, wider social policy is needed 'to challenge the precariousness of the riders' careers and also that of teams'. One example of such policy can be measures that promote 'dual vocational projects (in sport and outside sport)' that increase athletes' chances of securing a rewarding job in the highly likely event that athletic results and long-term employment in sport fail to materialise (Aubel and Ohl, 2014, 1101). Different examples could be minimum salaries, workload restrictions and, as none are better placed than athletes to draw attention to other structural issues previously unattended to: athlete representation in policy making processes. If individualized control measures were subordinated to wider social policy, I suggest, the coordinating bodies of

larger sporting communities would operate more trustworthily with the athletes' best interests in mind – that is: more inviting of their larger loyalty.

What about the 'anti' in anti-doping?

Admittedly, loyalty redescription carries a challenge captured by the question: 'What about the "anti" in anti-doping?' This question partly arises from the elevation of the goal of creating compelling communities of trust, common interest and interdependence above the presently overarching goal of eradicating doping. The loyalty redescription of fair play leads to this shift because, while the eradication of doping could represent an achievement of an extremely appealing larger sporting community, it could also be something different: a result of loyal behaviour being forced on athletes in an Orwellian sense. With the shift I am suggesting, sporting practices with zero doping but with high levels of surveillance are less likely to survive critical scrutiny than are sporting practices with some doping but low levels of surveillance. Similarly, sporting practices with close-to-zero doping but in which a proportion of the few individuals who are caught doping are subjected to public condemnation and stigmatization and driven into severe depression or even suicide, are less likely to survive critical scrutiny than are sporting practices with some doping but more compassionate approaches towards those who break the rules.

The challenge that stems from downgrading the eradication aim is better understood as a challenge for political rhetoric than a threat to a, however subordinated, aim of reducing the prevalence of doping in sport. Empirical evidence suggests that current policy is not very efficient with regards to the eradication aim as doping remains considerable in many sports (de Hon, Kuipers, and van Bottenburg 2015; Moston and Engelberg 2017; Ulrich et al. 2017). Thus, whereas downgrading this aim certainly marks a rhetorical shift, it does not mean throwing overboard demonstrably efficient policies for new and assuredly less efficient policies.

There is at least one more way in which the question ‘What about the “anti” in anti-doping?’ can be aimed at loyalty redescription. This concerns the role that fallibility plays in the argument. Fallibilistically liberal, reflectively ethnocentric sport communities welcome the realisation that what most of their members believe now might be found out to be wrong, or become wrong, as context changes through future contingencies. In other words, the ‘anti’ in anti-doping might come to be seen as irreconcilable with the communities’ commitments to, for instance, solidarity, tolerance, and fair play. As a philosophical standpoint, recognising the contingency and fallibility of anti-doping as an ethical standpoint is not very controversial. Philosophers from many traditions can make a wide range of convincing arguments for the justification of anti-doping in the current situation and with the currently available facts and premises. These arguments are no less convincing, I think, if the philosophers admit that their argument would not have carried the same weight if presented to the riders and organisation of, say, the 1923 Tour de France[iii], or when, like Loland and Hoppeler (2012, 353), they explicitly restrict their argument to ‘the current situation’. After all, one can easily imagine future scenarios in which anti-doping policy in its current form becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile with the principle of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ (Loland 2002), for example in a context where some athletes are born with genetically modified traits or other innate technologies not yet conceived. For anti-doping advocates, I suppose, the fallibility of anti-doping as an ethical position in the current situation is less intuitively appealing. However, it follows the same line of thought: Admitting to anti-doping’s present fallibility amounts to saying that there might be relevant facts about the current situation yet to be discovered or accounted for that can alter the premises of the arguments rested upon to justify anti-doping.

In terms of how they affect political rhetoric, however, larger sporting communities ought to consider both these challenges carefully. How can one rhetorically go about downgrading the aim of eradication? What is lost for the anti-doping movement if sport

communities introduce a certain amount of fallibility to their cultural politics and let go of the rhetorical points of being 'essentially' *anti* and exerting 'zero-tolerance'? I admit that something important might be lost and that, rhetorically, both consequences of the loyalty redescription are better conceived as humble afterthoughts rather than central tenets. Rather than presenting their anti-doping regulations and policies as more permissive and even potentially provisional, larger sport communities are better off treating these shifts in an implicit manner, as when slogans like 'Play with us!' replace slogans like 'Play true!'

Concluding remarks

Members of larger sporting communities that are consensually anti-doping regularly accuse members of smaller sporting communities that are tolerant to doping of having got sport wrong. For example, over the last few years, many have criticized leaders of Russian sport of conflating sport with soft power politics. In the years before, leaders of professional road cycling regularly criticised groups of practitioners for practising sport in a way that was perversely focused on performance and results, neglectful of health and vulgarly disrespectful of rules and fair equality of opportunity. To be clear, I do not wish to imply that the criticisms directed at Russian sport or certain practitioners of professional road cycling necessarily miss the mark. Neither do I want to imply that members of larger sporting communities are wrong in advancing these criticisms, nor that there is anything problematic about their strong encouragement that Russian sport or certain cycling practitioners begin to understand sport more in the same manner as they themselves do. What I suggest is that the rhetoric of such criticisms and encouragements would be greatly improved if the message that 'we have got sport right whereas you have got sport wrong' were replaced with compelling stories and practices that showcase the appeal of one's own understandings of sport.

With this rhetoric, leaders of the Olympic movement would not accuse leaders of Russian sport of conflating sport with soft power politics but frankly tell stories about how

they, too – since Coubertin – have conflated sport with politics, with the difference that their politics, from their fallibilistically liberal, reflectively ethnocentric vantage point, have been more fruitful: more favourable to the flourishing of what Murray (2018) calls ‘Good Sport’, more conducive to values such as solidarity, tolerance, and fair play. Similarly, leaders of professional road cycling would cease criticising some past and present practitioners for their dedication to a vulgar image of sport and instead tell stories about how they, too, are dedicated to an image of sport, only that this image, from their vantage point, has proven more fruitful. By this token, members of larger sporting communities can cease thinking about themselves as playing ‘true’ or ‘clean’ while others play ‘untrue’ or ‘dirty’ and start characterising their play as more attractive than currently available alternatives.

The first aim of this paper has been to make such a shift in rhetoric look attractive. The second aim has been to show that the shift in rhetoric can only be successful if it is supplemented with political reform. Larger sporting communities need to continuously redescribe themselves as more favourable to the flourishing of ‘Good Sport’, more conducive to values such as solidarity, tolerance, and fair play. Through such a redescription, they can attract the loyalty of more and more athletes. At present, anti-doping policy presents substantial challenges to the possibilities of such an endeavour.

Notes

[i] The reference to doping as a paramount case of foul play rests on a tacit acceptance of the ethical justifiability of the current ban on doping. From this acceptance, I lean on Loland and Hoppeler's (2012, 352) observation that 'when a ban on doping is justified without reference to the wrongness of breaking it, … the fairness argument becomes valid as well'. In other words: Breaking justified rules is foul play. As it happens, I do believe that the current ban on doping is justifiable from within a Rortyan, non-foundationalist perspective but that discussion belongs to a different paper.

[ii] That these incidents can run into conflict with 'what comes naturally' suggests that moral progress does not necessitate larger loyalties outgrowing smaller loyalties in terms of individuals' emotional attachment. Larger communities need only foster loyalty to the degree that individuals wish to abide by principles of 'fair play', and even if this is not a small task, it can hold even for people strongly attached to smaller loyalties. After all, even the most devoted team players in football, even in the most decisive moments of the game, tend to kick the ball out of play in the situation just described.

[iii] The 1923 Tour de France was won by Henri Pelissier, who, after quitting the race the year after, gave a famous interview together with his brother Francis and a rider named Maurice Ville:

> 'You have no idea what the Tour de France is,' Henri said. 'It's a cavalry. [...] We suffer on the road. But do you want to see how we keep going? Wait...' From his bag he takes a phial. 'That, that's cocaine for our eyes and chloroform for our gums...' 'Here,' said Ville, tipping out the contents of his bag, 'horse liniment to keep my knees warm. And pills? You want to see the pills?' They got out three boxes apiece. 'In short,' said Francis, 'we run on dynamite.'
>
> (McGann and McGann 2006, 73-74)

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Sport, stories, and morality: a Rortyan approach to doping ethics

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ABSTRACT

Stories pervade sport. In elite spectator sport, stories play out in packed stadiums while being broadcast simultaneously to immense TV audiences. These stories, which present controversial goals, great comebacks, underdog victories, or clever instances of cheating among other incidents, can foster moral reflection. This paper explores the relationship between sport, stories, and morality. It discusses Richard Rorty's insistence on narrative as a powerful vehicle to moral change and progress, as one way to understand this relationship. Stories about Justin Gatlin and Therese Johaug – two world-class athletes who tested positive for prohibited substances and served doping bans – are discussed as exemplars of redescriptive narratives: stories that can foster our moral imagination, broaden our conversations and help us to enhance our descriptions and practices of solidarity. In this Rortyan approach, moral progress can occur when the work of narrative redescription joins forces with philosophy's rational struggle for coherence. Building on this conception of progress, the paper concludes with a reflection on narrative redescription as a method in sport ethics.

KEYWORDS Stories; narrative; redescription; Richard Rorty; ethics; doping

Introduction

As Justin Gatlin celebrated a controversial gold medal in the men's 100-m dash at the 2017 World Athletics Championships, the story playing out on TV screens worldwide raised many moral questions about doping, anti-doping, and public condemnation of athletes who have served doping bans. The inescapable contrast in this story between, on the one hand, an emotional Gatlin and comforting popular hero, Usain Bolt, and, on the other hand, a booing crowd, elucidated conflicting moral beliefs in a way highly conducive to reflection and discussion. Ten months earlier, the Norwegian sports community had been shocked by cross-country skier Therese Johaug's positive test for clostebol; this initial shock developed into an intense debate as the media story around her case unfolded, and as,

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eventually, an eighteen-month ban from competition was handed down. Unprecedented in the Norwegian context because of its strong emphasis on the perspective and emotions of an athlete testing positive for doping, the story raised questions previously all but unexplored in this context about the adverse consequences of anti-doping.

