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The Struggle over Military Identity
–A Multi-Sited Ethnography on Gender, Fitness and "The Right Attitudes"
in the Military Profession/Field

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Summary

As a result of dramatic changes in the arrangement and missions of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and consequently in competence, gender and identity politics, traditional thinking on what are considered to be valuable persons, skills, abilities and bodily characteristics is being challenged. Yet, what is challenged by some may be guarded by others. As such, a social struggle over what kind of skills and characteristics should be required from military personnel, and *who* should be allowed in the military profession has been observed. This dissertation investigates ***what is at stake in the struggles over who can take part in the military profession/field***. This investigation is both important and necessary in order to understand how both *men and women* experience and perceive their own and others' value in the organization, and to which interests the activities and struggles of different agents contribute.

Theoretically, the study is based on Pierre Bourdieu's conceptual framework supplemented with Norbert Elias' figurational perspective, as well as feminists' development of Bourdieu's theories. As a methodological consequence of this perspective, the military profession/field is approached from two analytical levels (macro- and micro-level), which are interpreted in an interactive perspective.

Data was gathered through a multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork consisting of participant observation, interviews and collections of written material. Written material, such as management documents, previous debate and research literature, is used to provide insight into the macro-level. This includes the extensive changes in extra-local power relations and management ambitions which have followed the end of the Cold War, and which engage individuals at local military sites to act and struggle as they do. Social interactions at local military sites (micro-level) were investigated through 72 days of participant observation spread over 12 months including 65 interviews. The participant observation took place at different sites where selection, education and training of squad leaders to the Army and the Home Guard were the main concern. Twenty-five interviews were recorded from 22 officers, and 40 interviews recorded from 34 officer candidates at the Army's Officer Candidate School. 32 interviews were with women, 33 with men.

Two research questions were developed to fix the direction and limit the content of the micro-level investigation:

1. What is required from men and women respectively to do an officer role appropriately?
2. How do men and women with different forms of capital respond to different formal and informal requirements in the military field?

The result shows that officer candidates are encouraged to become normative role models with "the right attitudes" for their subordinates to imitate. Doing the job as a normative role model (officer) appropriately is dependent on the ability to embody power resources and obey regulation impositions at the same time. Accordingly, the study supports Belkin's (2012) claim that military masculinity is structured by contradiction, and that the military compels soldiers/officers to embody masculinity *and femininity* at the same time. This claim is based on an understanding, developed from Bourdieu (1998) and Skeggs (2004), where masculinity is seen as a belief system that comes with impositions of accumulating power resources and striving for dominance, victory, honor and recognition, through which one is classified as masculine. Femininity is understood as a form of regulation that is based on morals and shame, and used to establish control over women *and troops* through an emphasis on appropriate culture, attitudes and style.

The contradictory requirements that apply to the officers are reflected in the culture being referred to as 1) a performance culture in which the "power of example" is used as a pedagogical method to encourage winning instinct and accumulation of power resources, such as physical fitness, and 2) a feedback culture in which buddy evaluations and buddy rankings are actively used as a pedagogical method to socialize the officer candidates into the norms accepted in the social fellowship. The requirement to embody power resources and become a winner and a leader results in internal competition and struggles for positions within the local hierarchy. Considering the requirement to obey regulation impositions, the field was characterized by a voluntary submission and adaption to the requirements, as well as a struggle to maintain (reproduce) the field's traditional criteria for valuation, in particular physical prowess.

It is concluded that systems of classification constitute a stake in the struggles that oppose individuals in the social interactions that take place in the field. It is argued that being classified as soldier/officer vs. murderer, civilized vs. uncivilized, appropriate vs. inappropriate, constitutes a stake in the struggle over soldiers' culture, attitudes and style. Moreover, it is shown that women, in particular small-sized women who might join the military to disprove the stereotype of being "cute and petite", jeopardize the belief system on which the military's capacity for legitimating personal claims to authority and a powerful and masculine identity is based. Women, in particular the "cute and petite", enter the military field with bodies that stand in direct contrast to skills and qualities associated with military requirements, and as a consequence they put the classification of the military profession as masculine, tough and physically demanding at stake. Accordingly, women also challenge the belief system on which the production of fighting spirit is based.

Sammendrag

Som et resultat av dramatiske endringer i innretning og bruk av Det norske forsvaret har tradisjonell tenkning om hva som anses å være verdifulle ferdigheter, egenskaper og personer blitt utfordret. Men, det som utfordres av noen, voktes ofte av andre, og en sosial kamp om hva som skal kreves fra militært personell, og hvem som skal kunne bli del av den militære profesjon er observert. Denne avhandlingen undersøker følgelig *hva som står på spill i kampen om hvem som kan være del av den militære profesjonen/feltet.* En undersøkelse av dette er nødvendig for å kunne forstå hvordan ulike menn og kvinner opplever sin egen og andres verdi i organisasjonen, og hvilke interesserer forskjellige aktørers aktiviteter og kamper bidrar til.

Teoretisk er studien basert på Pierre Bourdieus begrepsapparat supplert med Norbert Elias figurasjonssosiologi, samt feministers videreutvikling av Bourdieus teorier. Som en metodisk konsekvens av dette perspektivet er den militære profesjon/feltet analysert fra to nivåer (makro- og mikronivå) som er tolket i et interaksjonistisk perspektiv.

Empirisk materiale ble samlet inn ved hjelp av et multi-lokalt etnografisk feltarbeid bestående av deltakende observasjon, intervjuer og innsamling av skriftlig materiale. Skriftlig materiale, herunder styringsdokumenter, tidligere debatter og forskningslitteratur, er brukt til å skaffe innsikt i feltet på makronivå. Dette inkluderer de omfattende endringene i globale maktforhold og styringsambisjoner som fulgte fra slutten av den kalde krigen. Sosiale interaksjoner på mikronivå ble undersøkt gjennom 72 dager deltakende observasjon fordelt over 12 måneder, inkludert opptak av 65 intervjuer. Den deltakende observasjon fant sted på forskjellige steder der utvelgelse, utdanning og opplæring av lagførere til Hæren og Heimevernet var et hovedanliggende. 25 intervjuer ble tatt opp fra 22 befal, og 40 intervjuer tatt opp fra 34 befalselever ved Hærens befalsskole. 32 intervjuer var med kvinner, 33 med menn.

To forskningsspørsmål ble utviklet for å styre retningen og begrense innholdet i undersøkelsen på mikro-nivå:

Hva kreves av henholdsvis menn og kvinner for å utøve befalsrollen på en aktverdig/respektabel måte?

Hvordan reagerer menn og kvinner med ulike former for kapital på de formelle og uformelle kravene som stilles til dem i det militære feltet?

Resultatene viser at befalselevene oppfordres til å bli normative rollemodeller med "riktige holdninger". Å gjør jobben som en normativ rollemodell (befal) på en aktverdig måte avhenger av evnen til å kroppsliggjøre ressurser som gir makt og autoritet, f.eks. fysisk styrke, samtidig som man skal underkaste seg autoriteter og adlyde adferdsregulerende pålegg. Følgelig støtter studien Belkins (2012) påstand om at militær maskulinitet er strukturert av motsetninger, og at det militære pålegger soldater/befal å kroppsliggjøre maskulinitet og femininitet samtidig. Støtten til Belkins påstand er basert på en forståelse, utviklet fra Bourdieu (1998) og Skeggs (2004), hvor maskulinitet kan sees som et trossystem som kommer med pålegg, eller oppmuntringer, om å akkumulere maktressurser og strebe etter dominans, seier, ære og anerkjennelse, - for så gjennom dette å kunne bli klassifisert som maskulin. Hvilke maktressurser som kreves for å oppnå denne klassifiseringen avhenger av den aktuelle kulturens klassifikasjons- og verdisystem. Femininitet forstås som en form for regulering som er basert på unngåelse av skam, og brukes for å etablere kontroll over kvinner *og soldater/befal* gjennom å legge vekt på kulturelt passende moral, holdninger og stil.

De motstridende kravene befalet og befalselevene møter er reflektert i at den militære kulturen omtales som: 1) en prestasjonskultur der "eksemplets makt" brukes som en pedagogisk metode for å oppmuntre vinnerinstinkt og akkumulering av maktressurser, som for eksempel god fysisk form, og 2) en tilbakemeldingskultur der blant annet kameratvurderinger og kammeratrangeringer brukes som en pedagogisk metode for å sosialisere befalselevene inn i normene som er akseptert i det sosiale fellesskapet.

Kravet om å kroppsliggjøre maktressurser og bli en vinner og en leder, resulterer i intern konkurranse og kamper for posisjoner i det lokale hierarkiet. Når det gjelder kravet om å adlyde reguleringspålegg, var feltet preget av frivillig underkastelse og tilpasning til kravene, samt en kamp for å opprettholde (reprodusere) feltets tradisjonelle kriterier for vurdering og verdsetting, og da spesielt fysisk kapasitet.

Studien konkluderer med at klassifiseringssystemer står på spill i de sosiale kampene som finner sted i feltet. Det å bli klassifisert som soldat/offiser versus morder, sivilisert versus usivilisert, anstendig versus uanstendig står på spill i kampen om soldatenes kultur, holdninger og stil. Videre vises det at kvinner, hvorav noen har valgt å gå inn i det militære for å utfordre stereotypien "liten og søt", svekker muligheten til å legitimere personlige krav om autoritet og en tøff og maskulin identitet basert på tilknytning til den militære organisasjonen. Kvinner, spesielt de "små og søte", går inn det militære med kropper som står i direkte motsetning til ferdigheter og kvaliteter som er assosiert med militære krav, og som en konsekvens setter de klassifiseringen av den militære profesjon som maskulin, tøff og fysisk krevende på spill. Følgelig utfordrer kvinnene også trossystemet som produksjon av kampvilje er basert på.

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Chapter 1:

Introduction to the Field of Inquiry

> A modern and high-tech defence with new operational models *implies new needs for competency and skills among personnel.* […] It is essential for the Armed Forces to be able to draw upon the competency held by the Norwegian population, both women and men. The soldier of the *future requires a much wider combination of skills and qualities than the traditional soldier. By attempting to reflect the diversity within society, the Armed Forces will achieve new competency and a much broader base of experience.* An increase in the ratio of women will provide a necessary increase in cultural and competency-related diversity in the Armed Forces (White Paper No 14, (2012–2013), p. 43).

1.1   What is at Stake in the Social Struggle over Who Can Take Part?

Institutions and professions such as the military are continuously under reconstruction by the shifting network of people of which they are comprised, and who act in relation to internal and external traditions and changes. However, since the end of the Cold War Western Armed Forces have faced all-embracing changes, including new roles and missions that have shifted the substance of what armies do and, accordingly, have caused a crisis in military identity (Bondy, 2004; Forsythe, Snook, Lewis, & Bartone, 2005; Hajjar, 2014; Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000; Snider & Matthews, 2005). In particular, the events of the Balkans and the war in Afghanistan brought about a process of rapid and comprehensive change for the Norwegian Armed Forces, including altered political application of the military power, as well as downsizing, modernizing, specialization, internationalization and professionalizing (Græger, 2006; Haaland T. L., 2008a; Heier, 2006; Johansen R. B., 2013; Sookermany, 2013). In preparing for the future, investments are being made in "extremely advanced" high-tech weapon systems that will be interlinked in complex networks (White Paper No 14, (2012–2013)).

Consequently, and as reflected in the above quotation from White Paper No 14 (2012-2013) *Competency for a new era*, there have been major changes in the Norwegian Armed Forces' "needs for competency and skills among personnel" (p. 43). Hence, it is argued that altered personnel, recruitment, educational and career policy is required. In previous research, it has been argued that the changes facing military institutions are of such a fundamental character that a change in mentality, culture and identity, as well as thinking and understanding of military power and skills, is *required* (Eriksen, 2011; Haaland T. L., 2008a; Johansen R. B., 2013; Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000; Petersson, 2011; Sookermany, 2013; Ulriksen, 2002). In the case of Norway, there are two particular policy changes which have clashed with traditional understandings of the military power, and as such are causing an identity struggle.

Firstly, where it has traditionally been assumed that military power could be measured in the number of *physically strong men* with a rifle (Græger, 2006; Ulriksen, 2002), the military of today requires *less men* but a higher level of specialized competence and expertise in a wide range of areas (White Paper No 14, (2012–2013)). Hence, where the former mobilization defence concept based its personnel policy on a general and basic *all male* mass-education through one year of compulsory military service, the military today aims to attract a *selection* of the best and most competent candidates available in a highly competitive labour market *regardless of gender* (White Paper No 14, (2012–2013); White Paper No 42, (2003-2004)). In addition, it is an explicit political aim to increase the proportion of women in the Norwegian military (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006; White Paper No 14, (2012–2013); White Paper No 36, (2006-2007)).

Secondly, due to increased ambitions for political use of the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Chief of Defence decided to move Norwegian military identity away from idealism towards professionalism (Eriksson, 2004; Johansen R. B., 2013). This was formalized through a new Joint Operational Doctrine for the Norwegian Armed Forces, launched in 2007. It highlights that the military is a profession and aims to be a "pedagogical tool that helps the officer corps to develop a common understanding, a common mind-set, a common framework, a common terminology and thus the basis for the development of a common *professional culture*" (FFOD 07, p. 3)[1]. According to Johansen (2013), the doctrinal shift to professionalism as a preferred and necessary military identity at the cost of altruism, patriotism and nationalism was seen as a way to increase military performance.

Following such dramatic changes in competence, gender and identity politics, traditional thinking on valuable persons, skills, abilities and bodily characteristics is being challenged. Yet, what is challenged by some may be guarded by others and as such a social struggle over

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[1] All translations from Scandinavian sources used in this dissertation are mine. This will not be marked in later quotes. Nor will visual changes (capitalization and italics) in quotes that are English in origin be marked. *All italics* should thus be read as *what I want to emphasize* with the quote.

what kind of skills and characteristics should be required from military personnel, and *who* should be allowed in the profession[2] has been observed.

This is a story from a meeting I participated in as a research assistant for *The Norwegian School of Sport Science/Defence Institute[3]*:

> The topic of the meeting is whether the physical tests used in selection and examination of officer candidates are a barrier for recruitment of more women into military jobs, and whether the physical test requirements can be changed. A man explains that the military personnel feel that the political request for increased recruitment of women is threaded down over their heads, and that the organization's need for diversity should refer to skills and competence, not gender. A female officer with higher intermediate rank participating in the meeting requests to speak.
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> "The few women who work at […], we are *so* tired of the affirmative actions for women! Many female officers at my level will quit their job in the Armed Forces if the affirmative actions for women do not come to a final end. And there's a term used *all the time*, and that is to *lift up the women*. But I tell you, we do *not* want to be carried a damn meter!" In a very excited tone she carries on. "You can recruit as many women as you want to the bottom, but if they are going to be *lifted up* - then we, who are at the intermediate level will quit. We have talked about it", she assures us, and rattles off several names of female officers who have the same standpoint as her. She continues:
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> "And all of you already know that we have two women who are *lifted up* in the air force. They are not capable of doing their job", she says, and looks at the participants at the meeting. "If you criticize immigration you are a racist. But in the military you become a male chauvinist once you criticize a woman. Therefore you are unable to criticize women who are not capable of doing their job", she explains, before she shouts: "This cannot continue! They are responsible for life! Recruiting to the military is not the same as recruiting 40% women to a company board [4].This is operational service where we are dependent on performance. *We have to feel that this is exclusive!*"
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> She is pointing eagerly to her uniform and the gold stars at her shoulders with both hands when she cries: "If we shall be able to demand *any kind* of respect for our uniform, if we shall be able to gain any kind of respect for what we are dressed in and what we have on our shoulders, then we need to have *an absolutely clear* cut in terms

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[2] According to the doctrine, everybody who wears a uniform is part of the profession (FFOD 07, p. 159). Accordingly we could also have asked "who should be allowed to wear the uniform?"

[3] The Defence Institute located at the *Norwegian School of Sport Science* belongs to *The Norwegian Defence University College.*

[4] It is mandatory to have at least 40% women in PLC company boards in Norway

of who is allowed to enter and who is allowed to wear the uniform and who to hold the ranks…". Her voice bursts. She sits back fighting with emotions and tears.

This meeting took place in 2009. Later, other female officers and officer candidates determined through feature articles in Norwegian newspapers and military magazines that affirmative action where women are preferred over "better qualified men to satisfy political ambitions" must end immediately, and that "harsh physical requirements" and "set minimum requirements" must be kept and should be equal for men and women (see Egeberg, 2010; Kollbotn, 2013; Moilanen, 2014; Ringvold & Wenaas 2009)[5]. For example Ringvold & Wenaas (2009) declare that "It is sad to note that the political objectives of increasing the proportion of women among enlisted and officers override the basic requirements that *should be set to every singular soldier*".

A research program established as a consequence of White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) on *Increased recruitment of women to the Norwegian Armed Forces* revealed, in accordance with international literature, that physical capacity was considered an unalterable and a key valuation criterion in military culture, and that women were considered an opposite to the traditional image of the ideal soldier (Steder, 2013)[6]. Research from the program is referred to in White Paper No 14 (2012–2013), where it is claimed that it is essential to continuously question whether traditional "requirements are objective and have a professional basis, or whether they are the result of traditions and culture" (p. 27). It is written:

> The establishment of a high-tech rapid reaction capability defence has generated new and complex competency requirements. A high number of functions have to be discharged. This will not make the traditional soldier redundant; people with good physical and military-specific skills who are able to carry out the core tasks of the Armed Forces during military operations are essential. At the same time however, there is an *increasing need for employees with competency within a number of other areas* (White Paper No 14, (2012–2013), p. 14).

Additionally, the White Paper highlights that the uniform educational structures and selection systems "do not correlate with the variation and dynamic nature of the organisation's competency requirement" (p. 30).

> The uniform systems also restrict diversity. The Armed Forces recruit from a limited section of society, based on relatively standardized criteria for selection, such as management skills and physical and practical skills. Moreover, new recruits are provided with a relatively uniform training and career development, while the actual competency requirement should imply a wider spectrum. *This could result in a cultural and competency-related reproduction of the existing organization and thereby*

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[5] Similar arguments are to be found in all the referred feature articles.
[6] Summary of the research is presented in the Anthology: *Military Women- The Armed Forces' Achilles Heel* (Steder F. B., 2013). For full publications overview of the program named "Forskning på Årskull [Research on cohorts]" see: http://www.ffi.no/no/Prosjekter/Forskning_paa_aarskull/Sider/Publikasjoner.aspx

a continuation of the existing gap in competency (White Paper No 14, (2012–2013), p. 32).

Hence, the aim of White Paper No 14 (2012–2013) is to create "a framework for a new policy on competency within the defence sector – a competency reform" (p. 6). Among other aspects, it is declared that "The Armed Forces shall recruit more employees with a civilian education and integrate their competency into the organisation" (p. 69). Responding to this, a male cadet at the Norwegian Military Academy claims that traditional mental and physical requirements should also apply to civilian employees. He writes:

> As the White Paper No14 *Competency for a new era* sketch out, we must make greater use of the civil society's resources in order to increase the efficiency of the Armed Forces. An organization of the highest quality needs the best candidates in the work force [...] However, civil recruitment is not without problems - it may be at the expense of the traditional military (Størkersen, 2013, p. 36).

Accordingly, Størkersen (2013) claims that utilizing personnel with expertise gained from civil institutions

> requires that the civilian recruits get a relevant military additional training where they can acquire an unembellished picture of the demands of war through *physical and mental trials*. In such trails they will have to prove that they are fit to be military professionals, something which is crucial both for themselves and for the Armed Forces. Such a focus on abilities and personal development means that the profession will be *reserved for the best* (p. 36).

Based on these and similar observations of the struggle over what kind of skills and characteristics should be required from military personnel, **the aim of this dissertation is to get a deeper understanding of what is at stake in the social struggle over who**[7] **should be allowed in the military profession/field**[8]**.** Since military identity and gender identities can be considered as *constructed collective identities* which are *associated* with possession of certain skills and abilities, I consider *the struggle over requirements* as key to grasping a deeper understanding of *what is at stake* in different identity projects. This is important and necessary to investigate if we want to understand how both *men and women* experience and perceive their own and others' value in the organization, and to which interests the agents activities and struggles contribute.

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[7] In relation to gender, identity, body, physical fitness, skills, competence etc.

[8] The aim of this study is inspired by Marcia Kovitz (2003) who has posed the question: "Given that the activities in which soldiers engage have lethal aims and consequences, *why the struggle over who can take part?"* (p. 1).

1.2   Theoretical and Methodological Framework – A Preview

Theoretically, the study is based on Pierre Bourdieu's conceptual framework supplemented with Norbert Elias figurational[9] and processual perspective, structuralist constructivism and symbolic interactionism in general, as well as feminist developments of Bourdieu. As a methodological consequence of this perspective, individuals will be interpreted as players of a game. That can be the game of power or prestige, the game of war, the game of politics or the game of positions and recognition within the military profession. However, as the players are engaged by competitive interaction (the course of the game) Elias (1978) claims that "their actions and ideas cannot be explained and understood if they are considered on their own; they need to be understood and explained within the framework of the game" (p. 96) (cf. 4.3.2). Accordingly, the military profession/field will be approached from two analytical levels which will be interpreted in an interactive perspective: macro- and micro-perspective.

Data is gathered through a multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork consisting of participant observation, interviews and collection of written material. Material from the participant observation and interviews will be used to reconstruct the micro-level, i.e. social actualities at local military sites. Written material, such as government documents, previous debate and research literature, will be used to provide insight into the macro-level, including relevant context, learned thinking and extralocal[10] power relations and management ambitions which engage individuals at local military sites to appear, act or play, as they do.

The participant observation consists of 72 around-the-clock days spread over 12 months that occurred at different places where selection, education and training of officer candidates, or squad leaders, to the Army and the Home Guard have been the main concern. Twenty-five interviews were recorded from 22 officers, and 40 interviews recorded from 34 officer candidates at the Army's Officer Candidate School. 32 interviews were with women, 33 with men.

A quite bewildering variety of written material has been gathered and will be used in different ways to create the richest possible picture of the military profession/field. Based on a suggestion by Baur & Ernst (2011), previous researchers' work will be seen *as data* and used to draw a broader picture of the struggles within the Norwegian military profession/field.

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[9] A figuration can be defined as dynamic networks of interdependent individuals, or 'chains of interdependencies'.

[10] According to Elias (1978) our conventional instruments for thinking and speaking of society and other formations of people in plural, as for example the UN, NATO, the state and the Armed Forces, are generally constructed as if they are a thing or an object existing prior and external to the network of peoples who make them up. Hence, Elias claims that the idea that peoples are surrounded by "the society" or "structures" should be replaced by a more realistic picture, and suggests the notion of figuration, describing dynamic networks of interdependent individuals (cf. 4.3.1.2). However, as figurations refer to the network of people, I will use the terms extra-local and local to speak of the different sites were people are with their body. The sites investigated through the fieldwork will be considered local sites (micro-level), whereas I consider UN resolutions, politics, strategies, educational tools, management documents, doctrines etc. as made at extra-local sites (macro-level). Inspired by actor-network theory and Dorothy Smith, written material will be considered as actors and ruling devices which link extra-local (macro-level) and local sites (micro-level) together, and enables efforts made at extra-local sites to be brought into local field.

Accordingly, the review of previous research should be considered a part of the macro-analysis.

1.3   Outline of the Dissertation

A text is a linear construct; research and interpretation is not. For many reasons the first and second chapters in this study should have been the theory and method. It is however usually expected that background and previous research comes first, since this leads to research questions, which in turn lead to choice of theory and method. This is also the case with this study. At the same time, and due to the theoretical and methodological perspective, I have chosen to use background description and previous research to interpret the struggles and tensions in the military field from a macro- perspective. In any case, the structure of the written dissertation falls into three parts where the first part illuminates the field from a macro-perspective, the second presents the theoretical and methodological perspective, and the third investigates the field from a micro-perspective.

In more detail, the first part of the dissertation has two chapters (chapters two and three).

Chapter two is devoted to the historical and political background that caused the process of fundamental change in Western Armed Forces' structure, missions and requirement, and how changes have been implemented, questioned and debated in the Norwegian context. The chapter will also answer why research on the topic under investigation is important and necessary.

Chapter three reviews previous literature on 1) the military profession, and 2) gender and military issues, and has a dual intention. One purpose is to clarify what we already know about the research need presented in chapter two and to situate this dissertation in the context of current academic debates. Another purpose is to shed light on the military profession/field from a macro-perspective, something which means that the literature review will be more extensive than if it were only employed for identification of knowledge gaps. In addition, some military theory will be included amid the two research fields under review.

The second part of the dissertation also has two chapters (chapters four and five) and is concerned with the theoretical and the methodological framework from which the field of inquiry will be approached and interpreted.

Chapter four discusses the theoretical perspectives that underpin the understanding of culture, identity, gender and body in the study, which are Pierre Bourdieu's theory and concepts and Norbert Elias' ontology and perspectives. Literature from part one will be linked to the theory. At the end of this chapter, the research questions that fix the direction and limit the content for the micro-level investigation will be explained and contextualized.

Chapter five looks to explain how I have tried to take into account the epistemological and methodological challenges arising from the theoretical perspective in the research design and methods. The approach to written material will be described. The sites where the multi-local

fieldwork has taken place and the sample of interviewees will be introduced, as well as accounting for the methods for participant observation, interviews and analysis of the material. Lastly, reflections on researcher position, ethics and judgments of qualitative studies will be provided.

The third part of the dissertation has four chapters (chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9) and illuminates the military field from a micro- perspective, based on the following research questions:

1. What is required from men and women respectively to do an officer role appropriately?
2. How do men and women with different forms of capital respond to different formal and informal requirements in the military field?

Chapter six shows that officer candidates are trained to become *Normative Role Models with the Right Attitudes*. It concludes that successful integration in the military field is dependent on the ability to embody power resources and obey regulation impositions at the same time; meaning that an officer should simultaneously be able to dominate and be willing to subordinate/conform. Following this conclusion, chapter seven is devoted to *Power Resources and Power Relations,* and chapter eight to *Regulation Impositions and Adaption Issues.* Chapter nine looks to examine *Micro-level Responses to Macro-level Requirements.*

Finally, chapter ten will summarize what is at stake in the social struggle over who can take part in the military profession/field, and makes suggestions for further research.

Part 1:

The Military Field from a Macro-Perspective

Chapter 2: Situating the Field

Whatever goes on is situated in time and place. Thus, to understand the social struggle over what should be required, and who should be allowed in the military profession, we must understand the historical and political context in which the struggle takes place (the macro-level). Hence, this chapter will examine the historical and political background which caused the process of fundamental change in Western Armed Forces' missions, structure and requirements. The main focus will be on how the changes has been implemented, questioned and debated in the Norwegian context. The first subchapter is based on management documents and previous literature which have discussed *the military transformation* or documents that have activated it, in the Norwegian context. The second subchapter is based on debate articles responding to the situation, published in the Norwegian media or debate books launched by *The Norwegian Defence University College*.

2.1 Historical Background and Political Management Efforts

The military transformation[11], with a capital T as Sookermany (2013) states, refers to a US-initiated process of change within The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries with national peculiarities following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The transformation is characterized by the transition from a personnel-intensive and low-technological homeland defence-concept that was designed to defend territory against direct aggression from a

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[11] The transformation-concept is not unproblematic. It has been used in both research and debates on the military to describe a wide range of changes in different contexts for a long time, and perspectives on what causes the transformation are varied, numerous and sometimes even competing (Haaland T. L., 2008a; Petersson, 2011). According to Petersson (2011) the term transformation comes to replace the term *Revolution in Military Affairs* (RAM) around the shift of the millennium, and especially after 9/11. While RAM had circled about changes resulting from new (information) technology and could lead thoughts to an uncontrolled change and expectations of a final condition, the concept of transformation was introduced to bring the message that the military organization had to be able to continuously change and adapt in relation to constantly changing security challenges in an on-going process.

massive and known invader, towards a radical volume-reduced[12] but modernized and high-technological political tool for interventions throughout the world (Heier, 2006; Solberg, 2007; Sookermany, 2013).

According to NATO's strategic concept of 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union had effectively removed the threat of an imperialistic full-scale attack on NATO's European fronts. On the other hand the demise of the Soviet Union left Europe open to both geographical and political reconfiguration. Hence, instabilities arising from "serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes" (NATO, 1991) with possible spill over effects to NATO countries were identified as a *new threat image*. The political perspective taken by NATO's opinions-makers was therefore that the alliance had to be transformed to meet complex new risks against stability, in areas affecting the security and stability of the alliance members (Heier, 2006; NATO, 1991; Sookermany, 2013). Consequently, a process where traditional military priorities, doctrines and operational concepts were adjusted to fit new threats and missions was commenced in most Western countries (Græger & Leira, 2005; Græger, 2006; 2011; Høiback, 2010; Larsen, 2011; Ulriksen, 2002).

Yet, while NATO altered its concerns from Norway's strategic location in the US-Soviet rivalry to more imminent threats against stability in newly independent states of Europe, Norwegian opinion-makers still perceived a threat towards its territory from its Russian neighbour[13], and anti-invasion in Northern Norway remained a persistent criterion in the planning process during the 1990s (Græger, 2006; Heier, 2006; Petersson, 2011). Accordingly, only small and reluctant steps towards reformation of the military forces were taken in Norway (Græger & Leira, 2005; Græger, 2006; Græger, 2011; Larsen, 2011; Ulriksen, 2002). The steps taken were mainly "a result of increasing discrepancies between the military structure and defence budgets [14] rather than a reflection of the internalization of new defence concepts among political and military leaders" (Græger & Leira, 2005, p. 54). Hence, Måseidvåg (2011) holds that the 1990s became mainly a decade in which neoliberal market mechanisms gained foothold in the Norwegian defence sector. This led to comprehensive change in the management, administration and organization[15] of the Norwegian Armed Forces (Måseidvåg, 2011). However, the economic rationale underlying

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[12] The Norwegian Armed Forces have gone through a quantitative reduction that is unprecedented in Norwegian history. In 1990 Norway had 13 brigades, in 2000 six brigades and in 2010 one brigade (Petersson, 2011).

[13] At this time Norway and Russia had "unsolved disputes on borders and resource management at sea" (Heier, 2006, p. 28), and considerable Russian military capacities were located at Kola Peninsula (Græger, 2006). The disputed maritime area was divided equally in 2010. Concealing undiscovered reserves of natural gas and oil, the Arctic costal states have in recent years taken various measures to protect their interest in the area, including development of new military capabilities. Accordingly, "concerns about an incremental militarization of the Arctic have also been raised at the political level" (Åtlanda, 2014, p. 145),

[14] The reduced budget was caused by the discharge of the US's military financial support coupled with increased salaries and requirements for advanced technological materials (White Paper No 45, (2000-2001)).

[15] This involved the introduction of New Public Management with focus on cost-effectiveness and management through economic incentive systems, performance measurement, control, personal accountability and adoption of internal market mechanisms. The latter was established by distinguishing between primary activities and support structures/services, where resources were channeled to the first in order for them to purchase services from the latter (Måseidvåg, 2011).

the reforms implemented in the 1990s mainly caused a qualitative reduction in force structure (Græger & Leira, 2005; Ulriksen, 2002). Hence, political and military leaders had problems in rapidly deploying relevant troops to events in the Balkans, and those who were deployed met complex missions requiring different mandates and approaches to that for which they were prepared, equipped and trained (Haaland T. L., 2008a; Johansen R. B., 2013; Larsen, 2011; Ulriksen, 2002).

As a consequence, the need to adapt the Norwegian Armed Forces to international operations and interoperability with the US and other allies was put on the agenda from 1998 with the White Paper No 38 (1998-99) *Adapting the Norwegian Armed Forces to participate in international operations*. It was emphasized that Norwegian forces must be enabled to participate in international operations in order to demonstrate solidarity with the alliance, if we were to expect the allies' active involvement in our security issues (White Paper No 38, (1998-99)). The first major steps in the transformation were then taken with the following *Defence Study 2000* (Chief of Defence, 2000) and White Paper No 45 (2000-2001)*The Restructuring of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the Period 2002-2005,* in which anti-invasion was abandoned as a valid concept in the advantage of out-of-area operations (Godal, 2011; Larsen, 2011; Heier, 2006; Heier, 2011). In White Paper No 45 (2000-2001) the government summarized that the Norwegian Armed Forces were "in a deep and persistent structural crisis" characterized by two fundamental imbalances; the size was not in proportion to the resources provided, and the military arrangement was not suitable to solve future tasks. It was explained that reforms after the Cold War had not reflected the changes in requirements to the Armed Forces. In addition, it was written that it had "not been demonstrated sufficiently understanding of the major changes in international politics in the 1990s which led NATO and allied countries to gradually require completely different military capabilities and organization" (pp. 6-7). The confession in this statement was driven forward by a combination of lessons learned from NATO operations in the Balkans and the US's criticism of Norway's and other allies' readiness for participation in these operations. The US's criticism is visible in the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) which was adopted by all allies at the NATO summit in 1999 (NATO, 1999b), and *in which the US sent a clear message on the future requirements to the European allied* (White Paper No 38, (1998-99)). It was written that many allies had limited capabilities for rapid deployment of significant forces outside national territory, and that increased attention had to "be paid to *human factors* (such as common approaches to doctrine, training and operational procedures) and standardisation, as well as to the challenges posed by the accelerating pace of technological change" (NATO, 1999b, p. pkt. 4). Heier (2006), refers to Lundestad and claims that "*NATO gave the United States a unique instrument with which to guide developments in Europe*" (p. 9), and explains that the DCI has been regarded as an important initiator for the transformation process (Heier, 2006).

From now, it "was gradually received in the general defence discourse, […] that Norway, due to its dependence upon allied support, could best ensure its own security by dutifully supporting the common NATO structure" (Græger & Leira, 2005, p. 55). This implied that Norway started to develop mobile and flexible, rapid, reaction forces that could contribute

efficiency in international operations together with the allied in order to protect supranational interests in regional conflicts outside of Norway and NATO's territory (Græger & Leira, 2005; Sookermany, 2013; White Paper No 38, (1998-99); White Paper No 45, (2000-2001)). Consequently, it was concluded in White Paper No 45 (2000-2001) that the "situation requires a comprehensive reduction and considerable change of the *whole* Norwegian Armed Force's structure and organization – smaller adjustments will not be sufficient" (White Paper No 45, (2000-2001), p. 9).

Shortly after this was written, the threat from terrorist attack predicted in NATO's strategic concept of 1999 (NATO, 1999a), reflected in the White Paper No 45 (2000-2001), was actualized with the fall of the Twin Towers on the 9/11 2001. According to Godal (2011), this dramatic crescendo had epoch-making consequences for security politics and the military's role in the Norwegian political landscape. As a consequence of this event, Norwegian Armed Forces followed NATO and the US into Afghanistan in the "War on Terrorism" as a result of NATO's Article 5[16], upon which Norway's eventual need for support from the alliance would be dependent. Henceforth, the Norwegian Armed Forces went through what is said to be the most extensive restructuring ever in the Norwegian public sector, in order to adapt to the new security political situation and the military requirements that converged in actual, modern, high-technological warfare with allied troops in a foreign country.

New requirements, orientation and structure for the Norwegian Armed Forces were described in White Paper No 42 (2003-2004) *The further modernization of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the period 2005-2008,* and a new strategic concept, *Strength and Relevance* (Ministry of Defence, 2004) was launched. In these documents it was emphasized that transnational and rapidly changing security policy and challenges, as well as accelerated technological progress and more complex tasks for the Armed Forces – ranging from humanitarian efforts to peacekeeping, governance and combat operations in the borderland between war and peace, and between military and civilian activities – constitute a central frame factor for the Norwegian Armed Forces challenges and further development. It is claimed in both documents that military transformation has to be made into a strategic and on-going process, and explained that transformation means reorganization and qualitative change in a continuous and prospective process, where innovative concepts, doctrines and capabilities are repetitively developed and integrated to improve and increase efficiency within the Armed Forces. The aim is to create flexible military forces that are able to deal with unpredictability and a wide range of tasks (White Paper No 42, (2003-2004); Ministry of Defence, 2004).

According to White Paper No 42 (2003-2004) a flexible expeditionary force based on better equipment, new technology and quality thinking rather than quantity thinking is a

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[16] "Article 5 is at the basis of a fundamental principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked" (NATO, 2005). "On 12 September, NATO decided that, if it is determined that the attack against the United States was directed from abroad, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This is the first time in the Alliance's history that Article 5 has been invoked" (NATO, 2005).

consequence of these requirements, which means that the personnel area will be of "critically importance for the armed forces operational ability" (p. 68). Hence, it is claimed that the transformation "is mostly about human beings and competence" (p. 16) and that professional skills must characterize the military personnel. Accordingly, it is declared that "reforms in the personnel area will be one of the most important prerequisites for success in the further modernization of the Armed Forces" (p. 16), and that "personnel management and military education systems must be adapted to the significant changes that have taken place in and outside the military after the Cold War" (p. 16).

Finally, it is declared that the Norwegian Armed Forces "must recruit the best suited and most motivated personnel of *both gender* to the armed forces' multifarious enterprise" (p. 75). This is further emphasized and elaborated on in the White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) *Increased recruitment of women into to Norwegian Armed Forces*. This White Paper departs from statistics showing that the proportion of female personnel in the Norwegian Armed Forces has remained consistently low, around 5 to 9 per cent, despite the fact that there has been an explicit political aim of increasing the proportion of women in the Norwegian military for almost 30 years. As the recruitment efforts undertaken[17] have evidently not had the desired effect, the government has now asked for serious action to be taken.