'Sport', says Kretchmar (2017) 'is story-friendly'. Sharing structural, semantic, and social similarities with fiction, sport has a comparable potential for 'generating … powerful stories' (Kretchmar 2017, 57). From a sport ethical point of view, this story-telling feature of sport is significant because stories are morally important. Narrative philosophers have widely discussed the many possible ways in which fictional and non-fictional stories work in our moral universe (e.g. Lindemann Nelson 2001; MacIntyre 1981; Nussbaum 1990, 1995; Ricoeur 1992, 1988; Rorty 1989, 2016; Taylor 1989). In particular, Alisdair MacIntyre's account of foundational narratives as practice communities' sources of moral normativity has informed sport ethics (McNamee 2008; Morgan 1994). Following Morgan (1998) and Roberts (1995, 1997), the present paper takes its inspiration from Richard Rorty.

Focusing on two stories about a particularly contentious moral issue in sport – doping – the present paper suggests one approach to better understand the role of stories in moral thinking about sport. This Rortyan approach starts from the presumption that moral progress is made in search of means to increase one's moral imagination and enhance one's descriptions and practices of solidarity. This project is well served by redescriptive narratives: stories that expose us to the contingency of our beliefs and inform our moral thinking with alternative beliefs, new perspectives, and new questions.

Thus, the central purpose of this paper is to posit the Gatling and Johaug stories as redescriptive sport narratives In extension, a second purpose is to develop and discuss narrative redescription as a method in sport ethics. Towards these aims, the following section explores the salience of stories in sport and moral thinking and introduces Rorty's approach as one promising way of exploring the moral work of stories in sport. Next, the Gatlin and Johaug stories are introduced and subsequently discussed in light of the Rortyan approach. The paper concludes with a methodological discussion that reflects on the potential of narrative redescription as a method in sport ethics.

Sport, stories and morality

To play sport, notes Howe (2011, 43), 'is to take on the narrative … of "being a player in this game" or being "a runner/swimmer/climber/etc." It is to introduce into one's internal narrative of self this additional narrative thread of oneself as doing actions in a certain way, and of perhaps being this way or that'. In playing sport, we do not merely add content to the story we tell

ourselves about ourselves; we play that story out *as* players, runners, swimmers or climbers. In any sport setting, thus, there are people involved in telling stories about themselves from the perspective of a practitioner. In most settings, there are multiple stories, multiple storytellers, and more perspectives.

Particularly in elite spectator sport, the presence and significance of both live and television audiences, media, sport governing bodies, support personnel, sponsors, and so on, make for a rich tapestry of stories told from a wide variety of perspectives. To paraphrase Howe, to watch, cover, or fund a sport event, is to take on the narrative of being a fan, a reporter, or a sponsor involved in the sport. What is more, sport narratives enjoy a particular salience in popular culture. In most cultures, athletes, coaches, teams, and competitions enjoy broad public appeal, and stories of these are told and retold and reinterpreted in a variety of ways by the media, sport governing bodies, fans, and the general public.

The omnipresence and public appeal of narrative in sport is important because stories are morally important. That stories matter in a way central to our understanding of moral life is the unifying idea of 'narrative ethics'. In narrative ethics, stories are seen as necessary means to some moral end and thus matter beyond their widely recognized utility as illustrations or examples to test moral theories or principles. Narrative ethicists have argued that stories are a necessary means to moral education, moral guidance and motivation, moral justification, and making persons morally intelligible.[1] Moreover, narrative ethicists generally hold that stories can play these roles not least because of their unique potential to *move* us. Stories, fictional or non-fictional, told, retold or played out on the sport field, invite us to emotionally engage and form bonds of sympathy and identification with its characters. One philosopher who embraces the ethical utility of this aspect of stories is Richard Rorty. Building on Rorty's work, this paper explores the idea of stories as a means to redescribe ourselves, and our moral beliefs, by increasing our sensitivity to the cruelty, pain, and humiliation experienced by other people.

Rorty and narrative redescription

To Rorty, one of the main values of great storytellers lies in their ability to invite us into the perspective of 'other'. Great fiction exposes audiences to the experiences of people with whom they had previously not concerned themselves, and forms of cruelty they had not previously realized existed. Engaging in the tragic experiences of Twain's Huck or Dickens' Oliver invites readers to redescribe themselves in terms of the suffering they could themselves have endured; engaging in the deeply distressing experiences of Dostoyevsky's Raskolnikov or Highsmith's Tom, readers are invited to

redescribe themselves in terms of previously unfamiliar forms of cruelty laying within the realm of human possibilities. Exposure to such redescriptive narratives inclines us to expand the circle of people referred to as 'we' or 'us' and, in turn, our conversations become broader as the perspectives of more people come into consideration. 'That is why', says Rorty (1989, xvi), 'the novel, the movie, and the TV programme have, gradually but steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the principle vehicle of moral change and progress'. Because of their peculiar potential for hitting where it hurts the most – by evoking emotion, compassion and identification – stories are powerful vehicles to foster the kind of imagination necessary for accommodating new and unfamiliar perspectives as our own.

Rorty's views on the redescriptive work of narrative reflect his view of moral progress, which, in turn, aligns with his conception of a liberal democratic utopia chracterized by an ongoing and pervasive search for better descriptions and better practices of solidarity. In Rorty's utopia 'solidarity would be seen not as a fact to be recognized by clearing away "prejudice" or burrowing down to previously hidden depths but, rather, as a goal to be achieved' (Rorty 1989, xvi). As the true descriptions of solidarity are not 'out there' for humans to uncover, solidarity cannot be described or achieved in a final sense but is always open to redescription.[2] This insight carries with it the caveat that we can never be fully confident about the status of our descriptions and practices of solidarity, and, thus, the project Rorty promotes becomes a continual search for better descriptions by way of exploring alternatives. In this project, fiction and other kinds of narrative are preferred means as they confront us with alternative descriptions. In Rorty's words, stories help us redefine solidarity by cultivating 'our talent for speaking differently' (Rorty 1989, 7), by confronting us with ever-changing answers to questions such as 'solidarity for whom?' or 'whom have we, hitherto, looked past in our struggle for inclusivity?' or 'what do *these* people care about the most?'.

Narrative, thus, can contribute to moral progress insofar as it works to expand our 'we', broaden our conversations by taking into considerations a wider plurality of perspectives and, ultimately, enhance our and our communities' conception and practice of solidarity.[3] The following discussion explores ways in which non-fictional sport narratives can serve the redescriptive function Rorty ascribes to fictional narratives. In the following analysis, my interpretation[4] of the Justin Gatlin story exemplifies the potential of elite spectator sport for embodied, largely non-verbal narratives set in a competitive setting, conveyed to large audiences with the sense of urgency associated with live sport broadcasting. It plays out over a brief, but intense moment. The discussion focuses on the way in which the story facilitated new perspectives and new debates in the international athletics community on the issue of doped athletes. My interpretation of the Therese

Johaug story, on the other hand, relies on the potential for sport narratives to capture the attention of the public over time and facilitate rich and detailed public personal narratives about athlete-celebrities. I discuss how the story unfolded perspectives and arguments more or less unheard of previously in a strict, Norwegian anti-doping culture.

Justin Gatlin: from villain to victim?

At the 2017 World Championships in Athletics in London, the career of one of the most lauded athletes in the history of modern sports ended. On August 5, Jamaican sprinter and world record holder in the 100-m and 200-m sprints, Usain Bolt, participated in his last individual race: the final of the men's 100 m. Acclaimed for his public persona and showmanship in addition to his athletic excellence, Bolt's last shot at an individual gold medal in one of athletics' most prestigious events received massive attention from media and fans worldwide. A 'Lightning Bolt' win was widely anticipated. However, Bolt placed third, and American Justin Gatlin won the race. When the 60,000 spectators inside London Stadium realized that Gatlin had won, many started booing. A sense of strong, collective displeasure grew as Gatlin hushed the crowds. At that moment, Bolt approached Gatlin, who kneeled for Bolt, before the two embraced each other and, at least according to Gatlin, Bolt assured him that the win was well deserved.[5]

Although Bolt failing to win gold in his final race was an anti-climax to many, the reactions of displeasure inside the stadium had another main cause: doping. As Sebastian Coe, president of the International Association for Athletics Federation (IAAF), remarked: 'Sport rarely settles upon the perfect script. [...] I'm hardly going to sit here and tell you I'm eulogistic that somebody that has served two bans in our sport would walk off with one of our glittering prizes'.[6] In 2001, Justin Gatlin tested positive for amphetamines and was banned from competition for two years for violating anti-doping regulations. Gatlin appealed on the grounds that the positive test was due to medication for attention deficit disorder, and he was allowed an early reinstatement.[7] Then, in 2006, he tested positive for synthetic testosterone, maintaining that he was the victim of sabotage by a massage therapist. Gatlin was banned from competition for eight years (the World Anti-Doping Code allowed for lifetime bans for second violations, and Gatlin avoided a lifetime ban in exchange for cooperation with anti-doping authorities). Because the circumstances of his first violation indicated no intent of doping, the ban was reduced to four years after appeal.[8] Thus, Gatlin returned to competition in 2010.

It seems clear that the booing formed part of a powerful historical narrative in global sport culture positioning doping as a major threat to the integrity of sport. This narrative produced and was reproduced by

the creation, expansion, and intensification of anti-doping policy post-1960s (Gleaves and Llewellyn 2014). In this narrative, doping in sport has been described almost exclusively in language highlighting the harms of doping to sport and health and the need to promote and preserve 'clean' sports. Against the backdrop of this historical narrative, the booing can be interpreted as feeding into a subplot where the public narratives of Justin Gatlin and Usain Bolt intertwined in a popular dichotomy between (doped) 'villain' and (clean) 'hero'. The main interest here is the subplot description of Justin Gatlin as a villain, cast by the London crowds, following a report in *The Guardian* 'as the former drugs cheat who would dare to rain on Bolt's farewell parade'.[9] The news media's coverage of the final suggests that Gatlin was villainized due to a sense that the bans he served were insufficiently severe, that he had not admitted any wrongdoing, that his win might have been 'tainted' by potential long-lasting effects of doping, and that his presence at the race simply did not fit within the narrative of Usain Bolt's retirement.[10]

Against this background, I suggest that Justin Gatlin and Usain Bolt played lead roles in an embodied redescriptive narrative. Through a sequence of symbolically charged bodily gestures – Gatlin visibly crying, hushing the crowds, and kneeling for Bolt, Bolt approaching Gatlin with a huge smile and the two embracing each other – the brief but intense and highly publicized scene offered alternatives to the popular description of Gatlin as a villain. First, the sequence of gestures can be interpreted as informing and being informed by an understanding of Gatlin as a victim. In this interpretation, the two athletes' gestures are a reaction to the booing. Gatlin's first reaction is to dismissingly hush the crowds, communicating that he perceived their expression of condemnation as misplaced. Inevitably aware of the booing and the public interest in his reaction, Bolt attested to the description of Gatlin as a victim of misplaced condemnation. According to Gatlin, at least, Bolt assured him, as they embraced each other, that 'you don't deserve these boos'.[11] Further, the two athletes' actions can be interpreted as communicating a description of Gatlin as redeemed. In this interpretation, the sequence of gestures resembles the literary plot of a 'sinner' asking for forgiveness from a 'ruler' (or anyone with the power to forgive, symbolically or literally, 'on behalf of' a particular community). Gatlin introduced this plot when he kneeled for Bolt. In a scene casting Gatlin as having the 'masses' against him, he turned to the sole person in the arena with the charismatic authority to mitigate the popular response and powerfully suggest an alternative reading of the unfolding events. By approaching and hugging his rival, Bolt validated and advanced the plot introduced by Gatlin. With an inclusive gesture, the popular hero symbolically recognized Gatlin's place in the athletes' community and suggested a redescription of Gatlin as redeemed.

Interestingly, these redescriptions of Gatlin as a victim or redeemed need not contrast directly with the popular description of him as a villain. In the end, one can perceive Gatlin simultaneously as a villain due to his doping violations and victim of exaggerated public expressions of condemnation. However, stories can work to set up alternative descriptions against each other in ways conducive to reflection and discussion. In this particular narrative, as Gatlin and Bolt played out a redescriptive narrative against the backdrop of (and in reaction to) loud booing, there was a clear polarisation of alternative descriptions. Was Gatlin villain or victim? Raising (versions of) this question in the minds of many onlookers, the redescriptive narrative worked to encourage reflection and, as such, make relevant communities 'talk about more things'. Accordingly, in the following days, commentators and experts engaged in a lively debate on Gatlin, Bolt, and the booing. Without a doubt, the popular descriptions steadfastly depicted Gatlin as villain. Opinion pieces in major British newspapers described Gatlin as a 'shameless fraud',[12] a 'super-villain'[13] and, referring to the main antagonist in J. K. Rowling's *Harry Potter*, 'a Voldemort in spikes'.[14] However, these descriptions were challenged by the depth of Gatlin and Bolt's redescriptive narrative. BBC commentator and former sprinter Michael Johnson, for example, argued that 'We didn't educate people about all the drugs cheats. I think we have presented him as a villain. I think we need to do a better job of educating [everyone about] what has been going on'.[15] The problem with singling out Gatlin as a villain, in a sport suffering from a pervasive doping problem, was reflected by Michael Powell of *The New York Times*. In a piece titled 'Justin Gatlin is an athlete of his time; not a villain', Powell provided some nuance to the popular description of Gatlin as a two-time offender ('His first offense was not an offense at all') and argued that the villainization of individual athletes distracted from consideration of the systemic conditions underlying the sport's problem with doping.[16] Similarly, Gatlin's agent and retired hurdles sprinter Renaldo Nehemiah challenged the idea of demanding more from individual athletes than that they play by the rules. Gatlin, Nehemiah argued, has 'done his time. He plays by the rules. The IAAF reinstated him. They said if you come back we should accept that. So, to put a narrative out that it's just Justin Gatlin, and he's the bad guy, it's really not fair. It's inhumane. It's unsportsmanlike'.[17]

Whereas these are only small excerpts from a lively debate, they illustrate the way in which the embodied redescriptive narrative stimulated people to reflect and talk about some 'new' aspects of athletes who have served doping bans. Besides saying something general about the significance of stories to morality, the case highlights the moral work of one type of narrative particular to sport. The elite sport competition context – including its immediate aftermath of celebration or disappointment, admiration or indignation – facilitates narratives that are at the same time embodied

(through athletes performing, entertaining, and telling stories with their bodies), non-fictional, and broadcasted live via TV to large audiences. Narratives set in this context have the potential to raise moral questions that can engage entire communities and beyond through bodily movements that transcend language barriers. Furthermore, people commonly consume these narratives with a sense of urgency and intensity relating to the phenomenon of live broadcasting, the social significance of elite sport, and the non-fictional nature of sport narratives: the ending of the story is open, and the reactions to the story do not just comment on the story but inform it. In this vein, people applaud, approve, or boo, discuss, reflect, or question, and their applause, booing, or debates become part of the story, to some degree or other.

Therese Johaug: from pure hero to tragic hero

The following interpretation of Johaug's story is based on the Norwegian media's coverage of events as they unfolded beginning in October 2016, when it was announced that she had delivered a positive doping test, to the announcement of the Court of Arbitration for Sport's final verdict in August 2017. Johaug's positive test was for a clostebol metabolite. According to her testimony, two weeks prior to the test, she had approached the national team doctor with a severely sunburnt lip. The doctor gave her Trofodermin, an over-the-counter product containing clostebol and assured her that the product did not contain any substances on the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)'s prohibited list. Failing to notice a 'doping warning' on the packaging, Johaug used the product for 12 days. A 13-month suspension was issued to Johaug by The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sport; it was appealed by the International Ski Federation, which was subsequently extended to 18 months by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).'[18,19]

Arguably, the dominant narrative in the Norwegian media throughout the judicial process recast Johaug as the hero of a personal tragedy. Johaug's public narrative prior to the case was that of an athletically excellent, charming, and archetypically Norwegian 'Synnøve Solbakken',[20] rising to stardom in the national sport. She was a national sport hero, often framed as a particularly 'pure' one. Thus, when the case was made public in October 2016, it represented a dramatic downfall in a hero story. The Norwegian sport community has been described, prior to the Johaug case, as a rather dogmatic anti-doping culture marked by strong anti-doping attitudes in both general and athlete populations, and a somewhat uniform and condemning tone in media reports on doping cases (Breivik, Hanstad, and Loland 2009; Solberg, Hanstad, and Thøring 2010; Sandvik, Strandbu, and Loland 2017). Media narratives of Norwegian athletes in doping cases

prior to Johaug ranged from straightforward villain stories to stories of blunderers, unfortunates, or victims of bad expert advice. Johaug, however, would retain her hero designation as her story played out. As philosopher Hilde Vinje argues, Johaug would be redescribed as a tragic hero.[21]

Besides Johaug's established position as a national sport hero, this redescription was made possible by a certain ambiguity in the case. The story of the actual rule violation – Johaug's use of Trofodermin – balances between the athlete's striking negligence in overlooking a doping warning on the package of a medication and her understandable trust in expert advice. Thus, there is tension in the case between harm brought upon oneself and harm occurring through no fault of one's own. Arguably, this enabled the casting of Johaug as a typically ambiguous tragic hero: good, yet imperfect; unlucky, yet reproachable.

Furthermore, an overwhelming focus on Johaug's emotional turmoil amplified the sense of tragedy. Aligning with Johaug's previously established public narrative, the dominant media narrative during the case focused heavily on her personal story. Here, the role of first-person authorship was prominent. At the press conference, Johaug opened by saying that she was 'devastated [. . .] despaired and furious to be in this situation' and that there were 'no words to describe how terrible' she had felt since learning of the positive test.[22] The bulk of reporting from the Norwegian press conference emphasized and reinforced the focus on her emotional turmoil. For example, according to one report, Johaug 'informed about the case while crying and sobbing', was 'emotional and [in despair]' and 'without make-up', and the presence of her boyfriend at the press conference was considered an expression of 'important support'.[23]

Throughout the judicial process, similar observations and descriptions were prominent, alongside numerous stories describing a tough and gloomy existence as Johaug trained and prepared for an uncertain comeback in isolation from her former teammates.'[24,25] A 2017 *TV2* documentary,[26] which followed Johaug on a private training camp in the Italian Alps, contains scenes presumably shot when the athlete learnt about the final CAS verdict and, later, when she informed her family about it. After her manager takes Johaug aside and informs her about the news, she yells in despair, 'What? 18 months?'. Then the picture shifts to a bird's-eye view of the hotel. In a horror-like scene, the camera zooms out as viewers can hear a tearful Johaug informing her family about the lengthened ban, prompting a heartbreakingly shrill and drawn-out 'No!' from one of her family members. The documentary then fades to black and rolls the credits.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Johaug story is the impression it offered that the perspective and emotions of the athlete in question are relevant and even urgent to a community's approach to a doping case. Redescribing Johaug as the hero of a personal tragedy entails

a redescription of the wider categories 'athletes testing positive for doping' or 'athletes banned for doping': now, these categories were expanded beyond villains or blunderers to involve tragic heroes as well. This redescription contrasted sharply with the descriptions of other athletes involved in doping cases. For example, some commentators and experts have pointed out the contrast in the Norwegian discourse between the attention to Johaug's perspective and the firm course taken against other athletes claiming to consume a prohibited substance by accident or mistake, including Spanish superstar cyclist Alberto Contador[27] and little-known Norwegian weightlifter Ruth Kasirye.[28] The redescriptive Johaug narrative introduced the notion that some of these athletes are tragic heroes – worthy of compassion and even admiration.

With a basis in the redescription of Johaug as a hero in a personal tragedy, came a thorough debate in Norway about anti-doping policy. The primary example was the proliferation of opinion pieces and expert interviews regarding the principle of strict liability.[29] In a debate where prominent lawyers, intellectuals, politicians, cultural celebrities, and sport leaders took part, most contributors framed strict liability as problematic. In the days after the announcement of Johaug's positive test, Thorbjørn Jagland, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and former Prime Minister, linked her case to the possibility that strict liability in anti-doping represents an infringement of human rights.[30] Novelist, lawyer, and former Minister of Justice, Anne Holt argued that strict liability rendered full acquittal impossible in doping cases because impunity is insufficient for acquittal in the eyes of all-important sponsors and fans.[31] Headlines indicating that Johaug had been 'sacrificed' to the anti-doping system in order to catch 'real cheaters', and that this sacrifice is institutionalized through the principle of strict liability were frequent.[32,33,34] The contrast between these descriptions and previously widespread beliefs in a rather dogmatic anti-doping culture, such as the Norwegian one, is striking.