The need to increase the proportion of women in the military is explained in that Norway through *UN Security Council Resolution 1325* (2000) *on women, peace and security* has

> committed to increase the proportion of women in their international troops. A greater
> percentage of women will make the forces better able to get in touch with the entire
> civilian population, including helping to establish partnership with women and
> women's organizations in the areas of operation. As war and conflict affects women in
> different ways than men, there is a need to pay attention to women's special needs for
> protection (White Paper No 36, (2006-2007), p. 8)

Considering the UN Resoultion 1325, Schjølset (2014) and Tryggestad (2014) explain that the inter-governmental conflicts and the rivalry between the Great Powers which dominated during the Cold War were challenged by internal, non-governmental and civil war conflicts during the 1990s. These conflicts affected civilians, mainly women and children, far harder than traditional interstate conflicts. Among other things, the use of systematic rape as a weapon was witnessed. This reinforced the relevance of a feminist approach to international politics. Accordingly, transnational networks of women activists succeeded in *expanding the understanding and definition of security from security for states to security for human beings* (Schjølset, 2014; Tryggestad, 2014). Hence, it was for the first time recognized that planning and management of conflicts required a gender perspective and UN Resolution 1325 was subsequently adopted *unanimously* by the UN Security Council on 31 October 2000[18].

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[17] According to Fasting & Sand (2012) 198 unique initiatives have been suggested.

[18] UN Resolution 1325 contains 18 action points with recommendations and encouragements to member states. Among other things, member states are urged to increase women's representation and participation in all decision making and conflict management at all levels; nationally, regionally and internationally. There is a request for greater emphasis on local women's

Schjølset (2014) explains that the key to the women's success lay precisely in the transformation of the very concept of security and to *whom* it applied. Traditionally it focused on the protection of the state from external threats or protecting the state's authority in civil wars. However, with increased focus on internal conflicts and non-state actors the civilian population and human security were put on the agenda, resulting in the extension from state security to security for humans.

The main responsibility for implementing UN Resolution 1325 lies with the UN member countries. Hence, the Norwegian government prepared a national action plan to meet the obligations in UN resolution 1325 in 2006. In the action plan it is declared that increasing the proportion of women in the Norwegian military is considered a priority measure, and that Norway will work actively to ensure that 1325 will be followed up in the UN and NATO (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006; White Paper No 36, (2006-2007)). In White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) it is emphasized that Norwegian troops must be a mirror of our own democratic society when they are participating in international operations, because "a sufficient gender balance at all levels in our forces will demonstrate gender equality in practice" (p. 10).

In addition to the need for women's presence in international operations, several other arguments are presented in White Paper No 36 (2006-2007). One is that "the tasks and challenges faced by the military in the future depends on that the military are able to *recruit enough qualified personnel* from the entire population, not just persons from one of the sexes" (p. 17). Furthermore, it is stressed that it is "natural to expect that key elements in the military culture as norms, values, attitudes and behaviors reflect that the organization is dominated by men" (p. 9) and that "increased integration of women will be an important part of the efforts to change the Armed Forces" (p. 9). White Paper No 36 concludes by underlining the necessity to research on culture and attitudes because:

> There are many assumptions about the culture in the military that are seldom verified through research. Therefore, there is a need to increase knowledge about the culture and attitudes that are actually dominant in the Armed Forces. [...] Greater knowledge about the culture in the military will form a necessary basis for evaluating the need for targeted interventions to change any unwanted culture. A mapping of the culture in the military will also reveal which attitudes that prevail between women and men. [...] It will also be of interest to gain knowledge [...] whether it is expected that women must change their behavior in order to experience a sense of belonging. Such studies may also provide information about any differences in attitudes between generations, grade levels, branches and sex and between civilian and military employees (p. 21).

The decision to recruit more women was followed up in several subsequent political documents and through relative crystal clear messages from two female Ministers of Defence,

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peace initiatives and needs in the UNs operations areas, and for increased collaboration with local women/organizations on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Furthermore, increased focus on women's rights and the need for protection in areas of conflict is requested. Since 2008,the UN Security Council has adopted six follow-up resolutions that have contributed to clarify and operationalize UN Resolution 1325 (Græger, 2006; Schjølset, 2014; Tryggestad, 2014).

Strøm-Erichsen (2005 - 2009) and Faremo (2009 - 2011). On several occasions, they repeated that the Armed Forces were a system that had practiced radical quotas of men for many years, and that a quota of women in the Armed Forces could be necessary. Faremo also emphasized that the request to recruit more women should be considered a mission, as well as an order (Arbeiderpartiet, 2010; Faremo, 2010a; Faremo, 2010b; Johansen M. , 2010; Pedersen, 2006).

However, parallel to efforts to increase the number of women, in the extensive period of reforms and efforts to adapt the Norwegian Armed Forces to international operations and obligations from NATO, White Paper No 48 (2007-2008) *Armed Forces for the protection of our security, interests and values* gave the extensive transformation a new face with less radical downsizing and restructuring, but a focus on continual development and adaption. However, it was claimed that *challenges persist in the personnel area.* Accordingly, White Paper No 14 (2012–2013) *Competency for a new era* was launched with an aim to address persisting challenges in the personnel area. This White Paper particularly emphasizes that "the weapon systems of the future will feature an extremely advanced level of technology and will be interlinked in a complex network" (p. 6). Hence, personnel and competency will be "an extremely critical factor" (p. 6).

Results from the aforementioned research program (cf. 1.1) initiated through White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) *Increased recruitment of women into to Norwegian Armed Forces* are echoed in White Paper No 14 (2012–2013) in that physical abilities are included as a diversity category together with gender, ethnicity and age. It is written: "Visible diversity refers to variables such as gender, ethnicity, age and physical abilities" (p. 25). Moreover, several formulations can be traced which declare that physical skills are necessary for some personnel, but that other competencies are also required. For example it is written:

> It is claimed that women are physically less able for service in the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces still requires employees with very good physical health for a number of missions, but an increasing number of positions will also require other skills (p. 44).

Hence, White Paper No 14 (2012–2013) challenges the standardized criteria for selection and uniform systems for education and career development. We will now turn to a debate that emerged in 2008/2009, as a consequence of the rapid change in the period 2002-2008.

2.2 Political and Military Requirements Out of Step?

2.2.1 Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation

In late 2008 military culture was put on the agenda in the Norwegian media. A professor[19] criticized the Norwegian public for not being impressed by Norwegian snipers' brilliant achievements in Afghanistan (Matlary, 2008a). The Defence Minister replied that we do not want to exult over slain enemies. Neither do we have a tradition for such a *warrior culture*, nor should we strive in that direction (Strøm-Erichsen, 2008a). The professor retorted that a

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[19] International politics *University of Oslo,* professor II position at *The Norwegian Defence University College*

warrior culture already existed (Matlary, 2008b). The Minister answered that a *professional military culture* treated the issue of taking life with deep seriousness, and the community recognized the effort in a dignified manner without invitation to "a party with killed Taliban's in focus of the celebrations" (Strøm-Erichsen, 2008b).

Under the headline *The new warrior culture*, the Chief of Defence responded that the debate on whether soldiers receive the recognition they deserve is interesting. Because, it gives expression to the fact that the rearrangement of the Norwegian Armed Forces as a partially professionalized military instrument applied far beyond Norway's borders, to counter a diffused threat, is fundamentally different from the earlier mobilization defence *both in the psychological and cultural area* (Diesen, 2008). Since soldiers' lives are now risked for things that a majority of the population may be quite indifferent to and could do well without, motivation and fighting spirit must be based on something other than self-defence on home soil, the Chief of Defence explained. He added that this is a challenging project. Yet, he claimed that there have always existed military organizations with this quality, and went on to explain that such units were characterized by a strong *professional identity*, where corps spirit and unwillingness to abandon comrades alongside the units' reputation and tradition served as the fighting motivation instead of high ideals. However, such fighting spirit must be systematically built up through ceremonies and celebrations in the corps' daily life:

> This creates a sense of belonging and commitment to the unit until the individual is
> determined to bring even the biggest sacrifice, because self-esteem and self-respect
> rests on the acceptance and trust of your comrades and fellow soldiers (Diesen, 2008).

Accordingly, the Chief of Defence declared that it is "extremely important" that soldiers who have distinguished themselves are recognized and decorated by the politicians who gave them the right to take life, "not least as to help the soldiers to maintain faith and legitimacy of what they do". Hence, in parallel with the organizational and external restructuring, "we have to undergo a psychological and cultural transformation" he concluded, and invited further debate on the military profession (Diesen, 2008).

Shortly after, *The Norwegian Defence University College* launched a debate book entitled *Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation* (Edström, Lunde, & Matlary, 2009a). The intention was to illuminate the tension between the professionalizing of the Norwegian Armed Forces, with emerging warrior cultures as part of the change, and a society characterized by a self-image as a peace nation[20]. Besides that, the book explicitly aimed to stimulate research on cultural

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[20] According to Edström et al (2009b), the Norwegian self-image as a peace nation can be confirmed by the following statements from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre (2005-2012): "We are not in Afghanistan to make war, but to assist a poor state [...] Norway's international politics is a systematic policy of peace" (p. 26). In order to clarify concepts, Edström et al argue that the historical examples of Sparta and Nazi Germany can be considered warrior cultures, which means that the step from warrior culture to militarism is not necessarily far. Militarism is, however, often contrasted against pacifism in a similar dichotomy as "warrior culture – peace culture", they add. Yet, where pacifism does not endorse the use of violence as a means to resolve conflicts *at all*, a peace culture can consider it legitimate to use violence as a last resort, for example in self-defence. Thus, having military forces was not considered controversial or problematic in the Norwegian "peace nation" during the Cold War.

implications from the professionalization of the Norwegian Armed Forces (Edström, Lunde, & Matlary, 2009b).

In the first chapter (Edström, Lunde, & Matlary, 2009b) attention is paid to *the military as a profession*. It is explained that the concept was adopted as an official description of the Norwegian Armed Forces for the first time in 2007. It then emerged with significant importance in the new Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 07), and changed the attention from organizational culture to professional culture. The changed approach to military culture reflects the fundamental changes in the Norwegian Armed Forces rationale; explained by the Chief of Defence in the media article on warrior culture reviewed above. The authors point to the fact that a separate chapter in the doctrine is devoted to *the military profession*, and argue that the definition used for the military profession ties to classic perspectives in Western military tradition, which emphasizes military virtues such as courage, preparedness, obedience and willingness to set the mission ahead of personal safety. In the Chief of Defence's foreword it is written that the doctrine aims to help the officer corps to develop a common understanding and a common *professional culture* (cf. 1.1).

Edström et al (2009b) question what the terms professional culture and warrior culture really means and contain, and state that the concepts are rarely used and analyzed in a Norwegian context. They find two master theses that touch upon the issue. Brunborg's (2008) thesis indicates that *the warrior* poses the principal professional identity in the professional combat unit Telemark Battalion. Johansen's (2007) thesis does not explore warrior culture but levels of professionalism, defined as possessing the skills to deal with the sharpest combat operations in The Coastal Ranger Command. If combat professionalism can be connected to the phenomenon of warrior culture, warrior cultures may exist within the Norwegian Armed Forces, Edström et al conclude. Yet, they emphasize that although warrior culture exists as a *linguistic phenomenon* it cannot be verified that it exists as an *actual phenomenon*. On the other hand, the term warrior culture is often used as an opposite to peace culture and idealism on the rhetorical level. So, the authors argue that the development challenges the Norwegian self-understanding and identity, and is regarded as deeply problematic by stakeholders both within and outside the military, while others advocate for its necessity.

Furthermore, Edström et al (2009b) question whether it is relevant to speak of a common overriding culture and a common profession regardless of differences in function, and argue that the professional culture in many ways contrasts one or more military subcultures. The authors point to examples that indicate the existence of different cultures in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and various normative assessments of these, which may indicate an inner tension in the interaction between them. Hence, Edström et al argue that an overreaching common professional culture will have to deal with both external and internal aspects of tension. The external aspect concerns the military profession's exclusivity compared to other professions in the military, and consequently who is included in the military profession. The inner aspect deals with hierarchical and functional dimensions in the profession/organization, including the relationship between different branches, units and services within these.

Edström et al (2009b) argue that a particularly important issue is to understand the relationship between new cultures that may develop in the modernized Norwegian Armed Forces', traditional values and norms and the rhetoric of the Norwegian peace nation. Equally important is it to understand risks of internal tensions between different subcultures within the Norwegian Armed Forces. The authors conclude that Norwegian military culture, profession, identity and self-understanding have been insufficiently examined so far, and that the studies that do exist are mainly at master level conducted in combat or elite units. Accordingly, they emphasize that the purpose of the book is to inspire research on the military profession in a Norwegian context.

2.2.2   Uniformity or Diversity?

Shortly after *Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation* was published *The Norwegian Defence University College* (NDUC) launched a sequel, entitled *Uniformity or Diversity?* (Edström, Lunde, & Matlary, 2010a). The aim was to inspire a debate on the balance between military necessities and political desires regarding uniformity and diversity in the Norwegian military profession. In the foreword Kjøsnes (2010) writes that given the battle for talents in the Norwegian work force, there is a problem that the military does not recruit well from the large pool of potential candidates. He adds that women and ethnic minorities also bring operative advantages in operations where language and cultural understanding are important, and where only women can interact with women. Hence, diversity is necessary. Yet, diversity challenges the uniform profession. Below, I will review the most relevant debaters given voice in the book, all insiders at NDUC.

Edström, Lunde, & Matlary (2010b) claim that the Norwegian Armed Forces have come under "crossfire amid traditional *requirements* of uniformity and modern *norms* of diversity (p. 18). They explain that uniformity is seen to rest on a *functional* basis, while diversity is based on political *desires*. Although, they note that diversity can also be seen to rest on a functional basis, likewise within the military. Hence, the degree to which both uniformity and diversity have a functional importance is disputed. Nevertheless, since diversity is the new dimension being introduced, diversity is the dimension that has been considered a challenge. The challenge is further intensified in that the political demand for diversity coincides with the increased use of the Armed Forces in actual operations, which makes the functional imperative increasingly important.

Edström & Lunde (2010) explain that uniformity as a norm stands strong in military operational documents, as for example the Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 07) where the word common is used five times in one sentence (Chief of Defence foreword). Hence, the doctrine demonstrates that homogeneity and uniformity are not just something that applies to external things like the uniform, but also to the cognitive domain, e.g. its written that "being an officer or NCO in the military means to have incorporated the military profession as part of the personality" (FFOD 07, p. 162) and that "values and attitudes that weakens our unity is unacceptable" (FFOD 07, p. 160). At the same time diversity is held up and described as a strength and enrichment in a number of political policy documents for the military. Accordingly, it seems to cause a tension between the political and military norms and ideals.

Yet, both uniformity and diversity are justified by functionality and legitimacy, and both the political and military leadership want legitimacy and functionality. Edström & Lunde (2010) refer to this being a classic debate within military sociology, and review the work of Huntington, Janowitz and Moskos [21].

Heier (2010) argues that military success in extreme situations requires unity, discipline, loyalty, obedience and subordination, and asks if social inclusion and equality have become so politically correct that operational considerations must yield. He argues that the desire to civilize the Armed Forces is a postmodern phenomenon, and that traditional professional virtues clash with modern, liberal and tolerant values. Heier goes on to explain that the desire to customize the Armed Forces to a peace situation through better demographic representation must be understood as being a leftover political project[22] afforded by rich and stable countries in the West who are not facing a militarily threat. In such a situation the individual's rights can be held up as more important than the duties to the state imposed in the citizenship. Likewise, the citizen's desire for self-development, individual freedom of choice and co-determination are allowed to dominate over requirements of discipline and cohesion. Hence, the soldiers' community is placed in tension, and the boundary between individual freedom and group cohesion is challenged. Thus, Heier asks to what degree the units' fighting spirit and professional community are consistent with the development. He also problematizes that liberal governance ideals are spreading at the same time as stricter requirements to drill and submission is needed to get the modern intervention forces to work.

Furthermore, Heier (2010) argues that pressure for the integration of a gender perspective across ministries and sectors has been created by recommendations from the UN Women's Conference[23], and that, accordingly, politicians and bureaucrats are subject to orders from the UN Resolution 1325 and the Norwegian Gender Equality Act. According to Heier, these challenges force us to consider how diversity can be justified and implemented in an organization that is based on functionally. He continues that this leads us to the core activities taking place on the ground in the operational units where only two things apply: training and practice. Heier explains that training and practice are the methods by which individual traits are socialized into disciplined units with tight group cohesion and loyalty to the units' goals. Social diversity is transformed into uniformity and common identities are built, including unified doctrine and common procedures and training standards. This collective discipline enables efficient and rapid execution of military power. As such,

> reflections and conflicts of opinion occur because diversity as a political idea does not
> match the foundation in the military professional community. A prevailing

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[21] Other authors reviewed below also link to these classics within military sociology. They will be presented under the literature review in chapter three.

[22] Heier however refers to the different points of view regarding the military organization among politicians, and argues that the Conservative/Christian democratic government (Bondevik's Second Cabinet) prepared the ground for a clear functional organization, while the Labour/Socialistic left government (Stoltenberg's Second Cabinet) implemented more anti-militaristic and social imperatives.

[23] As I understand it this refers to UN resolution 1325. See previous chapter on historical and political background.

understanding within this community is that the military are not aimed to create an equal or socially inclusive society, but to achieve practical political goals in the security policy area (Heier, 2010, p. 90).

Heier (2010) maintains that the argument for the military to reflect society can be counterproductive if it takes time and focus away from the core task. He goes on to explain that fewer soldiers are now used to more and more tasks, and more quests to civilize military power keep coming. For instance, he comments that combating human trafficking, sexual violence and drugs, as well as child soldiers and gender perspective are now to be integrated into the planning of every field practice and operation. Following on from the additional tasks, Heier problematizes that the political quest for diversity has mainly focused on observable indicators of diversity, primarily female representation, and less on underlying or invisible diversity variables[24], such as differences in personal characteristic, education, academic and practical skills and mindset which are important in an increasingly complex and demanding situation. Furthermore, Heier argues that the need for endorsement from the higher level for career advancement causes servility, weakness and self-censorship in the officer corps. Accordingly, political pressure for conformity has contributed to intellectual poverty and uniformity in the military profession. Nevertheless, Heier summarizes that the military is based on a very functional and professional logic since the enterprise is ultimately about taking lives and risking its own.

As others have also done, Ydstebø (2010) departs from the doctrine FFOF 07. He explains that this is the Armed Forces authoritative document which is normative for the conceptual basis and for how the professional culture will be developed. However, with reference to the classic works of Huntington and Janowitz (cf. 3.2.1.1), Ydstebø explains that there are different views on *who* determines the functional imperative. With Huntington's perspective, the functional imperative can only be interpreted and determined by the military profession itself. Conversely, from Janowitz' perspective political leadership provides the criteria for military efficiency. Thus, the functional imperative can be considered to be what the politicians at any time define as the mission. With reference to Egnell and Ydén, Ydstebø argues that the functional imperative should be defined as an "ongoing game of strategic interaction" (p. 100), because it will change with a number of conditions, including both strategic context and political preferences.

Ydstebø (2010) points out that interaction between military forces and civilian population is a significant part of the units' daily activities in the conflicts in Afghanistan. In a gender-segregated society like this, it is essential to have women in the military units to communicate with women and children in the operational theatre, and diversity is thus a functional perspective. However, this is today's conflict claims Ydstebø, and he goes on to argue that a general problem is that current conflicts can be accorded too great an importance for the design of future forces. Then, once again, the military power risks preparing to fight a

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[24] Others have also argued that the military diversity politic has mainly focused on female representation. See for example Steder (2010) and Steder, Stornæs, & Stubberud (2012).

previous war. Accordingly, the functional argument for a higher proportion of women in the military should be given an explanation that goes beyond the current specific situation in Afghanistan.

Moreover, Ydstebø (2010) reviews the history and explains that the modern military organization was designed in the aftermath of the French Revolution (1789). An important quality was that the combination of civil rights and military duty made it possible to set up arms with considerably more troops than before, and motivation increased when the soldiers were fighting for a state to which they belonged. Another important quality in the design was that the officer position, which had previously been reserved for the nobility, was opened up to be reached by merits, not just by family. This means that the military hierarchy was designed as a meritocracy, and, according to Ydstebø, it is from the meritocratic perspective that resistance arises towards group representation and access to a position due to gender or skin colour, at the cost of clean merits.

However, Ydstebø (2010) describes that in the century of nation-building and major ideologies (the 1800s) the military had a key role in bringing the nation's prevailing values on to the nation's young men, reducing differences between people and creating national unity. Yet, with the boost from the US transformation the mobilization structure was phased out in advantage of a much smaller and specialized task force during the 2000s, something which caused increasing differences within the military. In particular between those who call themselves warriors, and *the others*. Professionalization terminates the uniform soldier and creates clearer subcultures that define themselves by their difference from what they classify as the less operative parts of the military. This was clearly apparent in the debate about warrior culture, Ydstebø recalls. He states that the transformed and postmodern Norwegian Armed Forces are much narrower in content and organization. Since it has been decided to develop the military in a more exclusive direction with a common professional culture, the institutionalized diversity which characterized the popular defence will decrease. According to Ydstebø, the narrow task force, which is the result of a deliberate and politically driven transformation, is dependent on a socialization process where individual traits will be *socialized into the standards and "norms accepted in the fellowship"* (p. 132). A key question is therefore to what degree the individual qualities with which the diversity project seeks to enrich the Armed Forces can withstand the professional socialization, Ydstebø concludes, and argues, that what will be left from the socialization process will only be what is different by birth, and that women and non-whites will still stand out.

Kvarving (2010) writes that arguments reflected in the debate carry on attitudes of ancient tradition, structure and culture, and emphasizes the importance of ensuring that diversity and gender remain high on the agenda in the Norwegian Armed Forces. She maintains that it may be useful to recall the overriding principle for the use of military force, and refers to the doctrine: "Application of military power is politics, and political objectives are always overreaching for a military operation or campaign" (FFOD 07, p. 30). She also recalls that Norway has undertaken national and international obligations to work for basic human rights *for all*, and states that the fact that the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was adopted

unanimously underlines the extent of people and countries that are behind this approach. Therefore, the resolution must have consequences for how we exercise military power. Furthermore, Kvarving emphasizes that military force has no value in itself in a civilized society. Conversely, military forces are used to achieve political objectives. Without a political purpose it is pure violence. The foundations of military power are then precisely the values that are reflected in UN Resolution 1325. And so, diversity is about functionality, not to mention legitimacy in relation to political values and *whose security we are fighting for*.

Moreover, Kvarving (2010) has noted that many of the concerns regarding women in the military are related to women's physique. For example, it is constantly repeated that "it is fair enough with women if they are strong enough to carry me to safety if I get injured" (p. 274). Kvarving agrees that small women and small men can have trouble carrying heavy loads for a long time, and it is fair to take this fact into consideration, regardless of gender, in positions where this is necessary. However, with the highly diverse and specialized tasks faced by the Armed Forces, it is not necessary for all soldiers to carry heavy loads, Kvarving declares. Therefore, the Armed Forces must get rid of the one-sided physical orientation. Instead, the right balance between actual operational requirements and the need for diversity must be found. Kvarving assumes that one of the reasons the Armed Forces do not succeed with diversity is that personnel do not feel recognized and appreciated. However, Kvarving emphasizes that even though you feel too little appreciated and recognized it is unacceptable to ignore international obligation, political order and fundamental principles of equality and human rights for something you consider more interesting.

2.3   Summary and Reflections

The historical and political background has shown that lessons learned from NATO operations in the Balkans and the US's criticism visible in the *Defense Capabilities Initiative,* in which the US sent a clear message on future requirements to the European allied, activated a transformation process in Norwegian Defence Policy. The process gained radical momentum when NATO's Article 5 was activated and the Norwegian Armed Forces followed NATO and the US into Afghanistan. Henceforth, it was gradually received in the defence discourse, "that Norway, due to its dependence upon allied support, could best ensure its own security by dutifully supporting the common NATO structure" (Græger & Leira, 2005, p. 55). The situation required completely different military capabilities and the *whole* Norwegian Armed Force's organization and orientation had to be changed. Major steps were taken in the period 2005-2008, with the aim of creating military forces able to deal with accelerated technological progress and complex tasks (ranging from humanitarian efforts to combat operations out-of-area) together with allied forces. The increased complexity required a shift from quantity thinking to quality thinking in the personnel area, and it was declared that the Norwegian Armed Forces must recruit the best personnel of both genders in order to gain access to enough qualified personnel for the multifarious enterprise.

In the debate on emerging warrior cultures, the Chief of Defence explicated that a professionalized military instrument applied far beyond Norway's borders to counter a diffuse threat, required soldiers' fighting spirit to be based on something other than high ideals and self-defence. Motivation for such missions could be achieved through systematic development of a culture where self-esteem and self-respect rested on unwillingness to abandon comrades and the unit's reputation and tradition. Consequently, the Chief of Defence argued that the Norwegian Armed Forces had to undergo a cultural transformation in parallel with the altered use of military forces. The changed approach to culture is reflected in the Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 2007), which is the Armed Forces authoritative document and normative tool for how to develop a common professional identity and culture.

At the same time other lessons were learned from events in the Balkans and elsewhere during the 1990s. The internal and non-state conflicts affected civilians far harder than the traditional interstate conflicts that had dominated thinking during the Cold War. Accordingly, feminist theory and women activists succeeded in expanding the understanding and definition of security from security for states to security for human beings. Hence, it was recognized that planning and management of conflicts required a gender perspective, and UN Resolution 1325 was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council. In order to implement UN Resolution 1325 and ensure that Norwegian troops would mirror "our own democratic society" in international operations, serious efforts were taken to increase the number of women in the Norwegian Armed forces from 2006. It was emphasized that diversity in competence was needed and that radical action would be taken if the Armed Forces did not succeed in recruiting from both genders.

These changes caused debates. Firstly, the professionalization of the Norwegian Armed Forces, with the emergence of actual or rhetorical warrior cultures, challenged the Norwegian

identity as a civilized peace nation. This development was regarded as deeply problematic both within and outside the military, while others advocated its necessity. Warnings were made against the risk of internal tension in relation to the military profession's exclusivity compared with other professions in the military, including hierarchical and functional dimensions and relationships between different branches and services.

Secondly, the functional basis for uniformity versus diversity was debated. While uniformity stood strong as a norm in the military and its operational documents asked for common mind-set, identity and culture, the political documents asked for increased diversity. Accordingly, it was argued the Norwegian Armed Forces had come under crossfire amid traditional *requirements* of uniformity and (post)modern *norms* of diversity and social inclusion. However, the debate showed itself to dispute the degree to which both uniformity and diversity have a functional importance and whether the functional imperative is determined by the military professionals or the political leadership.

On one hand it was asked to what degree the units' fighting spirit was consistent with postmodern and liberal ideals, such as individual freedom of choice and co-determination. It was explained that efficient execution of military power depended on traditional virtues such as obedience, discipline and group cohesion, built through training and military socialization. It was further argued that the UN Women and the Norwegian Gender Equality Act created pressure for integration of diversity and gender meanwhile the military community did not consider itself a political tool for gender integration. It was problematized that fewer soldiers are used to increasingly complex tasks, and that more quests to civilize military power keep coming, such as demand to integrate a gender perspective in planning of military practice and operations.

On the other hand, it was recalled that the Joint Operational Doctrine defined the application of military power as politics, which means that "political objectives are always overreaching for a military operation or campaign" and that Norway has undertaken national and international obligations to work for basic human rights for all. The foundations for military power are then precisely the values that are reflected in UN Resolution 1325, it was declared. Consequently, diversity is about functionality and legitimacy in relation to the political values and *whose security we are fighting for*.

Finally, the debate revealed that group representation by gender or skin colour was seen as problematic in a meritocratic perspective. It was also noted that concerns regarding women in the military are related to women's physique and their ability to carry heavy loads. It was declared that such physical requirements apply to some, but are not necessary for all. It was assumed that one of the reasons the Armed Forces do not succeed with diversity is that some personnel do not feel recognized and appreciated.

In the latest White Paper No (2012–2013) access to qualified competence is regarded as an extremely critical factor and reforms in the competence area identified as important prerequisites for further modernization. It is declared that the uniform system for education and standardized criteria for selection, such as physical skills, do not correlate with the

variation in requirement and can result in a cultural and competency-related reproduction, and thereby a continuation of the existing gap in competency.

In sum, we can conclude that there are different points of view regarding which culture, identity, gender and competence are functional and appropriate in the military organization, and by whom it is determined. While some see the new approach to military professionalism, culture and identity as deeply problematic and a risk for development of subcultures and tensions between services and functions, others consider construction of a common identity and a uniform culture as necessary to create group cohesion and fighting spirit. Accordingly, we can conclude that fighting spirit, including willingness to risk one's life, is at stake when military power is to be used as a political instrument out-of-area. But, if fighting spirit is at stake at the military management level, Marcia Kovitz (2003) inspires a highly relevant question; what is at stake in the social struggle over who should be allowed to take part at the executive level?

Moreover, the debate above reveals that integration of visual diversity categories such as women and ethnic minorities has been seen as a threat to uniform culture and meritocratic logic. But, what is the meritocratic logic in a profession with a diversity of services, functions and tasks, and where competence and skills requirements are disputed? And if the task force is dependent on a uniform culture built through a "socialization process so strong that the professional requirement for fellowship initially suppresses individual traits, or *socializes these into the standards and norms accepted in the fellowship",* what are the standards and norms accepted in the fellowship? Besides, if military socialization is so strong that it suppresses social diversity and transforms this into disciplined and uniform units, why is diversity actually a threat? Does it mean that women withstand socialization, while men are apt to discipline and collective submission? Or does it mean that the female body, which cannot be socialized away, constitutes a threat to military cohesion and uniformity in itself?

As stated by the debaters reviewed, the topic under discussion ties in to a classic debate on *the military profession* within the field of military sociology. In addition, there is a considerable body of research on *gender and military issues* both inside and outside the tradition of military sociology. To find out what we already know and also to better understand the military field from the macro-level, we will look into the classic debates as well as more recent research on the military in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Profession, Culture, Identity and Gender in Theory and Research on the Military

In the forgoing chapter we saw a quest for empirical research on the military profession, culture, identity and gender in a Norwegian context. In this chapter I will provide an overview of existing international and national literature on these topics. The purpose, however, of the chapter is twofold. Firstly, it will provide an important framework with which to understand the military institution and profession from a macro-perspective. As will be explained further in chapter five, previous research can be used to draw a broader picture of the figurations and struggles of which the military profession/field are part, and how the figurations and struggles have developed over time. Secondly, the purpose of this chapter is to clarify how the present research relates to and builds on previous knowledge about the military profession, culture, identity and gender.

3.1   Introduction to the Literature

The topics in question can be categorized under two subfields in the classic tradition of military sociology[25], respectively "the military profession" and "women in the military". Studies referred to as military sociology include a very wide range of themes and methodologies, but do include political science, (social)psychology and anthropology, as well as other fields of social science studies. According to Ouellet (2005b) and Woodward & Jenkins (2011), the field of military sociology has remained marginal within the broader field of sociology due to both substantive and ideological reasons. Substantively, the tradition of military sociology seems to have identified its disciplinary purpose as applied and problem-solving, contributing towards the *effective management of the military institution*. Accordingly, the tradition has been criticized for being too oriented toward functionalist approaches and "engineering" models of sociological inquiry, even though military sociologists have been influenced by various waves of critical and intellectual fervour (Higate & Cameron, 2006; Ouellet, 2005b; Woodward & Jenkings, 2011). Ideologically, researchers in the broader field of sociology did not want to identify themselves too closely with the military, or provide legitimacy to the military[26](Ouellet, 2005b).

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[25] *The Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society*, as well as the journal *Armed Forces & Society* have been the focal point for the field of military sociology. In the *International Sociological Association* sociology on the armed forces and conflict resolution are brought together in *Research Committee RC01*. In Europe research on armed forces is represented with *ERGOMAS - European Research Groups on Military and Society* and the journal *Res Militaris: European Journal of Military Studies*. Shields (2013), the editor of *Armed Forces and Society*, provides two definitions of Military Sociology. Firstly, she refers to James Burks' work and defines military sociology as: "a subfield of the study of armed forces and society that is focused more narrowly on the relationships between military organizations and the larger society". Secondly, Shield refers to Nick Jans' work and defines military sociology as "a broad term to describe the academic field that studies the individual within the military institution, and the military profession within its wider society." Based on a critique of military sociology, which will be described later in this chapter, Ouellet (2005b) argues that military sociology should or could be seen as the sociology of organized violence.

[26]Consequently, Ouellet (2005b) argues that "interesting sociological perspectives from other subfields are not applied to military objects out of principle" (p. 12).

Outwith military sociology there exists a body of critical, interpretive or "enlightening" literature on militarism and military personnel, which engages directly with military culture, identity and gender issues. This literature is, according to Woodward & Jenkings (2011), characterized by post-structuralism and feminist theory as well as constructionist approaches.

Furthermore, there exists a wealth of explorations of military culture, identity and women's participation in war and military institutions in the field of history. Besides that, military culture and identity are dealt with within the tradition of military theory, strategy and doctrines. Some of the contributions within this field must be considered to be normative. However, strategy and theory lay the foundation for how military power and war is to be understood, and especially relevant is a body of literature from this field which discuss to what degree culture can be used to manipulate behavior, identity and culture, through which fighting spirit is produced (Høiback, 2010). Accordingly, a selection of this literature will be included in the review.

To identify and provide an overview of the literature developed on military profession, culture, identity and gender, I have used three search strategies. I have searched different databases and search engines[27]. I have traced citations and reference lists in particular relevant literature (e.g. (Higate P. R., 2003; Sasson-Levy, 2008; Woodward & Jenkings, 2011), and I have looked into previous developed literature overviews and research bibliographies (Caforio, 2006; 2007; Fasting & Sand, 2010; 2011; Gustavsen, 2011b; Kümmel & Prüfert, 2000; Ouellet, 2005a; Sand & Fasting, 2012; Segal & Burk, 2012a; 2012b; Siebold, 2001; Winslow, 2010).

Especially relevant is Sand & Fasting's (2012) categorized bibliography on research on "Gender and military issues in the Scandinavian Countries". They found a total of 226 publications on "gender and military issues" from the Scandinavian countries, of which 60 percent of the publications were unpublished reports, memos etc. A majority of the publications were conducted in Sweden (n= 101). Only four of a total of 35 graduate theses were PhD dissertations, and all PhD dissertations were from Sweden. The authors concluded that research on gender and military issues in Scandinavia is "largely driven by the political discourse and demands from public authorities and first and foremost the three Scandinavian defense ministries. This can be illustrated by the fact that the largest category is "Gender and recruitment" (Sand & Fasting, 2012, p. 18).

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[27]Since this research project has been going on over a period of four years, I have searched different databases using various keywords at different times. However, I have searched Google Scholar, Web of Science, ERIC, EBSCO Military & Government, World Cat, BIBSYS (Norwegian library), Libris (Swedish library), Biblioteket.dk (Danish library) and SAGE Sociology Collection and SAGE Political Science Collection from the Fellows-Only section at The Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. I have used the key words Military, Armed Forces, Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, Officer and Soldier in combination with different key words such as gender, women, men, masculine, feminine, identity, profession, education, training, experience, value, status, respect, recognition, requirement, behavior, style, culture, ethos, body, Bourdieu, Elias, Ethnography, Field Work, Norway, Sweden, Denmark etc. dependent on the specific interest at the actual time. In addition I have searched for full publications lists for specific relevant authors, and for doctoral dissertations and master thesis on the Norwegian military from military and civilian institutions. Inclusion criteria have been that the material was written in English Norwegian, Swedish or Danish, and that it was relevant to the problem area.

During the research process I have collected more than 900 references that are more or less relevant to the present research project. In this chapter I will introduce the literature I have considered relevant to 1) contextualize the research question I have developed, and clarify how the present research relates to and builds on previous literature, and 2) illuminate struggles and stakes in the military profession/field from a macro-perspective.

The literature that will be presented is organized under two subchapters with the headlines 1) *In search of "Fighting Spirit" through Professionalism*, and 2) *Why the struggle over who can take part?* The headlines reflect basic research questions raised in the two, more or less, ideologically contradictory research traditions on the military, as referred to above. The literature is organized as to how it can be used to illuminate the question reflected in the two headlines.

In search of "Fighting Spirit" refers to the first question that was raised in the tradition of military sociology (Shields, 2013). Literature presented under this headline is included under two principles: 1) It seeks to manage and improve the military organization through discussions on how 'fighting spirit', military effectiveness and good military performances can be achieved through professionalism. 2) It discusses the military profession/field[28] or the military institution.

The second headline is inspired by Marcia Kovitz' (2003) question posed in the book *Military Masculinities: Identity and the State* (Higate P. R., 2003). The book represents research on military culture, identity and gender that exists outwith the tradition of military sociology, referred to by Woodward & Jenkings (2011) above. However, literature from the field of military sociology, as well as from the field of military strategy and theory, is also included under this headline. Criteria for inclusion is that the literature 1) seeks to interpret or contributes to reveal how men have been lured into the military through concepts of masculinity, and/or 2) discusses or contributes to reveal reasons why the integration of women, in specific, has been perceived as a threat to military organizations and their effectiveness.

The research questions for the micro-level investigation will be developed from the literature presented in this chapter and the theory presented in chapter four, and will therefore be presented at the end of chapter four.

3.2   In Search of "Fighting Spirit" through Professionalism

Literature about war and warriors exists all the way back to Plato, Aristotle and the Iliad/Homer. August Comte, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Erving Goffman and Norbert Elias are among some of the traditional sociologists who have discussed the military. However, military sociology was not established as a separate field of research before World War II. I chose, however, to start the literature review with a vintage

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[28] This means that the studies on the military after Bourdieu will be included in their own section under this subchapter, although some of these studies could also be utilized to illuminate the question represented in the second headline.

classic which formulates a basic question of military sociology (Jacobsen & Krabberød, 2012; Shields, 2013): the Russian author Leo Tolstoy's (1869) epic novel *War and Peace*:

> Military science maintains that the greater the number of soldiers, the greater their strength.[…] In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something else, an unknown x. Military science, seeing in history an immense number of examples in which the mass of an army does not correspond with its force, and in which small numbers conquer large ones, vaguely recognises the existence of this unknown factor, and tries to find it sometimes in some geometrical disposition of the troops, sometimes in the superiority of weapons, and most often in the genius of the leaders. But none of those factors yield results that agree with the historical facts. One has but to renounce the false view that glorifies the effect of the activity of the heroes of history in warfare in order to discover this unknown quantity, x. X is the spirit of the army, […] The spirit of the army is the factor which multiplied by the mass gives the product of the force. To define and express the significance of this unknown factor, *the spirit of the army, is the problem of science* (Tolstoy 1869: Chapter II).