Again, these are only small excerpts from a debate persisting in the Norwegian media throughout the judicial process and, indeed, afterwards. However, they illustrate how the redescriptive Johaug narrative – casting the athlete as the hero of a personal tragedy – prompted the Norwegian sport community to reflect and talk about aspects of anti-doping previously more or less unquestioned. Arguably, this points to an important feature of the relationship between sport, stories, and morality. Elite athletes are the subject matter of hero narratives. When spectators follow athletes on the pitch or on the track, they watch them perform athletic achievements, but also, as in Johaug's case, they reflect social values the community cares about and display virtues it admires. 'The hero shows us what we ought to be', says Crepeau (1981, 23), 'and we make him a hero because we wish to be what he is'. Because many elite athletes enjoy celebrity status, these hero

narratives are typically rich in detail, with interviews, TV documentaries, and social media appearances adding to a sense among the general public of knowing athletes personally. However, as sport is full of pitfalls, both athletic and moral, our heroes can turn tragic. Paraphrasing Crepeau, the tragic hero shows us that what we wish to be can include tragedy and fallibility. The Johaug story, as narrated in the Norwegian context, is an example of how the tragic hero narrative can encourage us to redescribe ourselves in terms of the missteps that could have been ours, and, thus, make us more compassionate and more forgiving.

Narrative redescription as a method in sport ethics

Gatlin and Johaug represent two different kinds of redescriptive sport narratives that can evoke emotion, compassion and identification to foster our moral imagination, broaden our conversations and help us to enhance our descriptions and practices of solidarity. Drawing on embodied communication, moral nerve and the experienced urgency of sport broadcast in real time, the Gatlin story had the international athletics community debating whether expressions of public condemnation are appropriate in the cases of athletes returning to competition after serving doping bans. Moreover, the story had influential voices commit publicly to a shift in attention from individual athletes such as Gatlin to systemic factors enabling doping. Exemplifying sport's potential for casting tragic hero narratives, the Johaug story invited the Norwegian sport community to engage in and relate to her emotional turmoil. By sensitizing people to the perspective of an athlete involved in a doping case – a perspective not thoroughly addressed previously in the Norwegian context – the story encouraged debate, in particular about whether the principle of strict liability in anti-doping is justified.

Can it be said that society has progressed morally when its conversations about athletes testing positive for doping have broadened in these ways? This question can be answered in the positive by pointing out two ways in which Rorty's liberal democratic purpose, underlining his project of redescription, makes sense as a core purpose also in sport communities, influencing among other things anti-doping policy. First, there is the obvious point that sport is not an isolated phenomenon but exists within society. Thus, if one believes, as Rorty does, that society would benefit by increasing solidarity, one is inclined to think that sport is both an arena contributing to the wider realization of that aim and itself an arena that benefits from becoming more inclusive. Widespread 'sport for all' policies and slogans emphasizing both the social importance of sport and its potential to deliver solidarity and inclusion is a testimony to the impression that a Rortyan-like purpose is already familiar and core to sport communities and pervades sport policy

worldwide. Second and more specific to the topic of athletes testing positive for doping, there seems to be a pragmatic fit between the aim for solidarity and more inclusive communities and the global aspirations of the anti-doping movement. In implementing and enforcing prohibitive and regulative policies in sport worldwide, one seeks to unify a large and diverse population under one flag, so to speak. The success of such a lofty ambition seems far less likely in a context where most consider the policies as products of 'them', than in a world where most consider them as 'our', developed by 'us' and attentive to 'our' perspective.

In line with this core purpose, the present paper has sought to provide a narrative encouraging the replacement of the popularized anti-doping slogan 'protecting clean athletes' with 'protecting all athletes' and the reframing of our conversations within this redescription. Via the story of Gatlin, the paper has argued the notion that at some point after serving a doping ban, it makes sense for an athlete to be reconsidered as 'one of us'. With Johaug's story, the paper has conveyed the idea that some athletes testing positive for doping remains 'one of us' throughout the judicial process and onwards. A more general message in the two stories has been that one way for sport communities to realize solidarity is to take a more inclusive approach towards moral fallibility.

The normative aim of the paper has been to persuade the reader that this would be a promising way forward for sport communities. This entails a conception of narrative redescription as a sport ethical method: a means for sport philosophers to address and enhance their understanding of moral phenomena in sport and, correspondingly, argue for change. The title of Rorty's book *Philosophy as Poetry* entails a recognition of the philosopher's role as narrator of redescriptive narratives – as *a poet*, understood in the broad Rortyan sense as anyone who seeks to 'make things new' (1989, 13). The previous analyses have revolved around how redescriptive sport narratives can morally matter prior to our philosophizing about it. However, the redescriptive Gatlin and Johaug narratives are equally well understood as part and parcel of a redescriptive philosophical narrative. Indeed, the present paper rests upon interpretations, accentuation of some aspects and toning down of others, use of metaphors, backstories, and frames, development of plot and character – in short, narrative techniques employed to create a redescriptive narrative serving a purpose. This narrative is about the salience of stories in sport and in morality, and about the philosophy of Richard Rorty. It casts Justin Gatlin, Usain Bolt, and Therese Johaug as protagonists in redescriptive sport narratives and proceeds by plotting the function of these narratives in our moral universe as moral progress, rather than deterioration, standstill or, simply, change.

However, there is no guarantee for progress through poetry; no guarantee that redescriptive narratives offer *better* descriptions, no guarantee that

'new' is indeed 'better'. According to Burke and Roberts (1997, 101), it lies beyond a Rortyan approach to sport ethics to 'argue for any change beyond and expansion of our willingness and capacity to listen to others. Change will occur only if the sport community is touched by the stories it hears'. In Rorty's philosophy, there are two levels of redescription: one that puts me in full agreement with Burke and Roberts' claim, and one that reveals one way in which the stories we tell can indeed form the basis of arguments for change.[35] The former level is the kind associated with Bloom's *strong poet*, the maker of not only new things but radically new things, the poet that fills her stories, in Roberts' (1997, 76) words, with unfamiliar words and sentences, noises and movements 'outside existing language, logic, rationality and orthodoxy'. Arguments for change cannot be rationally pursued in the language of the strong poet before her words achieve a certain degree of common currency. I do not see this level of redescription at work in the present paper. The other level of redescription – a softer one – originates in Rorty's later attempts at reconciling the poet's work of imagination with the philosopher's work of rationality. In *Philosophy as Poetry*, Rorty's insistence on narrative redescription as a means of moral change and progress is not a matter of surrendering rationality entirely to imagination, but a matter of seeing how the two work together:

> Rationality is indeed a search for the coherence of our beliefs and desires, but imagination keeps proposing new candidates for belief and new things to desire. It keeps adding new pieces to the puzzle and suggesting that some of the old ones be swept off the table.
>
> (Rorty 2016, 48)

Here, Rorty understands rationality as the attempt 'to make one's web of beliefs as coherent, and as perspicuously structured, as possible' (1998, 171). Ultimately, this pursuit offers direction to his notion of progress. Viewing redescriptive narratives in the context of the search for coherence allows us to consider not only those stories that radically challenge the vocabularies that house our beliefs but also those that operate within our vocabularies to challenge the coherence of our beliefs. This softer kind of narrative redescription exposes us to new perspectives, intuitions, and commitments that, in some way or another, need accounting to achieve coherence.

Having been exposed to the Gatlin and Johaug stories, our beliefs about public condemnation or strict liability enter into a relationship with the perspectives, intuitions and commitments arising from engaging in these athletes' sufferings. To ensure that this relation contains no conflict, some refinement of our prior or newfound beliefs, or both, will often be necessary. Broader conversations entail progress because by 'talking about more things' we challenge the coherence of our webs of beliefs in more ways.

Talking about more things is step one; talking about more things coherently, remains.

Telling stories that encourage sport and anti-doping communities to protect all athletes rather than merely the 'clean', thus, is not to say that all beliefs expressed by all athletes at all times are equally 'right' and worthy of consideration. Rather, it is asking 'what happens to your prior beliefs – about public condemnation, the singling out of individual athletes, or the principle of strict liability – if you consider them alongside these beliefs, expressed by these athletes, through these stories?'. Asking these questions, the narrative philosopher comes well equipped with the capacity of stories to invite emotion and evoke compassion and identification on the one hand, and the persuasive power of argument to point out incoherent beliefs, on the other.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the relationship between sport, stories, and morality. Discussing the stories of Justin Gatlin and Therese Johaug as exemplars of redescriptive narratives, the paper has aimed to show how sport can convey stories that have society look at moral issues in new ways, take into account a wider plurality of perspectives and, ultimately, enhance its conception and practice of solidarity. Finally, the paper has argued that if society considers this imaginative work of narrative – in sport and elsewhere – as joining forces with philosophy's rational strive for coherence, it is on the pathway to moral progress. For sport communities, in the context of anti-doping, progress occurs when a wider conception of solidarity, encompassing all athletes, including those considered 'morally fallible', is brought into equilibrium with other pressing purposes.

Notes

1. For an overview of the various claims narrative ethicists have made about the relationship between stories and morality and a thorough discussion of four of these claims, including Rorty's, but also MacIntyre's, Nussbaum's and Taylor's, see Lindemann-Nelson (2001, 36–68). There are significant differences between Rorty's narrativism and other narrative accounts that have proved useful to the ethics of sport, including MacIntyre's in particular. Further exploration of these differences, both in the context of the topic of the present paper and more generally, is an intriguing topic for future papers. For more general discussions of Rortyan approaches to sport ethics, dealing less explicitly with the role of stories, see Burke and Roberts (1997), Dixon (2001), Morgan (2000, 2004), and Roberts (1995, 1997).
2. The decisive role of redescription in Rorty's project springs out of his anti-essentialist philosophy: rejecting the idea that the truth about ourselves, morality, or anything else is 'out there'. 'The world is out there', Rorty grants

(1989, 5), 'but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false'. As our descriptions are not confined within 'the Real', matters are always open to redescription, and there is always a potential for descriptions better fit for our similarly improvable purposes. Rorty acknowledges that the world contains the states of affairs that allow us to decide among competing descriptions. Some claims, for instance about the colour of a wall, seem simply wrong, and we can point to the world 'out there' in order to show why this is so. However, it does not follow that the world can tell us what to decide. The world 'out there', says Rorty, 'is indifferent to our descriptions of it'. Descriptions of colours and truths about colours emerge simultaneously, as human creations.

3. Not all stories are good or useful to the project of enhancing one's descriptions and practices of solidarity. A merited concern is whether Rorty's anti-foundationalist approach carries sufficient tools to distinguish useful stories from useless or even counterproductive ones. Indeed, Rorty seems to hold that all stories can appear good to someone, somewhere. However, he does not conclude from this that any story can appear good to everyone, everywhere, including Rorty or any other liberal. Rorty's project is not an unguided search for just any story that conveys alternative descriptions to one's own. Rather, it is the search of a liberal guided by the socially and historically contingent perspective of a liberal: a person that loathes cruelty and appraises solidarity, is acutely aware of previous and present cruelties in her own culture and beyond, and adds to this awareness an equally acute strive to uncover or learn about new ones. Thus, Rorty trusts the liberal – in her hermeneutical project of refining her 'final vocabulary' – to distinguish useful stories from useless ones. This is not to say that Rorty's liberal is immune to the influence of bad stories, only that her liberal idiosyncrasies and inclination towards redescription point her in the right direction.
4. I stress that the Gatlin and Johaug stories presented herein are my interpretations. Indeed, both stories are ambiguous and open to various interpretations. An empirical enquiry into Bolt or Gatlin's intentions for doing what they did, or Johaug's emotional turmoil, or the extensive media coverage in both cases, would probably shed light on several, perhaps conflicting storylines rather than *one story*. The rationale for offering these interpretations is to explore how sport stories can enter into the Rortyan liberal's project of enhancing conceptions and practices of solidarity. Whereas I point to some evidence to this effect, I do not intend to say that the cases cannot serve different or even conflicting functions in society.
5. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/othersports/article-4764534/Justin-Gatlin-Usain-Bolt-said-deserved-world-title.html.
6. https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/athletics/justin-gatin-usain-bolt-100m-world-championships-wasnt-in-script-sebastian-coe-a7879191.html.
7. https://www.usada.org/u-s-track-athlete-receives-two-year-conditional-suspension-from-u-s-anti-doping-agency-for-inadvertent-violation/.
8. https://www.usada.org/arbitration-panel-suspends-gatlin-for-four-years/.
9. https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/dec/19/usain-bolt-justin-gatlin-beat-100m-final.
10. E.g. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/gatlin-spoils-party-for-bolt-hznfln9b7.
11. Justin Gatlin, cited in: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/othersports/article-4764534/Justin-Gatlin-Usain-Bolt-said-deserved-world-title.html.

12. https://www.independent.ie/sport/other-sports/athletics/comment-justin-gatlin-is-the-shameless-fraud-who-plays-the-system-perfectly-36006495.html.
13. https://www.theweek.co.uk/87569/gatlin-ruins-bolts-farewell-where-now-for-athletics.
14. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/sport/justin-gatlins-victory-reminds-us-that-sport-is-not-a-fairytale-88wzgvv8w.
15. https://www.bbc.com/sport/athletics/40842008.
16. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/sports/justin-gatlin-doping.html.
17. https://www.bbc.com/sport/athletics/40858219.
18. https://www.idrettsforbundet.no/Nyhet/dom-i-saken-mellom-antidoping-norge-og-therese-johaug/.
19. http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/news-detail/article/cas-decision-in-the-case-of-therese-johaug.html.
20. *Synnøve Solbakken* is a novel written by Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson. It portrays the struggle of protagonist Torbjørn, from the shadowy side of the valley, to marry Synnøve, a girl from Solbakken, a place where the sun always shines. In Norwegian culture, the figure of Synnøve Solbakken has come to symbolize a form of archetypically Norwegian femininity centering on rural background, beauty, goodness, and kindness (and, more shallowly, blond hair.)
21. The value of the tragic hero metaphor to shed light on the Johaug story was brought to my attention by Vinje, who understands the Johaug case an example of Aristotle's discussion of beauty in tragedy in *Poetics*, with Johaug as particularly well fit for the role of a tragic hero. Both my use of the term tragic hero and the discussion of the unresolved tension in the story between harm brought upon oneself and harm occurring by no fault of one's own is inspired by Vinje's opinion piece in *Morgenbladet*: https://morgenbladet.no/ideer/2018/11/skisportens-tragiske-helt.
22. https://www.vg.no/sport/langrenn/i/82AnW/johaug-fikk-stoette-fra-kjaeresten-under-pressekonferansen-han-har-vaert-veldig-viktig.
23. Ibid.
24. https://www.tv2.no/a/8687296/.
25. https://www.aftenposten.no/100Sport/vintersport/langrenn/Hun-var-en-del-av-familien-i-11-ar-Plutselig-er-alt-borte-226807b.html.
26. https://sumo.tv2.no/programmer/fakta/dokumentarer/therese-johaug-dommen-1184692.html?gclid=Cj0KCQiAxNnfBRDwARIsAJlH29Aq9lbssmFD24zMMYhYv3BCVtlhmNsuiQhpzU0BORRAAZdnj4EnbbUaAvcKEALw_wcB.
27. https://www.dagbladet.no/sport/johaug-saken-har-forandret-folks-syn-pa-doping-i-norge-og-i-sverige—vi-moter-oss-selv-i-doranbspsier-estil/65384786?fbclid=IwAR2swdqhYTKxYwqWoxbtyd0EsG-PZLS4CPbiZXfBNpS1BTmoopC5g3swfoQ.
28. https://www.vg.no/sport/i/o0KdR/vg-sportens-kommentator-hvem-graater-for-flaggbaereren.
29. As codified in the World Anti-Doping Code (2015), the principle of strict liability means that an anti-doping rule violation occurs whenever a prohibited substance, its metabolites, or markers are found in the bodily specimen of an athlete, whether or not the athlete intentionally or unintentionally used a prohibited substance or was negligent or otherwise at fault.

30. https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/i/RpAq5/Idrettsstjerner-har-ogsa-krav-pa-rettssikkerhet–Thorbjorn-Jagland.
31. https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/det-urimelige-ved-therese-johaugs-sak-1.791329.
32. https://www.dagensperspektiv.no/2017/johaug-uskyldig-ofret-pa-balet .
33. https://www.aftenposten.no/100Sport/vintersport/langrenn/Professor-om-Johaug-saken—Vi-kan-ikke-ofre-uskyldige-for-a-ta-skyldige-73614b.html.
34. https://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/sport/2017/08/22/195326463/idrettsjurist-johaug-er-blitt-ofret-pa-dopingreglementets-alter.
35. The significance of this distinction was suggested by an anonymous referee for *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*.

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Paper 4

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The Confession Dilemma: Doping, Lying, and Narrative Identity

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ABSTRACT

Despite the commonly held view that confessing to doping is morally right, few former elite athletes who have doped confess to doping. In this paper, I ask whether elite athletes who have doped are morally obliged to confess. I start by observing that the core of the elite athlete's confession dilemma is located in the dichotomy between lying and veracity. I argue that lying about doping belongs to a particular kind of lying that, in turn, brings about a particular kind of consequence. More specifically, I consider lying about doping in light of an athlete's personal narrative identity. Initially, the narrative identity view seems to strongly support an elite athlete's moral obligation to confess (i.e. to start telling the truth about who they really are). However, viewing narrative identity not merely as description (responding to the question, Who am I?) but also prescription (responding to the question, Who should I be?) complicates this picture. The prescriptive perspective of narrative identity is a gateway to understand the significant negative consequences of confessing to doping. In this way, I call into question commonly held views about the moral obligation to confess.

KEYWORDS

Doping; cycling; narrative identity; confession; lying

Introduction

> There's no easy way to say this, so let me just say it plain: on Sunday night you'll see me on 60 Minutes making a confession that's overdue. Long overdue.
>
> During my cycling career, I knowingly broke the rules. I used performance-enhancing drugs. I lied about it, over and over. Worst of all, I hurt people I care about. And while there are reasons for what I did—reasons I hope you'll understand better after watching—it doesn't excuse the fact that I did it all, and there's no way on earth to undo it.
>
> (Tyler Hamilton's letter of confession 2011)
>
> For close to 15 years I've kept a secret. I will start at the beginning, but first I will say that what's been revealed the last two weeks through the USADA [United States Anti-Doping Agency]'s report on US Postal has made it necessary for me to pull out my dark lie from the past. […] After my first two years as professional, a bit into the 1998 season, I made the choice that if I was to continue in this 'race', I had to take part in the prerequisites that I felt existed in the peloton,[1] and I got, on my own initiative, EPO [erythropoietin].

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(Press conference with Steffen Kjærgaard 2012b, author's translation)

These are the first words of two professional road cyclists' public confessions to doping. Tyler Hamilton and Steffen Kjærgaard are not alone. In the context of several 'scandals' in road cycling, beginning with the 1998 Festina affair[2] and culminating with the demise of Lance Armstrong,[3] numerous athletes—in autobiographies, press statements, interviews, or testimonies to civil law enforcement agencies or sports' anti-doping authorities—have confessed to doping; that is, to using erythropoietin (EPO), human growth hormone, blood transfusions, or other banned technologies to increase athletic performance.

With tales of regret, hurt loved ones, deception and self-deception, the quotations attest to the morally charged nature of doping use in elite sports and, relatedly, the morally charged nature of confessing to doping. The stance that confessing to doping is morally right is a recurring theme in the autobiographies of several road cyclists: finally, after years of wrongdoing, the message is that they have done the right thing. As Thomas Dekker, who tested positive for EPO in 2009, puts it: 'It's only in recent years that I've been able to see my actions for what they were, take stock of the damage I've done. I have made a mess of things. The aim of this book is to clear up part of that mess' (Dekker and Zonneveld 2017, 210).

Moreover, the framing of confessing as morally right was salient in the USADA's public communication about its case against Lance Armstrong and the US Postal Service Pro Cycling Team. The case was built on testimonies from several of Armstrong's former teammates (including Hamilton), and USADA CEO Travis Tygart publicly described the testifying athletes as 'heroes' who displayed 'tremendous courage' (Brown 2014; Tygart 2012). According to anti-doping authorities, athletes' confessions greatly contribute to the identification of other cheaters and influence anti-doping education by increasing educators' understanding of doping practices (e.g. Niggli 2017).