I have chosen to depart from Tolstoy's problem definition (what is x/the spirit of the army) for two reasons. Firstly, we recognize the concern for fighting spirit from the former Chief of Defence's media article on the political and cultural reorientation of the Norwegian Armed Forces presented in chapter two. Secondly, Samual A. Stouffer was concerned about Tolstoy's X when he laid the cornerstone for what is considered to be the field of military sociology (Jacobsen & Krabberød, 2012; Shields, 2013).

In the period from 1942 to 1945 Samual A. Stouffer and his research team performed 500 000 soldier interviews/surveys. According to Ryan (2010), this is the largest ever empirical work conducted in the social sciences, which shows how much effort the US was willing to lay down to develop its army. The study investigated the soldiers' attitudes and morale but also race-relations, officer-enlisted relations and primary group relations in order to determine x, what motivated esprit de corps, meaning literally spirit of body. It was concluded that neither ideology nor patriotism was the major motivating factor for soldiers in combat. Rather, the soldiers' desire was to get the job done so they could get home, keep their comrades and units safe and alive, prove themselves as men and gain promotion. The researchers were surprised that white and black soldiers alike got along well, and that integration of black was met with enthusiasm. The researchers assumed the latter "could be simply a reflection of the desire of combat men to have their own burden lightened by letting others do part of the fighting" (*TAS* vol. I. 590. I: (Ryan, 2010, p. 66). The reports were summarized in *The American Soldier. Combat and its Aftermath* (1949/1950).The study impacted on further policy, award system, personnel management and content of propaganda movies, and set the scene for further research into military sociology and psychology. We will now turn to the subfield on "the military profession" within military sociology. Through the review on this literature we will see how professionalism is considered important for military function and effectiveness.

3.2.1 The Military Profession

3.2.1.1 Classic Theories

The classic and most influential theoretical frameworks within the field of military sociology[29] are considered to be Samuel Huntington's[30] (1957) *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* and Moriss Janowitz'[31] (1960) *The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait*. Huntington's framework is often referred to as the divergence model while Janowitz' framework is referred to as the convergent model. According to Caforio (2006) the tension between their contradictory models prompts a further dialectic on the military forces and civil-military relations. In this text we shall mainly concentrate on their views on the military profession. Yet, this is closely linked to their view on civil-military relations.

Huntington: Officership as a profession

In the introduction to his book *The Soldier and the State* Huntington (1957) writes:

> The principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state [...]. Consequently, in analyzing civil-military relations, the first necessity is to define the nature of the officer corps. What sort of body is the officer corps? What sort of man is the military officer? (p. 3)

Huntington already answers this question in the first paragraph of the first chapter entitled *Officership as a profession*:

> The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man. This is, perhaps, the most fundamental thesis of this book. *A profession is a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics* (Huntington, 1957, p. 7)

Then, Huntington argues that the military has been neglected as a profession[32], and that terms such as professional army and professional soldier have obscured the difference between the career enlisted man who is professional in the sense of one who works for monetary gain, and the career officer who is professional as one who pursues a higher calling in service to society. Accordingly, Huntington defines what he understands by a profession, and who is included in the military profession.

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[29] Overviews and history of this research field can be found in (Caforio, 2006; 2007; Kümmel & Prüfert, 2000; Ouellet, 2005a; Segal & Burk, 2012a; Segal & Burk, 2012b; Siebold, 2001).

[30] Huntington (1927-2008) was a political scientist inspired by Thomas Hobbes and John Stuart Mill. It is argued that Huntington's approach is based on an absolutist view.

[31] Janowitz (1919-1988) was a Chicago sociologist, often referred to as the founding father of military sociology since he founded the *Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society* and the journal *Armed Forces & Society*. He was clearly grounded in the pragmatism of John Dewey. Pragmatism has later been the traditional school in military sociology.

[32] According to Bolin (2008), the research on the military as a profession "never became an integrated part of the study of professions in general, but remained instead within the field of the study of the military" (p. 31). Bolin identifies several reasons. One is that the military is often difficult to study, due to secrecy and security issues. Another reason argued by some scholars is that the military does not fulfil the preconditions for fitting into the category of a profession.

According to Huntington, a profession is as a special type of vocation with three distinguishing characteristics: "expertise, responsibility and corporateness" (p. 8). Expertise involves "specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor" (p. 8). Responsibility comprises that the professional man is working in a social context, and performing a service which is essential to the functioning of society. Providing the essential service is, however, not grounded in normal expectations of economic benefits. Consequently, the profession becomes a

> moral unit positing certain values and ideals which guide its members in their dealings
> with laymen. This guide may be a set of unwritten norms transmitted through the
> professional educational system or it may be codified into written canons of
> professional ethics (Huntington, 1957, p. 10).

This means that the officer corps is a community in which the behavior of men is governed by a code. Corporateness[33] is explained by Huntington as a shared "sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen" (p. 10). According to Huntington, the collective sense of unity has its "origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence" (p. 10).

Huntington admits that, at first glance, it is hard to detect any specialized expertise and skills common to all military officers and yet not shared with any civilian groups. The officer corps appears to contain many varieties of specialists, including large numbers who have their counter parts in civilian life. However, Huntington identifies *management of violence* to be the specialized expertise of the military office. Accordingly, he argues that the medical doctor who is uniformed and holds a military rank is not a part of the military profession, but a part of the administration. The medical doctor manages another profession within the military system or organization, and has his own expertise and duties. The duties and expertise of the military officer who *is* part of the profession include: (1) the organizing, equipping, and training of the force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat. In sum, Huntington concludes that *management of different units and forces for the purpose of violence* is the specialized expertise of the military profession. He explains further:

> A man who is capable of directing only the activities of an infantry squad has such a
> low level of professional ability as to be almost on the border line. A man who can
> manage the operation of an airborne division or a carrier task force is a highly
> competent professional (Huntington, 1957, p. 12).

Finally, Huntington argues that professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today (1957) from the warrior of previous ages, and gives a unique cast to the problem of civil-

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[33] Hagesæther (2008) interprets corporateness as a form of identity and/or ethos. He argues that all three characteristics of a profession in Huntington's definition hold an aspect of ethic. He also argued that all three characteristics are aspects in professional identity.

military relations[34] since the officer's corps' peculiar skill is *management* of legitimate violence, and not the act of violence itself, which is a mechanical task performed by the subordinates. Regarding the subordinates, Huntington argues that they should be separated from civil society in order to develop common thinking, esprit and cohesion. In short, Huntington's thesis was that isolation of subordinated soldiers and professionalism in the officer corps would guarantee a subordination of the military forces to the civilian state authority[35].

Another thesis in Huntington's (1957) model of civil-military relations is that "the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society" (p. 2). Where strong military institutions can threaten the political authority, military institutions that reflect only social values may be incapable of effectively performing their function. The degree of conflict between the functional and social imperative will however be influenced by society's current security needs and how society's values and ideologies are defined. Huntington argues that the latter will vary with time and place, making the social imperative a dynamic element, while the military professions expertise and ethos are shaped by the functional imperative which is universal and timeless. Huntington goes on to explain that the military and civilian sphere in the United States has gradually developed cultures and values which are emerging as incompatible and diametrically opposite[36]. For instance, while civil society has become increasingly liberal with individual rights as a core value, the military is characterized as fundamentally anti-individualistic with discipline, loyalty and obedience as essential values. Huntington argues that the military will have to keep its conservative structure, in which individual interests are subordinated to the collective, in order to maintain unity and esprit de corps, and that the relentless competition between military forces of different states dictates which military practices are needed, and not the values, norms and behavior patterns that are prevailing in the society's civil domain.

Huntington's theories are predominantly normative and based on an absolutist view on war. The latter means that he saw war as absolute or total, with total victory or defeats as a result, which again means that the end of war is given. However, it is argued that "most of the

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[34] The classic problem in the field of civil-military relations concerns how to achieve democratic control over military forces. According to Bolin (2008) there was a growing curiosity of the military and the military profession in the post-war period caused by a widespread concern for the relatively massive military build-up taking place, including risk for militarism and too much heavy influence at other areas such as economic distribution, values, politics etc. Accordingly, a critical approach referring to the military and officer corps as a "power elite" was common, up to the work of Huntington, Janowitz, Abrahamsson and Moskos who shifted the discourse.

[35] The idea is that civilian leadership has undisputed authority over formulation of political objectives of war and peace, while the professional officer corps subordinates in political affairs in exchange for autonomy in the management of the military forces and activities needed to achieve policy objectives. In other words, military leader should stay out of politics and act loyally to the different political constellations, while the government on its side should not interfere in the officers' exercise of the profession, and the management of the soldiers: the latter who were to be isolated from civil society.

[36] Huntington argues the same applies to other societies, and that the Soviet arms have the same challenges with communist ideology as US forces have with liberal ideology / liberalism.

concepts and definitions of military professionalism rests on the classic theories and models of Huntington" (Johansen R. B., 2013, p. 20), even today.

Janowitz: The Professional Soldier

In the book "*The Professional Soldier*" (1960) Morris Janowitz accepts the main features of Huntington's definition of a profession: expertise, responsibility and corporateness. Likewise, Janowitz includes only the officer corps in the profession. However, when it comes to the question of political control of the military forces, Janowitz contrasts Huntington. Janowitz' work also differs from Huntington's in that it is based on analysis of empirical material. Using an analysis of this material[37] as a basis, Janowitz argues that the military underwent a fundamental transformation against what he called a *constabulary concept*, meaning that military forces increasingly resemble police forces, which manage, organize and use violence under tightly controlled and limited conditions, and in close connection with the communities they protect and are themselves a part of.

The main difference between Huntington and Janowitz lies in how they look at the professions' autonomy and relationship to the current social values in the society they are to protect. Where Huntington believes that military forces had to be separated from society so as not to be influenced by, what he saw as, counterproductive liberal and individualistic values, Janowitz argues that military personnel has to be integrated into society because it is crucial for the military organization's legitimacy to share and represent the values they are set to defend.

Janowitz also differs from Huntington in that he does not see the military from an absolutist perspective, with a dichotomous choice between war and peace, and with total victory or defeat as the only exit. Rather, Janowitz finds that the military has become an instrument for management of international relations in which the boundaries between peace and war, political and military activities, victory and defeat have been difficult to establish. According to Janowitz, this means that the professional officer's expertise should include political sensitivity and understanding, as well as preparedness to act with minimal use of violence in order to seek viable international relations, rather than military victory. Accordingly, Janowitz promotes a pragmatic view, and represents a shift from the absolutism represented in Huntington's perspective, to pragmatism in the field of international relations.

Moreover, Janowitz found that in the post war period the military profession became increasingly similar to civilian professions and bureaucracy, following from the military's growing reliance on technology. The introduction of more complex and sophisticated weapons and communications systems meant, in the first instance, that there was need for increased intellectual capacity and specialized skills from the civilian sphere. This led to an increasing percentage of civilians who in turn challenged the internal structures of authority, causing a movement from obedience toward consensus. Consequently, Janowitz argues that

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[37] The material consisted of surveys with 761 generals and admirals and 576 officers in the Pentagon, in addition to 113 in-depth interviews with senior officers conducted in the period from 1953 -1960.

the military institution's history can be described as a struggle to balance three different roles: 1) the traditional heroic leader, who embodies traditionalism and glory, 2) the military manager, who is concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of warfare, and 3) the military technologist. Janowitz believes, however, that managerial and technical skill was becoming more important than the practical, heroic leadership of men in combat.

Janowitz (1960) also found that the military profession had become a path to social mobility, which made the military elite more and more representative of the population as a whole. However, he stated that the increased breadth in recruitment had not happened because of demands from society, but in order to meet the organization's personnel needs. Through analysis of the motivation for choosing a military career, Janowitz found that the police-like activities were seen as less prestigious and less honorable. Furthermore, he found that due to the prevailing emphasis on commercial values and business success in the United States, the selection of a military career was often believed to be a weak career choice. From this Janowitz predicted that the military would continue to expand its social base of recruitment and that the military profession would suffer an identity crisis (Janowitz, 1960).

Against this background, Janowitz outlines three options for staffing the constabulary military forces: professionalism, conscription or a combination of professionalism and selective conscription. He argues that conscription is the option that best favors a democratic society's need for representativeness and thus ensures best legitimacy. Yet, he argues that the constabulary force demands more in terms of personal skills than the traditional military forces, and thus speaks against the conscript system[38].

Moskos: From Institutional to Occupational

Charles Moskos' (1977) article *From Institution to Occupation: Trends in military organization* is considered to be the third classic theoretical framework within the field of military sociology. In this article Moskos launched the hypothesis that with the abolition of enlistment in 1973 the US military gradually developed from being a value based organization with institutional characteristics, to increasingly resembling an organization characterized by a market mentality where the military must have something to offer. The model is often referred to as the Institutional/Occupational (I/O) thesis. An update of the I/O thesis was published by Moskos in 1986. In the update Moskos (1986) explains that the I/O thesis was presented to advance a comprehensive understanding of trends in military organization. Since it was presented in 1977, the I/O thesis has generated a growing body of research, also in Europe despite the theory being based on conditions in the US. In the update, Moskos (1986) attempts to make the theory more useful for cross-national analysis; he explains that "the I/O thesis assumes a continuum ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one highly convergent with civilian structures" (p. 377-

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[38] According to Edström & Lunde (2010) and Kilde (2012), Janowitz' approach had a major impact on the political debate on the military forces in Norway, where it was decided to keep conscription while the changes following the end of the Cold War caused a shift from conscription to all-volunteer forces in several other countries in Europe. However, Norway has gradually changed from an all-male conscription toward the combination of professionalism and selective gender neutral-conscription.

378)[39]. The essential differences between the institutional and occupational model are that the first is based on normative values, while the second is based on a "marketplace economy".

> An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms: that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Such values are captured in such mottoes as 'duty', 'honor' and 'country' (p. 378).

> An occupation is defined in terms of the marketplace. Supply and demand rather than normative consideration are paramount (p. 379).

Moskos goes on to argue that to the degree one's institutional membership is congruent with notions of self-sacrifice, is to the degree it will usually enjoy high esteem from the larger society, where prestige in an occupational model is based instead on level of compensation. Next, remuneration in the institutional model is essentially based on rank and seniority, while compensation in the occupational model should be linked directly to skill differences and skill level of individual members. According to Moskos, this means that the military institution is organized vertically, whereas an occupation is organized horizontally. He explains further that people in an occupation tend to feel a sense of identity with others who do the same sort of work and receive similar pay, while the horizontal model that applies to an institution entails that it is the organization one belongs to which creates a feeling of shared interests. Moskos explains that traditionally in the Armed Forces it is the fact of being part of the services that has been more salient than the different jobs that military members do. What follows is that role commitment in an institutional military tends to be diffused and means that members are expected to perform tasks not limited to their military specialties. Conversely, in an occupational military role commitment tends to be job specific. A consequence of these differences is that an institutional military tends to evaluate its personnel in 'whole person' categories and relies heavily on qualitative and subjective evaluation, while "an occupational military tends toward judgments relating to specific performance standards and prefers numerical or quantitative evaluations" (p. 381).

However, Moskos' I/O-model received great import for analysis and understanding of military organizations and the individual soldier, and was increasingly applied by scholars in other nations. The model has also been widely criticized (Segal D. R., 1986; Battistelli, 1997; Boëne, 1990). For example Böene (1990) argues that military professionals display both institutional and occupational features at all times, while Battistell (1997) argues that the postmodern soldier in peacekeeping operations has a myriad of different motivations.

3.2.1.2 Role Confusion and Identity Crisis

In the light of Janowitz', Huntington's and later Moskos' theories, contradictory values, roles and identities in the military profession and organization became an important issue in

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[39] In a footnote he writes "The institutional/occupational distinction is oblique to the concept of military professionalism. But generally speaking, the military profession portrayed by Samuel P. Huntington [...] falls closer to the institutional type, while the trends described by Morris Janowitz [...] are more congruent with the occupational type" (Moskos C. C., 1986, pp. endnote 2, p. 382).

military sociology. The peacekeeping operations that dominated the first post-Cold War decade added new concerns and questions regarding the military's role and missions[40]; as did the "The Global War on Terror". Thus, there is a lengthy line of studies that focus on role conflict and role perception. In broad terms, these studies have focused on how a variety of factors[41] have driven forward a change in the military's structure, function and role, which in turn has devalued or altered traditional military virtues, as well as the distinct military culture and ethos/identity.

Several studies find that the traditional heroic military leader with ethos and values linked to a higher calling: honor, self-sacrifice, courage, sense of duty, obedience and subordination to the self to the group (collectivism), has been replaced by the rational administrator or manager, equipped with highly technological weapons and specialized expertise, bound to cost-benefit evaluations and motivated by self-interests (individualism) (Baucom, 1985; Coker C., 2001; 2002; 2005; 2007; Nuciari, 2006; Snider, 2005; Snider & Matthews, 2005). According to Nuciari (2006), many of these studies are characterized by a "generalized perception of an ongoing decline in relevance, legitimacy, and prestige afforded by contemporary affluent society to the military profession, which can be defined as a 'role crisis', the 'deprofessionalization,' or the 'occupationalization' of the military profession" (p. 71). For example, one of the studies conducted during the Cold War argued that "we must urgently rediscover the focus of the military professional and find ways to restore the warrior-leader to the position of honor traditionally accorded him" (Baucom, 1985, p. 17). Similarly, and due to a retention crisis, distrust between generations and documented peril[42] to the professional culture of the US Army, Snider (2005) argued in 1999

> that the most critical challenge the Army now faces in its planned transition is to reinforce the professional nature of the institution [...] The Army is neither a public-sector bureaucracy manned by civil servants nor is it a business with employees. It has been and must continue to be a profession, one in which military professionals serve with deep pride (p. 3-4).

This conviction, he argues, remains when an updated volume of research on *The Future of the Army Profession* (Snider & Matthews, 2005) is published in a starkly different situation only three years later[43]. Snider (2005) adds that the Army must be recognized as a profession by the American people and its officers. Throughout the volume it is argued that expertise is the hallmark of being an officer. Consequently, Forsythe, Snook, Lewis, & Bartone (2005) argue that "dramatic changes in the substance of what we do as an Army have sparked serious

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[40] According to Snider (2005) "These other-than-war missions brought sharply into question the Army's identity and its ability to prepare for what is still thought was core to its future, the conventional land battle" (p. 3)

[41] Tightened financial resources, bureaucratization, changing social values, liberalism, globalism/multinationalism, technological development, and particularly new tasks given in an increased rate of deployment to other-than-war operations

[42] According to Snider (2005) "Studies by knowledgeable outsiders,[..] soon to be reinforced by the Army's own internal studies[..], documented a stressed institution whose professional culture was in peril" (p. 3).

[43] The first volume was published in 1999, post-Cold War, but pre "War on Terrorism" period. Accordingly, Snider repeats the argument he gave in the setting of 1999 in the introduction to the second edition of "*The Future of the Army Profession*"

debate about fundamental issues of identity"[44] (p. 189). Indeed, they argue "the debate within the profession about roles and missions, and the associated questions about an officer's identity – am I a warrior or more? – is fundamentally about the content of an officer's identity" (p. 190).

Other writers have portrayed the development of a hybrid soldier: multiple and diverse, fighter as well as a constable, diplomat and global street worker. These studies describe this as a cultural adaption to new missions and argue that the new and multifaceted role of the military requires that soldiers' and officers' expertise in the use of force should be added alongside cultural and social empathy, intercultural and social skills, and competence in diplomatic behavior and communication. They also describe a movement toward greater multiculturalism, significant integration of information-age technologies, growth in military civilians, more questioning of authority and ideas, and the emergence of multi-missions (Bolin, 2008; Campbell & Campbell, 2010; Hajjar, 2013; 2014; Kümmel, 2006; Mannitz, 2011; Nørgaard, 2004; Vennesson, Breuer, Franco, & Schroeder, 2009).

Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull (2006) argue that military culture is traditionally male dominated, masculine and warrior like, but that the described development may impact on this phenomenon. Firstly, they argue that the traditional aggressive culture will gradually have to be balanced with developments in task requirements, as the "performance of military organizations is increasingly becoming less oriented toward violence at a close distance and aggressive behavior" (p. 253). Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull (2006) maintain that this is true even after the war in Afghanistan, and that the military tends to become more and more involved with humanitarian action, civil-military collaboration and distant violence based on "smart" technology". Secondly, they argue that culture will be influenced by the new categories of personnel that will enter the world of the military, and that the management of demographic diversity will become a priority on the agenda of uniformed organizations. Especially since the very entrance of women and ethnic minorities may influence the way the military perceives and performs its work. Accordingly, one of the most prominent debates over minority participation within the field of military sociology has been whether or not inclusive policies will undermine operational effectiveness. Bridges & Horsfall (2009) find that an increased percentage of female military personnel is beneficial to operational effectiveness in UN peacekeeping operations, while Okros & Denise (2014) find that allowing transgender personnel to serve openly has not harmed the effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.

However, Bolin (2008) criticizes that even today thinking and discussions among scholars studying military professionalism take place, almost without exception, within the separate theoretical frameworks developed by Huntington, Janowitz and Moskos. Accordingly, Bolin takes advantage of more generally acknowledged frameworks from the broader field of sociological studies of professionalism in her analysis of the military. Yet, she reaches similar

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[44] They write: "Since 1989, what's been at risk has been our Army's professional center of gravity, its sense of self. One way to conceptualize this assault is to think of it as an 'identity crisis'" (Forsythe, Snook, Lewis, & Bartone, 2005, p. 189).

conclusions as studies within military sociology, and describes a development from professionalism of the "sovereign warrior" to professionalism of the "involved constable" as a consequence of the broad changes following the end of the Cold War.

Others have also criticized military sociologists for failing to take advantage of generally acknowledged frameworks from the broader field of sociology. In particularly, Ouellet's (2005a) edited volume *New Directions in Military Sociology* suggests, as the title says, that new directions should be taken within military sociology. Ouellet (2005b) himself claims that military sociologists are constrained by the functionalist and pragmatic tradition in military sociology, while the roles and even the meaning of the Armed Forces are evolving rapidly. What Ouellet finds especially problematic is "*how* the military institution is viewed" (p. 4). Whether it is the growing importance of women and non-Caucasians in the Western Armed Forces or the new demands imposed by military operations other-than-war, the institution of the Armed Forces remains the starting point of the analysis of change. Accordingly the institution is taken for granted, Ouellet argues, while a possible direction would be to look at the military institution from the other end; at the final outcome of military life and practices, rather than the starting point. This view, according to Ouellet, builds on an interpretative paradigm which remains clearly underused in military sociology. Thus, Ouellet (2005b) proposes that effort should be taken to reenergize the interpretative tradition within military sociology represented by Janowitz, and recalls his central thesis as being that the military institution must be examined in its *process of change,* since it must necessarily change with the changing conditions of the society to which it belongs. According to Ouellet, it can therefore be argued that this remains the essence of military sociology, and as such, he suggests that military sociologists would benefit from assessing what makes the existence of military institutions possible in the first place, instead of viewing the institution as an assumed starting point.

A reason Ouellet finds it necessary not to take the military institution for granted is that as much as the military of the West is the exclusive domain of nation-states, it is clear that elsewhere in the world this is not the case. Furthermore, the present expansion of the so-called "War on Terror" has brought new emphasis on private armed security apparatures and the very idea of "the Armed Forces" is becoming less attached to the traditional conceptions found in the West. Therefore, Ouellet argues that military sociology could or should be seen as the sociology of organized violence, in which new theoretical directions should be taken and theoretical frameworks from the broader fields of sociology utilized. Both Bourdieu and Elias are among these suggestions, and the contributions in the volume are studies which utilize these and other suggested frameworks. With the exception of Moelker's (2005) interpretation and reconstruction of Elias' unpublished work on the Naval Profession, which are published in Ouletts edited volume and elsewhere (Moelker R. , 2003), I have found no other studies on the military profession utilizing Elias' framework. Since Moelker reconstructed Elias' own work, Moelker's work will be presented as a part of the theoretical presentation of Elias in chapter four.

Before we turn to studies on the military inspired by Bourdieu, presented in Ouellet's volume and elsewhere, it should be mentioned that Irwin (2002) *before* Ouellet, writes that

> Virtually all studies of the military treat the institution as a social fact, in the
> Durkheimian sense, as a pre-existing reality external to the individuals who are part of
> it and who are constrained by it. [...] Most of these studies [...] treat soldiers as
> products of a 'system' and neglect the ongoing work that individuals who are a part of
> a system do to constitute that system as an objective fact and a recognizable state of
> affairs (p. 13).

Accordingly, Irwin (2002) describes the military as an institution continuously under construction by those who serve in it, as suggested by Janowitz and recalled by Ouellet. Irwin finds that soldiers' identities rely on claims to soldierhood which are embedded in networks of social relationships and that the soldier's identity is constantly renewed and refreshed by the activity of soldiering.

3.2.1.3 The Military after Bourdieu

Returning to Ouelett's (2005a) volume, it is claimed that considering the prevalence of Bourdieu's framework[45] in other fields he is surprisingly little used in studies of the military[46]. In Ouellet's volume Virchow (2005) uses Bourdieu's concept of habitus to explore how military ways of thinking influence the wider society. He focuses especially on the close link between the military and entertainment as organized sport and war-like computer games. Referring to Bourdieu, Virchow (2005) assumes that "'doing military while playing' will gradually change the habitus of the persons involved" (p. 54). Virchow also shows that German Armed Forces' direct support of organized sport creates 'soldier-athlete' representations which are part of the constructed nation-state identity.

Hagen (2005) utilizes Bourdieu's theory of social practices to study how Protestant ethics shaped German military culture. He traces back to the "Soldier King" Friedrich Wilhelm I in Prussia (1688-1740) who "thought it necessary to create a spirit of voluntary obedience among his solders". To promote the idea of officership as a vocation, or calling, the Soldier King introduced army chaplains. Thus, Pietistic work ethos and self-sacrifice in one's duty toward God and the state were raised to the level of moral worth. Accordingly, Hagen (2005) argues that, in particular, the disciplinary and ascetic nature of Lutheran Protestantism "and the *military ethic of austerity* perform an institutional function in the military that can be termed 'spiritual armament'" (p. 136).

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[45] The framework of Bourdieu has been widely used to understand institutional/organizational culture, tensions, reproduction and socialization. Within the field of education Bourdieu is considered a key sociological thinker. Among other fields that are comparable to that of the military, Bourdieu's thinking tools have also been utilized to understand policing (Chan, 2003; Lagestad, 2011), risk-sport (Dant & Wheaton, 2007; Fletcher, 2008; Kay & Laberge, 2002; Langseth, 2012) physical education and gender relations in physical cultures (Brown, 2006; Thorpe, 2009; 2010).

[46] For example a search for Bourdieu in the leading journal in military sociology, *Armed Forces & Society* resulted in only 15 references (04.06.2014). However, only one (Vest, 2013) of these 15 articles utilizes Bourdieu's concepts as a theoretical framework.

Another study using Bourdieu is Vest (2013) who, based on ethnographic evidence, examines how US Army National Guard members understand and construct their dual and potentially contradictory identities as soldiers and civilians. They find that "for National Guard members who have never experienced deployment, the two identities of civilian and soldier are mostly separated. However, after experiencing deployment and reintegration, soldier and civilian identities become more intertwined and individuals must reorganize their identity" (p. 602).

Based on ethnographic material and literature on the sociology of the body, Hockey (2002) illuminates how the military body is disciplined and how it resists such a process. Hockey (2002) finds that "the infantry body becomes disciplined through a combination of the imposition of military law and, crucially, the development of a specific *bodily capita*l, in the form of fighting practices" (p. 163). He argues that the empirical material reveals a view which is "consonant with Foucault's conception of the soldier as the outcome of a series of disciplined practices" (p. 163). The study will be presented further under the subchapter entitled *Why the struggle over who can take part?*

In addition, three master theses (Bjørnstad, 2005; Netland, 2013; Rones, 2008) and two articles based on two of the master theses (Bjørnstad, 2011; Rones, 2011) that utilize Bourdieu's concepts on the Norwegian military were found. Netland (2013) departs from figures from the Norwegian army personnel registry confirming that female officers in the army mainly work in support and logistics departments, and furthermore possess administrative-/support positions within them. Using Bourdieu's theory Netland (2013) relates the army woman's defensive career choice to expectations and feminine dispositions incorporated in a female habitus. She argues that women seem to be influenced by a masculine dominance which is based on an androcentric logic that divides the world into opposites, where the masculine contrasts the feminine and where the man becomes the acting subject imposed to achieve honor, while women are objects imposed to avoid shame. Bjørnstad (2005; 2011) and Rones (2008; 2011) will be presented at the end of next section.

3.2.1.4 Norwegian Studies on Military Role and Identity Conceptions[47]

Norwegian Sociologists have also avoided studying the military because of ideological reasons[48] (cf. 3.1). The Norwegian literature which deals with the military is multidisciplinary with a center of gravity in the intersection of political science and history. Yet, this does not limit the literature to sociological themes (Bjørnstad, 2011; Græger, 2006; Skauge, 1993).

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[47] Little literature exists up to 2005. From 2005 onwards only Ph.D. dissertations and published articles or books will be included in the review. In addition to the studies that will be presented there have been an increasing number of master theses in recent years, especially from *The Norwegian Defence University College,* that illuminate the topic military profession and identity, such as: (Brunborg, 2008; Forsjord, 2009; Jensen, 2008; Kilde, 2012; Kvilvang, 2012; Landgraf, 2010; Lydén, 2012; Sondov, 2010; Tholander, 2010; Trettenes, 2009). Master theses utilizing Bourdieu were included in the previous subchapter.

[48] Francesco Kjellberg (1961) explained the lack of systematic research on the military profession in Norway in that there existed certain reluctance in academic circles towards engagement with military apparatus. Græger (2006) refers to the same, but claims that another explanation for the lack of interest in the study of the military forces during the Cold War was probably due to the defense policy area being characterized by consensus. Besides, there were very few officers who had participated in war, except during World War II, which rendered research on the military a boring field, as opposed to countries involved in military interventions that created severe reactions (e.g. Vietnam). In addition comes difficulties for civilian researchers to gain access to study the military.

Works that can be characterized as military sociological analyzes of officers and the military profession before the millennium are Grønmo (1975), Jacobsen (1996), Kaspersen (1996), Kjellberg (1961; 1965) and Skauge (1993). A commonality found in all of these works is that officers increasingly come from all segments of the population, and not from a distinct social group. Like Janowitz (1960), they conclude that the officer profession has become a way for social mobility. In addition, they found that the trends described by Moskos (1986) (cf. 3.2.1.1) were existing among Norwegian military personnel.

Kjellberg's (1961) *Officers as a social group*[49] is regarded as the classic military sociological work in a Norwegian context (Edström & Lunde, 2010). He uses Huntington and Janowitz' theories and analyzes the relationship between Norwegian army officers' social backgrounds and their occupational, social and political self-understanding. Kjellberg shows that Norwegian officers have a broader social background than other professional groups in contemporary society, but the diversity of social backgrounds does not lead to ideological diversity within the profession. Therefore, Kjellberg concludes that the military socialization process leads to uniformity. Furthermore, he argues that the uniformity which arises from education results from a necessity of adaptation, by the underrepresented group, to the uniform norm, in order to be accepted and integrated into the military. Likewise Skauge (1993) found that the military socializes officers into a common mindset.

Grønmo (1975)[50] demonstrates, however, that there are significant differences in the self-perception, interests and attitudes toward the surroundings between officers trained at the Officer Candidate School and officers trained at the Military Academy. The officer candidates had more negative attitudes toward the military environment (workplace) and the state, than the academy officers. The officer candidates had, however, a more positive attitude toward low status groups, such as grassroots people and workers, and a more negative attitude toward high status groups (especially business) than academy officers. The officer candidates had so little interest in international surroundings that attitudes toward this could not be compared between the two groups. Grønmo found that the difference in attitudes was associated with status differences where the lower officers educated at the Officer Candidate School perceived themselves as a low status group, something which laid the foundation for greater dissatisfaction with the surroundings. The two groups were, however, not opposed against each other in all questions, but the officer corps was far from homogeneous in terms of their attitudes towards the surroundings.

Toward the millennium, increased participation in international operations in the 1990s led to an increased interest in the military from social scientists. Haaland (2008a) explains that former international debates and issues which had previously been irrelevant to Norway now became relevant. In particular, the increased interest resulted in several studies on the topic of role-perception in peacekeeping operations.

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[49] The study is based on register data on officers educated at the military academy in the period 1880-1960 compared with other professions, e.g. lawyers, doctors, priests.
[50] The study is based on an analysis of the interests and attitudes expressed in the two officer groups' journals in the period 1918-1969.

Mæland (2004)[51] observed that Norwegian officers in Kosovo experienced confusion as to which role they were playing. Were they soldiers, aid workers or diplomats? Therefore, he asked officers to give a brief, almost logo-like expression for the function and role they had filled in their service - a sort of self-reported working title. From these titles Mæland found that several officers only had an internal perspective, meaning that they focused on their relationship to "the guys" and the internal responsibility for their troops, more than engagement with the surroundings in focus. Working titles like "buddy" and "personnel manager" exemplifies this. Some titles were however focused on the tasks they performed outside the camp fence: commander, guarantees for security, visiting sheriff and police officer. Finally, some of the titles were dual in the sense that the officers in question identified the title as being as much about the guys as the civilian population. They used titles like: educator, supervisor, social worker, problem solver. No one chose concepts like 'warrior' or 'soldier' as their title. Mæland argues that the individual's role understanding showed that the service was perceived as socially complex. The social complexity is also reflected in a variety of motivations for the service. In short, Mæland finds that motivation is based on a tension between selfishness (my own good) and altruism (the other's best), between military idealism (improve the situation/security) and humanitarian idealism (helping disadvantaged people), and between national interests (useful experience for the Armed Forces) and international interests (contribute to peace, security and stability in the world).

Røkenes' (2004)[52] study of Norwegian soldiers in Kosovo confirms several of Mæland's findings. In addition, she observed that soldiers found it difficult to maintain their humanitarianism throughout the mission and were deeply frustrated by the lack of demand for traditional soldiering skills and capacities. Military training, which appeared irrelevant in the quiet circumstances, was seen as a meaningless activity created only to keep the troops busy and prevent boredom, with the main purpose of concealing the lack of meaningful things to do.

Laberg, Ingjaldsson, Kobbeltvedt, & Horverak's (2005)[53] study on Norwegian soldiers in Kosovo builds on Horverak (2001) and finds, in line with Røkenes (2004), that deployed soldiers develop increasingly negative attitudes towards peacekeeping operations. This was particularly the case for the officers. Laberg et. al. refer to Kobbeltvedt, Brun, & Laberg (2004) who previously found that soldiers experienced few "sharp situations" and that the risks in the service were perceived by the individual to be moderate to low. Therefore, Laberg et. al. assume that soldiers experienced work as having been marked by little "action" and excitement compared to what they expected, and that this may have contributed to dissatisfaction, boredom and negative attitudes to peacekeeping missions in general. Laberg et. al. conclude that a challenge for military training is to ensure that military personnel can manage acute situations with fire, but also withstand long periods of boredom. They believe

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[51] The study is based on interviews with 15 officers who served in Kosovo in 2000-2002.

[52] The study is based on fieldwork in the Norwegian battalion in Kosovo in the period 2002-2003, and interviews with 35 officers

[53] The study is based on a longitudinal survey among 677 officers and soldiers before, during and after service in a Norwegian contingent to Kosovo in 2000.

that soldiers should identify simultaneously with the role of warrior, peacekeeper and mediator, and emphasize the importance of creating realistic expectations.

Solberg (2007)[54] depicts how peace support operations in Kosovo involved a variety of contextual demands which made it difficult to identify required skills and create realistic training scenarios for the soldiers. Furthermore, Solberg shows how combat-oriented training gives the soldiers' role conflicting and ambiguous expectations to deployments (warriors vs peacekeepers). He refers to Sion (2006) who found that Dutch soldiers preparing for peacekeeping missions mainly trained for and expected combat, and that they perceived peacekeeping operations as "feminine" and therefore inappropriate for men viewing themselves as masculine and fit for combat. Sion (2006) and Solberg (2007) argue that combat training and expectations negatively influenced the soldiers' level of satisfaction during deployments.

Haaland (2008a)[55] explores role conception in the Norwegian Armed Forces. She argues that the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War has led to uncertainty and disagreement about the role and purpose of the Armed Forces in Norwegian society. From having developed clear signs of occupationalism during the Cold War, Norway's participation in peace support operations in Somalia and the Balkans, as well as stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, brought real life operational experience to the Norwegian Armed Forces and altered the military's role perceptions. Based on a role categorization developed from the works of Huntington, Janowitz and Moskos, Haaland finds three role perceptions or professional self-images which are part of the collective Norwegian professional identity today (2008), and which exist simultaneously on both an individual and organizational level: the warrior[56], the homeland defender/citizen soldier[57], and the state employee[58]. Haaland argues that the three different roles represent different military identities, ethos, cultures and professional understanding, and notes that the terms profession, ethos, culture and identity overlap and are difficult to distinguish between. However, Haaland finds state employee was the dominant role-conception in the Norwegian military in the 1990s while the warrior is formative of today's professional culture and identity, and is now seen as the appropriate role. Haaland states that this is in despite of the warrior role not necessarily

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[54] The study is based on a longitudinal survey among 884 officers and soldiers before, during and after service in a Norwegian contingent to Kosovo in 2000.

[55] The study is based on an analysis of written documents produced on the Norwegian military's participation in international operations since 1995, such as formal 'lessons learned' reports from the forces in the field, memo books, official documents etc.