Despite clear recommendations from confessing athletes and anti-doping authorities that admitting to doping is morally right, few elite athletes who dope seem to confess. An independent investigation into road cycling's history of doping specified that 'from the early 1990s to the mid/late-2000s'—a period often referred to as the 'blood doping era'—'it would have been hard to overestimate the prevalence of drug use in the peloton' (Marty et al. 2015). While there has not been a scientific study about the prevalence of doping in professional road cycling, *not* doping seems to have been the exception rather than the rule in this particular 'era'.[4] This assumption is consistent with the general impression from athletes' testimonies, media reports and the stance of anti-doping authorities. Given these circumstances, the number of confessing athletes is relatively low. The same is true for other sports: in athletics, for example, a recent study estimated the prevalence of doping among the participants in two international championships held in 2011 to be 43.6 and 57.1%, respectively (Ulrich et al. 2018). Comparatively, the number of doping confessions in athletics is negligible.

In this paper, I ask whether elite athletes who have doped are morally obliged to confess. My discussion focuses on the dilemma of professional road cyclists who doped during the blood doping era of the early 1990s to the late 2000s. Tyler Hamilton and Steffen Kjærgaard are examples of such cyclists. I want to stress that my analysis does not concern their individual cases—or any individual case—per se. Instead, I draw upon various reports (including social research), autobiographies and journalistic interviews to substantiate a philosophical argument about the morality of doping confessions.

In the following section, I argue that the core of the confession dilemma lies in the dichotomy between lying and veracity, and I develop an approach to the ethics of lying indebted to the work of Bok (1999). Lying comes in many forms, and in the subsequent section I depart from a recent argument framing elite athletes' lies about doping as lies about who they really are in the eyes of the public (Gendreau 2015). More specifically, I consider lying about doping in light of athletes' personal narrative identity. While the narrative identity view seems to strongly support an elite athlete's moral obligation to confess, I argue that viewing narrative identity not merely as description but also as prescription complicates this picture. The prescriptive perspective of narrative identity is a gateway to understand the significant negative consequences of confessing to doping, which calls into question commonly held views on the moral obligation to confess.

The Ethics of Lying

Deception is a necessary part of successfully doping in most sports. From a virtue ethical standpoint, McNamee (2008) highlighted the role systematic deception plays in the moral evaluation of 'doping cheats' as constitutive of the vices, *pleonexia* and *aidos*. Similarly, Gendreau (2015) identified lying as the central moral concept feeding into the public condemnation typically facing elite athletes who dope. The quotations in the introduction illustrate how lying is a central aspect of elite athletes' experience of doping or, as in these particular cases, former elite athletes' experiences of *having* doped. In essence, to confess or not is a question of whether to continue lying about one's history of doping or start telling the truth.

In the seminal book *Lying* (1999), Bok departs from the consequentialist approach by arguing that weighing good and bad consequences has an important intuitive quality and approximates a commonsensical approach to lying. Arguments commonly acknowledged as justifying a lie typically stress how the lie promotes some good consequence or protects from some bad consequence. According to a clear-cut consequentialist view, lying is morally neutral. Thus, if telling a lie produces better consequences than telling the truth, then lying is right and truth-telling is wrong. If telling the truth or a lie produce equally good and bad consequences, then telling the truth or a lie are morally equivalent. The consequentialist position leads to intuitively problematic conclusions, including that it is right to tell—and wrong not to tell—a lie that produces only marginally good consequences to oneself and no good or bad consequence to anyone else. Facing such conflicts with intuition, Bok argues that lying ought not to be considered morally neutral and need not be treated as such, even from a consequentialist perspective.

Moreover, a clear-cut consequentialist approach risks biased calculations that undermine distant negative consequences of lying (affecting distant others and/or in the distant future) in favour of salient positive consequences (affecting ourselves or significant others in the present). For these reasons, Bok stresses that a consequentialist approach must account for the moral status of lying and restrain our tendency to prefer near over distant consequences. Hence, she argues that a moral analysis should begin from an initial presumption against lying, 'as a correction, endorsed by experience' (Bok 1999, 50). As such, she endorses a conditional principle of veracity, which holds that lying comes with a negative presumption and is wrong, barring overriding ethical reasons to lie. That is, reasons to lie must carry more weight—even substantially so—than reasons to tell the truth. Here, then, Bok returns to

consequentialism as the approach with which to examine any potentially overriding reasons for lying.

Bok argues that the consequences of lying should be looked at from three viewpoints. First, lying can both benefit and harm the liar him or herself, and the consequences to the person contemplating the lie affect the consequentialist analysis. Second, the purpose of a lie is often closely aligned with some intended good or bad consequence to the deceived, and these consequences should be accounted for. Third, we should evaluate lies from the viewpoint of aggregation: if the kind of lying considered in a particular case spreads and gives rise to a deceptive practice, what consequences would that produce to society?

My intention in this paper is not to map and calculate all the possible consequences arising from whether an elite athlete confesses to doping or not. Rather, I aim to show how lying about having doped belongs to a particular kind of lying which, in turn, gives rise to particular kinds of consequences that operate across the three viewpoints proposed by Bok. This particularity, I argue, encompasses lies that substantially affect how the liar reflects on the question, Who am I? In a narrative approach to personal identity, lying about core actions or experiences in our lives equates to lying about core aspects of who we are.

Narrative Identity as Description and Cyclists with a History of Doping

The following argument rests on the premise that (1) being a former professional road cyclist and (2) having doped are likely to be core aspects of how a person answers the question, Who am I?—or, as I conceptualise it here, of a person's narrative identity. To Ricoeur (1988b, 1992), narrative identity starts from the observation that human experience is narratively structured in the sense that objective/cosmological time and phenomenological time are reconfigured and rearticulated in our experience through narrative means. Through stories and plots, we make sense of our experience and, by extension, ourselves as the protagonists of that experience. As such, narrativity contributes to the constitution not only of what Ricoeur calls human time but also of the self.

In more practical terms, narrative identity can be conceptualised as an evolving and dynamic life narrative which functions to integrate the (roughly) recollected past and the (uncertain) anticipated future in order to ingrain one's life in the present with a sense of meaning, value and purpose (Atkins 2008; Scechtman 1996). Narrative identity is evolving as we lead our lives and dynamic as we continuously tell and re-tell our self-narratives through experience and reflection and, thus, edit and re-edit our identities. Because we lead lives in social and historical settings, narrative identity cannot merely be a first-person report of one's subjective experiences and point of view. Our social existence dictates that the first-person perspective (in which I am the 'me' in my life) be inevitably interweaved with the second-person perspective (in which I am a 'you' in your life). With the title of his major work on narrative identity, *Oneself as Another*, Ricoeur (1992, 3) highlights the centrality of the sense of otherness implied in the narrative constitution of the self:

> Oneself as Another suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms. To 'as' I should like to attach a strong meaning, not only that of comparison (oneself similar to another) but indeed that of implication (oneself inasmuch as being other).

This dialectic of selfhood creates a minimum requirement of coherency of a specific kind. A clear sense of who one depends on a self-narrative that coordinates the two perspectives, meaning that the 'me' in my life is coherent with the 'you' in your life. Coherency of this kind is determined by how *I* view *myself* across both perspectives, and the second-person perspective is mediated to some degree by my experience of how other persons actually view me (as a 'you' in their lives).

Is it reasonable, within this framework, to claim that (1) being a former professional road cyclist and (2) having doped are likely to be core aspects of a person's narrative identity? The question of how central an action or experience is to our identity is complex and subject to narrative's dynamic nature. One salient aspect is the role of social and historical circumstances and collectively shared themes. In the current Western context, for example, education and occupation are core themes at a collective level and, correspondingly, core themes in many (or most) people's life narratives. Similarly, elite sports strongly delineate individual lives through their time-consuming narratives of training, preparation and competition as well as the popularised, appraised and even heroised 'status' of elite athletes. Furthermore, elite sports offer several strong 'identity markers' that work across the dialectic between self and other. One example concerns the bodily aspect of sports and the moulding of bodies recognisable to oneself and others as 'athlete bodies'. A different example is the staging of dramatic performances before an audience, and the imprint of these into a 'collective sports memory', meaning that a sports performance is both something to remember and something to be remembered by.

Social and historical circumstances seem to play a crucial role in doping. If doping is—as in many Western countries today—highly publicised, problematised and even criminalised, it is more likely to be a central theme in the doped athlete's life narrative than if it was a mundane and trivial phenomenon. As Gendreau (2015) points out, the relationship between doping and narrative identity is crucially a matter of the role 'not doping' plays in most elite athletes' public narrative. In strong anti-doping cultures, that elite athletes do not dope is something a majority of people (explicitly or implicitly) hold as a precondition for admiring, celebrating, or even taking an interest in their endeavours (e.g. Engelberg et al. 2012; Solberg et al. 2010). Correspondingly, elite athletes often share with the public an active stance against doping and, by doing so, put the label 'clean athlete' on their public narratives (Gendreau 2015). Athletes who dope break with this narrative. Arguably, the awareness of breaking with public expectations and doing something most people consider wrong is likely to turn doping into a controversial aspect of one's life story.

Thus, it makes sense to say that former professional road cyclists who have doped and lie about it lie about core aspects of who they really are. Looking at this particular kind of lying from the three viewpoints proposed by Bok initially seems to highlight its problematic nature. Considering first the liar's viewpoint, lying about core aspects of who one really is potentially comes close to the meaning of the expression 'living a lie': always aware of the notion that how one is made sense of by (some, many, or most) others differs in core aspects from how one, in the first-person perspective, makes sense of oneself. Whereas one's first-person perspective re-articulates subjective experiences more or less accurately, the second-person perspective must integrate a 'deceptive layer' that accounts for the lies told and the deception undertaken. For extreme cases, such as unqualified medical doctors or even non-confessing serial killers, this deception is not only a threat to the psychological need to be made sense of by others, but also a challenge to a clear sense of who one is, potentially

threatening the narrative identity itself. While a former cyclist's lies about doping hardly compare to these extreme cases, the need for a deceptive layer in the second-person perspective of narrative is present, and similar consequences are conceivable.

Turning to the perspective of the deceived, it is difficult to think of examples of lies about core aspects of who one really is that are designed to benefit the deceived. There might be candidates; for instance, war veterans who do not mention to spouses that they have killed people during a war or parents who never tell their children that their divorce was due to infidelity. These are only candidates for consideration, however, with no obvious conclusions. In most instances where people lie about core actions and events in their life story, they do so mainly to achieve some personal benefit or avoid harm to themselves. This is not to say that the deceived are necessarily harmed; it only goes to show that they are less likely to be the primary ones to benefit from the lie.