[56] The role has the following characteristics: The core function is to fight wars and perform high intensity operations. Key values are internal unity, sacrifice, courage and strength. The needs of the individual are subordinated to the needs of the collective. Relations with civil society are characterized by distinct otherness. Unconditional loyalty to their political superiors in exchange for internal autonomy (Haaland T. L., 2008a; 2009).

[57] The role has the following characteristics: The core function is to safeguard the security of their own country and people. Participation in international operations is a means to strengthening the alliances willingness and ability to help Norway in return (Haaland T. L., 2008a; 2009).

[58] The role has the following characteristics: The profession's core competence is determined by the currently seated political leadership in dialogue with the agency and official of the organization. Positive values are loyal and effective implementation of public policy (Haaland T. L., 2008a; 2009).

reflecting functional needs or what the personnel actually do. Haaland (2008a; 2008b) finds[59] that the most valued soldier qualities are the ability to endure boredom, monotony and uncomfortable surroundings, good humor and personal "drive" and initiative, while aggressiveness related to the warrior role was not a commonly praised quality.

Hagesæther[60] (2008; 2010) explores the relationship between the military's ethical discourse and professional self-understanding, and illuminates the utmost importance of military role perception for the professional soldier's behavior in the battlefields. In the book *Military Pedagogies and why they matter* (Kvernbekk, Simpson, & Peters, 2008). Hagesæther (2008) claims that all aspects of military ethics "are in one or another way directly or indirectly dependent on the self-understanding of the soldier or officer involved" (p. 95). Hagesæther refers to a Canadian document *A site of duty with Honour* from 2003 where professionalism in general and military professionalism in particular are defined as follows:

> A profession is an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a systematically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive research, education, training and experience. Members of a profession have a special responsibility to fulfil their function competently and objectively for the benefit of the society. *Professionals are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work. This code of ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large* (p. 96).

Hagesæther (2008) recalls that Huntington and Janowitz do agree on the description of the military profession as consisting of three major elements: expertise, responsibility and identity/ethos, and claims that the Canadian definition fits well with the three categories. Then, Hagesæther focuses on how the code of ethics is dependent on the personnel's role, perceptions and self-understanding. He explains that "a military professional must understand himself in terms of an institutional or collective category and cannot see himself as a purely private and individual executer or manager of military power" (p. 97). This means that the military professional is a specific kind of official social role-player who is "acting in a way that belongs *only* to his or her role as a professional soldier. A lot of these actions are related to the use of military force, and would be deemed unacceptable without the role model to justify them" (Hagesæther A. P., 2008, p. 97). According to Hagesæther this "means that the military professional has to understand her or himself and her or his action as belonging only to the official and collective role as a professional soldier" (p. 97). However, this does not mean that moral responsibility is removed from the individual: "The individual military professional is still morally responsible for his or her actions in the name of the military role" (p. 97). Accordingly, the word interpretation becomes a key word in the matter, Hagesæther states, and the question will be "how all the different participants, from the government to the

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[59] From documents and reports produced in connection with Norwegian participation in international operations in Somalia and former Yugoslavia

[60] Hagesæther's dissertation (2010) is based on an analysis of the Norwegian military profession's ethical discourse. The material consists of educational programs for conscripts in the period 1959-2009.

lowest ranked soldier, interpret the actual conditions and circumstances, and how their interpretations affect attitudes, behaviors and solutions" (p. 97). Since interpretation is crucial, it requires that soldiers develop a high level of situational awareness and practical-ethical wisdom or phronesis.

Johansen (2013)[61] departs from the doctrinaire guidance set forth in the Joint Operational Doctrine FFOD 07 which intends to set the premise for new perspectives on military ethos and identity (cf. 2.2.1). He explains that it was decided to move Norwegian military identity away from idealism towards professionalism in 2005. Furthermore, this shift has been referred to as the Norwegian military paradigm shift, "where professionalism was introduced and doctrinaire formalized [in FFOD 07] as a necessary condition for serving in the military, and was seen as a way to increase military performance" (p. 11).

According to Johansen, FFOD 07 appears to follow the lines of Huntington (1957) in that it "seeks to express a combination of required shared attitudes, values, norms, skills and behaviors to be expected from military personnel serving in the Norwegian Armed Forces" (p. 20). This can be

> characterized by (a) the necessity and willingness among the military personnel to participate in international joint operations (expeditionary ethos), (b) a strong instrumental focus, with emphasis on the conduct of operations, in particular the development and cultivation of combat skills (operational ethos), and (c) a motivation to serve based on team cohesion and war comrade fellowship rather than on a desire to serve a superior cause (peer ethos) (Johansen R. B., 2013, p. 20).

Based on the paradigmatic exodus of idealism[62] in preference of professionalism as a military identity, which was introduced and highlighted as necessary and vital for the Norwegian Armed Forces, Johansen seeks to explore the *predictive validity of military identity on outcome variables such as military performance, skills and attitudes.* Thus, Johansen seeks to develop a questionnaire that can investigate to what degree military identity actually predicts military performance, attitudes and commitment to the organization through measuring aspects of idealism, professionalism, warriorism and individualism in relation to performance and attitudes. The content is the four–ism concept that Johansen developed in part from Huntington and Moskos' theories and definitions. Johansen concludes that military identity predicts aspects of perceived military performance[63]. Professionalism predicted military

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[61] The study is based on three articles with different sources 1) N=317 unspecified personnel + 238 junior officers under education. 2) N=117 cadets from the military academy 3) N=347 candidates

[62] Johansen (2013) writes that "In a Norwegian context, idealism can be viewed as the dominant military identity during the Cold War, when Norway was of specific geopolitically interest in the strategic interplay between NATO and the Warsaw Pact […] However, the shift in operational focus has affected the current assumption that idealism as a military identity is now less relevant for Norway, and should therefore be abandoned (Diesen 2005, Eriksson 2004, 2006)." (Johansen R. B., 2013, p. 19)

[63] Military skills, general military competence and organizational commitment were measured by self-report. Military competence covered general leadership, responsibility, cooperation/communication, judgment, oral/writing skills, creativity and coping. Specific skills covered elements of operational conduct related to professionalism.

competence and skills positively, whereas individualism predicted organizational commitment negatively (see also Johansen, Laberg, & Martinussen, 2014)[64].

In addition to the studies above there exists a slightly different direction of research on the Norwegian Armed Forces. This direction focuses on the military and the officer corps role in Norwegian nationalism and national identity construction. A common feature of these studies is that they are rooted in constructivist approaches and use discourse analysis to explore the field. From this point of departure the researchers have examined the historical, cultural and symbolic climate which controls, shapes and defines Norwegian defense and security politics, culture and practice. Studies in this direction are Bjørnstad (2011), Friis (2000), Græger (2006; 2011), Græger & Leira (2005), Rottem (2008) and Ulriksen (2002).

Friis (2000), Græger (2006) and Ulriksen (2002)[65] claim that Norway has appeared as a demilitarized nation, where commitment to international humanism and international institutions has been an inherent part of a national identity. Moreover, they declare that Norwegian defense discourse has been characterized by doxical concepts and notions which have substantially defined what qualities Norwegian officers should possess, how they should act and what kind of tasks and roles they should perform. They claim that the restructuring of the Armed Forces, from an instrument for nation building into a political instrument of power, has challenged central Norwegian national core values and concepts in Norwegian defense tradition and identity. This caused a reluctant and slow transition to the new role of NATO, and a situation where the war in Afghanistan was described and interpreted in a political discourse of peace.

However, Bjørnstad (2005; 2011)[66] utilizes Bourdieu's concepts and shows that we are facing a shift in the discourse on the Norwegian soldier as a result of increased professionalism, globalization and international military cooperation after the Anglo-American model. Bjørnstad (2011) finds that soldiers in the professional unit Telemark Battalion describe themselves as professional and elite orientated with a clear demarcation from the former Norwegian defense traditions, and that the battalion is described as a flexible expert-oriented intervention force, clearly *distinguishable* from the mass-oriented static invasion force in its advertisement. Furthermore, Bjørnstad finds that Norwegian soldiers struggle and desire to imitate American and British soldiers, and present themselves as professional and skilled soldiers for these great actors which they place at the top of a hierarchy of other countries' soldiers.

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[64] Broesder, Op den Buijs, Vogelaa, & Euwema (2014) also attempt to develop a method for measuring the predictive value of military role identity on soldiers' performance. They argue that "[t]he modern military profession encompasses two seemingly contradictory roles, those of warrior and peacekeeper, simultaneously," and state that the question is whether soldiers can identify with both roles.

[65] All three studies are based on discourse analysis of written material.

[66] The study is based on a discourse analysis of written material and interviews with 10 enlisted soldiers and one officer in the professional Telemark Battalion.

Rones (2008)[67] also utilizes Bourdieu's concepts. She examines what kinds of criteria were used to define the best soldiers in the Norwegian Home Guard Rapid Reaction Force at a time when it was highlighted that "the best soldier" had to be recruited to solve unknown tasks. In accordance with Bourdieu & Passeron's (1990) studies on reproduction in education, Rones found that officers regarded the soldiers who were most similar to themselves as being the best soldiers, i.e. the soldiers who shared the officer's interest in outdoor life and hunting. Moreover, Rones found that the military field was characterized by a struggle in which historical practice and traditional valuation criteria (capital accumulated from outdoor life and hunting) were brought into discussion. Later Rones (2011; 2013) utilized the studies of Bjørnstad (2005; 2011), Friis (2000) and Ulriksen (2002) to discuss how the outdoor man and polar hero has been constructed and reconstructed as "the national ideal character" and thus "the ideal soldier" in the Norwegian defense discourse, and how this national/military ideal is now challenged by the Anglo-American warrior and the female soldier. The present dissertation continues from this work on "the ideal soldier", as well as Sookermany's (2013) and Eriksen's (2011) work on military performance and pedagogics, to which we will now turn.

3.2.1.5   How Should a Good Soldier be Understood?

From the literature examined above we have seen that expertise and skills are a central component in a profession as well as in a professional identity, and that altered missions and skill requirements have caused role confusion as well as an identity crisis (cf. 3.2.1.2). From a Norwegian perspective Sookermany (2013) argues that "the transition from large static invasion-based defense concepts towards a flexible expeditionary-based defense concept *changes the ideal of a good soldier* (p. 116). From being one who "was seen as willing to succumb to authority, accepting and conducting a narrowly defined role/function developed through drills, leaving him or her with little intrinsic value", it is now expected that a soldier ethos is "based on the ability to take initiative, act flexibly and independently in circumstances that are unfamiliar, chaotic, rapidly changing", and where applying military power is seen as being based on the fact that "individual judgment is well developed and mature" (p. 116).

Aiming to explore the implication of these changes at the level of education and pedagogics, Sookermany (2013) attaches to academic literature in the tradition of military sociology which has interpreted the changes witnessed in the NATO countries as a paradigmatic move from modern to *postmodern* military organizations. To explain the meaning of postmodernity Sookermany (2013) refers to Usher and Edwards who describe postmodernity as "a world where people have to make their way without fixed references and traditional anchoring points. It is a world of rapid change, of bewildering instability, where knowledge is constantly changing and meaning 'floats'" (p. 64).

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[67] The study is based on fieldwork and interviews with 15 officers and soldiers.

A central[68] work within the discourse of postmodern Armed Forces is Moskos, Williams and Segal's (2000) anthology *The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War.* Moskos et.al argue that the modern military which emerged in the nineteenth century was inextricably associated with the rise of the nation-state[69]. The modern military consisted of a combination of conscripted lower ranks or militia and a professional officer corps. It was "war-orientated in mission, *masculine in makeup and ethos*, and sharply differentiated in structure and culture from civilian society" (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000, p. 1). By contrast, the postmodern military loosens the ties with the nation-state, becomes multipurpose in mission, and moves towards a smaller volunteer force which becomes "increasingly *androgynous in makeup and ethos*" (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000, p. 1).

Sookermany (2013) argues that the move from modernity to postmodernity is a change in worldview. Accordingly, he claims, that *if* military organizations are becoming postmodern, it enforces a shift from a modern worldview based on fixed knowledge summed up as universalism, structure and objectivity, towards a postmodern worldview based on contextualism, constructivism and complexity. From this it follows that the transformative shift in NATO, and consequently the Norwegian Armed Forces, has fundamental consequences at the ontological and epistemological level, and therefore will necessitate "a change in our conception of the *good* soldier" (p. 4), as well as in our "understanding of what constitutes good soldiering skills" (p. 4). Sookermany's point is that the modern and postmodern worldviews judge good skills differently. For example, Sookermany (2012) explains that being skilled within a modern and universalistic perspective will be measured by the degree to which how right or wrong one is in applying propositional knowledge and carrying out standard procedures (accordingly, teaching is based on memorizing and drills). From a postmodern and contextual view being skilled will be judged as a consequence of how good you are at solving the task, or reaching the goal in the specific context, regardless of given guidelines.

However, due to debates on the very usefulness of postmodernism as a theoretical framework with which to understand the changes in military organizations[70], Sookermany (2013) traces literature that can be said to "either support or oppose the idea of a postmodern military" (p. 53) in order to justify the claim that the military organization is becoming postmodern. Sookermany (2013) finds that there is a valid opposition against the idea of a postmodern military. Yet, he argues that "the opposition is seen foremost in relation to the gap between the political and doctrinal urge for developing armed forces and soldiers that are intuitive, flexible, diverse and adaptable, and the traditional military culture of embracing authoritarian

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[68] According to Ouellet (2005a), a collection edited by James Burk in 1984 introduced postmodern analysis into military sociology.

[69] The inextricable link between the rise of the nation-state and modern military organizations is the reason why Prividera & Howard III (2006) claim "The closer one's fit to the [national] archetype, the better the soldier is" (p. 31), and also why Friis (2000), Rones (2011; 2013) and Ulriksen (2002) argue that the Norwegian defense discourse has been characterized by doxical concepts on the ideals soldier/ideal Norwegian man.

[70] E.g. Bradford Booth, Meyer Kenstbaum and David R. Segal (2001) have argued that military organization and the analytical model of Moskos were predominantly modern. Whereas when the surroundings were becoming increasingly postmodern, the military response was distinctly modern.

leadership and obedience" (p. 54). For example, Sookermany refers to Wong (2002) who argues that the US Army values innovation in its rhetoric, but in action still adheres to the traditional bureaucratic and hierarchical values of the past. On the other hand, Sookermany finds that there are "a great number of academic studies and valid examples of military writings and conduct that show the military and its surrounding culture as adapting to the postmodern mode" (p. 42). Sookermany (2013) argues that the contributions which support the idea of an emerging postmodern military are so substantial that it makes sense to discuss the changes in the military within the framework of modernity and postmodernity. Accordingly, he contends that it remains (for him) to expand upon "implications for the level of military skill-acquisition – in the sense of becoming a good soldier in a *post*modern moment/era" (p. 113).

From this background, Sookermany provides a theoretical and typological construct to describe how different ontology and epistemological foundations *should* influence our understanding of military skills, skill acquisition and skillfulness. However, Sookermany is aware that his work is a philosophical framework which does injustice to reality. Thus, he concludes that *it remains for others to expand upon what it means to become a good soldier, or skilled soldier in the real world, or at the empirical level.*

Like Sookermany, Eriksen (2011) addresses the implications of changed requirements of soldiers on our understanding of skillfulness and skill acquisition. With reference to Sennet (1998), Eriksen argues that even if our military organization nowadays appears to be well tuned towards challenging joint operations, the maintenance of the soldiers' skill development process still belongs in a traditional sphere. Again, similar to Sookermany, Eriksen (2011) meets this challenge by providing an alternative approach to skill acquisition that better supports the structures of a transformed and modern military organization. However, Eriksen aims to get closer to an understanding of skillful behavior at the individual level. In defining the term skill he refers to a statement by Summers saying that skilled behavior underlies nearly every human activity, and argues that "it indicates that skill has to do with our *ability to deal with our life-world in an appropriate way*" (p. 6). Furthermore, Eriksen (2011) argues that

> It is also common to understand skill as *something that is learned*, and which develops through practice and experience (Moe, 2004). As such, to be skilled or *to show skillfulness must be understood as our ability to employ our acquired skills in an appropriate way*, in relevant settings. This should also indicate that the demands for *being perceived as skillful* [...] vary with the different tasks and challenges we face (p. 6)

Since, as Sookermany concludes, it remains for others to expand upon what it means to become a skilled soldier in the real world, Eriksen's definition of skillfulness means that what remains to expand upon is: *what is required from a soldier to be perceived as able to deal with the world in an appropriate way?*

3.2.1.6 Summary and Reflections

In this chapter we have seen Huntington argue that being a professional is to be an expert with a specialized knowledge and skill who is performing an essential service to society under the guidance of certain values and ideals. The specialized expertise of a military officer has been identified by Huntington as the management of violence. However, expertise is tied to role and function and since military missions have changed, skill requirements have shifted accordingly. The presented research shows that the transformation of missions has been perceived as an ongoing decline in relevance, legitimacy and prestige afforded by contemporary affluent society to the military profession. This has been defined as a role crisis and identity crisis. The research also shows that the loss of prestige and relevance is due to civilian experts having replaced military personnel resulting from more complex and demanding tasks. Nevertheless, US researchers argued that it was necessary to rediscover the professional character of the US Army and find ways to restore pride accorded to the service. In Norway it was decided to move military identity away from idealism toward professionalism in 2005, and professionalism was introduced and formalized in the Joint Operational Doctrine in 2007. According to Johansen (2013), professionalism was seen as a way to increase military performance. He also argued that the doctrine follows Huntington's view on the military profession.

Hagesæther explains that all three characteristics of a profession: expertise, responsibility and ethos/identity contain an aspect of ethics, which is in line with Huntington who wrote that a profession is a moral unit positing certain values and ideals which guide its members in their dealings with laymen, or, to use Eriksen's words, dealing with the life-world. According to Huntington, this guide may be a set of unwritten norms transmitted through the professional educational system or it may be codified into written canons of professional ethics.

Therefore, to investigate prevailing values and ideals (on, for example, who is an appropriate soldier) in the military profession, it is relevant to ask 1) *what are the set of unwritten norms transmitted through the professional educational system?* And 2) what are the set of norms and thinking transmitted through the written canons (authoritative texts)?

Different kinds of unwritten norms and ideals that are transmitted through the professional education system will be explored further in the investigation at the micro-level. Conversely, given the limits of this project's framework it is not possible to examine in detail the norms and thinking that are transmitted through written canons. However, the Doctrine FFOD 07 provides guidelines for how the Norwegian Armed Forces officer corps shall understand their role and develop a common mind-set and identity through a common professional culture. The doctrine is an authoritative text which seeks to transmit certain norms and ideals[71]. To expand our understanding of the military profession/field and the altered approach to identity and culture observed and discussed in chapter two, reflected in the literature above and

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[71] It is explained in the doctrine FFOD 07 itself that a doctrine can be designed in various ways. For example, a doctrine can orient towards cultural development. The doctrine will then emphasize the communication of ideas, values and attitudes that should characterize the organization. *It is stated that FFOD 07 is an example of such a doctrine* (FFOD 07, p. 7).

formalised in the doctrine, it is necessary to explore what is said about culture in the discipline of *military strategy, theory and doctrine.* In this discipline we also find an important written canon which has heavily influenced our understanding and thinking *On War* – and thus our thinking of what war requires. We will therefore look at a selection of literature from this discipline before we return to review previous literature on gender and military issues under the second headline *Why the struggle over who can take part?*

3.2.2   Culture and Doctrine as a Mean for Fighting Spirit

As just mentioned, to expand our understanding of the military profession/field and its paradigmatic exodus of idealism and organizational culture in preference of professional culture, it is necessary to review a selection of literature from the field which sets the premises for this cultural development, i.e. the field of *military strategy, theory and doctrine.* Also, as Huntington (1957) points out, written canons transmit not only certain norms but also dominant ways of thinking and understanding. Thus, a rough overview of the classic thinking *On War* and how this thinking has been challenged in the aftermath of the Cold War will help us to understand the long-term process of change in the state-figuration to which the modern state controlled armed forces are inextricably associated. The topic will be further explored in the introduction to Elias' work on the civilizing process in chapter four.

In addition to the classics, other literature selected for this review is Høiback's (2010) dissertation entitled *On the Justification of Military Doctrine: Past, Present and Future.* The study describes long-term processes of change, and is the most comprehensive study on doctrines conducted in a Norwegian context. In addition three chapters from an introduction book to Norwegian military strategy written by Høiback will be included (2011a).

In the introduction to strategy Høiback (2011a) states that the notion of doctrine is strongly related to and often occurs together with, or instead of, the terms strategy and tactics. This is why we need to investigate strategy in order to understand the approach to military culture and identity within the doctrine. Høiback (2011a) explains that strategy in its *simplest form* can be defined as a theory for action in a competitive situation. Hence, strategy can be understood as a theory of games[72]. Within the paradigm where the military is understood *as a political instrument for the state*, strategy builds the bridge between political objectives and military actions. What military authorities (state power/politicians) want to achieve is a political issue; how to realize this is a matter of strategy. The state paradigm got its content in the 1700s with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars as a result of the state administration becoming so stable that strategy in today's sense of the word became possible, Høiback (2011b) explains. It should thus be noted that this refers to the very process of modern European national-state formation, which is inextricably linked to the physical use of violence becoming *monopolized* by the state as described by Max Weber[73] and Elias In *The*

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[72] Unlike games of skill (e.g. ski jumping) and games of chance (e.g. lottery) games of strategy are games where you have to pay attention to your opponent's moves (Høiback, 2011a).
[73] According to Max Weber, a state is any "human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force/violence within a given territory"

Civilizing Process. Elias (2000) describes the modern state formation as a transition from the feudal system with rival warriors to state controlled armies and police forces which made violence unacceptable as a mean for internal rivalry (cf. 4.3.3). Above, Ouellet (2005b) reminded us that it was necessary not to take the military institution for granted because the so-called "War on Terror" has brought new emphasis on private armed security apparatures, and the very idea of "the Armed Forces" is becoming less attached to the traditional state paradigm found in the West.

The towering classic in the field of strategy within the European "state-paradigm" is Prussian *realist* Carl von Clausewitz' (1780-1831) *On War,* which is considered to be the single most important work ever written on the theory of warfare. However, Høiback (2010) writes that Clausewitz' contemporary writer on the Napoleonic art of war, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) "deserves the 'dubious title of founder of modern strategy' due to his methodological *isolation of war from its political and social context*, and as a result *'turning warfare into a huge game of chess'*[74]" (Høiback, 2010, p. 89). This notion sets the premise for the division where military thinkers today can stick to purely operational issues, while the ideological, social and cultural issues are left to the state power. Although Clausewitz is often seen as the originator of this division, his most important and still widely accepted legacy is his famous assertion that *war is the continuation of politics by other means.*[75]

However, where the French Revolution resulted in the formation of the democratic nations states with its state controlled armies (the monopolization of violence), World War I and II, and particularly the invention of nuclear weapon, changed the relationship to war considerably, Høiback (2011b) explains. War went from being the ultimate problem solver to becoming the ultimate problem, and previous strategies that heavily relied on history became outdated. Engineers, economists and other civilian experts took over and military educational institutions lost the lead in their own profession (which is linked to the loss of heroic prestige and the changes described by Janowitz and Moskos). According to Høiback (2011b), we could assume that military personnel threw themselves into the small wars between people when la grande guerre (the Great War between the states) became a "push button war" for civilian experts. However, and despite the fact that Western military power has almost always been used to fight small wars, and not wars between great powers or governments, it was the dream of the war between the states and with that a continuation of Clausewitz' approach to war, that caught the military's attention during the non-violent Cold War. Hence, the Prussian *realism* thinking on war has been reproduced till this day through military education.

In the 1990s and 2000s, however, military forces became increasingly used for small wars, and strategists began to realize that military forces were designed to do anything other than what they were actually used for. According to Høiback (2011b), new strategic concepts such as effects-based operations and comprehensive approaches, which began to show up in the

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[74] Høiback refers to John Shy.

[75] According to Høiback (2011b), Clausewitz' strategy was to exploit tactical victories in such a way that the field master's political ambitions were realized. Military power is thus not only a political tool, but also a political act, and thus also subject to the current political rules, norms and ambitions.

1990s and 2000s, are a confession of the failure of classic strategy. It should also be recalled that *UN resolution 1325 on women peace and security* was adopted as a consequence of the traditional and realism-based theories on inter-governmental war, which had dominated in the rivalry between the Great Power during the Cold War, being insufficient in the face of internal, non-governmental and civil war like conflicts (Schjølset, 2014)[76]. However, the uncertainty of nuclear war had already led some military theorists[77] to begin to look at culture and a-rationality as a friction factor in strategy, and a military strategic thinking about culture gradually began to develop. As a consequence of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s this field exploded, Høiback (2011c) declares. It was now important not only to know the terrain, but also to know what has been called 'the human terrain'.[78]

Høiback (2011c) explains that three different schools of thought as to what the term culture describes have crystallized since the 1980s. In these schools, he proceeds, culture refers to respectively 1) meaning, 2) values and 3) "templates of human strategy." Firstly, culture as meaning is largely tied to Clifford Geertz who sees culture as a process of meaning-making. Secondly, the most common school of thought focuses on aspects of value in culture. The third direction, which is relevant in the context of strategy, sees *culture as a mean.*

One way to get a better grip on the concept of culture as a mean, is to see culture as "the aggregate of practices and discourses" (Høiback, 2010, p. 150)**.**

> Practices are […] defined as the 'socially recognized forms of activity, *done on the basis of what members learn from others, and capable of being done well or badly, correctly or incorrectly* [...] Practices, in contrast to values, ideas, and beliefs, are public and visible, and manifest themselves through what members of a group actually do. The concept of discourse, on the other hand, is almost as fluffy as culture, but in this context, it is sufficient to state that discourse is 'not the content of what anyone says, *but the systems of meanings that allows them to say anything meaningful at all* '[79] (Høiback, 2010, pp. 150-151).

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[76] Schjølset (2014) explains that the non-governmental conflicts which were witnessed during the 1990s clarified how the realist approach gave an inadequate understanding of safety and actors in conflict. This reinforced the relevance of feminist approaches to international politics, and led to UN Resolution 1325 being adopted.

[77] A pioneer was Jack Snyder who thought culture had to be taken into account in order to predict the Soviet Union's reaction to a possible attack (Høiback, 2010; 2011c).

[78] According to Høiback (2011c), the inspiration behind the exploding cultural approach is the famous and still frequently cited quote from the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu (400 BC): "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle (Sun Tzu 2006: 35 I: Høiback 2011c, pp. 150-151). The perspective where culture is seen as mean for the Armed Forces has effectivity caused several anthropologist to boycott *Military Anthropology.* "Anthropologists accuse colleagues working with the US military of weaponising their profession into a tool of spying and torture, servicing a 'kill chain' rather than enlightening the waging of war" (Porter 2009: 26 I: (Høiback, 2011c, p. 151). See also: David H. Price, (2011) *Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in Service of the Militarized State* and George R., Jr. Lucas, (2009) *Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology.*

[79] Høiback refers to: Ann Swidler. *What Anchors Cultural Practice*s, p. 75

In other words, how we think and how we speak influences what we do and can do, and thus the way we operate. Discourses justify, explain and limit our beliefs of what works in war and what we can or cannot do. It means that culture influences military thinking and how war is waged and can be done. Moreover, "culture, understood as 'practices in interaction with discourse', is what makes not only doctrine making, but all sorts of collective action and planning possible" (Høiback, 2010, p. 151). This perspective also means that one sees culture as something that can be acted upon and changed, which brings along an active approach to culture. Høiback explains that with this perspective on culture, cultural development became a core part of business development for several organizational theorists. Similarly, "the Norwegian Armed Forces see its 'corporate culture' as something which is not given once and for all, but something that can be changed and developed purposefully, preferably through a new doctrine" (Høiback, 2011c, p. 129-130) .

Whether it is possible to use and develop culture in this way is disputed. Høiback describes various directions in the theory of cultural components in security politics, and highlights that an issue in these discussions is "*whether you can blow more combat spirit into a population by cultural means*, or whether culture is something that is beyond our reach" (Høiback, 2011c, p. 149). In other words, what is discussed is the extent to which culture has a manipulative power. How the doctrine author(s) relate to these questions will affect how military doctrines are formulated and used, Høiback states, and he adds that what seemingly underlies the Norwegian doctrine is the perspective that culture is at least partly manipulative and can be used to produce fighting spirit.

The function of a doctrine in military organizations is to *coordinate* all the resources and ensure that they pull in the same direction. This requires a common set of beliefs and understandings and doctrine is the military term for such perceptions, and can be loosely defined as "institutionalized beliefs about what works in war" (Høiback, 2010, p. vii). The doctrine has an authoritative element. It represents guidance from a formal authority about how to approach future strategic and tactical challenges. Høiback (2010) explains that

> the word doctrine ventured irrevocably into the military vernacular of the Western world in the aftermath of the French disaster in 1870. How could France, still riding high on the legacy of Napoleon, be beaten so devastatingly by the Prussian upstart? Old explanatory variables […] cut conspicuously little ice […] It was something with the ability and willingness to fight that separated the Prussian from the French. *This something was baptized la doctrine*, which, more or less, deliberately rested on the word's religious and theological baggage (p. 247).

The search for something that is here baptized *la doctrine* can be recognized as Leo Tolstoy's (1869) x, the spirit of the army, which introduced us to the basic question in the field of military sociology. Høiback suggests, however, that a doctrine can be seen simply as the way things are actually done (as doxic practice and thinking recognized from Bourdieu's conceptual tools), but he argues that there is a fundamental difference between an official doctrine, which is something we can write and print, and an informal doctrine, as "the ethos"

or "minds of men". An official doctrine is within practical reach and explicitly specifies the strategy. According to Dorothy Smith (2005; 2006), it is precisely because printed texts can reach out with a standardized message across multiple local settings that they can be used to rule and coordinate people's behavior into institutional behavior (cf. 5.1.2.1).

According to Høiback, doctrines have been cultivated by military organizations as tools of command, tools of change and tools of education. In particular, the USA and UK have tended to use doctrines mainly as a tool of education, he writes. The educational perspective is also reflected in the Joint Operational Doctrine FFOD07[80]. As mentioned before, it is written that the doctrine shall be an *"pedagogical tool* that helps the officer corps to develop a common understanding, a common mind-set, a common framework, a common terminology and thus the basis for the development of a common professional culture" (FFOD 07, p. 3).

As we saw in chapter 2, the introduction of a professional military culture, formalized in the doctrine, caused a debate about the possible emergence of warrior cultures which were seen as deeply problematic in Norwegian society. Consequently, the Chief of Defence wrote that a warrior culture was required to produce fighting spirit if the military instrument should serve political interests far behind Norwegian borders. Accordingly, Edstrom & Ydstebø (2011b) write in the introduction book to Norwegian military strategy that the warrior culture that was so unwanted by the former defence minister is, paradoxically enough, a consequence of and a prerequisite for the politically directed restructuring of the Armed Forces in the 2000s[81]. Ydstebø (2009), who contributed to the book on *Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation* from the strategic point of view, referred to medieval knights as examples of warriors and wrote: "The motivation to go to war was his own status and honor as much as the war's purpose - which then often essentially was to ensure the knights status and honor" (p. 138). "For the warrior cultures, the war is not only a mean but an end in itself. […] *With Clausewitz's terminology the mean has become the goal*" (Ydstebø, 2009, p. 29).

This leads us to the another military historian and theorist, Martin Van Creveld (1991; 2006; 2008) who has been a prominent opponent of what he calls state-focused and neorealist approaches to war which, with reference to Clausewitz, posit that war is a rational means of achieving political goals. Creveld claims that war also has ends in itself. His departure point is that the ability to kill is admittedly important in war, but "in the end, the *readiness to be killed* if necessary is even more important" (Creveld, 2006, p. 7). Creveld (1991) explains that "war does not begin when some people kill others; instead, it starts at the point where they themselves risk being killed in return: Those [...] who engage in the former but not in the latter are not called warriors but butchers, [or] murderers" (p. 159). His point is that killing people who cannot resist does not count as war. Such a form of murder will in fact not earn

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[80] "Bjergan says there is no doubt that the American doctrines have been the source of inspiration for the Norwegian doctrine. It is the US that sets the standard, and all other Western countries' doctrines are broadly in line with what is written in the American doctrines" (see: http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2011/januar/275301)

[81] They also refer to that traditionally the security policy of small states has focused on combat operations as self-defense whereas the new Strategic Concept from 2009 states that the Norwegian Armed Forces will be "a crucial instrument to promote Norwegian interests and values, home and abroad" (Ministry of Defence, 2009a, p. 5).

the respect and honor reserved for the warrior. Consequently Creveld (1991) claims: "Insofar as war, before it is anything else, consists of fighting – in other words, a voluntary coping with danger – it is the continuation not of politics but of *sport*" (p. 191). He refers to the medieval professional warriors, the knights, who were fighting as much for sporting reasons, as for lands and profit. According to Creveld, a lack of analysis of these elements prevents us from understanding war.

> Precisely because it [war] is instrumental by nature, strategic thought not only fails to tell us why people fight but prevents the question from being asked in the first place. Yet I can only repeat that, in any war whatsoever, this is the most important question of all. However strong an army may be in other respects, where fighting-spirits is lacking everything else is just a waste of time (Creveld, 1991, p. 191).

To understand war Creveld (1991) suggest the examination of five conditions:

1. By whom war is fought (whether it is state or non-state actors)
2. What war is all about (relationship between actors and between actors and non-combatants)
3. How war is fought (strategy and tactics)
4. What war is fought for (for national power, or as an end in itself?)
5. Why war is fought (the motivation of the individual soldier)

The last question, *the motivation of the individual soldier*, he argues must be seen in relation to *"the culture of war" which provides the structures needed to create warriors of civilian youth* (Creveld, 1991; 2008). Creveld (2008) points out that throughout history a comprehensive "culture of war" has been created consisting of war movies, uniforms, traditions, ceremonies, medals and other symbols that *produce ideas about valuable benefits; glory, honour and prestige. This is intentionally to "make men willing, even eager, to look death in the face"* (p. 412), and "it can do so only if it [war] is understood not as a means to an end but as an end in itself" (p. 412).

3.2.2.1 Summary and Reflections

From the subchapter on The Military Profession we remember Huntington's (1957) claims that the military profession was a moral unit positing certain values and ideals which govern the behavior of men, and which are transmitted through the professional educational system as well as written canons. We also remember that Norway decided to move military identity and culture away from idealism toward professionalism in order to increase military performance in 2005. The cultural transformation was formalized in a new Joint Operational Doctrine in 2007 (FFOD 07). The new approach to culture represented in the doctrine is part of a new military strategy.

Within the paradigm where the military is understood as a political instrument, strategy builds the bridge between political objectives and military actions. This paradigm has been heavily influenced by the legacy of Prussian realist Clausewitz, who is the originator of the famous assertion that war is the continuation of politics by other means. In the 1990s and 2000s

military forces became increasingly used for small wars, and strategists began to realize that the realistic theory on inter-governmental war was insufficient in the face of internal, non-governmental and civil conflicts. New strategic approaches developed and as a consequence of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq a field where culture was seen as a mean and something that could be changed and manipulated to achieve certain goals, including fighting spirit, exploded within the field of military strategy, theory and doctrine.

Høiback (2011c) claims that the degree to which culture has a manipulative power is disputed, and he questions whether it is possible to "blow more combat spirit into a population by cultural means" (p. 149). However, he claims that the perspective that seemingly underlies the Norwegian doctrine is of culture having at least some powers of manipulation. The Norwegian doctrine is inspired by those of the US and aims to be an educational tool to help the officer corps develop a common mind-set and understanding, as well as a professional culture. The doctrine claims to be oriented towards cultural development and to "emphasize the dissemination of the ideas, values and attitudes that shall characterize the organization" (FFOD 07, p. 7).

The debate on the possible emergence of warrior cultures, as reviewed in chapter two, is explained to be due to the changed approach to culture formalized in the doctrine. According to the Chief of Defence, as well as Edström & Ydstebø (2011b), this is a consequence of and a prerequisite for the politically directed restructuring of the Armed Forces to a political instrument for promotion of Norwegian values and interests far behind Norwegian borders. Edström & Ydstebø (2011b) describe this as a paradox since the former Minister of Defence was an opponent of the cultural development in the debate presented in chapter two under the headline *Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation*. Among other things, one problem associated with the emergence of honor-based warrior cultures was, according to Ydstebø (2009) that "for the warrior cultures, the war is not only a mean but an end in itself. It is inextricably linked to the warriors' own individual and collective interests. With Clausewitz's terminology the mean has become the goal" (p. 29). This makes it relevant to ask: What are the individual's interests? If fighting spirit and military effectiveness versus Norway's national self-image and identity as a peace-nation is at stake in the struggle over appropriate culture at a macro-level, what is at stake in the struggle over who can take part at a micro-level?

Creveld has been a prominent opponent of neorealist approaches to war, who argue, with reference to Clausewitz, that war is a rational means of achieving political goals. He argued "insofar as war, before it is anything else, consists of fighting – in other words, a voluntary coping with danger – it is the continuation not of politics but of sport" (Creveld, 1991, p. 191). Then he claimed that strategic thought fails to tell us why people fight precisely because war is seen as instrumental and rational.

Creveld goes on to argue that the motivation of the individual soldier must be seen in relation to "*the culture of war" which provides the structures needed to create warriors of civilian youth.* He points out that throughout history a comprehensive "culture of war" has been intentionally created to *produce ideas about valuable benefits; glory, honour and prestige which shall "make men willing, even eager, to look death in the face"* (Creveld, 2008, p.

412). This quote leads us to the question raised by Marcia Kovitz in the book *Military Masculinities: Identity and the State* (Higate P. R., 2003)[82]: "Given that the activities in which soldiers engage have lethal aims and consequences, *why the struggle over who can take part?"* (p. 1).

3.3 Why the struggle over who can take part?[83]

According to Woodward (2003): "The very process of becoming a soldier [which military education is about] involves the construction, negotiation, and reproduction of gendered identities, and this process is critical to armed forces" (p. 43). Thus, in order to gain a deeper understanding of what is at stake in the social struggle over who should be allowed to be a part of the military profession at the micro-level, we need to know why gender and identity has been critical in the making of soldiers and how this influenced the individual soldier's expectations to and assumed benefits from military training.

3.3.1 "A Few Good Men"

The military is often represented and therefore seen and researched as an institution that offers individuals the possibility to achieve, perform and enact (hegemonic/hyper-) masculine status or identity (Goldstein, 2001; Hinojosa, 2010; Haaland T. L., 2008b; Rosen, Knudson, Moore Parmley, & Fancher, 2003; Sand & Fasting, 2013; Lahelma, 2005; Totland, 2009). Several authors have, for example, described military socialization as "a rite de passage" from boy to man(hood) (Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978; Ben-Ari & Dardashti, 2001; Creveld, 2008; Hockey, 2002; 2003; Klein, 1999; Maringira, 2014; Sasson-Levy, 2008; Segal, 2006; Woodward R., 2003). For some of these authors this description is due to empirical findings which suggest that soldiers join the military to become "a real man" or, more academically expressed, to engage in an individualized process of masculine self-actualization and/or gendered identity work (Sasson-Levy, 2008; Woodward R. , 2003).

More clearly still, Belkin (2012) sheds light over the individual soldier's traditional expectancy to military practices and gender when he refers to Brown's work with veterans. During his work at The Johnson City Veterans Administration Hospital in Tennessee, Brown found that transgendered veterans had volunteered for the most dangerous missions in Vietnam in order to prove and affirm their masculinity *beyond doubt*. These veterans were so uncomfortable with who they were that they had seen potential death as "an acceptable price to pay for achieving the status of a real man" (Belkin, 2012, p. 1). Though Brown's observations seem relevant to just a small minority of service members, Belkin (2012) argues that "similar narratives are ubiquitous in accounts about joining the military, as service members often explain their willingness to risk their lives in terms of a desire to cement their masculine status" (p. 1-2). However, the achievement of masculine status does not seem to

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[82] This is not to say that all authors above are concerned with the question of fighting spirit, whereas all authors below stand outwith the tradition presented so far. The authors and literature are organized in relation to whether they can illuminate the basic question and following problem within these traditions.

[83] See subchapter 3.1 on introduction to the literature for information on criteria for inclusion. Norwegian master theses and un-published reports are included, due to lack of research on the Norwegian military and gender issues.

depend on the individual's participation in actual life-threatening combat themselves, Belkin claims. This is because military masculinity consists of beliefs, practices and attributes which enable individuals to legitimize a claim to power and authority by associating themselves with the military (Belkin, 2012).

According to Segal (2006), the importance of masculinity and the transition from boyhood to manhood "is especially apparent in the culture of basic training, where new recruits are exhorted to try harder or be labelled 'girls' or 'sissies' (Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978; Faris, 1976; Williams, 1989)" (p. 565). In addition, Maringira (2014) argues that military identity, which sits together perfectly with military masculinity, "is explicitly embedded during military training" (p. 3). Thus, Maringira states that "military training is the ultimate point of departure in understanding how a soldier's identity is shaped" (p. 3). He refers to Woodward (2000) and writer: "There is no doubt that transforming a civilian into a soldier involves inculcating a new identity, which is that of a masculine 'warrior-hero'" (Maringira, 2014, p. 3).

Hockey (2002; 2003) conducted an ethnographic study of military training in a British infantry unit. In correspondence with Segal, above, he observed that physical inadequacy was equated and portrayed as being womanly. This was expressed through expressions used by the instructors such as "You are like old women [...] Act like men [...] girls can do better [...] [and] 'you bunch of girls are always on the back'" (Hockey, 2003, p. 17). He describes further how basic training is presented to the recruits as a demanding physical and mental test where masculine status is the reward that can be won, and how this explicitly links military role effectiveness with masculine potency. Hockey (2003) writes:

> Basic training is consequently presented to them as a direct challenge, a series of tests that have to be passed. [...] These activities are physically hard on the recruit. *The ability to cope with these physical demands constitutes a prime indicator of the individual's masculinity, and this message is repeatedly reinforced by instructional staff. The unfit are then by definition unmasculine, and the only way forward is to try harder, get fitter and become 'real men.'* [...] Accompanying this focus on physical endurance is the development of a particular kind of mental endurance that centres on the toleration of pain and discomfort (p. 16).

From his historical and strategic perspective Creveld (2008) describes the aims and objectives of military education in parallel with Hockey's (2002; 2003) observations. However, Creveld's (2008) focus is that the education is arranged with humiliating, mentally and physically demanding tests "as part of a well-considered plan" (p. 48) to offer status and pride to those who succeed. He writes:

> Every military education system ever designed starts by humiliating its trainees *[...] as part of a well-considered plan.* [...]The methods used can be pretty barbaric [...] there are verbal forms of abuse [...] yelling [...] highly charged sexual terminology, is legendary [...] they will call their charges "girls." [...] Trainees may be made to assume postures that are hard to maintain [...] go through strenuous exercises [...]. A

particularly common one, used to teach trainees to operate under pressure, is to assign
them certain tasks but insufficient time in which to perform them, such as making
beds, changing uniform, cleaning and arranging all kinds of gear [...] while paying
meticulous attention to the smallest detail [...] "Recruits may find themselves rolling
in mud *[...] Such methods appear to have something magical about them. What
happens to them during training, recruits are told, will change them forever. The
childish, the weak, and the feminine must die to make way for the manly and the
strong*; soldiers, in other words [...] *The same methods are also used as tests, enabling
instructors to weed out the weakest recruits and grade the rest* in preparation for more
advanced training and assignments. Even these, however, are not the only goals. *Even
as it humiliates trainees, a well-considered, well-carried-out program will also instil
in them pride and self-confidence – in fact, this may be as important as any skills it
imparts. The tests must be devised in such a way as to make them hard to pass but not
so hard as to cause too many trainees to fail. Looking back on the obstacles they have
overcome, graduates will experience a sense of satisfaction and increased self-respect.
[...] tests in which what counts is not results achieved but honest effort made and
which everybody is allowed to pass, cannot carry out this function. In this sense the
success of most depends on the failure of some* (Creveld, The Culture of War, 2008,
pp. 48-51).

In short, Creveld explains that initial military training has traditionally been designed to
deliberately offer status, pride and the label "real man" to those who manage to exceed the
demanding obstacles put forward. These benefits or merits depend, however, on the failure of
some and require that the tests are hard to pass. From chapter two we remember Ydstebø
(2010) wrote that the military hierarchy was *designed* as a meritocracy. In an empirical study
of men's attitudes towards female service members in Norway and the US, Gustavsen (2011a)
found that a meritocratic repertoire was employed to argue for inclusion based on individual's
skills rather than gender. The ranking or grading of men has been observed in empirical
studies. Sasson-Levy (2008) writes:

The combat body project not only creates hierarchal gender differences, however, but
also stratifies male bodies. The 'chosen body' (Weiss 2002) of the combat soldier
depends on the existence of the wrong body, the body that fails to become a combat
soldier. The literature often specifies female or homosexual bodies as representative of
the 'wrong' military body. However, the soldiers I talked to did not compare
themselves to women or homosexuals but mostly to other male heterosexual soldiers
who had failed to endure the physical training - that is, the fat soldier, the lazy soldier,
the 'crybaby', or the soldier who is too small. As Robert Connell (1995, 75) notes,
masculinity is a relational identity that is often constructed in relation to other
masculinities (Sasson-Levy, 2008, p. 306).

Similar observations of ranking of men's bodies, as described by Sasson-Levy, are observed
by and described in Rones & Fasting (2013) and Rones & Hellum (2013)**.** In *The chosen body*

Weiss (2002) explains that bodies are always in a process of becoming; able to be worked on to become closer to the ideal of the chosen body. The ideal is shaped by cultural scripts, and the individual is thus faced with multiple choices. However, one of the most notable cultural scripts is militarism, which provides soldiers with clear and disciplinary bodily requirements and "allows them to 'complete' their corporal deficiency and find their prescribed military identity. [...] The military, in a manner parallel to other social institutions, uses the body as a template on which to imprint signals that identify the person with a certain group and exclude him from other groups" (p. 12).

We can sum up that military training is designed to offer men a possibility to become not only a man, but one of the "*few good men*" which is a traditional slogan used in military recruitment campaigns, originally used by the US Marine Corps[84] (see figure 1).

Figure 1: US Marine Corps Recruiting Poster: subtitle: We are looking for a few good men

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[84] The slogan has also inspired the title of the popular film "A few good men" (1992) directed by Rob Reiner and starring Tom Cruise, Jack Nicholson, and Demi Moore.

*Figure 2: The Private Military School Norwich University's
recruiting poster (1995): What's this about a few good men?*

3.3.2   Women – a Paradox in the Military

What then about women in the military? Several studies have explored women's entrance and
role in the military and how the gendered culture impacts on the acceptance of women in the
military (Brownson, 2014; King, 2014; Lilleaas & Ellingsen, 2014; Nuciari, 2006; Segal M.,
1982; 1986; 1999; 2006; Rosen, Durand, Bliese, Halverson, Rothberg, & Harrison, 1996;
Sand & Fasting, 2013). For example Diamond, Kimmel, & Schroeder (2000) entitled their
article "What's this about a few good men?" after a recruiting poster (see figure 2) for the
private military school Norwich University. On the poster "two female cadets stand proudly
and prettily in uniform" (p. 232) posing the quoted question. By being women and two of the
few good men simultaneously, Diamond et al. argue that the two female cadets "visually
resolve the paradox of women's participation in the military" (p. 232). The women
interviewees in their study seemed to be trapped in this paradox. The authors argues that
reliance on ideas of

> natural, biologically based differences between women and men confronted women
> entering military education with the same dilemmas as the women who have
> successfully entered every field of endeavour traditionally the homosocial preserve for
> men [...] – the assumption that *women who seek military education cannot be 'real*

women.' Military service is seen as gender-conforming for men, gender
nonconforming for women. Thus, women were trapped in a paradox: *To the extent that*
they are successful cadets, women cannot be successful women; to the extent that they
are successful women, they cannot be successful cadets. [...] they cannot be both, and
thus either way they lose (Diamond, Kimmel, & Schroeder, 2000, p. 236).

Diamond, Kimmel, & Schroeder (2000) refer further to a team of researchers[85] who wrote:
"When women deviated from their feminine role, *despite the appropriateness of this behavior*
to the cadet role, *they were regarded unfavorably by their classmates*" (p. 236).

In their study, Diamond et al. investigated how gender was negotiated in two different
military school institutions. They found that adherence to "[s]tereotypic assumptions about
putatively natural differences between women and men led to the problems typically
associated with tokens in any large organization (cf. Kanter, 1977; Laws, 1975)" (p. 237).
Moreover, they found that stereotypical assumptions about women's essential difference to
men were most prevalent in the institution, with hostile attitudes toward women's entry
beginning at the top of the chain of command, for example "over my dead body will women
come here" (p. 237).

However, despite assumptions that women "naturally" have different interests and desires to
men, Diamond et al. (2000) state that: "Virtually all available research suggests that women
enter military institutions for the same reason men do. A longitudinal study of 3, 700 male
and 300 female cadets (Adams, 1984) found that the women [as a group] and men [as a
group] were similar on personality variables and in their work and family orientation" (p.
234). Diamond et al.'s (2000) interviews also confirmed what current survey data revealed –
that women and men have similar reasons for entering military institutions, such as desire for
discipline, opportunities, challenge and that "they wanted to place themselves 'under stressful
conditions, overcome obstacles and succeed'" (p. 234). The authors argue that two female
cadets summarized the cohort's motivations with their expressions: "'I wanted to be in a place
where I could live to the extreme' [and] 'I like running around in the mud and doing that sort
of stuff'" (p. 234).

Similar findings are observed in studies under the Norwegian research program on cohorts
initiated through White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) on increased recruitment of women. For
example Fauske (2013) analyzed a sample survey of Norwegian adolescents with 2,116
respondents, as well as a survey of candidates met to Joint Selection for The Norwegian
Armed Forces Schools with 1,051 respondents (70% of the cohort) and found that women and
men report the same reasons for wanting to serve. The three main causes for both sexes were:
"'I think I will benefit from it', 'I want a year where I get to test myself', and 'I want to have
a year where I get to be active and struggle a bit'" (Fauske, 2013, p. 87). From data from the
national service administration's survey, which is mandatory for all Norwegian men *and*

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85 Diamond et al refer to: Yoder, Adams, & Prince (1983). The price of a token. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*,
11 (Fall), 325-337

women at the age of 18, Fauske finds that the youths' physical condition is a very important factor for wanting to serve, or not, in the military. Fauske writes: "In other words, the youths [of both gender] are tempted by personal challenges" (p. 87).

Furthermore, several authors have argued that masculinity is something that both men and women can perform, as masculinity is not fixed to men or women[86]. However, men are expected to perform masculinity whereas women are not (Connell R. W., 2005a; Messerschmidt, 2012; West & Fenstermaker, 2002). Belkin (2012) "conceives of military masculinity as a set of beliefs, practises and attributes that can enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of an affirmative relationship with the military or with military ideas [...] [Although], military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power [...] women have harnessed it as well" (p. 3). Sasson-Levy (2002) finds that women in the military structure their gender according to the masculinity of the combat soldier, and acquire a masculinized personality. Woodward & Winter (2007) entitled a subchapter "Military femininities, female masculinities, military women" and they write: "The clumsiness of the terms proposed in the subtitle [...] reveals the awkwardness of the concept of the gender identity of the women soldier" (p. 74). They refer to different "gender strategies" for women in the military with one strategy being to adopt masculinity and shape the body as a man, but they do not find proper terms to describe military women's identities with gendered labels.

Yet, even though women are willing to serve in the military for the same reasons as men and have the ability to embody masculinity, resistance against women's entry into the military has been considerable in most countries. The public arguments as to why, or why not, women should, or should not, be allowed in to the military and in combat are numerous (Cohn, 2000; Nuciari, 2006; Gustavsen, 2011a). In a comparative study of attitudes towards women in the US and Norwegian Armed Forces, Gustavsen (2011a) summarizes the four core arguments which recur "as to why gender integration is undesired and harmful to the Armed Forces" (p. 29). The main argument used is women's (lack of) physical strength. "The second argument raised as to why women should not be admitted into the Armed Forces relies on the assumption that it will destroy unit cohesiveness – a crucial factor for military efficiency"[87] (p. 30). The third argument asserts that women are avowed with a unique emotional value that makes the "harm done to a female soldier much harder to accept than injuries inflicted on a man" (p. 31). The fourth argument is due to biological factors such as pregnancy.

3.3.3 Masculine Uniformity Camouflages Differing Male Interests

Attempting to overcome points of tension in the debate on women's problematic service, Kovitz (2003) wants to shift the "focus from problematizing women's service to problematizing that of men" (p. 1). She examines the foundation of the military's conceptualization, construction and reconstruction of gender through a number of related

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[86] Rendering e.g. Ghaill & Haywood (2007), "femininity and masculinity is not something one is borne with or inherits. Rather, it involves an active process of achievement, performance and enactment" (p. 35).
[87] Gustavsen refers to Fenner and de Young (2001).

questions. Some of the questions she raises are: "why is women's service seen as contentious whereas men's is assumed? Given that the activities in which soldiers engage have lethal aims and consequences, *why the struggle over who can take part?* (p. 1).

Another question raised by Kovitz (2003) is: "given the presence of multiple masculinities based on multiple military occupations and unequal ranks, why is military masculinity identified as and represented as singular and uniform?" (p. 1). She argues that a review of the debates on women's military service "reveals *internally contradictory features that conspire to paint a picture of* essential difference between men and women, and of *essential similarity between men themselves*" (p. 2). Thus, she writes:

> Men's military service is taken for granted. Few, if any, questions are raised regarding men's capacity, willingness, desire, or inclination to serve, or that in war it is the cream of male youth that is sent out to 'die for their country.' [...] Moreover, *men are treated as an internally undifferentiated group rather than as a socially constructed category incorporating disparate individuals* exhibiting a spectrum of physical and psychosocial characteristics, interests, and inclinations, including the inclination for or against military service. *If there is uniformity among servicemen, little attention is paid to the painstaking efforts expended by militaries to construct it through deliberate social practice, particularly in basic training, part of which includes expelling non-conforming men* (Kovitz, 2003, p. 3).

Kovitz (2003) reminds us that historical evidence shows that men have often fought under the influence of drugs or under the threat of lethal violence from superiors. What's more, that numerous individual men have attempted various means of avoiding participating in war fighting by means of flight, prison, feigning illness, insanity or sexual deviance, self-mutilation and suicide. She argues that "such evidence dispels essentialist myths of innate male aggressiveness. Rather, it demonstrates that dramatic transformations, along with social boundaries and liminality[88], are needed to construct and maintain a combative identity and solidarity" (Kovitz, 2003, p. 6). According to Kovitz (2003), the practises of transformations and rites of passage in "pre-state societies where warfare is strictly gender segregated and marked as masculine [...] are often accompanied by discourses of male-female antagonism, ambivalence and fear" (p. 6). This functions as a projection and "a displacement of the fear of the dangers of war onto dangers associated with female 'pollution'"(p. 6) and weakness. In other words, it has created a discourse where it is better to sacrifice one's life, than to risk misrecognition and the status as weak and womanish.

In state societies, where military service has been voluntary "motivating soldiers to place themselves in harm's way - with little to gain and much to lose – is a principal preoccupation" (p. 7), Kovitz argues. But, when the decision to engage in collective violence has been

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[88] Liminality is a "temporary state during a rite of passage when the participant lacks social status or rank, is required to follow specified forms of conduct, and is expected to show obedience and humility" (thefreedictionary.com) .

voluntary, "how does the military appropriate the soldier's autonomy and ensure obedience to orders, especially to those that entail risking one's life?" Kovitz asks (p. 7).

As I understand Kovitz (2003) a deliberate construction of an imagined unity of men becomes the means for internal cohesion to extract obedience from different men with different interests and power in the interest of the collective. For example, rank marks the internal differentiation, or conflicts of interests, between more and less powerful men. But rather than being transparent, these differences in power and interest between men must be camouflaged in order to construct the military's unity of purpose, which is its operational effectiveness of the whole human "megamachine" – the collective of power.

What Kovitz (2003) refers to is Mumford's description of large hierarchical organizations as a machine using humans as its components. In contrast to the individual initiative of the hero, the organized army, often called the military machine, utilizes collective power. But in order for "the human machine" to function effectively, orders have to be reproduced and followed for which a kind of internal coercion and discipline is needed. Thus, the ranking system is constructed as inviolable and each individual member is lured into altruistic behavior in the interest of the whole group, call it the machine or organization. Kovitz (2003) argues that construction of the ranking system as sacrosanct is the most obvious method of containing differences in interests among men. Then she argues:

> The second method of containment consists in the construction of gender along a male-female axis of opposition, […] [because] it is this emphasis on male-female difference that serves to deflect attention from the fault lines along which military masculinity fractures internally (p. 9).

As Lorber (1994) argues, "the social institution of gender depends on the production and maintenance of a limited number of gender statuses and of making the members of these statuses similar to each other" (p. 57). To make uniform means to make something or someone similar. Consequently, Kovitz (2003) argues that "masculine unity, an ally of masculine military uniformity, is a third method of containing, as well as actually masking, differences in military masculinities, and it forms the basis for constructing and fostering troop solidarity in order to achieve the military's unity of purpose, which, again, is its operational effectiveness" (p. 9). Kovitz (2003) concludes that "a uniform military masculinity is carefully constructed through deliberate practice as a means of operationalizing a unique mandate – waging war – through an authoritarian organization that is preoccupied with ensuring the obedience of potentially resistant practitioners" (p. 9).

Consequently, because the military is constructed as uniformly masculine it is, according to Kovitz (2003), disrupted by the entry of women. "What makes women's presence so contentious is not what they *are* [...] but what they *represent*" (p. 6). As mentioned before, she recommends shifting focus from the "male-female axis of opposition to the oppositions between military men and to the fractures within military masculinity" (p. 10). In recent years, several studies have also focused on the existence of different types of masculinities in the military, and relational and/or hierarchical relationships between these (Hinojosa, 2010;

Levy & Sasson-Levy, 2008; Lilleaas & Ellingsen, 2014; Lomsky-Feder & Rapoport, 2003; Sand & Fasting, 2013; Sasson-Levy, 2008). Despite, the empirical observed existence of multiple and hierarchically organized/negotiated masculinities, Sand & Fasting (2013) write that the impression from their overviews of the research is that a traditional masculinity still exists as an ideal.

3.3.4   Military Masculinity Structured with Contradictions

In congruence with Kovitz (2003) and others' emphasis that any essential assumptions on military masculine uniformity must be challenged, Belkin (2012) claims that American glorification of the relationship between masculinity, authority and military institutions "has obscured scholarly understanding of what military masculinity is and how it works" (p. 4). He argues that military masculinity is often understood "in one-dimensional terms, as an identification that is premised on a renunciation of the unmasculine" (p. 173). By contrast, Belkin (2012) also claims that "military masculinity is structured by contradiction" (p. 173), and that the military has compelled soldiers "to embody masculinity *and* femininity, filth *and* cleanliness [...], dominance and subordination, civilization and barbarism" (p. 173). In other words, Belkin's (2012) argument is that the production of masculine warriors has required those who embody masculinity to enter into an intimate relationship with its unmasculine foils, such as cleanliness, tidiness, subordination, obedience, refinement etc., *rather than to reject them.*

> Parallel to the compelled disavowal of what is constructed as unmasculine, the military has also incited the unmasculine, and forced service members to inhabit it in order to be disciplined and conform to power. At the level of individual and institutional practice, military culture involves not just a flight from the unmasculine, but a simultaneous endurance and even embraces of it as well. Thus the creation of a masculine armed force depends on a surprising degree of engagement with the very sorts of unmasculine foils that masculinity sees by its very definition to be positioned against (p. 24-25).

While Kovitz (2003) claims that the construction of military masculinity is used to camouflage individual difference in power and interests to foster obedience and subordination to the collective, Belkin (2012) explores "how the military establishes social control over the troops" (p. 25) through *masculine beliefs combined with unmasculine practises.* He argues that the expression of "contradictions in, on, and through service members' bodies and identities has contained and camouflaged" (p. 25) the problematic sides of military power and practises through the construction of a benign façade, the moral soldier, which is also expressed in the slogan "A few *good* men". Contradictions in soldiering are also elaborated by Sasson-Levy (2008) who "claims that the warrior's bodily and emotional practices are constituted through two opposing discursive regimes: self-control and thrill. The nexus of these two themes promotes an individualized interpretation frame of militarized practices, which blurs the boundaries between choice and coercion, presents mandatory military service as a fulfilling self-actualization, and enables soldiers to ignore the political and moral meanings of their actions." (p. 296).

3.3.5   Summary: Why The Struggle Over Who Can Take Part?

Research has shown that some soldiers join the military to achieve the status of a real man (Belkin, 2012; Sasson-Levy, 2008; Woodward R. , 2003). Furthermore it has been shown that military role effectiveness is explicitly linked to masculine potency, and that basic training is presented to recruits as a physically and mentally demanding test where the "ability to cope with these physical demands constitutes a prime indicator of the individual's masculinity" (Hockey, 2003, p. 16). It is claimed that the importance of masculinity "is especially apparent in the culture of basic training", and thus that, "military training is the ultimate point of departure in understanding how a soldier's identity is shaped" (Maringira, 2014, p. 3).

According to Creveld (2008), the military education system is designed with mentally and physically demanding tests "as part of a well-considered plan" (p. 48) to offer status and pride, and a shift of status from boy to man for those who succeed. These benefits depend of the failure of some, and require the test to be hard to pass. Furthermore, according to Creveld (2008) the transformation in status from boy to man requires that the trainees' "womanish qualities" are driven out.

Due to the traditional link between masculinity and the military, research also finds that military service is seen as gender-conforming for men and gender non-conforming for women. For example, Diamond, Kimmel, & Schroeder (2000) found that military women were trapped in a paradox: "To the extent that they are successful cadets, women cannot be successful women" (p. 236) and vice versa. Still, "virtually all available research suggests that women enter military institutions for the same reason men do" (Diamond, Kimmel, & Schroeder, 2000, p. 234), are willing and able to serve and have the ability to embody masculinity.

Yet, resistance toward women's entry into the military has been considerable. Attempting to overcome the tension points in the debate on women's service, Kovitz (2003) suggests shifting the "focus from problematizing women's service to problematizing that of men" (p. 1). She poses the important question: "Given that the activities in which soldiers engage have lethal aims and consequences, *why the struggle over who can take part?"* (p. 1).

Kovitz argues that a review of the debates on women's military service "reveals *internally contradictory features that conspire to paint a picture of* essential difference between men and women, and of *essential similarity between men themselves*" (Kovitz, 2003, p. 2). Therefore, she draws attention to how the emphasis on male-female difference serves to deflect attention from fractures and differences in interest, power etc. between men, in order to extract obedience and altruistic behavior from the men in the interest of the "masculine unity" – the collective. This constructed uniform collective is disrupted by the entry of women, Kovitz argues. However, "what makes women's presence so contentious is not what they *are* but what they *represent*" – the symbolic association tied to their bodies.

Belkin (2012) claims that glorification of the relationship between masculinity, authority and military institutions "has obscured scholarly understanding of what military masculinity is and how it works" (p. 4). He argues that military masculinity is often understood "in one-

dimensional terms, as an identification that is premised on a renunciation of the unmasculine" (p. 173). Conversely, Belkin (2012) claims that "military masculinity is structured by contradiction" (p. 173), and that the military has compelled soldiers to embody masculinity *and* femininity, filth and cleanliness, dominance and subordination, civilization and barbarism simultaneously. He goes on to explore "how the military establishes social control over the troops" (p. 25) through *masculine beliefs combined with unmasculine practises.* He argues that the expression of "contradictions in, on, and through service members' bodies and identities has contained and camouflaged" (p. 25) the problematic sides of military power and practises through the construction of a benign façade and the moral soldier.

Consequently, traditional arguments which suggest that the problematic status and value of women in the military is due to requirements by the military for soldiers to reject what is traditionally considered feminine behaviour can be questioned. What also becomes problematic is the argument that men's success in the military depends on their ability to perform masculinity and reject femininity. So, in order to understand the social struggle over who can take part, we need to pay attention to what is actually required from men and women in military localities, and the symbolic system of classification of bodies (such as intuitive categorization as feminine, masculine, fit, tough etc.), requirements and the military profession, and the nexus between these. The research questions for the micro-level investigation are developed from the knowledge presented above, yet in an interactional process with Bourdieu's theoretical framework. Therefore, we will now turn to the theoretical framework, after which we will link up with this section and develop the research questions.

Part 2:

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

Chapter 4: Theoretical Perspectives

In this chapter I will present the theoretical framework from which the struggles in the military field are approached. In order to justify the choice of theory, i.e. Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias, I will first provide a general review of theoretical perspectives on culture, identity, gender and body, linking literature presented in chapter two and three to the theory where appropriate. In this way, the chapter also has a double purpose: it serves as an introduction to the theory by drawing upon examples from the military field's macro-level, whilst also theorizing macro-level descriptions.

4.1   Perspectives on Culture, Identity, Gender and Body

4.1.1   Identity: Doing Sameness, Doing Difference

The concept of identity has been used in a wide variety of ways in different contexts (Ghaill & Haywood, 2007; Lawler S. , 2008; Woodward K. , 1997a). The term has its origins in psychoanalysis, where identity is mainly seen as a *property* of the individual (Korsnes, 2008; Lawler S. , 2008). The one-dimensional assumptions in such an understanding have been criticized. In sociology identity is understood as being tied to interactions between individuals, groups and communities as well as to their relationships, to objects, places and activities. Thus, the concept of identity is approached as place and situation specific, as well as socially and historically *produced* (Korsnes, 2008; Lawler S. , 2008; Woodward K. , 1997b). According to Woodward (1997a; 1997b) and Lawler (2008) identity can be understood in terms of sameness and difference:

> The root of the word 'identity' is the Latin idem (same) from which we also get
> 'identical'. One important meaning of the term, then, rests on the idea that not only are

> we identical with ourselves (that is, the same being from birth to death) but we are
> identical with others (Lawler S. , 2008, p. 2).

However, at the same time as we identify with and *share* identities with someone, we experience that we are *different* from others. Thus, identity is about how we identify as well as dis-identify ourselves and others with different categories, e.g. female (gender), Norwegian (nationality/place), officer (profession/occupation/class/expertise), Kosovo-veteran (events) etc.

Woodward (1997a) explains that

> identity gives us an idea of who we are and of how we relate to others and to the world
> in which we live. Identity marks the ways in which we are the *same* as others who
> share that position, and the ways in which we are *different* from those who do not (pp.
> 1-2).

Even though identity is about sameness and difference simultaneously, Woodward (1997a) argues that "identity is most clearly defined by difference, that is *by what it is not*" (p. 2). This means that identity has a capacity for exclusion and marking of divisions between 'us' and 'them', as especially seen in extreme forms of national and ethnic conflicts, e.g. between Hutu and Tutsi, Serbs and Croats etc. According to Lawler (2008) and Woodward (1997a) such identities have relied on a *denial of similarities and exaggeration of difference* between the groups. Both Lawler (2008) and Woodward (1997a) refer to Ignatieff's (1994) story about how to tell Serbs and Croats apart in war-torn Yugoslavia, and hold that difference between such groups has to be *done or made* through language and *symbolic systems of difference*; doing difference. Similarly, recall Kovitz (2003) who argued that a review of the debates on women's military service "reveal internally contradictory features that conspire to paint a picture of essential difference between men and women, and of essential similarity between men themselves" (p. 2). Kovitz proceeded that little attention is paid to the painstaking efforts expended by military politics to construct similarities and uniformity between men; in other words, the doing of sameness. Dressing in military uniform should be the most obvious example of doing sameness. Also, the aim of writing a doctrine, we have seen, is to *coordinate* all the human resources in military organizations and ensure that they pull in the same direction. Development of a common professional identity was seen as a mean to reach that goal (see 3.2.2).

Lawler (2008) explains further, and in accordance with Kovitz, that identities are often made as binary oppositions, for example the male/female antagonism, with *associated* traits and abilities often understood to be mutually exclusive, such as strong/weak, high/low, aggressive/peaceful, defenders/defended. Although male and females traits and abilities show considerable similarities and overlaps the *average* differences between male and female *as groups* are often highlighted, as if a certain trait, e.g. strength, belongs to only one of the sex categories; thus doing gender difference (see also Connell, 1993; 2005a).

4.1.2   Culture: Shared Classifications- and Value Systems

This perspective on identity is related to culture. Woodward (1997b) refers to the anthropologist Mary Douglas who "argues that the marking of difference is the basis of culture because things – and people – are given meaning in culture by being *assigned to different positions within a classification system" (p. 29).* For example, a male's characteristics as well as his action can be classified as masculine, feminine or neither, depending on how these characteristics and actions are classified in the specific culture's classification system. It is however important to note that a classification often implies a simultaneous ascribing of value, position and status. *A classification system is thus simultaneously a value system.* According to Woodward (1997b) shared classification, value and meaning systems are in fact what we mean by `by´ culture. That means that a culture is characterized by its *distinct* classification- and value system, which is based on some degree of consensus between the members of that culture "about how to classify things in order to maintain some social order" (Woodward K. , 1997b, p. 30). However, a culture's classification system can and does change. We understand from above that this will affect the value, position and status of the object or the person who is classified.

This is perhaps why Ghaill & Haywood (2007) claim that the question of identity has emerged as one of the key dynamic concepts in the context of understanding social and cultural change. Ghaill & Haywood (2007) refer to Mercer (1990, p. 43) who has argued with reference to social change that: "'identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable, is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty'" (p. 34). This doubt is, according to Ghaill & Haywood, "experienced at individual, social and psychic (unconscious) levels, circumscribed by the local-global nexus of cultural transformations" (p. 34).

From this we understand that cultural transformation involves changes in the culture's classification- and value system and thus affects identity; which means that culture, classification, value and identity are mutually related concepts. An activity or a profession which at one time had value and prestige, and thus provided its performers with an attractive identity, may lose its value when the world transforms. The value of the person associated or identified with the activity or profession changes accordingly. In chapter three we saw that the transformation of the military institution's missions and activities witnessed up to the millennium was perceived as an ongoing decline in relevance, legitimacy and prestige afforded by contemporary society to the military profession. Forsythe, Snook, Lewis, & Bartone (2005) argued that the dramatic changes in *what they do* as an Army sparked a military identity crisis (cf. 3.2.1.2). This suggests that we have to pay attention to the intersection of military identity and requirements/what the personnel need to do (practice), as well as the symbolic system of classification (communication)[89], if we are to understand what is at stake in the struggle over who can take part in the military profession/field.

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[89] We remember from chapter three that the discussion on military culture and identity was strongly related to changed military role, mission and practices/doings, and that Høiback (2010) referred to culture as 'practices in interaction with

4.1.3   Doing Gender and Social Hierarchies

In addition to using the concept of identity in relation to understanding cultural change, Ghaill & Haywood (2007) also claim that the concept of identity has been useful in attempts to understand gender and gender relations. Firstly, because the concept of identity opens up to examine how we relate and identify ourselves and others to other individuals, groups and categories, such as man/woman and feminine/masculine. Secondly, the concept opens up to examine how different cultures *do gender* differences through their distinct schema for *classifying different persons, features, objects and activities as feminine, masculine or neither*. As Segal (2006) notes, "a culture can exaggerate or minimize the importance of sex differences" (p. 569). As we have already seen above, the classification of traits, behavior or objects in binary oppositions, such as feminine-masculine, often means that the opposite terms is given a different value; that one term is valued more than the other and often seen as the norm, while the other is `other´– seen as deviant or outside, and less valuable (Woodward K. , 1997b). In other words, different gender *statuses* with more or less power are made through the classification of personal traits and attributes in culture specific value systems.

Yet, Ghaill & Haywood (2007) suggest that there is a need to move beyond the binaries that underpin the foundation of thinking on gender. They stress that when the notion of power is taken into use, we have to think about it relationally and take into account that people *occupy more than one (identity) position simultaneously*, and have traits and attributes which are valued differently. This means that we must see gender identities in combination with other social relationships and/or identities in society which give people with shared gender identity different status, such as generation, ethnicity, nationality, body, class - or profession, which can be considered an aspect of class since class is linked to work (profession) and income (value). Ghaill & Haywood state that the exploration of simultaneous relationships between different identity categories is an under-theorized area, and that there is little empirical work available to illustrate how these inter-relationships are lived out within local cultural arenas. The need to bring the simultaneous doing of different categories of social inequality into focus through empirical work is also emphasized by Fenstermaker & West (2002). This study will therefore seek to contribute to the understanding of the intersection of profession and gender identities.

One of the most influential and commonly applied theoretical perspectives where gender is understood in relation to power and status, and which takes into account that all individuals within the same gender category do not have the same position, status and power as a result of other social categories, is Connell (1993; 2005a; 2009).

Firstly, Connell (1993; 2005a; 2009) points out that women - as well as men - can perform masculinity. Connell (1993; 2005a) then emphasizes that there are a number of different forms of masculinity and femininity. Therefore, Connell speaks of masculinities and femininities in the plural. The content of the different forms is not permanent or fixed, but

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discourse'. Below we will see Bourdieu argue that a culture's particular system of classifications is an effect of symbolic violence/power which is exerted through symbolic channels of communication of recognition and misrecognition.

depends on, and varies with time, place and cultural context. Nevertheless, Connell claims that there exists a type of configuration that is more or less stable and durable over time. Within what Connell understands as Western patriarchal culture, she outlines some symbolic "ideal-types" which she places in a hierarchy. On top of the hierarchy stands hegemonic masculinity which is dominant over all other forms of masculinities and femininities in society. However, Connell (2005a) emphasizes that "'hegemonic masculinity' is not a fixed character type, always and everywhere the same. It is, rather, the masculinity that occupies the *hegemonic position* in a given pattern of gender relations, a position always contestable."[90] (p. 76).

Hegemonic masculinity is thus a *normative ideal* that all men and women have to deal with, and men who exemplify this model of masculinity tend to be accorded a higher social status than those who do not (Connell R. , 1993). Consequently, hegemonic masculinity is a type of masculinity to which boys and men are generally encouraged to aspire. Although hegemonic masculinity is perceived as the ideal form of masculinity there are only a few men who can live up to this form of masculinity. Connell (1993) writes: "The public face of hegemonic masculinity is not necessarily what powerful men are, but what sustains their power and what large numbers of men are motivated to support" (p. 185). The warrior, often produced as a national hero/character, has been pointed out as an example of hegemonic masculinity, and several studies on men and the military have utilized Connell's theory. An example is Sasson-Levy (2008) (cf. 3.3.1 and 3.3.4) who has shown how combat soldiers are produced as an exclusive hegemonic identity in Israeli society, and how men strive to emulate the chosen body of the combat soldier. This, she argues, leads to an individualization of military practice which enables the soldier to interpret military practice in non-political terms, as a project of bodily self-actualization. However, in the US Janowitz (1960) found that due to the prevailing emphasis on commercial values and business success in the United States, choosing a military career was often believed to be a weak and less prestigious career choice (cf. 3.2.1.1). This would suggest that the military man's position in the *gender and power* hierarchy had been overtaken by the business man at this time and place. When power changes, hegemonic masculinity changes accordingly and can contribute to explaining the military identity crisis observed by US researchers, such as Baucom (1985) and Snider & Matthews (2005) (cf. 3.2.1.2). It is for such reasons that Connell (2005b) emphasizes why geopolitical struggle and changing power relations in contemporary globalization must be part of our understanding of masculinities.