This assumption seems to hold true in the case of former cyclists lying about doping. Presumably, these lies deceive a variety of people—from significant others, former teammates and competitors, and various subgroups of road cycling fans and sports fans to the general public. Thus, the potential consequences are diverse. However, it is difficult to think of primary beneficiaries of doping lies across these groups of deceived. Secondary beneficiaries seem much more conceivable. Examples can be family members, who savour the economic benefits that follow from a successful, perceivably 'clean' career, former teammates, who avoid the harm of being rendered suspect, or those fans whose enjoyment of the sport or the specific athlete decreases with the exposure of doping.

Finally, what would the consequences be if lies about who we are became an established practice? On a general level, at least some degree of veracity about who one is seems core to the basic trust necessary for meaningful human interaction and community. A society full of doctors practising without degrees in medicine is not just difficult to imagine but deeply problematic for reasons relating to communication and trust. Indeed, if not comparable to such extreme cases, the practices of doping in elite sports provide an interesting example of how lies about who we are can challenge meaningful interaction. In sports where the prevalence of doping is high, communication about performances in general and 'record performances' in particular seem increasingly complicated by uncertainty surrounding the question of whether record holders doped or not. In highly standardised sports with exact performance measurements, where the record narrative is a considerable part of the sport's attraction, uncertainty about the legitimacy of records is a significant challenge (Loland 2006).[5]

Narrative Identity as Prescription, and Cyclists with a History of Doping

The narrative identity view clearly seems to support the argument that former professional road cyclists who have doped have a moral obligation to confess. This conclusion, however, would be premature. The above analysis concerns lying about who one is in descriptive terms. By lying about doping, cyclists offer an inaccurate description of who they are in the sense of what they have experienced and done. However, narrative identity is not only about description but also about prescription. It involves value judgements of the description—a scrutinising aspect of, Who should I be? besides the descriptive, Who am I? As Ricoeur (1992, 114) puts it, 'Narrative theory finds one of its major justifications in the role it plays as a middle ground between the descriptive viewpoint on action […] and the prescriptive viewpoint'.

Applying the prescriptive viewpoint adds to the requirement of coherency. A clear sense of who one is depends not only on some degree of coherence about core actions and events but also on some degree of coherence about the moral evaluation of those actions and events. To Ricoeur (1988a, 99), human life has an ethical aim, and that aim is self-esteem: 'the interpretation of ourselves mediated by the ethical evaluation of our actions'. Conflicting moral evaluations of one's actions disturb this self-interpretation and call into question one's ability to pursue life with *ethical intention*: 'aiming at the "good life" with and for others in just institutions' (Ricoeur 1992, 172).

On this background, I argue that in the case of the former professional road cyclist who has doped, a full confession secures the former kind of coherence but is no guarantee of the latter. Rather, confessing cyclists are likely to face the challenge of being made sense of by others as moral agents, potentially presenting a radical challenge to self-esteem.

This challenge seems particularly salient for people who travel between cultural contexts with different social norms and moral frameworks. The clearest examples probably stem from the war context and involve soldiers who come from cultures with deeply held moral beliefs that are likely to be transgressed during a war. Returning home, the challenge of justifying the actions of war to oneself and others can be overwhelming. While an outright comparison seems misplaced, there are some parallels to the context of professional road cycling in the blood doping era.

Cyclists' autobiographies from this era typically describe travelling from strong anti-doping cultures, or at least cultures that value 'fair play' in sports, to what Waddington (2000) terms professional road cycling's 'internal culture of tolerance' to doping. This 'travel' between social contexts is not only in the abstract. For many riders, turning professional means moving to a new country. With 70–100 race days over a 9–10 month season and several 1–3 week training camps in far-off locations, it becomes habit that the people you see for breakfast, work, dinner and even those with whom you share flats at home and rooms during races or camps, are colleagues: fellow riders and support personnel. This fact also makes road cycling a closed culture, susceptible to the development of distinctive social norms and moral frameworks. On returning from Europe to the United States in the off-season for a brief holiday, Tyler Hamilton described the notion of living 'on two planets at once':

> One afternoon, my father came to me with that question. He sat me down; he brought up Festina. My dad's a smart guy; he knew that Festina wasn't something that could be brushed away. He was clear: he didn't want me getting mixed up in a bad scene, in something I might regret later.
>
> I didn't hesitate.
>
> Dad, if I ever have to take that stuff to compete, I'll retire.
>
> […]
>
> When I spoke those words to my father, it sealed my life in bike racing behind a steel door. That was the moment I started learning what we all had to learn: how to live on two planets at once. (Hamilton and Coyle 2012, 76)

To Hamilton, it seems, living on two planets at once meant travelling between cultural contexts in which doping in sports was evaluated very differently. Reflecting on this notion, I will consider three ways in which the doping cyclist's narrative is likely to be evaluated differently within different cultural contexts.

The Autonomy of Choosing to Dope

> I'm a chameleon. I adapt to my surroundings. If they're black, I'm black. If they're bright blue, you can count on me to be the biggest Smurf of the lot. (Dekker and Zonneveld 2017, 169)

Waddington's (2000, 63) case study of the 1998 Tour de France describes the shared understanding among riders and support personnel—'even those who may have strong objections to the use of drugs'—of good reasons to dope in the particular context in which they found themselves. One reason was the sport's economic structure. Most riders were on short-term contracts, and most teams were financed by short-term sponsorship. Riders, teams and sponsors depended on participation in big races like the Tour de France but had no assurances of such. The result, as Hamilton and Coyle (2012, 35) put it, was 'a chain of perpetual nervousness: Sponsors are nervous because they need results. Team directors are nervous because they need results. And riders are nervous because they need results to get a contract'.

A second aspect was the physical and psychological demands of the sport. Road cycling is a tough endurance sport. Races last for hours, stage races last for weeks and race organisers commonly seek out tough terrain—steep hills, high mountains, or rough cobbled roads—to separate the wheat from the chaff and facilitate spectacle. Furthermore, the logic of the road race—the most common form of competition—typically deprives individual riders of the possibility of setting their own pace. Rather, various interests in the peloton determine the pace, and it is up to each rider to follow, reducing or indeed removing the notion of control over physical effort and arguably adding a certain sense of despair to the experience of not being competitive.

The economic structure and physical and psychological demands of the sport seem to have contributed to a perceived need for illegal substances and methods to perform, recover and cope. The third, and crucial, reason, however, was the fact that *others* doped. In a competitive environment where one's performances are only relative to the performances of others, there is a coercive effect in which one rider's decision to dope creates added incentives for other riders to dope (Murray 1983).[6] As such, the perceived necessity of doping is contextually dependent upon the doping of others. It is not the distances covered during races or the contract situation per se that create a sense of necessity, but the knowledge or the sense that competitors covered those distances and fought for contracts with the aid of doping. The testimony of George Hincapie, a longstanding teammate of Lance Armstrong, reads:

> In 1995, there appeared to me to be a major change in the peloton. It was becoming very difficult to keep up, and I learned that the reason was the widespread use of erythropoietin […]. As the speed of the peloton increased, we seemed to be confronted with the choice of using EPO or not performing well in races.
>
> (Affidavit of George Hincapie 2012)

Research by Ohl et al. (2015, 879) suggests that permissive attitudes towards doping were so entrenched in the 'social dramas' of professional road cycling teams that 'reasoning on an individual level [wa]s not very relevant' to individual athletes' decision to dope.

As such, cyclists with a history of doping may wish to project a narrative that highlights the social and cultural context of professional road cycling, accounting for their decision to dope through narratives of socialisation and social pressures. In the end, if this is how they re-articulate their experiences and make sense of themselves, this is how they would want

to be made sense of by others. The problem with such a projection is that it is likely to contrast with what seems to be a widespread understanding, particularly in strong anti-doping cultures, of doping as an autonomous decision avoided by those with a finely tuned moral compass (Møller 2010; Sandvik et al. 2017). There are good reasons why this latter understanding dominates. The main reason, perhaps, is institutional, having to do with anti-doping organisations' vast efforts to detect, deter and punish doping among individual athletes, while often overlooking the role of support personnel or, more generally, the social systems in which doping takes place. While anti-doping organisations seem increasingly aware of the importance of the social context of doping, the notion left to the public from a judicial system that raises and tests the cases of individual athletes seems tied to the fact that, in the end, individuals dope and individuals are caught doping. At the same time, most media coverage of doping cases focuses primarily on the individual; a fact probably related to the institutional and judicial system but also to a more general focus on the individual elite athlete in the media coverage of sport in general (e.g. Sefiha 2010).

The Meaningfulness of Doping

A second way in which the narrative of a former professional road cyclist who doped is likely to be evaluated differently within different cultural contexts concerns the meaning of doping. Brännmark (2001, 2006) argues that to understand the meaning of life events, we must take into consideration how the events fit into the narrative of the life in question. Another way to put this is that the meaning of life events is intrinsically tied up with narrative identity: what some event or action means to me depends on who I am. Brännmark (2006) distinguishes between two types of narrative meaning: purposive and contrastive. Purposive meaning describes the way in which actions and events form parts of meaningful pursuits. The basic assumption is that it is prudentially better to succeed in a meaningful pursuit than to succeed in a meaningless one and that it might be better to fail in a meaningful pursuit than to succeed in a meaningless one.

The assertion that elite athletes believe that elite sport is a meaningful pursuit is uncontroverted. This assertion is no less true for road cyclists. Christiansen's (2005) cultural analysis of elite road cycling in Denmark in the 1990s and early 2000s offers a rich description of the purposive meaning of road cycling. Christiansen describes road cycling's attraction to its participants as paradoxical: young riders invest huge amounts of time and energy in the sport and sacrifice education and more conventional social lives, all the while knowing that only a select few will be able to pursue road cycling as a career. What drives them? The answer, according to Christiansen, has to do with Maslow's term 'self-actualisation'—the growth process towards the fulfilment of 'the highest needs', in particular, the need for meaning in life. For elite athletes, the sense of pursuing something 'higher' and more meaningful than, for instance, economic rewards, fame, or appreciation, typically comes with cultivating talent—setting, pursuing and fulfilling goals based on athletic development. Self-actualisation is inherent in the pursuit of 'becoming a better athlete', and, for Christiansen's informants, this process is reinforced by so-called peak experiences on the bike.