Connell argues that *gender politics* directly influence men's bodies through various practices of bodily disciplination, negations and differentiations; something that is also shown by Sasson-Levy (2008). Moreover, the ways in which we perceive, categorize and value different women's and men's bodies are important in legitimizing and reproducing social inequalities.

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[90] According to Connell (2009) gender relations are influenced by a gender regime and a gender order. A *gender regime* is the more or less permanent gendered practice patterns and relationships in smaller environments, as in various organizations and institutions. However, the *gender regimes* "are part of wider patterns, which also endure over time" (p. 73), and which she names the *gender order* of a society. The *gender order* is, according to Connell (2009), part of "the enduring or extensive patterns among social relations that social theory calls `structures'" (p. 74).

Therefore, Connell (2005a) perceives of the body as being inescapable in the construction of masculinities and femininities, and argues that "for men, as for women, the world formed by *the body-reflexive practices of gender is a domain of politics – the struggle of interests in a context of inequality*" (p. 66). In chapter three we also saw that the military hierarchy had been consciously designed as a meritocracy, providing soldiers with clear and disciplinary bodily requirements to allow those who succeed to come closer to the ideal of "the chosen body". Sasson-Levy (2008) argued, thus, that the military bodily practice *creates* hierarchal gender differences and *stratifies* male bodies.

According to Shilling (2003), Connell provides us with one of few theories to take seriously that the body is *both* a social and biological entity, and which recognizes the body as a project and site for recognition and gendered identity construction, as well as a site for inequality, discipline, control and politics. For example, after acknowledging that bodies provide us with different biologically determined advantages and limitations, Connell (1993; 2009) illuminates how *socially determined categories give qualitatively new meaning to bodies which cannot be justified with reference to their biological constitution*. By this Connells means that the reproductive difference in men and women is often assumed to be directly reflected in or linked to a whole range of differences in capacity and characteristics; such as the idea that males are aggressive, strong and interested in weapons, while females are caring, weak, and interested in needlework etc. Connell (2009) explains that such differences are *without* foundation in the realities found in the many individual bodies and are *not* fixed by nature. Instead, the differences are produced through enormous social effort to channel and discipline people's behavior into gender-appropriate behavior. The ideas of gender-appropriate behavior are constantly circulated by priests, parents, teachers, advertisers, popular culture, politics, and not least, military recruiters, Connell argues. As we saw in chapter three a traditional slogan used in military recruitment campaigns advertised for a "*few good men*", simultaneously telling men what a good man is.

However, the concept of hegemonic masculinity used by Connell, as well as concepts of non-hegemonic masculinities, have been applied differently and come under scrutiny for their academic usefulness (Messerschmidt, 2012). Moreover, we remember Belkin's (2012) argument that glorification of the relationship between masculinity and the military has obscured scholarly understanding of how masculinity works. Thus, we have to look for theories that can explore the dialectic between the body, gender, social institutions and identity politics without relying on concepts of masculinities. Yet, with Kovitz' (2003) emphasis on how power and interest between men have traditionally been camouflaged in order to construct the military's unity of purpose, I believe it is of the utmost importance to keep in mind Connell's emphasis on the existence of a hierarchical relationship between different men. As Connell emphasizes, although men as a group are more powerful than women as a group, it is in fact many men who have very little power in their relations to other men *and* women. We will now turn to theories on the body in order to look for a perspective to help us illuminate how sameness, difference and social hierarchies are carried out in practice.

4.1.4   The Body as a Marker of Social Inequality

There are several different perspectives that address the body. Merleau-Ponty is considered to be the philosopher of the body. He sees bodies as lived experience and has been especially influential within the tradition of phenomenology (Lesjø, 2008; Shilling, 2003). Ghaill & Haywood (2007) refer to approaches which investigate the "human body project" of late modernity and see the body as a primary site of desire and cultural consumption. Because consumerism is written onto the body, which is an externality that presents itself to others as a cultural text, there is a tendency for the body to become increasingly central to a sense of self-identity, they argue. For example, Shilling (1997) says: "The body [...] presents both the uniqueness of each individual and a site for the marking of difference" (p. 65). On the one hand, the body identifies us as human beings (the same); on the other hand it is a marker of social inequality (difference). What is then seen to be specific to the condition of late modernity is an emerging body regime marked by individualization, discipline, self-regulation and self-management. However, Ghaill & Haywood (2007) argue that alongside the impact of consumerism, there is a need to understand bodies within a broader social and cultural framework that includes other issues of globalization and trans-nationalism. They suggest that global processes are gendered and refer to the work of Shilling (1997; 2003) who is established as a classic in the sociology of the body, and addresses central theoretical concerns in sociology partly through his thorough review of how various sociological theories have dealt with the body.

Considering this review, Shilling (2003) first argues that naturalistic views have exerted a considerable influence on how the body has been perceived both in society and in social analysis since the eighteenth century. Yet, the naturalistic views fail because they hold that gender inequalities, as well as economic and social inequality, are a direct result of 'natural' inequalities in human bodies. But, instead of explaining inequalities, locating the causes of social inequalities in an unchanging, natural, biological body has served to preserve the status quo and legitimize dominant groups' positions (Shilling 2003). On the other hand, Shilling argues that more recent social theorists such as Foucault, Goffman and feminists have shown that bodies are not responsible for inequalities in the way that naturalistic approaches hold them to be. Foucault and Goffman have placed the body in the center of their analysis of, respectively, the 'disciplinary systems´ and the `interaction order´, and have in common that they have been especially influential in shaping contemporary analysis of the body as a socially constructed phenomenon. Likewise, feminists have also attempted to show that experienced differences between women and men are not biological, but socially and culturally constructed. However, Shilling (1997) argues that post-structuralist, constructivist and radical feminist approaches "are united in their concern to explain the significance of the body by social factors and to reject the idea that biology can provide explanation for social relations of domination and subordination" (p. 78). Accordingly, a key criticism against these accounts is the apparent belief that we can be certain that *all* the differences between women and men are culturally rather than naturally produced. By placing bodies in brackets they have thrown the baby out with the bath water, Shilling (1997; 2003) claims. He argues that they *reproduce in a different form* the Cartesian mind/body distinction which sociology has traditionally adopted towards the body. For example Shilling (1997) writes:

> Foucault's epistemological view of the body means that it [the body] virtually *disappears* as a material phenomenon [...] Consequently, the body tends to become an inert mass controlled by discourses centred on the mind (which is treated as if abstracted from an active human body) (p. 79).

Shilling (1997) contends that the distinction between mind and body, nature and culture are not fruitful because the body "forms a very real basis for human societies and social relationships" (p. 82). Thus he asserts that

> the body is most profitably conceptualized as an unfinished biological and social phenomenon – what Burkitt (1987) refers to as a 'socio-natural' entity – which is transformed, within certain limits, as a result of its entry into and participation in society. It is the simultaneously biological and social quality of the body which makes it at once such an obvious, and yet such an elusive phenomenon (p. 82).

According to Shilling (1997) social constructivists have not succeeded to:

> 1) bridge the nature/culture divide; 2) analyse the body as a material *basis for*, and not just an effect of, the construction of social differences; 3) examine the body in multi-dimensional terms that go beyond the conventional concern with images; 4) place the mind *in* the body [...] and 5) treat the body as an inherently historical phenomenon (p. 81).

Therefore, Shilling (1997) recommends "the work of Bourdieu – which seeks to combine several of these features into a theory of the body as a form of physical capital" (p. 82), and furthermore, he advocates Norbert Elias' framework in order to explore "civilized bodies". In *Body and Social Theory,* Shilling (2003) writes that he considers Bourdieu and Elias to "provide us with two of the most powerful theories of the body that presently exist" (p. 15).

According to Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer (2012), "Bourdieu and Elias are intellectual siblings" (p.70) and "can be viewed as contributors to a single theoretical approach" (p. 70), as both authors rely heavily on the same core concepts, habitus, field and power in a relentlessly relational and processual fashion. Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer identify the roots of their approach in Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Karl Marx. However, in part because of their diverging sensitivities, Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbaye argue that taken together Bourdieu's and Elias' "highly compatible approaches yield a vision more fertile than either of their sociological perspectives considered separately" (p. 69). I shall now make an examination of their work starting with that of Bourdieu, which forms the main framework of my understanding. I will then look at the approaches found in feminist theory, afterwhich, I will turn to Elias to see how he can fill in some of Bourdieu's shortcomings.

4.2 Pierre Bourdieu's Theoretical Principles and Conceptual Devices

4.2.1 Masculine Domination and the Paradox of Doxa

The basis for Pierre Bourdieu's[91] approach is, according to himself, that he was astonished by "*the paradox of doxa*" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 1). With that he means "the fact that the order of the word as we find it, with its […] obligations and its penalties, *is broadly respected*"(p. 1). Thus, he asked how it is

> that the established order, with its relations of domination, its rights and prerogatives, privileges and injustices, ultimately perpetuates itself so easily [...] and that the most intolerable conditions of existence can so often be perceived as acceptable and even natural (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 1).

Bourdieu sees "the masculine domination [...] as the prime example of this paradoxical submission" (p. 1). He believes that submission is an effect of what he calls symbolic violence. According to Bourdieu (1998), symbolic violence is a "gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims" (p. 1). Symbolic violence can be understood as the power to make a particular understanding of reality emerge as objective, true and legitimate. It is a kind of violence/power which is "exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely, *misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling"* (p. 2).

If we are to understand masculine domination or other relationships of submission and dominance, Bourdieu argues that we have to dismantle the processes responsible for the "transformation of history into nature, of cultural arbitrariness into the *natural*" (p. 2). We have to ask how socially constructed and acquired differences have been brought and continue to be brought into effect in such a way that the differences are experienced as natural instead of cultural. In the book *Masculine Domination* Bourdieu (1998) notes that the biological body and the impact of socialization intertwine in such a way that what is socially learned is naturalized in the body. According to Bourdieu (1998), the effect of the naturalization is sometimes so deceptive that it imposes itself even on to scientific research. This is so, because we ourselves, as male or female, "have embodied the historical structures of the masculine order in the form of unconscious schemes of perception and appreciation" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 5). Thus, researchers are likely to resort to modes of thought that are the product of domination. According to Bourdieu, we face the challenge that we are not just thinking *about* masculine dominance, we are thinking *with* masculine dominance[92].

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[91] Bourdieu was stationed as a soldier in the French Army in Algeria during the secession war (1954-1962) and witnessed the French colonial powers' brutality and condescending treatment of the Algerian population. He has said that his vast research production is due to the events in Algeria which made him furious and hard-working; trying to do something to remedy his guilt (Wilken, 2008)

[92] We can say that Belkin (2012) (cf. 3.3.4) criticizes researchers for doing precisely that when he claims that the glorification of the relationship between masculinity, authority and military institutions "has obscured scholarly understanding of what military masculinity is and how it works" (p. 4).

However, masculine dominance does not only affect researchers' thoughts and subordinate those who are dominated. According to Bourdieu (1998) the embodied politics of domination dominates both parts in a relationship of dominance and submission. In conversation with Wacquant (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), Bourdieu explains that *the social work of inculcation and socialization imposes upon men and women different sets of dispositions with regard to which social games are held to be crucial and highly valued in society.* These can be the games of honor and war, and in advanced societies, games of politics, business, science, etc. Bourdieu then argues that it is necessary to pay attention to the "paradoxical dimension of symbolic domination, and one almost always overlooked by feminist critique, namely *the domination of the dominant by his domination*" (p. 173). With reference to Virginia Woolf, Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) wants to provide us with a "gaze upon the desperate and somewhat pathetic effort that any man must make, in his triumphant unconsciousness, to try to live up to the dominant idea of man" (p. 173) (which can be understood as Connell's hegemonic masculinity) through investments and engagement in the central games of society. I will argue that Sasson-Levy (2008) exemplifies such a "forced" investment when she explores how men are lured into what Bourdieu call "the games of honor and war", through transformative bodily practices and the production of the combat solider as an exclusive hegemonic identity (body).

According to Bourdieu, historical, social and cultural dispositions for actions, judgments and classifications are incorporated in the body, in what he calls *habitus*, in such a way that the actions, judgments and classifications are perceived as natural or *doxical* – meaning something "taken for granted" and accepted beyond question. *Doxa* is the concept Bourdieu (1977) uses to denote social and historical conditions, premises, social rules and relationships of dominance which have been embodied and naturalized in the individual through socialization efforts. Doxa originates from Greek and means commonly accepted beliefs, learned/taught belief or doctrine[93].

According to Bourdieu, an important task for researchers is to reveal doxa, or learned common beliefs. In order to reveal doxa Bourdieu recommends questioning conditions that appear to be natural or a matter of course, and analyzing what kind of processes or mechanisms are responsible for transforming historically and culturally learned beliefs into naturalness. This is the rationale behind Bourdieu's interest in education and fundamental in his approach to power and inequality. Regarding the latter, his point is that learned or taught common beliefs include symbolic systems of classification, appreciation and misrecognition, and thus relationships of submission and dominance. Furthermore, he believes that "if we grant that symbolic systems are social products that contribute to making the world, that they do not simply mirror social relationships but help to constitute them, then one can, within limits transform the world by transforming its representation" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992,

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[93] Doctrine: "late 14c., from Old French doctrine (12c.) "teaching, doctrine", and directly from Latin doctrina "teaching, body of teachings, learning", from doctor "teacher"". Orthodox: from Greek orthodoxos from orthos "right, true, straight "doxa", "having the right opinion," "right teaching", "right doctrine", "right belief." (Online Etymology Dictionary). Confer Høiback's (2010) definition and explanations regarding the use of the word doctrine in military context in chapter 3.2.2.

p. 14). In other words, Bourdieu has an active approach to culture and believes that culture, that is classification- and value systems, can be transformed, yet they are often reproduced. As Lovell (2004) notes, Bourdieu sees culture not as a superstructure, but as a resource in power relationships and power struggles. Thus, we remember from chapter three that the exploding interest in culture within the field of military strategy and theory relied on a theoretical approach where culture was seen as mean, as something one, to a certain degree, could manipulate and change (cf. 3.2.2).

From Bourdieu's approach it follows "that systems of classification constitutes a *stake in the struggles* that oppose individuals and groups in the routine interactions of daily life as well as in the s*olitary and collective contests* that take place in the fields of politics and cultural production" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 14). Bourdieu (1992) explains that for example the social taxonomies (such as occupation or salary-scale) which organize the representation of groups in class-divided societies are at every moment produced by, and at stake in, the power relations between classes. In chapter three we saw it argued that "we must urgently rediscover the focus of the military professional and find ways to restore the warrior-leader to the position of honor traditionally accorded him" (Baucom, 1985, p. 17), which from Bourdieu's view could be interpreted as a struggle to enhance the classification and value of the military profession in society. As Bourdieu argues, "classes and other antagonistic social collectives are continually engaged in a struggle to impose the definition of the world that is most congruent with their particular interests" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 14). Consequently, Wacquant argues that Bourdieu provides a *"political* sociology of the formation, selection, and imposition of systems of classification" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 14). This means that for Bourdieu culture specific systems of classification are not simply instruments of knowledge and meaning but instruments of domination, power, recognition and misrecognition, which can be changed; therefore, classification systems constitute a stake in social struggles and politics. For this study it means that we must investigate systems of classification of skills, activities, persons, the military institution/profession etc. as *stakes in the struggles* over who can take part.

4.2.2 Habitus-Doxa-Field-Capital

4.2.2.1 Habitus: Embodied Action Recourses, Classification Systems and Judgment Patterns

As mentioned above, *doxa* becomes embodied in *habitus*. Habitus is the link between agent and "structure" in Bourdieu's framework and must, therefore, be understood in relation to the term *field.* According to Wacquant (2008), the notions of habitus, field, doxa and capital are the anchor in the conceptual arsenal Bourdieu forges to circumvent or dissolve the dualistic lines of debate in social sciences; such as those between subjectivism/objectivism, nature/culture, biology/social factors and material/symbolic dimension, as well as between micro-and micro-analysis. However, Bourdieu's concepts are not given any definition as he believed that would "demand a closure of thought" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. xiv). Instead they are constructed as *open concepts*, i.e. instruments of work and a technique to think relationally. Bourdieu explains that this is his way of rejecting positivism and reminds

himself "that concepts have no definition other than systemic ones" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 96).

As a short introduction to understand the relationship between field, habitus, doxa and capital, we can say that habitus is the product of socialization that equips the individual with field-specific classification schemes and meaning systems, i.e. doxa, as well as field-specific forms of capital (resources, skills, knowledge etc.) which have different values in different fields. If we understand a field as a game, habitus can be understood as a disposal system adapted to that game and which therefore provides the individual with a feel for that game (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1995).

In more detail, habitus can be understood as the culturally acquired and embodied *resources and schemata for interpretation and actions* that each individual possesses. Habitus can further be seen as the incorporated product of the immanent necessity of the social conditions which provide the individual with a disposition to understand, think, feel, judge and *act in an appropriate way*. According to Bourdieu, the "right" opinion and appropriate action becomes inscribed in habitus through the symbolic channels of communication of recognition and misrecognition. What actually constitutes appropriate social practice in a culture is therefore based on how those who are in *position to pass judgments* have *learned to judge* from history and prevailing culture (incorporated in their habitus and doxa), as well as the prevailing hegemonic actors' ability to (re)define it through symbolic violence. Accordingly, habitus designates the dispositions through which we perceive, judge and act properly *in accordance* with our particular culture, *and* our particular social position (classification), situations and relationship within it (Bourdieu, 1977; 1995; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Wacquant, 2008)[94]. Bourdieu describes the cultural and practical knowledge that habitus procures by referring to Platon's orté doxa:

> just as the 'right opinion' 'falls right,' in a sense, without knowing how or why,
> likewise the coincidence between dispositions and positions, between 'sense of the
> game' and the game, explains that the agent does what he or she 'has to do' (Bourdieu
> & Wacquant, 1992, p. 128).

This means that people who are socialized into similar relationships of dominance and submission will develop schemata for action and judgments (habitus) that are similar to each other. Previous inscriptions in habitus then impose on the individual a 'sense of one's place' (Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This is why Bourdieu describes habitus

> variously as 'the product of structure, producer of practice, and reproducer of
> structure', the 'unchosen principle of all choices', or 'the practice-unifying and

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94 In an anthropological study of the culture in the Norwegian Costal Ranger Command, Danielsen (2012) refers to the saying that "the culture sits in the walls". She also writes that in the Costal Ranger Command the rangers say that with them "the culture sits in the heart", which has also informed the title of this study. However, while Danielsen writes that culture sits in the head and the body, with Bourdieu we would say that culture sits in habitus.

practice-generating principle' that permits 'regulated improvisation' and the
'conductorless orchestration' of conduct (Wacquant, 2008, p. 268).

This is also the way habitus is constructed as the link between culture/nature,
individual/society and "structure"/agent. It follows that the current gender relations and
culturally specific perceptions of what can be recognized as appropriate behavior and practice
for men and women respectively are incorporated in habitus. According to Bourdieu,

> the case of gender domination shows better than any other that symbolic violence
> accomplishes itself through an act of cognition and of misrecognition that lies beyond
> – or beneath – the controls of unconsciousness and will, in the obscurities of the
> schemata of habitus that are at once gendered and gendering" (Bourdieu & Wacquant,
> 1992, pp. 171-172).

In other words, previously inscribed experiences with categorizations, recognition and
misrecognition, reproofs and encouragement in habitus constrain and limit the kind of action,
assessment and dreams which different individuals believe are possible or not possible for
them to achieve, and impacts on which games/fields the individuals think of as proper and/or
realistic for them to engage in (Bourdieu, 1977; 1995). We can assume that the observation
that women are more likely than men to believe they will not fit in the military (cf. 3.3.2) is an
effect of an incorporated sense of one's place, resulting form that the women carry learned
macro-level conditions and circulated gender ideas about the military into perceptions that
they themselves do not possess the kind of resources/capital needed to enter the field. This
means, however, that the concept of habitus provides a suitable tool to understand how our
thinking and assessment of others and ourselves is learned, and how differences are
reproduced because we have learned to think and judge in certain ways.

4.2.2.2 Field: Arena of Social Struggles driven by Illusio

A field[95] can be constructed as soon as a network of people (and their institutions) struggle
and compete for positions, influence and authority; and in the course of the struggle, to
establish control over, preserve or modify the distribution of resources or capital (i.e.
economic, social, cultural, physical, symbolic etc.), which gives access to positions, authority
and recognition. According to Bourdieu, "we can indeed, with caution, compare a field to a
game (*jeu*) although, unlike the latter, a field is not the product of a deliberate act of creation,
and it follows rules or, better, regularities, that are not explicit and codified" (Bourdieu &
Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). If, for example, we think of science, religion, politics and military
affairs as different fields, we understand that every field has its own history that underlies
today's culture and set of criteria for promotion, judgment and evaluation of what is good
style, right approach and good work.

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[95] Thinking of people in *predefined* categories like "youth", "immigrants", "women" etc., serves only to reproduce categories
and classification systems, Bourdieu argues. Therefore, he prefers to use the notion *field* as an analytical concept to think of
people in a *social room of relations and positions* (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Yet, in order for a field to exist there must be something at stake for or about which agents find it worth struggling. The struggles in the field require an inarticulate or doxic agreement between the participants/players as to what is worth struggle for. It follows that a field can only exist if there are people endowed with habituses who recognize, acknowledge and master the game's inherent laws, rules, investments and stakes, and thus are prepared to play the game. Bourdieu uses the term illusio[96] when he refers to what generates the specific form of interest in a game. He explains that illusio "is to be invested, taken in and by the game. To be interested is to accord a given social game that what happens in it matters, that its stakes are important [...] and worth pursuing" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 116). This implies that there are as many "interests" as there are fields, because "each field calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interests, a specific *illusio*, as tacit recognition of the value of the stakes of the game" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 117). Those who engage in the game contribute to the game's reproduction by reproducing the assumed value of the stakes, although the common interest and stake can be tacit.

As mentioned above, Bourdieu's argued that it was necessary to pay attention to the effort that men must make to try to live up to the dominant idea of man through 'forced' investments and engagement in the central field/games of society, such as the field/game of war and honor. To name the unconscious interest which leads us (men) to see these games as worth playing, as worth the investment and effort, Bourdieu uses the term illusio.The idea of the combat soldiers' honor, status, authority and 'chosen body' can, accordingly, be thought of as an illusio which calls forth investments in the military game.

Moreover, any field/game has a set of basic premises, logics, rules and matter of course which the players must follow to enter and/or play the game, but according to Bourdieu, "social agents obey a rule only insofar as their interest in following outweighs their interest in overlooking it" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 115). Thus he argues, while illusio leads the players to be *moved by the game,* and through that makes the rules operative, doxa calls forth the radical form of acceptance, such as voluntary submission and conformism to the rules and premises inherent in the game (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

However, the idea of doxa as a common acceptance of premises and rules inherent in the game does not mean that there are no disagreements within a field. On the contrary, *a field is defined precisely as an arena of struggles*[97] (Wilken, 2008). The struggles are not about issues, but about both material and symbolic interests such as what should be appreciated as

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[96] With the notion of illusio Bourdieu tries to avoid the term interest which is often understood as intentional (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

[97] Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer (2012) claim that the "notion that the social space should be conceptualized primarily as a site of *ongoing struggle* becomes utterly clear in Bourdieu's various writings on the state" (pp. 89, footnote 12). I consider that conceptualizing the state's instrument for legitimate violence (the military) as a field, and thus as an ongoing struggle, is in accordance with Janowitz' central thesis According to Ouellet (2005a), Janowitz' thesis was that military institutions *must be examined in their ongoing process of change* because they *must necessarily change with the changing conditions of the state* and society to which they belong. We have also seen that rapid global and security political change resulted in a political emphasis that the military transformation had to be made into a strategic and on-going process of change (Ministry of Defence, 2004).

necessary skills, good style, correct appearance, appropriate behavior and marketable competence and resources (capital) to reach dominant positions within the field. Thus, the struggles are about recognition, influence, power and ultimately monopoly over the symbolic violence, i.e. the soft and invisible power to get a specific understanding of what is valuable, important and recognized as marketable capital to appear objective, true and legitimate (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Wacquant, 2008).

4.2.2.3 Capital (Power Resources)

Bourdieu's concept of capital is inspired by Karl Marx and his theory that access to power is determined by possession of material capital. Bourdieu argues, however, that there are several different forms of power in a society linked to possession of various forms of material; *symbolic and embodied* capital which have *different values in different fields* (Wilken, 2008). Capital in Bourdieu's sense of the word can therefore be understood as *any resources* which provide the actor with trust, esteem, status, value, power etc., and which can be used as a power resource in competition with others within a field, as well as within the broader society.

In particular, Bourdieu identifies four main species of capital (each with its own subtypes):

1) Economic capital in the conventional sense of the term, such as income, wealth and realizable belongings. Economic capital might be of value in several fields, but depends nevertheless, on fields using monetary systems.

2) Cultural capital which Bourdieu later argues "we should in fact call informational capital to give the notion its full generality" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). However, Bourdieu explains that the cultural form of capital exists in three forms: a) embodied, i.e. culturally acquired dispositions and resources in habitus which provide the individual with the information, knowledge and skills necessary to act appropriately, that is to say in accordance with a specific field's legitimate culture, manners, style and code of conduct b) objectified, i.e. cultural goods such as military medals, badges, berets, trophies and other things that provide status in the eyes of those who have learned to recognize the object as a valuable object, c) institutionalized, i.e. educational qualifications, certificates of competence, etc.

3) Social capital in the sense of "network", but also rights and privileges following from citizenship, nationality, ethnicity and different group membership, which can be used in pursuit of privilege, favors and advancement (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Skeggs, 2004).

4) Symbolic capital which is the form that one or another of the three previous main species of capital takes when it is grasped through categories of perception that recognize its specific logic **as a value** (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Skeggs, 2004).

Bourdieu's capital model has been re-interpreted and further developed by feminists, especially Skeggs (2004). She argues that *recognizing* a kind of capital as legitimate, as a value, "is the key mechanism in the conversion to power" (p. 17), and, thus, that it is the *conversion* of a kind of capital into symbolic capital which is central to understanding power

and inequality. This means that even money has value only if there exists a field in which it is recognized as a symbolic medium of exchange and, so, can be converted into goods, services, position, power etc. This would be today's system of monetary economy. Moreover, the symbolic value of the different badges and symbols of rank on military uniforms depends on the existence of a field with people who have learned to grasp and recognize the symbolic difference and logic as signs of position and status. In sum, all forms of capital are context specific and any form of capital has to be regarded as legitimate within one or more fields before it can be capitalized upon, before its value is realizable (Skeggs, 2004). According to Skeggs, it is this conversion process that "challenges the critique made of Bourdieu, that he reduces everything to exchange-value" (Skeggs, 2004, p. 17). As Bourdieu himself claims:

> at bottom, the value of a species of capital (e.g. knowledge of Greek or of integral calculus) hinges on the existence of a game, of a field in which this competency can be employed: a species of capital is what is efficacious in a given field, both as weapon and as stake of struggle, that which allows its possessors to wield power, and influence (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98)

When Bourdieu first introduced the concept of cultural capital it was used to document how children from different class positions accumulated different amounts and types of capital/power resources which were valuated differently in the educational systems, resulting in a reproduction of the whole social system. Since the school's culture was based on the privileged class' culture, children of that class had already embodied the kind of capital (resources) which gave them recognition and abilities to succeed through their primary socialization, whereas children from a less privileged background had embodied resources which were not appreciated in the school system. In other words, those children who had embodied cultural resources *most similar to the teacher* got the most compliments and were recognized as the best school performers (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). In accordance with this concept I have previously showed how the soldiers who are recognized as "the best soldiers" in the Norwegian Armed Forces seem to be those who have embodied similar cultural resources (capital) as the military field hegemonic actors, such as officers and historical national heroes (Rones, 2008; 2011; 2013)[98]. This leads us to a crucial point in Bourdieu's theory on capital, which is that dominant actors in a field, be it a teacher, a leader or an officer, have the power to define what are good social practices and convert a kind of capital into a realizable and legitimate capital. Therefore, what is actually recognized as a symbolic (legitimate) capital depends on how those who are in a position to convert capital into a value have learned to valuate (through incorporated schemata for classification in their habitus), as well as their ability to (re)define value through symbolic violence.

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[98] More specifically, I have argued that the best soldiers in the Norwegian military field have been measured against the image of the polar heroes, Fritjof Nansen and Roald Amundsen. This means that capital accumulated from outdoor life, hunting and expeditions in harsh climates could be converted into status and influence in the military field. However, I have also argued that the traditional symbolic capital is challenged by new generations of hegemonic actors with experience from Afghanistan.

Moreover, the study of the educational system resulted in Bourdieu and Passeron's (1990) argument that capital acquired through cultural practices in primary or previous socialization (embodied in habitus), such as socialization in families, early schooling, children/youth organizations etc., results in opportunities and constraints in the face of the various fields in society, and can determine whether you succeed or fail in a field. This means that an actor's access to a field such as the military depends on the actor having acquired the legitimate capital for entrance from previous socialization, education and training. Secondly, the actor's success and access to positions in the field depend on the actor possessing the legitimate stock of capital to be recognized for further advancement.

However, players, or actors in a field, can play to increase or to conserve their possession of capital "in conformity with the tacit rules of the game and the prerequisites of the reproduction of the game and its stake; but they can also get in it to transform, partly or completely, the immanent rules of the game" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99). According to Bourdieu, a good number of struggles within a field of power are precisely of the last type. In other words, actors in a field will often struggle to change the relative value of various species of capital "through strategies aimed at discrediting the form of capital upon which the force of their opponents rests (e.g., economic capital) and to valorize the species of capital they preferentially possess (e.g., juridical capital)." (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99). What's more, this means that "shifting and largely unconscious or habituated valuations can create, temporarily maintain, and destroy capitals" (Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer, 2012, p. 74). According to Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer (2012), Bourdieu's studies of power dynamics and culture in fields all rests on an understanding of a social space in which differently positioned and empowered actors continually engage in a struggle for marketable capital, which also means that Bourdieu sees social life as inherently processual. Yet, Bourdieu has been criticized for providing a static theory of human life because of his description of habitus as long-lasting dispositions. However, for Bourdieu

> the question is always who (or what) is anchored into which more or less dominant
> positions because of which species and amounts of capital. This, in turn, is always
> related to the questions of how habitually ('naturally') recognized valuations of
> various forms of capital emerge, *how they are reproduced, and how they are (or might
> be) altered* (Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer, 2012, p. 75).

Bourdieu maintains, however, that there is no possibility of understanding what goes on in a struggle on capital and power in abstraction from history and what goes on in the broader context (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer, 2012). Thus, struggles at micro-level must be seen in relation to struggles at macro-level.

4.2.3 The Aesthetical Judgment

Bourdieu's model illustrates that different resources and assets accumulate as capital with more or less value *in bodies* (Skeggs B. , 2004). In the article *Sport and Social Class,* Bourdieu (1978) illustrates how distinct sporting activities produce different and distinct forms of physical capital which is utilized in an *aesthetic stratification* of the social world.

The aesthetic stratification is also the topic of Bourdieu's (1995) famous book *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Here Bourdieu illustrates how those with a high volume of legitimate capital have power to determine what constitutes good taste, style and proper bodily conduct, through symbolic violence exerted as symbolic communication of recognition and misrecognition. With this background Bourdieu links the *aesthetic judgment* to ongoing forms of naturalized class-based oppression and differentiation.

We have already seen above that those who are in a position to pass judgments have *learned to judge* from history, prevailing culture and hegemonic actors' ability to (re)define what is recognized as aesthetic and moral conduct through symbolic violence, and that the *learned* schemata for classification and judgment are incorporated in habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). We have also seen that *learned* belief and disposition in habitus are fundamental in Bourdieu's approach to understanding power, inequality and the paradox of doxa, and that this is the rationale behind Bourdieu's interest in education. A point made by Bourdieu is that the aesthetical taste varies with cultural background and social position because the aesthetical experience (the taste) is *the learned result from the sign and the recognition in the interaction* (communication/discourse) between humans and context (practice).

Firstly, this leads us back to the *three approaches to culture* referred to by Høiback in chapter three (cf. 3.2.2). Høiback explained that one school of thought saw culture as a process of meaning-making; the second, and most common, focused on aspects of value in culture; and the third defined culture as "the aggregate of practices and discourses". Bourdieu's approach fits both all and none of these schools of thought[99]. This can be explained with the suggestion that what Bourdieu tries to understand is not culture, but instead how aspects of cognition, thinking, meaning-making, value-making (including aesthetic stratification), classification and judgement are learned and done through a *theory of practices,* which includes discourse/communication and, accordingly, signs of misrecognition and recognition. This is also why Østerberg (1995) explains in the introduction to the Norwegian translation of *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1995) that the word distinction has a double meaning in French; firstly, distinction means to make a distinction, as doing difference and secondly, the word distinct means to be distinguished, as in being perceived as coming from a higher class. In other words, the distinguished person is someone who *knows* how to do the distinction which makes him/her distinct. Yet this is not enough, because someone must have learned to read the distinction and classify and recognize it as distinct, which happens through *sign and*

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[99] Lizardo (2010) reviews Bourdieu's approach to culture and argues: "it becomes clear fairly quickly that there exists a wide range of views and statements as to what exactly Bourdieu's conception of culture was. Some statements appear to suggest that Bourdieu held on to an unusually extensive (and possibly incoherent) sets of definitions of the culture concept while other analysts suggest that Bourdieu had a fairly specific notion of what culture was" (p. 2). Thus, Lizardo declares that it is easy to see that current conceptions of what Bourdieu meant by culture *cover the entire spectrum of possible conceptualizations of the culture concept*. In order to solve the puzzle "what did Bourdieu mean by culture" Lizardo finds that "Bourdieu's concept of culture" is often non-existing in his writing. Lizard argues that the reason for this is that Bourdieu, although he is seen as maybe the most dominant figure within in the study of culture today, belongs to a line of anthropological thinking that can be described as *post-cultural, which aimed to move beyond the concept of culture.* With that in mind, Bourdieu outlined a theory of practices (Bourdieu, 1977) I do not think it is fruitful to place Bourdieu within any of the schools of thought that describe the term culture.

recognition in the interaction between the human and the context. However, knowing how to do the distinction which makes you distinct should explain Bourdieu's interest in culture, but then as a *form of capital* which is, as we have seen, a power resource that has different values in different fields. We saw above how Bourdieu later argued that cultural capital should in fact be named *informational capital*.

Secondly Bourdieu's aesthetical distinction leads us back to identity conceptualized as a doing of difference, described by Lawler (2008) and Woodward (1997b) in the beginning of chapter four. Following Bourdieu, Lawler (2004) writes: "it is important to note that there are some people who, by virtue of their habitus, are able to pass judgment, implicitly or explicitly, on others, and to make that judgment count" (p. 112-113). This means, as we have seen, that the differences in bodily practices, movements and conduct, and the value of this difference, only becomes visible when it is perceived by someone who is able to perceive and *do* the difference. Lawler refers to Bourdieu who writes (2004):

> *difference*, a distinctive property…only becomes a visible, perceptible, non-
> indifferent, socially pertinent difference if it is perceived by someone who is capable
> of *making the distinction* [...] endowed with categories of perception, with
> classificatory schema, with a certain *taste*, which *permits her to make difference*, to
> discern, to distinguish (Bourdieu, 1998a:9, original emphases) (Lawler S. , 2004, p.
> 113).

Regarding bodies and difference (aesthetical stratification), Shilling (2003) explains that Bourdieu, like Elias, conceptualizes the body as an unfinished entity which develops and, thus, becomes marked by different kinds of labour and sport; and therefore bears the imprint of social class. More specifically, Shilling argues that bodies bear the imprint of social class because of the class (culture) based material circumstances, the formation of habitus and the development of taste. Shilling refers to Bourdieu who argued that the working class developed an instrumental relation to their bodies since they had little time free from necessity, while the dominant classes, in contrast, have the time and resources to treat the body as a project. Thus, where the body for the working class becomes a means to an end, the dominant classes tend to be concerned with the body's health, appearance and aesthetical presentation. Production of the bodily form of highest value requires investment of spare time and money. Yet, also

> socially elite sporting/leisure occasions often encompass strict rules of etiquette and
> allow for the demonstration of bodily competence in formal context which allow for
> the demonstration of bodily competence in formal contexts which allow members of
> elite groups to recognize the body as a sign signifying that the bearer shares a certain
> set of values (Shilling, 2003, p. 120).

However, the symbolic value attached to a specific sport and bodily form is changeable[100]. Central to the value of a sport, lifestyle and bodily form is, thus, the ability of dominant groupings to define their bodies and lifestyle as superior and worthy of reward. Looking more specifically at the taste for a certain activity Bourdieu argues that social stratification is reproduced by the tendency of different social classes/or groups to develop, through misrecognition of the other class(s)/group(s), an accompanied aversion towards their preferred objects, activities, bodies and behaviors. For example, if the high status people play golf, lower status people can think of that activity as a feminine and foolish sport they would never do themselves. Accordingly, the aesthetic capital and dispositions taught and instilled in habitus guides the individuals to activities, work and lifestyles appropriate for their social position. As Bourdieu writes:

> We can hypothesize as a general law that a sport is more likely to be adopted by a
> social class if it does not contradict that class's relation to the body at its deepest and
> most unconscious level, i.e. the body schema, which is the depository of a whole
> world view and a whole philosophy of the person and the body (Bourdieu, 1995)[101].

At the same way as a sport is more likely to be adopted by a social class or a person if it does not contradict that class or person's relation to the body, we can also hypothesize that self-selection to the military field depends on the individual's relations to their body, as well as their culturally acquired habitus and taste for military activities. For instance, we saw in chapter three Diamond et al.'s (2000) argument that their cohort's motivations for military service could be summarized in the expression: "'I like running around in the mud and doing that sort of stuff'" (p. 234), which would mean that the cohort assembly recognized running around in the mud as an activity appropriate for their own social position – and gender. Since various physical activities and bodily practices enable individuals to accumulate various forms of physical or bodily capital, which can be judged or classified as aesthetic or unaesthetic as well as masculine or feminine, we can say that physical activities and labor are capable of doing gender. Diamond et al. (2000) argued that "military service is seen as gender-conforming for men and gender non-conforming for women" (p. 236), which is seen as a reason why women will often not define military activities as appropriate for them. In order to conceptualize masculinity and femininity for the further investigation into the military field, we will turn to examine feminist's development of Bourdieu's ideas.

4.2.4   Masculinity as Power Resources – Femininity as Regulation Impositions

Above, Shilling (2003) referred to Bourdieu for the argument that the dominant classes tend to be concerned with appearance and aesthetical presentation. He further noted that this led to "*the body for others*" (p. 115) with emphasize on the presentation of the self. Moreover, Shilling write that "although Bourdieu does not provide a detailed account of gendered orientations to the body, we can extend his insight in that direction and suggest that women

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[100] For instance, boxing was popular among the English aristocracy in the nineteenth century, but was later spread among the working class, decreasing the activity among dominant classes (Shilling, 2003).
[101] The English translation is found at p. 215 in Routledge's edition of Distinction from 2010.

tend to be encouraged more than men to develop their bodies as objects of perceptions for others" (p. 116). This leads us to the feminist critique made of Bourdieu which is that Bourdieu has treated women *as objects*.

Yet, this has not stopped feminists from deploying, rethinking and critically developing Bourdieu's theoretical resources. According to Adkins (2004) this has also produced some of the most fruitful forms of feminist theorizing. Adkins (2004) argues that what is common with feminists working with Bourdieu's tools is that they do not cohere around a single concept of social categories[102]. Another commonality between feminists working with Bourdieu's tools is that few are centrally concerned with a sociologically defined gender. Concepts of masculinity and femininity are still used, but are instead seen as different forms of resources. (Adkins, 2004).

Skeggs (2004) notes that femininity poses particular problems for Bourdieu's analysis of capital "because although it is symbolically ubiquitous, it is not symbolically dominant in the same way as masculinity is" (p. 16). Where masculinity can be seen as accumulated *power resource* (symbolic capital), *femininity is rather a form of regulation*, she argues. Yet, as Skeggs notes, femininity is embodied and also operates as a resource which can be used in symbolic forms of exchanges. For instance in marriage femininity can be exchanged, and she refers to the historical version of middle-class *moral femininity* as a symbolic legitimate cultural capital. Yet, in marriage the contract is a form of masculine domination which gives women some value but not as much as her husband.

If we return to Bourdieu's (1998) *Masculine Domination,* he argues that in the system of masculine dominance the man becomes the acting subject imposed to achieve victory, success and honor, meanwhile women are objects imposed to avoid shame[103]. Combining Bourdieu's view with Skaggs's remarks, I will understand masculinity as an imposition to accumulate the power resources needed to achieve victory, success, honor and recognition, and through that become classified as masculine, in the actual culture. Femininity is understood as a form of regulation that is based in moral and shame, and used to establish control over women *and troops* through an emphasis on appropriate style. This will be explained further in the third part of the thesis (cf. 6.4 and 9.5.4).

4.2.5   Critique of Bourdieu

Bourdieu's perspective is often criticized for being too structure oriented, deterministic and static. This criticism is especially related to the concept of habitus which opponents believe leaves little room for change and conscious action. For example, Noble & Watkins (2003) have asked how Bourdieu could learn to play tennis and acquire the associated forms of capital as an adult, when dispositions for tennis were not part of Bourdieu's original habitus.

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[102] In the beginning of the chapter Ghaill & Haywood (2007) and Fenstermaker & West (2002) stressed that we need to see gender identities in combination with other social relationships and/or identities in society which give people with shared gender identity different status (cf. 4.1.3).

[103] This was also referred to by Netland (2013) who used Bourdieu's theory from Masculine Domination in her analysis women and military career (cf. 3.2.1.3).

In *Armed Forces & Society* Cohen (2011) claims that Bourdieu (as well as Foucault) is insufficient to understand how soldiers' bodies are able to, and trained to be, ready to take the initiative, because the concepts of discourse and habitus, in their view, are the expressions of power structure, which render individuals and bodies docile, compliant, and unreflective (Cohen, 2011).

Bourdieu himself speaks out against this kind of criticism in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Here he emphasizes that habitus is an open system of dispositions which is constantly influenced and changed, and which accumulates capital. Above, we have seen that capital is action and power resources that are used in strategic action, and which will provide soldiers with the abilities to act as trained. Yet, *at the same time* habitus is carrying the imprint of discipline, regulation, doxic beliefs and habits inscribed from the socialization process, Bourdieu argues. Habitus is inscription from training.

Skeggs (2004b) argues that the concept of habitus is similar to all other French theorists who propose technologies or models "of self in a very French and contradictory way " (p. 83). Skeggs explains that the double meaning in the French term *assujettir* (subject) used to explain these models, meaning "both to produce subjectivity and make subject" (p. 85), did not translate well into English. Thus, Skeggs argues with Bourdieu that habitus is shaped by the structures, yet *it is also* a very explicit model of how capital accumulation empowers the individual to engage in strategic game-playing. Accordingly, habitus has the potential to change the field from whence it came.

Nevertheless, and particularly in light of reading Bourdieu's most famous works *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1995) and *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990), social reproduction has been interpreted as working in the form of a closed and isolated loop, rendering Bourdieu with no possibility of explaining change and relations with other fields. Controversially, Bourdieu himself argues that the fields are 'spaces' of ongoing historical contestation, struggles and shifting configurations of power, yet temporarily objectified in the form of actual hierarchical positions (1992). Albeit Bourdieu's attempts to oppose this critique, the perception that his sociology is static, deterministic, reproductive and pessimistic remains a major critique of Bourdieu's work.

Therefore, I consider the field concept as sufficient to explore the struggle for capital and positions within a military institution, yet, not to understand the relationship of this field to that of politicians, supranational institutions such as UN and NATO and the global processes of change; which undoubtedly influence the struggles in the military field. Accordingly, I will supplement Bourdieu's framework with theoretical emphases made by Norbert Elias. As we remember Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer's (2012) argued that Bourdieu and Elias can be viewed as contributors to a single theoretical approach. Despite that Elias, in contrast with Bourdieu, is known for providing a dynamic and processual sociology, which opposes seeing people and groups of people in isolation from the relationships of mutual interdependence formed with other groups and people.

4.3   Norbert Elias' Processual and Figurational[104] Thinking

As argued above, to remedy some of the critique raised against Bourdieu's alleged static, reproductive and "isolated loop" theory (cf. 4.2.5), I will supplement Bourdieu with Elias' dynamic and processual sociology, which opposes seeing people and groups of people in isolation from the relationships of mutual interdependence formed with other people and groups. Especially important in this regard is Elias' ontology which has greatly influenced how this study's methods have been designed (cf. 5). Initially we will focus on Elias' re-conceptualizing of the individual and society including "the institution", and how he tries to bridge the gap between culture and nature, individual and society, agent and "structure" through a more "reality grounded" understanding of these concepts. In addition, when Ouellet (2005a) criticized military sociologists for failing to take advantage of broader fields of sociology, Elias was one of the acknowledged theorists suggested, and what's more, he differs from most other general sociologists in that he has actually studied the military institution and profession.

4.3.1   Reconsidering "The Individual" and "The Society"

To better understand the problematics of sociology one needs to re-orientate one's comprehension of the concept of 'the society' as well as the concept of 'the individual', Elias (1978) asserts. He argues that present forms of sociological analysis are formed in a way which implies that what they seek to represent is an object in a state of rest, bearing no relationship to anything else. For instance, Elias claims that the concept of the individual "conveys the impression that it refers to an adult standing quite alone, dependent on nobody, and who has never even been a child" (p. 116). This is echoed in ideas like "individuality" and "individualism", and, according to Elias (1978), it is found in theories of sociologists "who strain themselves in vain to discover how such an 'individual' might be related to 'society', which they conceive as a static entity" (p. 116). For example, Elias (1978) contends that this is the error in Max Weber's otherwise insightful work. Elias explains that for Weber the concepts of 'state' and 'nation', 'family' and 'army' appeared to be "structures which signify no more and no less than a particular pattern of individual people's social action" (p. 117). Following Elias (1978), this means that "Weber broke 'society' down into a more or less disorderly mass of actions by separate, completely independent, self-reliant adult individuals" (p. 117). On the other side, Emile Durkheim tended to the opposite way of thinking when he argued that everything found in the individual conscience comes from society, Elias (1978) explicates. Thus, sociology has a 'chicken-or-egg' problem. According to Elias (1978) there is no way out of this intellectual trap if the individual and the society remain being referred to as isolated objects in a state of rest. Consequently, Elias believes that there is a need for re-orientation, starting from some observable, even trivial facts.

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[104] Elias' "theoretical perspective came to be known as 'figurational sociology', although he later came to prefer the term 'process sociology'" (Baur & Ernst, 2011, p. 123) in order to avoid static thinking on figurations.

4.3.1.1 The Individual is a Process Fundamentally Dependent on Socialization

In reconsidering the concept of the individual, Elias asserts that every separate individual is born an infant having to be fed and protected for many years by adults, before they can provide for themselves from this or that position, may have children, and finally die. Accordingly, Elias (1978) argues it is most appropriate to say that a person is constantly in movement; that a person not only goes through a process, he *is* a process. Then, Elias proceeds, we can say that as the person grows up he becomes increasingly independent of other people. However, this is only true in societies which offer a relatively great scope of individualization. "But certainly, as a child every person has been as dependent on other people as it is possible to be – he then had to learn from others how to speak and even how to think" (p. 120-121). In sum, this means that Elias understands the individual as "*an unfinished* biological and social entity which *requires* a lengthy process of education before it is accepted fully into society" (Shilling, 2003, p. 131). This is a view which, according to Shilling, is the most profitable way to conceptualize the body/the human. However, from seeing the human being as an *unfinished* socio-biological entity[105], it follows that humans are equipped with a biological *capacity for learning* and, thus, the ability to rapidly adapt. As a consequence of this unique capacity to learn and adapt, human beings are to a much higher degree biologically and fundamentally *dependent on learning and socialization*[106] than other species.

Meyer (1997) argues that Elias' perspective makes people very plastic and changeable, both because humans change *through life* in interaction with their environment, and that various social formations will form various mental and psychological structures in the human. As Elias (1978) himself writes:

> 'Nature' is usually understood to mean something which will always remain unaltered, something beyond change. One unique aspect of humanity is that human beings are in certain ways changeable *by nature* (p. 107).[107]

To conceptualize human beings' internal steering mechanism, or behavior patterns, which are imprinted and learned through socialization, Elias, prior to Bourdieu, utilizes the concept of

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[105] According to Elias (1978), "few problems have been treated in so confused a manner as the problem of the relationship of sociology to biology. Over and over again, one encounters tendencies either to reduce sociological problems to biological ones, or to treat sociological problems as though they were completely autonomous and independent of everything that can be said about human organisms" (p. 107).

[106] Shilling (2003) summarizes Elias' view as this: "It is the exceptional ability of humans to learn and their unique capacities for synthesis – for making connection through the use of symbols – and transmitting accumulated knowledge in the form of symbols between generations which make possible 'rapid social differentiation and adaption to new circumstances independently of biological change' (Mennell, 1989: 204). [...] In contrast to most sociologists, who view social and cultural processes as having made biology all but irrelevant to history, Elias argues that it is evolutionary processes which have helped to reduce massively the importance of biology" (pp. 148-149).

[107] To explain further, Elias (1978) writes: "In short, the structure of societies composed of non-human creatures only changes when the biological structures of those creatures alters. [...] Human societies on the other hand can change without any change occurring in the species – that is, in the biological constitution of man. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the transformation of pre-industrial European societies was based on a change in the human species. The time-span over which this change took place is too short for us to even consider the idea of a change in the biological structure of mankind" (p. 108).

social habitus[108]. By social habitus Elias refers to "that level of personality characteristics which individuals share in common with fellow members of their social group" (Mennell, 1992, p. 30). In other words, habitus can be understood as the dependent variable that will differ between humans from different contexts.

However, because people not only can, but *must* bear the imprint of what they have learned, it follows that the individual is *oriented toward and dependent on other people in an absolutely fundamental way*. Thus, Elias rejects speaking of the individual in isolation from other individuals (Elias, 1978; Mennell, 1992; Shilling, 2003; Quilley & Loyal, 2004). We will, accordingly, turn to Elias' re-conceptualizing of "the society", yet, prior to that I would like to suggest that if we add Elias' dynamic perspective to the allegedly "static" perspective of Bourdieu, we could think of any person as a conscious human body in process; adaptable and open to learning and socialization, yet increasingly pre-socialized with durable disposition to understand, think, feel, judge, act and behave *as learned* in the society and field(s) where the socialization has taken place.

4.3.1.2 'Society' and 'Institutions' are Done by People in the Plural

In reconsidering the concept of "the society", Elias (1978) again departs with trivial evidences. The first thing to notice, he argues, is the simple fact that the concept of the individual refers to people in the singular, the society to people in the plural. Yet our conventional instruments for thinking and speaking of society and other formations of people in plural, as for example the state, the institution or the army, are generally constructed as if this was a thing or a stationary object external to the groupings of people who make up these networks, Elias claims. He suggests that the traditional idea that people are surrounded by "the society" or "structures" as if it exists prior to, or independent of, any actual people should be replaced by a different and more realistic picture, i.e. dynamic networks of interdependent individuals. Elias conceptualizes the dynamic networks of interdependent individuals as *figurations*. He argues that the concept of figurations "makes it possible to resist the socially conditioned pressure to split and polarize our conception of mankind, which has repeatedly prevented us from thinking of people as individual at the same time as thinking of them as societies" (Elias, 1978, p. 129)[109]. In other words, Elias (1978) introduced the concept of figuration to "serve as a simple conceptual tool to loosen this social constraint to speak and think as if 'the individual' and 'society' were antagonistic as well as different" (p. 130).

As we saw in chapter three, the critique raised by Ouelett (2005b) against traditional thinking in military sociology was precisely that *the military institution, "The Armed Forces"*, was taken for granted and this remains the starting point in the analysis (cf. 3.2.1.2). With Elias' critique and re-orientation in mind we can claim that the military institution, in such cases, is thought of as existing as a 'thing' or a pre-existing object above and beyond the shifting

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[108] Elias used the word habitus in his German writings. It is however translated into 'personality make-up' or 'personality structure' in English versions (Mennell, 1992; Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer, 2012).

[109] This traditional conceptual polarization is, according to Elias (1978), a reflection of various social ideals and belief systems where adherents of one ascribe the highest value to the individual, while adherents of another ascribe the highest value to the society.

network of actual people who constantly make up and reconstruct the institution. A more fruitful way we can think of the Armed Forces is to see it as shifting networks of living and socialized people who constantly do and reconstruct the Armed Forces in an ongoing process. The network of people is, however, characterized by interweaving processes of shifting power balances. We will therefore explore how Elias conceptualizes figurations (networks of people) in processes.

4.3.2 Figurations, Power Relations and Interweaving Processes

According to Elias (1978), imaging that someone 'has' power implies that power is a thing, a substance, and leads us down a blind alley. A more adequate solution, Elias suggests, is to see power as ever-shifting balances in *power ratios*, *power chances*, or *power distribution,* which are an aspect of *all* human relationships. This is rooted in interdependence and "the fact that people can withhold or monopolize what others need, for example material resources, food, love or knowledge" (Hughes, 2008, p. 175). This means that even the tiny child has power chances over its parents, for example by weeping, at least as long as the parents attach any kind of value or meaning to it. However, if the parents abandon the baby it loses its power ratio. As a result of such ever-shifting *power balances* social figurations are in a constant state of flux. Elias (1978) explains:

> At the core of changing figurations – indeed the very hub of the figuration process – is
> a fluctuation, tensile equilibrium, a balance of power moving to and fro, inclining first
> to one side and then to the other. This kind of *fluctuating balance of power is a*
> *structural characteristic of the flow of every figuration* (p. 131).

Elias (1978) proposes that we consider the metaphor of 'games' as *didactic models*, to illustrate better how we lose control and overview of complex figurations, such as society and institutions, and develop a tendency to view these kinds of networks of people as having an existence of their own. An important point with the game models is to illustrate how competition and shifting power balances in networks of people work in such a way that "the society" or "the institution" takes a *course which none of the individual players has planned, determined or anticipated*, causing the individuals to be played by the game.

Hughes (2008) summarizes Elias' simplest game analogy or didactic model, which is to be found in full detail in *What is Sociology?,* as this:

> At the most simple level, Elias provides the model of a two-person game; [...] think of
> a game of chess. Imagine that player A is a very strong player, and player B is much
> weaker. The strong player can force B to play certain moves, and, in direct relation to
> this capacity, can very largely steer the course of the game. While A has a high degree
> of control over B's move, B is not completely 'powerless'. *Just as B must take*
> *orientation from A's preceding moves, so must A from B's preceding moves*. If B had
> no strength at all, there could be no game. Thus, Elias concludes from this example, in
> any game the players always have a degree of control over each other. They are, that is
> to say, always *interdependent*. However, even when only two players are involved, *if*

> *their relative strengths become more equal, both players will have correspondingly*
> *less chance of controlling each other's moves or, indeed, the overall course of the*
> *game.* In other words, the players become increasingly dependent on the overall
> process of the game [...] Consequently, Elias, writes, to the extent that the inequality in
> the strengths of the two players diminishes, *there will result from the interweaving of*
> *moves of two individual people a game process that neither of them has planned.* (pp.
> 175-176).

In the next game model or figuration, Elias describes a strong player who plays several
weaker players simultaneously. The stronger player's capacity to control the course of the
game decreases as he has to play many games at once. If the weak players form a coalition
against the stronger and act in unison, they can enhance their control over the strong player.
However, if they are instead engaged in conflicts with each other they might end up less
advantageous than they had been individually.

The concept of figurations "can be applied to relatively small groups just as well as to
societies made up of thousands or millions of interdependent people" (Elias, 1978, p. 131). To
demonstrate the latter Elias introduces increasingly more complex game models with several
parties and layers of players which are analogous to, for example, oligarchic and democratic
types of society or states. According to Elias, the models demonstrate that figurations which
consist of a multitude of groupings and layers emerge because players come under growing
pressure from the competition in the game to organize, and form groups with distinct
functions in order to increase their power ratio and chances. Therefore, labor is increasingly
divided and specialized across increasing distance, which results in complex and longer
'*chains of interdependencies*' being formed with increasing numbers of individuals bound
together. From Elias' perspective, the globalization process of today can be understood as the
formation of a global figuration with increasingly longer and more complex chains of
specialization and, thus, interdependence. This process is, for instance, reflected in White
Paper No 15 (2008–2009) which describes the main line in the foreign politics the Norwegian
Armed Forces is a part of: "Globalization means that Norwegian society is immersed in, and
interwoven with the outside world. This creates a number of connections between community
development in Norway and in many countries around the world" (p. 16). The process Elias
seeks to illustrate is also reflected by Western European and Northern American states
founding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization when ideological clashes (competition)
between East and West were gaining momentum in 1949 (NATO, 2013), and the later
development described in chapter two, which led to a request for increased development of
dissimilar, but compatible and complementary capabilities within the different NATO
countries, to meet requirements of the alliance (Heier, 2006; Sookermany, 2013).

A distinctive trend with the development of complex human societies or figurations is, in
sum, that more and more people are becoming dependent on one another's specialized
functions in increasing numbers of ways, Elias claims. Moreover, he asserts that the
interweaving processes and the fluctuating power balance in the chains of interdependencies
cause the players to become increasingly unable to foresee, understand or control the direction

of the game, the society, the institution, or the war they form together. According to Elias (1978), this can be expressed as "the course of the game is not in the power of any one player. The other side of the coin is that *the course of the game itself has power over the behavior and thought of the individual players*" (p. 96).

A crucial point highlighted by Elias is that since the course of the game itself gains power over the individual players, "their actions and ideas cannot be explained and understood if they are considered on their own; they need to be understood and explained within the framework of the game" (p. 96)[110]. This is a reason why Elias refuses to see individuals or local sites in isolation from the figurations they are part of. Another crucial point demonstrated through the game models, Elias (1978) argues, is that as we lose control and overview of the game we develop a tendency to view the complex figurations as having an existence of their own, which is why we might think of society and social structures as something which exists beyond and above the individuals who constitute it. Thus the matter for sociology, Elias concludes, "is to make these networks more transparent and thereby to prevent them carrying their members along with them so blindly and arbitrary" (p. 103).

4.3.3   The Civilizing Process and the Monopolization of Violence

The foundation for Elias' processual and highly relational approach to sociological analysis and theorizing was set out in his major study *The Civilizing Process* (Elias, 2000). In this study Elias explores the genesis of the modern Western states and the state-controlled military institution, which is also understood as the monopolization of violence. In any case, Elias himself explains that the study of *The Civilizing Process* originates less in scholarly tradition than in his need to understand the long-term process in which the term 'civilization' came to "express the self-consciousness of the West" (Elias, 2000, p. 5)[111]. As Hughes (2008) summarizes:

> In short, Elias wanted precisely to understand the social conditions under which the term [civilization] came to express everything that people in the West who saw themselves as 'civilized' believed, distinguished and distanced them from their perceived social inferiors – those whom they understood to be 'primitive' or 'uncivilized'; how the term came to embody 'evolutionary', colonial, racist and derogatory sentiments; and, for example, *how it was that England and France came to fight against Germany in the First World War in the name of 'civilization'* (p. 170).

Then, in order to explore how people in Western Europe come to see themselves as more civilized and thus superior to others, Elias began his analysis by examining etiquette manuals and child-raising from the Middle Age onwards. Through this work he was able to discover how socially accepted behavioral codes, etiquette norms, emotion management etc.

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[110] For instance, in the third game analogy, Elias provides a model of two groups of almost equal strength, exemplified by football. According to Elias (1978), if the spectators are to understand the game of football they must be able to understand how the constant flux in the grouping of players on one side are interrelated with the constant flux of the other side.

[111] It should be mentioned that Elias grew up in a German Jewish family, participated in the World War I as a soldier at the front, had to flee from the Nazis into exile in 1933 and later got his mother murdered in Auschwitz (Hughes, 2008).

transformed qualitatively over the span of time. As he also observed that an increasing number of aspects of human behavior came to be regarded as 'distasteful', he argues that a defining characteristic of the civilizing process in the West was that people gradually came to exercise higher degrees of affect control, self-restraint and reflexivity in social relations. A reason *why* such processes have occurred, explains Elias, is found in changing power relations and lengthening *interdependency* chains. This leads to monopolization of violence and taxation, which we also recognize from Max Weber[112] as the process of modern state formation, in other words, the transition from feudal systems with rival warriors to state controlled armed (and police) forces.

Nedkvitne & Rygg (1997) explain that in medieval feudal warrior society, characterized by a struggle of all against all, long-term planning was generally difficult or impossible. Thus, long-term consequences of war and destruction were hardly worried about. However, as a result of that production and exchange of goods increased and became more specialized, the upper class people increasingly had to think strategically about the long-term consequences of what they did. Thus, Elias argues that the nobility transformed from being mainly a warrior class toward that of court- and government officials. According to Nedkvitne & Rygg (1997), Elias named this process the "Die Verhöflichung der Krieger" and deliberately plays on the two meanings of the German word "höflich",which in that the phrase can mean "warriors become courtiers" and "warriors became polite."

A crucial point in Elias' work is that this process of social development is related to the increased differentiation and specialization of production with formation of increasingly complex figurations, as demonstrated by the game models summarized in the preceding subchapter. When society, or the interweaving "game" process, gradually became more complex and people became more and more interdependent, they simultaneously had to regulate and control their behavior in an more stable, predictable and calculable way. As referred to by Shilling (2003) in his review of Elias, this resulted in the presentation of the body becoming "more important for success than overcoming other bodies by force, and it became a necessity for court people to develop 'an extraordinarily sensitive feeling for the status and importance that should be attributed to a person in society on the basis of his bearing, speech, manner or appearance'" (p. 135). Elias (2000) himself argues that the process led to an internal pacifism or pacification and disciplination linked to a shift in the *fears* facing the individuals; from that of violent attack to *social control with fears of shame and embarrassment*. Consequently, Elias maintains, the courtly man developed a special sense about how to manage their self-presentation (impression management[113]) and sense the

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[112] According to Weber a state is any human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force/violence within a given territory.

[113] According to Quilley & Loyal (2004), Elias can be read as a historicization of Erving Goffman's concept, such as impression management, *avant la lettre*, partly because Elias shows how management and "presentation of the self" varies through time and space. According to Wilken (2008), there are also so many similarities between Goffmann and Bourdieu in their perspective of social interaction that it is highly probable that Bourdieu draws inspiration from Goffman's game metaphor, although Bourdieu does not point directly at Goffmann himself. However, Bourdieu has referred to Elias, who also has a game metaphor.

slightest differences in the use of symbols, because symbols denoted exactly one's own and others' social status. This is why Elias (2000) argues that processes of sociogenesis (changes in relationships *between* individuals and groups, i.e. classes, professions, generations, sexes etc.) and psychogenesis (changes within people, i.e. emotions management, affect control, self-presentation etc.) are *fundamentally interrelated*. In other words, Elias argues that the civilizing process implies an increased division of functions at the macro-level and increased affective control at the micro-level.

In sum, what Elias draws attention to through his study of the civilization process is the interwoven character of social-political development and developments in human personality and identity. As we a saw in chapters one and two, the fall of the bi-polar power balance which characterized the Cold War resulted in a transformation of military missions of such an extensive character that the Chief of Defense (Diesen, 2008), as well as military scholars, claimed that it *required* a change in the psychological area, as well as in military identity and culture. Elias' approach points directly to these interdependencies; if we are to understand changes in the identity formations of the soldier (micro-level), we need to pay attention to changes in the figurations the soldiers are part of (macro-level), because processes of sociogenesis and psychogenesis are interwoven. For instance, it was explained in chapter three that military strategists' changed approach to culture was a consequence of Prussian *realism* thinking and the paradigm where violence is monopolized and controlled by states was being challenged by the conflicts observed during the 1990s (cf. 3.2.2). This can be read as a later development and change in the process studied by Elias, which resulted in the monopolization of physical violence by the state, i.e. the genesis of the military institution. As I understand it, this process of change is also why Ouellet (2005b) criticized military sociology for having taken the military institution for granted, and recommended instead to examine organized violence, which is constantly remade by people in a *process of change* since the institution must necessarily change with the changing conditions of the society (figuration) of which they are part.

4.3.4   Relevance for Military Sociology and the Genesis of the Naval Profession

According to Hughes (2008), Elias' sociology has been increasingly influential "within the fields of historical criminology; the sociology of the body; the sociology of emotions; and studies of violence, genocide and war". However, when it comes to military sociology Moelker (2005) writes:

> It is remarkable that the work of a key sociologist like Norbert Elias, who wrote so much on violence and civilizing processes (Elias 1939; 1969), has only scarcely been used in military sociology. The 'Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession' (Elias 1950), while so evidently devoted to military sociology, are not mentioned in recent reviews and studies on the military profession (p.164).

The reason why Elias' approach has scarcely been used in military sociology, Moelker believes, is due firstly to functionalism dominating military sociology. Secondly, Elias' work did not start to receive recognition until it began to be translated into English in the late

1970s. And, thirdly, because isolated articles were first published out of context from the complete work. Yet, Moelker finds that Elias' work has been referred to by the military sociologists Lammers (1969), Teitler (1974), Janowitz (1960) and Dandeker (1978).

Moelker (2005) argues that Elias' approach should be of relevance for military sociology because it shows how "social institutions like the military or the parliament evolve and change as a result of rivalries, antagonism, and power shifts in the network of relationships" (p. 166). First of relevance is that the consequence of *The Civilizing Process* described by Elias is, as we have already mentioned above, the monopolization of violence by the state authority. In other words, Moelker (2005) claims, the military are the cause and the consequence of the civilizing process, and the soldier has a strong correlation to the state. Secondly, Elias has studied and described the genesis of the Naval Profession (Elias, 1950).

In short, Elias, according to Moelker[114] (2003; 2005), found that England acquired a competitive edge over Spain and France, as well as supremacy over the sea, because they succeeded to create a fusion between nautical skills held by seamen and military skills held by officers of noble descent. At first the latter group did not want to lower themselves to the dishonorable manual labor that came with learning the tricks of the sea. They regarded themselves as gentlemen whose main task was commanding men in boarding of hostile ships and man-to-man battles. Thus, "the men on board cultivated the social distinction of the sailors "before the mast" and the officers "behind the mast". However, when ships were proven useful platforms for guns, which enabled ships to fight from a distance, nautical skills became more important. Thus, the Englishmen created a position for the training of young people from both the group of seamen and officer amidships. Through the institution of the "midshipman" the Naval Profession evolved and gave the English a competitive advantage, resulting in an empire (Moelker R. , 2003; 2005).

According to Moelker (2003), figurational approaches to military sociology are very promising because they enable the study of tension and shifting power balances between groups, postulating the theme that change normally comes from conflict and power struggles. Moelker proceeds that conflict sociology "has overcome the strangulation bias of Marxist structuralism. At the same time, figurational approaches are suitable for studying cultural processes and cultural patterns of interaction" (p. 196).

4.3.5 Critique of Elias

It has been argued that, for example, the Holocaust undermined the idea that the West had undergone a 'civilizing process' as argued by Elias. However, Elias' use of the term civilized was not intended to describe what we may perceive of as civilized behavior today, but to explore how France and England came to fight the Germans *in the name of civilization* (feeling superior); which means that we could also have asked how the Nazi's came to

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[114] Elias' published article on the Naval Profession is only the first part of a larger study which was recovered from the Norbert Elias Archive, and which Moelker (2003; 2005) has described in context of the larger study. According to Moelker (2003; 2005), what Elias wanted to gain with this study was an insight into the specific civilizing process that made Britain into an empire.

perceive themselves as so superior to the Jews that the Holocaust became possible. Moreover, the Holocaust has been used to criticize Elias' claim that the civilization process involved a pacification of society. However, Elias did not propose that violence, killing and torture had ceased to occur in the 'civilized' West, but rather that violence "had become increasingly monopolized by states and deployed at interstate level" (Hughes, 2008, p. 180). On the contrary, Hughes (2008) argues that Elias "foresaw an escalation of violence as a consequence of the struggle between hegemonical units" (p. 180). Moreover, Hughes refers to Kreiken and Mennell's proposal that the civilizing process produces its own dark side through the very long chains of interdependence, division of labor and distance, which were essential to implementing the 'final solution' in Nazi German. In other words, they argue that the long chains distanced people from the responsibility and possibility to influence the collective actions or change the course of the game. Similarly, Hughes (2008) also refers to Fletcher who suggests that "the technology of modern warfare in many ways facilitates forms of 'killing at a distance'" (p. 181), which distances people from the actual killing.

Moreover, it has been argued that the decline of formal standards of socially acceptable behavior, which replaces formalized and stiff etiquette with less formalization and loosening of manners, proves the civilization process wrong. However, Elias became increasingly interested in processes of informalization and controlled decontrolling of emotions in leisure, as sport. He argues that informalization does not "necessarily imply a corresponding decline in demands for individual self-control" (Hughes, 2008, p. 182). Instead Elias argues that the informalization process requires cultural knowledge of, for example, how to dress appropriately when there is no formal dress code, and requires the individual to keep up with changing styles, fashion and patterns of distinct conduct and to mold the body accordingly.

Finally, Bourdieu (1992) criticizes Elias for failing "to ask who benefits and who suffers from the monopoly of the state over legitimate violence, and to raise the question [...] of the domination wielded *through* the state" (p. 93). Bourdieu also claims that he has a great deal of intellectual sympathy with Elias because his work is based on the historical psychosociology of an actual grand historical process; the constitution of a state which progressively monopolized physical violence. However, Bourdieu proceeds that he would like to add that the state also monopolizes symbolic violence, which is what he seeks to understand in his work on the genesis of the state (see (Bourdieu, 1989-1992; Bourdieu, Wacquant, & Farage, 1994).Through this work, Bourdieu "defines the state in terms of the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, where *the monopoly of symbolic violence is the condition for the possession and exercise of legitimate physical violence*. The state can be reduced neither to an apparatus of power in the service of dominant groups nor to a neutral site where conflicting interests are played out: rather, it constitutes the form of collective belief that structures the whole of social life" (Bourdieu, 1989-1992).

4.4 Introduction to the Micro-level Investigation

4.4.1 Development of the Research Questions

From the literature discussed under the headline *Why the struggle over who can take part?* in chapter three, we saw that a traditional argument regarding women's contentious service was that succeeding in the military, for men and women, depends on the ability to perform masculinity (act like a man) and reject femininity (don't be a sissy). However, Belkin (2012) has demonstrated that military practise is structured with contradictions and has compelled soldiers "to embody masculinity *and* femininity"[115] (p. 173, my emphasis). Accordingly, it was concluded that the traditional argument on what gendered behavior is actually required from military personnel can be questioned.

Furthermore, Belkin (2012), Kovitz (2003) and Sasson-Levy (2008) revealed that the nexus between masculinity and military identity is constructed to camouflage "unmasculine" practises, obscure internal difference and fractures between men, and foster obedience and subordination to the collective (cf. 3.3.3 and 3.3.4). Hence, questions are raised about the very utility of the concept of masculinity in research on the military (Woodward R. , 2003)[116]. In addition, the traditional construct of masculinity as a recruitment mechanism to attract men is challenged by the interest to recruit more women. This is, for example, shown by Woodward (2003) who writes that the

> *recruitment crises* across the armed forces [...] has forced those responsible for recruitment to become aware of the unacceptability of such [masculinity] models for many potential recruits from non-traditional sources*; in its attempts to include more women and members of ethnic minorities within the armed forces, the MoD is aware that different gender models for soldiers are required* (p. 52).

Consequently, Woodward (2003) argues that "there is less sense in examining military masculinities, and more in examining gendered identities among both men and women, including relationships between the two" (p. 52).

Using an interactional approach and understanding "individual military identity as rooted in 'doing' rather than any essential categories of 'being'", Woodward and Jenkings (2011, p. 256) find that military identity is conceptualized and marked through possession of professional skills and expertise. They also summarize that the conceptual turn to 'doing' rather than 'being' seems to be key to understanding individual military identities. Similarly, Sand & Fasting (2013) found that Norwegian officers identified themselves more with a specific field of expertise than with "being" an officer. Also, Maringira (2014) found that military identity is a source of status and recognition which coheres around the possession and uses of military skills; in particular the capacity to use arms. Likewise, but not surprisingly, the research field on "The military profession" identifies the importance of skills and

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[115] E.g. "filth and cleanliness [...], dominance and subordination" (Belkin 2012, p. 173).
[116] See also Messerschmidt (2012) for a discussion on the academic appropriation of the concept of masculinity in research.

expertise in military identity constructions. For example in Snider & Matthews (2005) it is argued that expertise is the hallmark of being an officer, and that changed skills requirements have caused a crisis in the military professional identity.

Considering previous studies on professional identity in the Norwegian military, Sand & Fasting (2013) state that several studies have identified "the warrior" as an dominant professional identity in recent years[117], but "a striking common characteristic with these studies is the absence of a gender perspective" (p. 15). The absence of a gender perspective also applies to studies on Norwegian military professional identity where "the warrior" is not identified or mentioned[118], Sand & Fasting maintain. Hence, there is a need to investigate the Norwegian military profession with a gender perspective. There exist a few master theses which combine professional or operative identity with discussions on gender in a Norwegian context. Similar to international literature Kilde (2012) show that masculinity characterizes the soldiers' "understanding of operationally to such a degree that men and masculinity *appear* to constitute a mutually constitutive pair of concepts. A skilled soldier is not only a man. To be a man you must also be skilled soldier" (Kilde, 2012, s. 42). Based on similar findings Totland (2009) argues that the *discursive construction* and favoritism of masculinity "can be understood as a structural exclusion of women, who by virtue of their physics [are] unlikely to be able to take part in operational service" (p. 114). In other words, these studies identify the relationship between military identity and masculinity as an appearance or discursive practice.

From the discussion above it follows that both military (professional) identity and masculine as well as feminine identities can be considered as *constructed collective identities* which are *associated* with the possession of certain skills and abilities. Accordingly, these collective identity constructs and the intersection between them are at risk when military skills requirements are challenged and women enter the organisation carrying with their bodies associations to skills that stand in contrast to skills *associated with military requirements*. Hence, I consider *the struggle on requirements* as key to gaining a deeper understanding of *what is at stake* in the struggle on military identity, including *who* should be allowed to enter into the military profession/field. Accordingly, I will examine both what is required to gain recognition in military officer education and training, and the ways by which different social actors challenge, guard and negotiate the requirements.

In order to understand my approach to requirements and the formulation of the research question, we need first to turn to Sookermany (2013). He argues that the transformative shift in the Armed Forces has fundamental consequences for how we understand skills and skillfulness at the ontological and epistemological level, and thus, for *what it means to*

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[117] Sand & Fasting (2013) refer to studies on military/professional identity by (Brunborg, 2008; Forsjord, 2009; Haaland T. L., 2008a; Kristiansen, 2011; Landgraf, 2010; Lydén, 2012).
[118] Sand & Fasting (2013) refer to studies on military/professional identity by (Jensen, 2008; Johansen R. B., 2007). In addition we can add: (Johansen R. B., 2013; Kvilvang, 2012).

become identified or perceived as a good, or skillful, soldier[119]. In more detail Eriksen (2011) argues that to be skilled or to show skillfulness "has to do with our ability to deal with our life-world *in an appropriate way*" (p. 6). Thus, instead of asking what skills are required to be identified or perceived as a good or skillful soldier, we can ask: what is required to be identified as dealing with the life-world in an appropriate way in the military context? In combination with Woodward and Jenkings (2011) who claim that "'doing' rather than 'being' is key to understanding individual military identities" we can ask:

What is required *to do* an officer[120] role *appropriately*?