If we accept the idea that professional road cycling is a meaningful pursuit, the next step is to consider the idea that doping is a (perceivably) necessary part of that pursuit. If something is perceived as necessary to the fulfilment of a meaningful pursuit, it seems that this something derives its own kind of purposive meaning from that fact. In the previous section,

I described the perception of doping as necessary among professional road cyclists in the blood doping era. The way in which doping might derive purposive meaning from being part of the larger, meaningful pursuit of road cycling is neatly captured in this quote from one of Christiansen's (2005, 273, 274, author's translation) informants, described as a dedicated athlete 'bitten by the sport':

> I have wanted to be a professional bike rider since I was a little boy, and now I have the chance. If the consequence is that I have to take medicine, that will not get me to stop pursuing the dream. I have not been riding a bicycle for so many years just to quit now when I have come so far that I am living out the dream.

Being a professional road cyclist is so important to the informant that the prospect of having to take drugs in order to continue is almost trivial in comparison. To him, quitting because of having to 'take medicine', is irrational. Due to the importance—the meaningfulness—of cycling, continuing rather than quitting is a given, and doping is, more or less irrelevantly, a necessary means to that end.

Doping does not merely derive purposive meaning by being a (perceivably) necessary means to an end, however. Understanding the meaningfulness of elite athleticism as being closely aligned with the notion of 'becoming a better athlete', the performance-enhancing effect of doping, arguably, gives it a sort of contrastive meaning as well. Contrastive meaning, according to Brännmark (2006), refers to the kind of meaning actions or events derive from being situated among other narratively ordered action or events. The same action performed by two persons (e.g. the injection of EPO) may bring about virtually identical experiential qualities such as discomfort or pain. Their respective meaning will nevertheless diverge depending on the narrative of the life in question. Consider, for instance, a patient suffering from anaemia injecting EPO compared to a professional cyclist seeking performance-enhancement. For the patient, the injection may form a traumatic part of a troubling narrative of illness, for the professional cyclist, however, it may fit into an almost all-encompassing pattern of supposedly performance-enhancing behaviour that resonates with a range of measures taken to become a better athlete.

To former cyclists, therefore, it might well make sense to say that doping formed a meaningful aspect of their life narrative. At the very least, it makes sense to say that doping was not detrimental to the meaningfulness of being a cyclist. Again, it seems reasonable to suggest that this view contrasts with the dominant positions in strong anti-doping cultures. While there is, to my knowledge, no research on public perceptions about the meaning of doping or doped performances, the notion that doping deprives athletic endeavours of worth and meaning seems widespread.

Notions of Loyalty Involved in Doping

In mainstream anti-doping culture, doping is often understood as an act of disloyalty towards the athletic community—a sort of betrayal of colleagues, competitors, spectators and stakeholders (Miah 2010). Because doping is banned and generally viewed as morally problematic and, crucially, because there are athletes who do *not* dope, athletes who *do* dope seek an unfair advantage and disrupt the cooperative and rule-adhering basics of sport. However, the former cyclist's narrative may revolve around different conceptions of loyalty. To understand this aspect, it is crucial to understand the logic of road cycling as an individual sport with a hierarchical team structure. Whereas in conventional team sports, teams win or lose

as units, road cycling is organised as a team sport but awards individual winners and losers. The tactical function of teams is to offer support for designated team leaders, such as having team helpers protect team leaders from the wind, reel in breakaways, or set a fierce pace to tire competitors. 'Sacrifice' is an apt term describing the duties of a team helper and, in many ways, the duty of sacrifice extends beyond the races.

For a team helper in the blood doping era, loyalty to the team and, crucially, the team leader, could mean doping. There are a few examples in the testimonies and biographical accounts of explicit expectations to dope in order to offer the best assistance possible. For instance, George Hincapie recalls:

> Around this time, we got crushed in the Milan-San Remo race and coming home from the race Lance Armstrong was very upset. As we drove home Lance said, in substance, that 'this is bullshit, people are using stuff' and 'we are getting killed'. He said, in substance, that he did not want to get crushed anymore and something needed to be done. I understood that he meant the team needed to get on EPO.(Affidavit of George Hincapie 2012)

Moreover, implicit expectations are apparent in several accounts. Below, Tyler Hamilton recalls being introduced to blood transfusions:

> The last night of the Dauphiné [race], Lance [Armstrong] and Johan [Bruyneel; Sports Director] came to my hotel room. I expected them to talk about the race or maybe plan for the upcoming Tour [de France]. Instead, they told me that on Tuesday, two days after the race ended, we were going to fly to Valencia to do a blood transfusion. […] As Johan explained it, Lance, Kevin [Livingstone; teammate], and I would fly to Valencia. We would donate a bag of blood, which would be stored, and we'd fly home the next day. Then, at a key point during the Tour, we'd put the bag back in, and we'd get a boost. […] I listened to Johan, nodded, gave him my poker face. […] But part of me was thinking, What the hell?
>
> (Hamilton and Coyle 2012, 119–121)

Hamilton and Livingstone were key helpers to Armstrong, particularly in the crucial mountain stages where being 'isolated'—short of teammates—too early in the stage can be detrimental to a team leader's performance. For Armstrong to win, Hamilton and Livingstone had to perform. There is self-interest involved in ensuring a good performance for one's team leader. Nevertheless, Hamilton's decision not to speak up but quietly acquiesce to the transfusions can also easily be framed as a form of loyalty.

Thus, doping can be a sign of loyalty to one's employer and team leader. Furthermore, as doping is a social practice and one's confession is likely to implicate others, lying about doping can be an act of loyalty as well, ultimately shaping the confession dilemma into a question of honesty or loyalty. Thus, the self-narrative of the confessing cyclist may involve a double-edged conflict of, on the one hand, the moral status of doping, and, on the other hand, the moral status of the confession itself.

Conclusion

The purpose of the previous section was not to juxtapose conflicting views about doping to offer a form of moral evaluation. Rather, highlighting conflicting views on notions of autonomy, meaningfulness and loyalty involved in doping practices shows how, in confessing to doping, former professional road cyclists risk presenting themselves to others as morally inferior to the person they see themselves as. Always viewing oneself also as another,

this moral conflict leads to incoherence between the first and second person perspectives of narrative, regarding one's ways of navigating sports' landscape of moral choice.

What are the consequences across the three viewpoints proposed by Bok? To the cyclist, confessing to doping with all likelihood results in conflicting moral evaluations of his actions, potentially presenting a radical challenge to his sense of ability to pursue an ethical life. Probably, some cyclists can escape this harm by effectively disapproving conflicting evaluations of their actions. However, in strong anti-doping cultures where anti-doping norms appear pervasive and uncontested in public discourse, disapproving conflicting evaluations all together seems improbable. Always viewing oneself also as another, pervasive negative evaluations from others matter, even in cases where one doubts their merit.

Confronted with these conflicting evaluations, similar harms to the cyclist's significant others seem likely. Illustratively, Steffen Kjærgaard recalls the morning following his confession:

> I experienced the day after as a doomsday movie in which the protagonist wakes up after the rolling titles, and everything seems normal. The sun shines, and the grass is green. Birds sing. Kids play in the street. I ride over to the grocery store.
>
> Bang. Three of four newspapers had my confession [on the] front cover. The front page of [national newspaper] VG featured an old photo of me and my wife. The splash headline astounded him. 'SHE KNEW EVERYTHING'.
>
> (Kjærgaard 2012a, author's translation)

A reasonable interpretation of the VG headline—apparently shared by Kjærgaard—is that it implies that a spouse's knowledge about an athlete's doping is morally problematic.[7] Thus, being framed explicitly or implicitly as complicit seems one way in which significant others may experience harms similar to the harms to cyclists themselves.

Another group likely to be affected by a cyclist's confession is other cyclists who doped. Arguably, one's confession can have the dual effect of making another's lies harder to bear by illuminating conflicting moral evaluations while, simultaneously, highlighting the negative consequences of confessing. This point could change, however, if confessing to doping became a widespread practice endorsed by numerous elite athletes. Applying the aggregation viewpoint proposed by Bok, one can foresee a turning point in which a magnitude of confessions contributes to a more understanding public and reduces the present intense focus on the few athletes who do confess.

This observation leads to a closing argument. Because the particular harms analysed in this paper are contextually dependent, answers to the question of whether elite athletes who doped are morally obliged to confess are contextually dependent. This paper considers the specific circumstances of former professional road cyclists who doped. At least in the current Western context, I put into question the existence of a moral obligation to confess. Serious harms—illuminated herein through the perspective of narrative identity—result from extensive negative media coverage, public condemnation and a general lack of willingness to understand the cyclist's perspective. While one can see from the aggregation viewpoint that confession can be a step towards a more understanding environment, it seems wrong to place the burden of taking that first step on athletes in the present context.

Notes

1. In road cycling, 'peloton' is a term used (1) during races to refer to the main group of riders or (2) outside races to refer to riders at a certain sporting level as a whole, for example 'the professional peloton'.
2. The Festina affair was a series of doping revelations and conflicts that occurred during and after the 1998 Tour de France, commencing with French Customs' discovery of various doping products in an official team car of the leading French cycling team, Festina (Brissonneau 2015; Voet 2002).
3. In October 2012, the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) submitted to the Union Cycliste International (UCI) and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) a 'Reasoned Decision' in the agency's case against Lance Armstrong. The Reasoned Decision contained evidence proving beyond doubt the use, possession and distribution of doping substances by Armstrong and the existence of a large-scale doping programme in Armstrong's US Postal Service Pro Cycling Team (United States Anti-Doping Agency 2012).
4. The term 'blood doping era' refers a period lasting from roughly the early 1990s to the late 2000s. In this period, blood doping technologies such as EPO and blood transfusions were supposedly particularly prevalent in professional road cycling (Marty et al., 2015).
5. Recently, uncertainty about the legitimacy of records led to a proposal from European Athletics to erase all world and European records in athletics set before 2005, due to the relative lack of doping tests at the time.
6. Game theoretical approaches to doping in sports highlight this coercive effect (Breivik 1992; Haugen et al. 2013).
7. Kjærgaard's recitation of the headline is wrong. The actual headline translates into 'Told the wife about his lie'.

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