Yet, although expertise and skills are identified as an important factor in professional identity, we have seen from the literature review that a profession is also characterized by a certain responsibility and corporateness, or identity/ethos[121], which includes adherents to sets of values, ideals, norms and ethics which govern the professional behavior (cf. 3.2.1). However, Weiss (2002) argued that the cultural scripts of militarism provide soldiers with clear and disciplinary bodily requirements, and that "the military, in a manner parallel to other social institutions, uses the body as a template on which to imprint signals that identify the person with a certain group and exclude him from other groups" (p. 12). This suggests that it is more than skills and expertise that are required to do an officer role appropriately. Therefore, the question "what is required" must be seen in a broad perspective including what kind of behavior, (physical) performances and skills, as well as style, attitudes, (expressed) values, moral, bodily appearance etc. it is necessary for individuals to possess and display if they are to be perceived, identified and recognized as a worthy officer in the military fellowship they are part of. In addition, the question is also inspired by Elias who began his analysis by examining *socially accepted behavioral codes.*

However, we must be aware that the military is embedded in a culture with *ideals* of gender-appropriate behavior and the expectation that soldiering is more appropriate, or gender-conforming, for men than it is for women. Hence, we need to examine what is actually required of men and what is actually required of women, to be accepted and recognized as

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[119] Sookermany's (2013) study on what it means to become a skillful soldier is based on a philosophical construct. Thus, he claims that it is necessary to investigate what is actually required to become, or be perceived as a good, competent or skillful, soldier in the real world. This is also an argument for why the present study is needed.

[120] The proper Norwegian word to use would be "befal" (meaning commander, used on all ranks from sergeant and up). The term 'befal' would cover the ranks the candidates possess in the second year (sergeant), as well as the ranks of the commanders/instructors at the Officer Candidate School. However, while the term 'befal' covers the rank of sergeant, sergeant is not considered an officer rank. Yet, after completing the Officer Candidate School the students can possess ranks from second lieutenant to captain without attending the Military Academy. These ranks are referred to as officer ranks without any linguistic divisions referring to the rank holders' previous education or employment contracts, such as the terms NCO and COs. Thus, for simplicity, I will use the term officer to cover all the ranks in question. The research question could be formulated as: what is required to do the rank from sergeant to captain appropriately?

[121] Hagesæther (2008) claims that Huntington and Janowitz agree on the description of the military profession as consisting of three major elements: expertise, responsibility and identity/ethos. According to Hagesæter the categories overlap by that all categories contain aspects of ethics and identity. Yet, explicating identity as one of three elements places attention on the notion that certain identity can also be a requirement in itself.

dealing appropriately with the life-world[122] in the military field. Accordingly, the final formulation of the first research question presents as follows:

What is required from men and women respectively to do an officer role appropriately?

The research question should, however, also be seen in relation to my choice to base this study on Bourdieu's theoretical perspective. According to Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer (2012), the question for Bourdieu "is always who (or what) is anchored into which more or less dominant positions because of which species and amounts of capital" (p. 75). Then, positions and status become central, and we can link to Belkin (2012) who "conceive[s] of military masculinity as a set of beliefs, practises and attributes that can enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationship with the military or with military ideas" (p. 3). In addition, Maringira (2014) finds that military identity, which sits perfectly together with military masculinity, is a source of status and recognition. However, since the concept of military masculinities/identities has some challenges for use in research, I prefer to use concepts from Bourdieu's framework. Therefore, instead of asking which kinds of masculinity or identity enable individuals to claim authority and/or get access to position, I am asking which kinds of capital enable individuals to claim authority – or gain access to positions, status and recognition. This means that the first research question can also be formulated as: Which *species and amounts of capital* are required from men and women respectively to do a military officer role appropriately – in such a way that acceptance, status, recognition, positions and authority can be gained.

From Bourdieu's perspective the question on which capital gives access to power, authority and status is in turn, "always related to the questions of how habitually ('naturally') recognized valuations of various forms of capital emerge, *how they are reproduced, and how they are (or might be) altered"* (Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer, 2012, p. 75). As we have seen above, Bourdieu's concept of capital is fundamentally related to his concept of field. A field in Bourdieu's conceptual framework can be constructed as soon as a network of people (and their institutions, i.e. a military service or branches) struggle and compete to establish control over, preserve, modify or change the distribution of resources or capital, which gives access to positions, authority and recognition in the field. In this study, we have set forth from an observed struggle on what gender, skills and competence, i.e. different species of capital, should be required from military personnel. This means that the military organization/profession can be constructed as a Bourdieuian field. A field can be thought of as a game with some basic premises, logics and rules which the players must follow to enter, play and stay in the game, and to gain access to positions in the field's hierarchy, or meritocracy. Entrance tests such as mentally and physically demanding tests required to pass basic military training, described by Creveld (2008) (cf. 3.3.1), can be considered as a rule for entrance to the field.

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[122] I will not use the word life-world later. I consider this to be a synonym to particular reality, actualities and culture in local military context.

According to Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), acceptance of the field's tacit rules calls forth voluntary submission and conformism to the field specific logics for achieving status and recognition, and leads to reproduction of the game. However, a field is defined as an arena of struggle, which means, as referred to above by Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer (2012), that both the rules and values of different forms of marketable competence resources or capital can be challenged and altered. Thus, the second question in a Bourdieuian analysis is related to how the recognized valuations of various forms of capital – the internal value system – are challenged and guarded, altered and reproduced.

So, if we think of the first research question as which species and amounts of capital are required to gain acceptance, recognition, status and positions in the military field, then, the next question is related to what men and women with different possessions of capital need to do in order to gain status and position? What kind of strategies do different men and different women utilize to negotiate the value of their own and others' capital? For instance, if certain forms of physical capital have high value, players might train to accumulate this form of capital and/or take part in competitions or tests to demonstrate possession of it. However, if players possess a different form of capital with less value, they might try to enhance the value of the capital they do possess and challenge the value of the capital they lack, and which other may possess. This means that we need to pay attention to how men and women with *different forms of capital* respond to value systems, requirements, rules, and logics they meet in the field. Are these accepted, guarded, reproduced, questioned, challenged, contested or altered? And, importantly, who guards and challenges which requirements, how and why? Moreover, how are rules or requirements (formal and informal) set up to give value to certain forms of capital? In order to cover this kind of a Bourdieuian investigation, the second research question is formulated as follows:

How do men and women with different forms of capital respond to different formal and informal requirements in the military field?

By examining processes like this, I believe that we can gain a better understanding of the military field's classification and value systems[123] (its culture, see chapter 4.1.2), and how this is challenged and guarded. Through this, I aim to get a ***deeper understanding of what is at stake in the social struggle over who should be allowed to enter into the military profession/field.***

This is important and necessary to explore if we want to understand men's and women's experiences and perceptions of their own and others' value in the organization.

The research purposes and questions call for rich data and observations from the field. This means that the methods that will be considered in chapter five will be of qualitative art.

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[123] This enables questions such as: Who is of value in the internal classification system? How is the value system guarded, challenged and negotiated in order to maintain or enhance the actors' own value? How is the value system challenged by changes in the military's personnel requirement and identity policy?

4.4.2 The Research Question

The aim of this dissertation is to get a deeper understanding of what is at stake in the social struggle over who should be allowed to enter into the military profession/field.

This is operationalized into two subquestions which are intended to fix the direction and limit the content of the micro-level investigation:

1. What is required from men and women respectively to do an officer role appropriately?
2. How do men and women with different forms of capital respond to different formal and informal requirements in the military field?

Chapter 5: Epistemology and Methodology

To enable the readers to consider the credibility and sincerity of the knowledge production, this chapter will explain how I have arrived at the specific results and interpretations presented in this dissertation. In the previous chapter I presented the theoretical perspective from which the field of inquiry is approached. However, any theoretical approach is grounded on a set of philosophical assumptions, such as basic suppositions of ontology (philosophy concerning the overall nature of what things are: the form and nature of reality), epistemology (theory of knowledge: how can we create justified knowledge) and teleology (the research's function and purpose). In sum, these assumptions provide methodological guidelines and consequences for the research process as well as for the judgment of the results. I will therefore account for how the theoretical perspective has shaped the choice and design of methods. I will then introduce the sample and explain how data has been gathered, analyzed and interpreted. I will also discuss my own role in the research process, addressing some ethical issues I met along the way, and explain how I have tried to ensure quality in the research product.

5.1   Epistemological and Methodological Consequences of the Theoretical Perspective

5.1.1   Implications for the Choice of Methods

According to Manen (1990), "we need to make a distinction between research *method* and research *methodology*, and between research *method* and research *technique* and *procedure*" (p. 27). Methodology refers to the philosophical framework and theory behind the methods. It includes fundamental assumptions related to epistemology and ontology, and how these assumptions impact on and provide guidance to which method(s) can or should be used, how the methods should be designed and what kind of knowledge the method(s) gives access to. Thus, "the notion of method is charged with methodological considerations and implications of a particular philosophical or epistemological perspective." (Manen, 1990, p. 28). For example, the interview may mean something quite different for an ethnographer than for a therapist, even though the procedure and techniques, such as selecting a sample, assuring anonymity etc., may look common (Manen, 1990).

As mentioned before, the study is inspired by Bourdieu's and Elias' relational and processual perspective, as well as structuralist constructivism and symbolic interaction in general. Hammersley (2008) and Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) argue that qualitative research which is informed by constructivist and interactionist perspectives has failed to meet the expectations and promises made, because it have *not* taken into account the methodological implications that follow from these perspectives in practice, that is to say, in the choice and design of the method(s). According to Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005), the failure is partly due to an unreflected use of classical qualitative methods which are adapted to methodological consequences following from phenomenological/hermeneutic perspectives. However, a key

difference between phenomenology/hermeneutics and constructivism/interactionism is related to the *understanding* of the objects of analysis, Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) argue. Similarly, Hammersley (2008) argues that the failing of qualitative inquiry is related to two aspects: 1) understanding and 2) process.

Considering *understanding*, Hammersley explains that qualitative inquiry and methods were originally supposed to provide genuine understanding of people's *own perspective,* "rather than being biased by methodological preconceptions and conventional wisdom" (Hammersley, 2008, p. 37). Yet, later "influences on qualitative inquiry, notably 'critical theory', postmodernism and constructivism challenge the very possibility of, and/or desirability of seeking, such understanding" (Hammersley, 2008, p. 37). Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) explain that the pursuit to seek into people's life world to discover genuine meaning and life experience belongs to the tradition of phenomenology/ hermeneutics. Researchers such as Bourdieu, Goffman, Mead, Latour, Fairclough, Berger and Luckmann, whom Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) consider belong to constructivism/interactionism, all have in common that they assume the meaning of an action or a phenomenon is created in the interaction between people or between people and things. From this perspective meaning or people's "own perspective" is not an independent size the researchers can reveal or discover (Mik-Meyer & Järvinen, 2005). Instead, meaning and people's perspective is a relational phenomenon which can only be understood as situated and constructed in interaction with other "actors" as well as with things, artefacts, documents etc. In other words, the object of analysis is perceived as a fluid, unstable and ambiguous phenomenon which is formed in the interaction with its environment and situation, and consequently, in the interaction with the researcher. Mik-Meyer & Järvinen refer to Bourdieu, who warned against considering the research object as isolated and limited. This is, as we have seen in chapter four, a perception that Bourdieu shares with Norbert Elias who insists that the individual can *only* be understood in figurations, i.e. as part of networks of interdependent people with asymmetrical and changing power ratios. However, this means that constructivist/interactionist perspectives have other methodological consequences than phenomenological/hermeneutic perspectives. Most importantly, the perspectives of constructivism/interactionism require that the data collection also includes the context.

Considering *process*, Hammersley (2008) writes that qualitative research has promised to take "proper account of the processual character of human social life" (p. 37). Nevertheless, Hammersley claims that a large proportion of qualitative research is based solely on interview data which draws a static image of the research object at a given point in time. However, Hammersley does not challenge the value of the interview as such, but explains that the danger of drawing a static picture lies in the reliance of interviews as the only source of data, as well as in the techniques for interviewing and methods for analysis.

Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) claim that another argument against the interview is that it will be characterized by the interacting parties' self-presentation. Fangen (2010) notes that this phenomenon will also apply to participant observation because all meetings between people

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will have an aspect of self-presentation and impression management[124]. With Bourdieu's and Elias' perspective and their interest in self-regulation and self-discipline, I consider self-presentation and impression control as something relevant and of interest, and not something I need to avoid, try to get past or behind. Therefore, I still consider interviews as a relevant method to grasp thinking, perspectives and meaning-making which are not observable, but interviews cannot be the only method as we also want to consider contexts and social formations which inform the actors' perspectives and thinking.

As Järvinen & Mik-Meyer (2005) claim, the conceptual framework of interactional perspectives moves the attention away from the individuals' 'private' experiences (the studied people's own perspective) toward how the studied people (inter)act, and how the social context – both the specific and the more general –affect this interaction. This means that the interactional perspective leads our attention toward how a field, or a figuration, invokes and/or makes possible specific actions and specific relationships of dominance and submission. According to Järvinen & Mik-Meyer (2005), we can say that "the structures", or the field, figuration or game in Bourdieu's and Elias' perspective, provide resources which are indicative, but not determinative, of what can be said and done in different contexts. The military institution enables certain actions and relationships which would not have been possible for example in a school. Therefore, I must take into account that the players/individuals in the field play a game/role where they will do things that are expected of them because they are in the military, and furthermore because they possess certain positions in the military.

Consequently, a challenge for me was to collect data which provides insight into relevant frameworks, contexts and social relationships which engage the individuals to act as they do. In other words, I would need data which enables me to get insight into the interaction, dynamics and standards of acceptable and expected behavior at any given time; the social standards and hidden rules which, according to both Elias' and Bourdieu's perspective, regulate social context and actors at the same time as they are constructed by the individuals themselves. In sum, interactionism needs data on interactions and processes. Hammersley (2008), Järvinen & Mik-Meyer (2005) and Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) all propose fieldwork which involves a combination of participant observation, interviews and document analysis as the most suitable method to gain access to context and what goes on between individuals.

Järvinen & Mik-Meyer's (2005) and Mik-Meyer & Järvinen's (2005) methodical suggestions are made with reference to Bourdieu's perspective. As we saw in chapter four, Paulle, Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer (2012) claim that Bourdieu and Elias "can be viewed as contributors to a single theoretical approach" (p. 70). Yet, I chose to combine Bourdieu's theoretical perspective with Elias' processual sociology because I believe that it can contribute in counteracting some of the critique raised against Bourdieu, i.e. providing a static

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[124] According to Goffman, impression management can be understood as a more or less strategic and reflexive process in which people attempt to influence, control or guide the impression the other person(s) in an interaction will form of him/her.

picture of isolated individuals or fields. We should then remember from chapter four that Elias advocated for a re-orientation regarding what the "the individual" and "the society" actually are, and how they should be conceptualized (that is a re-orientation or reminder at the ontological and epistemological level), in order to better understand the problematic of sociology. The problem Elias points to is precisely that sociological analyses are formed in a way which implies that what they seek to represent is an object in a state of rest, bearing no relationship to anything else. Even though Hammersley (2008) and Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) provide some suggestions to meet this critique of qualitative inquiry, we need to look more closely into methodological and methodical consequences and suggestions following from Elias' theoretical perspective to see if this can take us any further. This is something I will account for in the next section. Thereafter I will explain the design of the study and address *some* of the challenges which arise from applying an interactional and processual perspective inspired by Bourdieu and supported with Elias' challenging theoretical perspective in practice.

5.1.1.1 Methodological Challenges Arising from Elias' Ontology

In considering some implications and challenges following from Elias' processual perspective we will depart with Baur & Ernst (2011) who analyzed Elias' methodological guidelines and practices. It can be mentioned already that Baur & Ernst (2011) assert that Elias' methods are usually either rarely discussed, criticized for their inadequacy (in line with the failure of qualitative research informed by interactional and processual perspectives in general, described above), or considered outdated from today's point of view. In other words, Elias was not able to live up to the methodological guidelines and consequences which follow from his theoretical perspective (Baur & Ernst, 2011). One challenge Baur & Ernst (2011) point to is that, as yet, there are no methods available to explore and analyze the intertwined processes described by Elias in full account. However, based on their discussion of Elias' guidelines, Baur & Ernst (2011) suggest that a process-oriented methodology inspired by Elias' theoretical framework would consist of the following steps:

1) Reconstructing the macro-level: According to Baur & Ernst (2011) "a first task of figurational sociology is to reconstruct the rules and social structure of the figuration" (p. 124). Similar to the early Chicago School and to Bourdieu, Elias did this by analyzing landscapes, buildings, maps, documents and other things and arrangements constructed to facilitate daily routines and symbolize relationships, meaning and hidden rules. However, Baur & Ernst (2011) note that methods "are not currently developed far enough to analyze *changing* macro-levels properly" (p. 136, note 9).

2) Reconstructing the micro-level: This implies exploring the individuals' placement within a figuration: how they perceive the figuration and their position within it, how they enter and leave it, "and how and why they manage or fail to change the figuration" (Baur & Ernst, 2011, p. 124). To analyze long-term developments Elias reconstructed past individuals' actions through historical sources, such as letters and etiquette manuals. However, when analyzing current individuals' actions Elias again resembles the Chicago School and makes use of ethnographies including participant observation and interviews (Baur & Ernst, 2011).

According to Hammersley & Atkinson (2007), ethnographies are based on an idea that social processes should be studied and understood in the social and cultural context in which they are part. Thus,

> in terms of data collection, ethnography usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents and artefacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 3).

This would mean that collecting documents and other things in order to reconstruct the macro-level (step 1) can be seen as part of an ethnography.

3) Reconstructing the sociogenesis of the figuration: According to Elias, processes of sociogenesis (changes in relationships *between* individuals and groups, i.e. classes, professions, generations, sexes etc.) and psychogenesis (changes within people, i.e. emotions management, affect control etc.) are *fundamentally interrelated* and change all the time. However, as Baur & Ernst (2011) mentioned there are currently no methods available to analyze these intertwined processes. So far, step 1 and 2 provide us with methods suited to grasp a figuration (macro-level) and the behavior and interaction of individuals within these figurations (micro-level) at a given point in time. Grasping the sociogenesis of a figuration however, means that researchers have to analyze a figuration's becoming, change and ending. Elias suggests the use of all kinds of historical documents for such an analysis[125]. According to Baur & Ernst (2011) analyzing historical source is a central step in a process-oriented figurational sociology. Likewise, Quilley & Loyal (2004) argue that analysis of long-term processes of change through historical documents is a key component in Elias' figurational and processual method. Thus, Elias' perspective advocates for historical sociology[126], a branch of sociology focusing on how societies develop through history.

Accordingly, Elias provides an all-embracing theoretical perspective which has huge methodical challenges in practice. Thus, Baur & Ernst (2011) ask the researchers to note that being inspired by Elias' perspective "does not necessarily mean that researchers have to do

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[125] Elias also provided guidelines on how to use this kind of data for a process-oriented analysis. In order to trace how a figuration changes Elias suggests that one has to look for power struggles and aspects which are contested. According to Elias, aspects which are contested at a specific time will be mentioned in documents produced in this span of time. If these aspects are not mentioned in previous documents, they were not yet important or they were assumed (Baur & Ernst, 2011). Since culture, identity, gender and physical skills among military personnel have been a topic in recent documents and writing on the Norwegian military (cf. 1.1, 2.1 and 3.2.1.4), these factors can be said to be contested.

[126] Bourdieu (1998) is also concerned with history as a source to understand contemporary phenomenon. For instance, he argues that if we are to understand masculine dominance we have to analyze how socially constructed differences between the sexes, which are now perceived as real and "natural" differences, have been brought into effect through history in such a way that they are perceived as naturally, rather than historically or socially constructed.

empirical research on all these aspects [listed above] at the same time but can either draw on other researchers' work or their own previous work" (p. 136, note 8).

In order to limit the work, I have chosen to take into account Hammersley's (2008), Järvinen & Mik-Meyer's (2005) and Mik-Meyer & Järvinen's (2005) suggestions for doing interactional research. They proposed the same methods Baur & Ernst (2011) suggested that researchers inspired by Elias could make use of in order to reconstruct aspects of the macro-level (step 1) and the micro-level (step 2). This makes it possible to grasp interactions within a figuration *at a given point in time*. I will not make an socio-historical analysis of the long-term process of change (step 3), and consider this work only as a contribution to a figurational and processual understanding of the figurations to which the Norwegian Armed Forces belong, such as NATO, the UN and the Norwegian state. Thus, as a substitute for step 3 I have provided a more detailed review of the historical background in chapters two and three than I might have done if I were *not* inspired by Elias' perspective.

Consequently, my choice of method was an ethnography that combines a collection of written material with participant observations and interviews. We will now consider how the theoretical perspective has *shaped* the methods.

5.1.2   Implications and Consequences for the Design of Methods

5.1.2.1 Written Material as Actors and Ruling Devices

According to Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) there is a tacit assumption "that ethnographic research can appropriately represent contemporary social worlds as essentially oral cultures" (p. 129). In contemporary societies government departments and organizations generate and consume huge amounts of documentation which *regulate and shape action*. Thus, ethnographers who take no account of text risk ignoring important features of a literate culture, Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) state. However, text can be approached and used differently in ethnographic research. The ways I have approached and used texts are inspired by authors in Järvinen & Mik-Meyers' (2005) book on qualitative methods in interactional perspectives. These authors have in common that they emphasize what texts *do* and how they control and coordinate action in organizations.

Justesen (2005) writes that already Weber pointed out that documents were one of the most significant aspects to characterize a bureaucratic organization[127]. However, with basis in the actor-network theory of Latour, Callon and Law, Justesen (2005) explains that when people form social networks[128] the interaction between the people is often mediated through text. In this perspective, text is not seen as a sort of neutral or passive descriptive media, and the '*real*' meaning or intention of the text is not important. Instead the document is seen as a

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[127] Janowitz (1960) found that the military profession was becoming more and more similar to civilian bureaucratic organizations (cf. 3.2.1.1).

[128] Similarly to Elias' perspective, the military organization would be considered as a network of people from this perspective. However, as I understand the actor-network theory, documents, objects, machinery, technology etc. are also included *as actors* in the network.

material thing that *does* something and *acts* in the network. For instance, documents can regulate, control, categorize, activate and/or legitimate action. Yet, documents cannot determine actions because the meaning is created by relations in the network game and depends on how the text is "translated" and converted into action in the different contexts. Consequently, a management ambition mediated in a document does not necessarily have the intended outcome. Yet, management documents *make it possible to create a network which speaks and acts as one unit*. In chapters two and three we saw, in particular, that the explicit intension of the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 07) was to create a "common understanding, common mind-set, common framework, a common terminology" (FFOD 07, p. 3) among the officer corps (cf. 2.2.1 and 3.2.2). Thus, we can say that FFOD 07 attempts to create a network of officers who speak and act as one unit. According to Justesen (2005), it is important to analyze how documents are used in attempts to construct units that hold a variety of heterogeneous elements together in a more or less enduring construction[129].

Mik-Meyer (2005) refers to Dorothy Smith who also conceives of texts as an actor that works and *does* something in a social interaction. Because texts can be replicated and circulated, they provide the opportunity to reach out with a standardized message which can be activated in multiple local settings, Smith (2005; 2006) explains. Then she argues that this is *why* texts can be used to rule, regulate, structure and coordinate people's discourses, consciousness and lives across time and space.

On this basis, Smith conceives of texts as powerful *tools* in organizing and standardizing people's activities into the kind of organization that is characteristic of contemporary society and organizations, and highlights that *text or text-based communication are essential in doing the social organization or institution* of today[130]. As Smith (2005) writes:

> Institutions exist in that strange magical realm in which social relations based on texts transform the local particularities of people, place and time into standardized, generalized, and, especially, translocal forms of coordinating people's activities (p. 101)

This means that *ruling relations* can be found in text mediated forms. With ruling relations Smith (2005) refers to how people at one local site can use power to accomplish interest and shape actions in other local settings. This means, furthermore, that text can be seen as *the link*

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[129] Justesen (2005) refers to Law who uses machines as examples of networks of heterogeneous components that are perceived as a unit, and explains that in the same way as the heterogeneity and components are hidden when we think of, for instance, a computer, the heterogeneity is often hidden when we think of an organization. In this perspective it is worth remembering Kovitz (2003) who argued that differences between men must be camouflaged in order to construct the military's unity of purpose, which is operational effectiveness of the whole human "megamachine" – the collective of power (cf. 3.3.3).

[130] Høiback wrote that doctrines have been cultivated by military organizations as tools of command, tools of change and tools of education, and that especially the US and UK have tended to use doctrines mainly as a tool of education. This perspective is reflected in FFOD 07 where it is written that the doctrine shall be an "*educational tool* that helps the officer corps to develop a common understanding, a common mind-set, common framework, a common terminology and thus the basis for the development of a common professional culture" (cf. 3.2.2).

and bridge between the local actualities of living and extra-local interest, often perceived of as the 'structure', 'society' or 'institution'[131]. Thus, paying attention to text enables the researcher to direct the gaze to both the local and the extra-local relationship (i.e. link the micro- and macro-level), and explore how extra-local institutional factors interfere in people's daily life at local sites. Especially in a globalized world (Elias' long '*chains of interdependencies*', see chapter 4.3.2), we need[132] to pay attention to how global and extra-local relations are often brought into local settings through text, and interfere in people's activities and make them act in specific ways. As Elias would argue, the actions and ideas of people at one local site (micro-level) cannot be explained and understood if they are considered on their own; they need to be understood and explained within the framework of the interdependencies and ruling relations (macro-level). Accordingly, text can be seen as a chain in Elias' figurations.

Because text/media material plays a major role in holding together local fields, and contributes significantly *to making them* trans-local and multi-local[133], Hannerz (2001) points out that global, trans-local and multi-local fields challenge the 'participating observational fetishism' in the anthropology, and contribute to text and media taking on a more central role in such studies than in traditional fieldwork. Similarly, Widerberg (2008) and Mik-Meyer (2005) also explain that if incorporated into ethnographic fieldwork, text can help us to reveal how people's activities are coordinated and chained together. Thus we can use text to explore how local military lives are embedded in and contribute to global and extra-local power relations. This is why we have already seen how, for example, the UN, the US[134], NATO, the Norwegian government and the Norwegian Armed Forces' leadership attempts to manage military culture, identity and skill through documents in chapter two.

However, Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) note that "there is often a quite bewildering variety of documentary materials that might be of some relevance to the researcher. These may be distributed along a dimension ranging from the 'informal' to the 'formal' or 'official'"(p. 123), coming from a variety of senders with various and sometimes contradictory missions and management ambitions. In this work I have gathered different forms of written material

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[131] The "materiality of the text [...] creates a situation in which it can seem that language, thought, culture, formal organizations and so on exist independently and outside time and the actualities of people's lives", Widerberg (2008, p. 318) writes in a text on Dorothy Smith. We recognize this experience of structure as 'the society' and 'the organization' etc. as having an existence prior to and beyond the people who do these formations, from chapter four where Elias claimed that there is a tendency to view complex organizations etc. as having an existence of their own (cf. 4.3.1.2).

[132] The matter for sociology, Elias concludes, "is to make these networks [chains of interdependencies] more transparent and thereby to prevent them carrying their members along with them so blindly and arbitrary" (p. 103).

[133] Hannerz (2001) points out that the sites that are part of a multi-local field do not need to be comparable. He refers to Appadurai (1996) who has used the concept of trans-local to describe localities characterized by people flowing through them, rather than people anchoring into them in a more durable situation. Many military sites can thus be understood as trans-local in that recruits, students and staff are continually replaced.

[134] For example, we saw in chapter two that the US sent a message on future military requirements to the European NATO Allied through the Defense Capabilities Initiative, and that this text played an important role in activating the transformation process toward out-of-area deployments in Norway. Heier (2006) wrote: "DCI is an American initiative that explicitly deals with Norway and the other European member states of NATO. [...] According to Geir Lundestad, *'NATO gave the United States a unique instrument with which to guide developments in Europe'*" (pp. 8-9). (cf. 2.1).

which have been used in different ways, in order to understand what is at stake in the struggle over who can take part in the military profession/field.

At the formal end of the spectrum of textual material there exists a hierarchy of official management documents for the military field. The existence of a document hierarchy is pointed out in The Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 07) where a figure is provided (p. 9) explaining the hierarchy of management documents for the Norwegian Armed Forces at the national level. In addition, the NATO doctrines provide important guidelines for the Norwegian doctrine. Therefore, in order to *reconstruct the macro-level*, which implies analysis of the overall conditions and structures of the figuration that the actors in the local military sites are part of, I have collected documents which are placed over the doctrine in the document hierarchy; including such documents that have been launched after the doctrine. These documents[135], reviewed in chapter two, are read with consideration of what they seek to do with military skills, gender, identity and culture. I have also used previous research on the type of documents, such as Græger (2006) and Heier (2006), to draw a picture of the structural conditions that underlie the activity in local military field. These types of documents provide the descriptive background information about the ethnographic context and are presented in chapter two, and also discussed in some of the former research presented in chapter three.

As previously mentioned, Baur & Ernst (2011) suggested that researchers inspired by Elias' perspective could bring other researchers' work in to play in order to draw a broader picture of a figuration than could be done through their own research (cf. 5.1.1.1). In addition, Woodward & Jenkins (2011) claimed that the tradition of military sociology seems to have identified "its disciplinary purpose as applied and problem-solving, contributing towards the effective management of military forces" (p. 254) (cf. 3.1). This means that this kind of previous research can be considered as actors that attempt to do something in the military field. Accordingly, I have considered previous research as part of the material. These texts are presented in chapter three[136]. Together chapters two and three seek to grasp aspects of the macro-level.

In addition, I have paid attention to documents which were used in the local field, and which play a central role in the activities taking place there. Such documents are curricula, prescribed texts, orders, assessment criteria, checklists, plans, formal requirements, including formal physical requirements, schedules, news etc. These texts will be introduced in the third part of the dissertation when relevant for the specific interactions and activities in focus.

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[135] The documents I have explored at the supranational level are UN resolution 1325, NATO's strategic concept since 1991 and the Defense Capabilities Initiative. At national governmental level I have reviewed the series of White Papers on the Norwegian Armed Forces since 1991, as well as the Defence Studies, the strategic concept, and the action plan on implementation of UN resolution 1325. Then at the institutional level we find the Joint Operational Doctrine.

[136] Thus chapter three had two purposes: 1) review previous research in order to identify knowledge gaps and contextualize the research question, and 2) provide an important framework in order to understand the macro-level of the military figuration.

5.1.2.2 The Fieldwork/Participant Observation

For reasons explained above I consider ethnographic fieldwork to be a suitable method for the micro-level investigation. As also previously explained, I consider that Elias' ontology and epistemology could be used to challenge the critiques made of Bourdieu. An important reason for the choice of Elias' perspective was, however, that a parallel reading of Elias and Fangen's (2010) description of multi-local fieldwork provided a possible solution to a methodical challenge I struggled with in the first phase of the study.

Due to the debates and previous literature presented in chapters two and three I considered *basic officer candidate education* to be a relevant sample for the micro-level investigation (the sample will be described below, see chapter 5.2.1.1). This caused a practical challenge because the Norwegian Armed Forces had several different officer candidates schools, some of them offering a module based, decentralized and practice-oriented education in a range of different services. Accordingly, the candidates were organized in a variety of different formations over the two years the educational program spans. Therefore, a practical challenge of doing fieldwork was related to choosing where, in which venue, to conduct a study of basic officer candidate education. The classical anthropological fieldwork was conducted in a foreign culture which existed at a particular locality and the researcher remained at that location for a long time. While the idea that the researcher could not do fieldwork in their own culture has been challenged, the idea that fieldwork should take place in a culture which exists *at a particular locality*, and that the researcher should stay on this site for a long and continuous period of time seems still to be dominant (Fangen, 2010). Fangen (2010) was the first author that challenged my classical idea of how to conduct fieldwork. In a chapter on *Transnational and multi-sited fieldwork*s Fangen (2010) writes: "According to Hannerz, it is first since the late 1980s that 'multi-local field studies' (multi-sited ethnography) becomes a term in international anthropology" (p. 132). She continues that the concept was introduced by George E. Marcus whom she describes as an influential and controversial re-thinker who launched "the idea of how the combined field studies from several localities could shed light on wider social and cultural connections" (Fangen, 2010, p. 132)[137].

Fangen (2010) explains further that fieldwork can be labeled multi-local when you collect your materials in several locations and these locations are *connected with each* other in a kind of coherent structure. She refers to Hannerz (2001) who believes that a multi-local field can best be understood as one field which consists of networks of sites; thus several subfields into one field. The point is that what happens in one of the sites affects what happens in the other. From such a perspective it is desirable to combine several points of observation. According to Hannerz (2001), the multi-local fieldwork is an adaptation to a reality where culture and people are moving and where social structures are propagated across space and place in such a way that we, from a local viewpoint, can only get an incomplete picture of the activities. As

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[137] To the best of my knowledge, Fangen (2010) is the author who has written most on multi-local fieldwork in Norwegian language. She refers to Hannerz' (2001) introduction in a Swedish anthology where examples of such works are presented and elaborate further on these method than Hannerz does. Thus, I consider it most sincere to refer to Fangen instead of any other, perhaps, more primary sources.

the military personnel were moving from site to site, I felt this was true for the military field. This "settlement" with my traditional expectations to fieldwork design became a turning point for the methodical design. It also caused me to see Elias' emphasis that people have to be seen as part of a dynamic network or chains of interdependence, as well as Hammersley's (2008) and Mik-Meyer & Järvinen's (2005) criticism of qualitative research, in a new light. I considered that the multi-sited ethnography was a method which sought to adapt both to the methodological consequences of an interactional perspective and the dynamic reality of the world/military, where interdependent people in networks are in movement from site to site, and where people at one local site are affected by actions made by people at other local sites.

5.1.2.3 The Multi-Sited Fieldwork

Although the multi-sited fieldwork solved some challenges, it led to other challenges. For instance, as Hannerz (2001) notes, it is inescapable that multi-sited fieldwork also becomes a matter of choosing. In other words, I still had to carve out some locations or sites to study from the potential field. However, the focus shifted from looking for one stable group of individuals that could be studied, to making a selection of sites which all involved basic officer education and training.

Furthermore, it was important to consider how multi-sited fieldwork could avoid falling into the same trap as that of research with processual perspective (as criticized by Hammersley (2008), namely of drawing a static picture of what is not static. I wanted to be able to capture how identities were constructed, reconstructed and negotiated over a certain period of time, and how identities were affected by the socialization process. Again, Fangen (2010) contributed with a solution: the yo-yo method.

The yo-yo method means that one visits the field, or the sites that are part of the larger field that the multi-sited fieldwork aims to study, for short periods at regular intervals over an extended period of time. Furthermore, Fangen (2010) claims that the yo-yo method offers advantages in terms of nearness and distance in that one gets the opportunity to withdraw from the field and analyze data, and then return to the field with a new and adapted perspective which can be further challenged in a new meeting with the field. Yet, one would probably be able to grasp other kinds of day-to-day matters, processes and changes with a longer continuous presence at one site, than one can grasp with the yo-yo method. At the same time, regular visits in a yo-yo model may contribute to avoiding seeing things as static, because one can more easily see contrasts if one returns regularly to re-inform the picture drawn from the last visit. In sum, the multi-sited fieldwork conducted using the yo-yo method brings both advantages and disadvantages, just as the traditional one-local and coherent fieldwork also has its advantages and limitations. One point that advocates for the yo-yo method is that, according to Wacquant (2004), Bourdieu believed he was capable of seeing his home environment and the structures there with new eyes when he returned from his anthropological work in Kabylia, and that this in turn enabled him to see Kabylia with different eyes. Therefore, Bourdieu believed that it was in the early *meeting* with a new field or a reunion with a familiar field, or in the transition between fields, that you were able to discover what might have been taken for granted over time in a field. I believe this provides

support for multi-sited fieldwork conducted using the yo-yo method. Thus, it was decided to spread the fieldwork over 12 months instead of using three to four consecutive months in the field, which I had initially planned for in the first phase.

5.1.3   Constructing Figurations, Field and Sites

Before we turn to the description of how the fieldwork was conducted, and how data was analyzed, it should be made clear what are constructed as sites, Bourdieusian fields and Eliasian figurations in this dissertation.

Since a struggle over which species of capital (power resources) should be required to enter positions and gain recognition in the Norwegian Armed Forces/military profession has been observed, the Norwegian Armed Forces can be constructed as a Bourdieusian field. The relative autonomy is achieved in that the Norwegian Armed Forces has a monopolized educational system and certain limits for access. The reason why the Bourdieusian field is limited to the *Norwegian* military, when there could be said to exist a larger military field in the Western alliance, is that there is a relative autonomy between the different state-controlled military forces in the alliance, due to the state-link and, accordingly, the requirements of citizenship.

Therefore, I consider the Norwegian military (Bourdieusian) field to be part of an Eliasian figuration with other states' military fields through NATO and its non-member allies'.

Moreover, since the military field is subject to political management and different kinds of capital and investments are required for positions, recognition and authority within the military field and the political field, I consider the Norwegian military field to be a Bourdieusian field within an Eliasian figuration with the Norwegian state and its politicians. The Norwegian state is again in a figuration with the UN. Other figurations also exist, for instance the weapons industry, but in order to limit the work this dissertation will only consider aspects of influence on the Norwegian military field from the figuration it forms with the Norwegian state/government, NATO and the UN.[138] The figuration Norway forms with NATO and the UN is managed and formalized through written agreements on membership, and we have seen in chapter two that the Norwegian government acts in relation to written NATO initiatives and UN resolutions.

Finally, local sites will be used to describe the different localities in the military field which I have visited during the fieldwork. Extra-local sites will refer to different places in the military field or larger figurations where people take decisions, write management documents, rule or do things that influence action at the local sites, for instance The Ministry of Defence. In sum, the military field is constructed from different local sites which are linked together by written material, often produced at other sites, both within and outside the field. A key point with Elias' figurational sociology is that social phenomena are of fundamental relational character,

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[138] Several different figurations within the military field could also be constructed. In this study I have, however, chosen to reserve the concept to the larger chains of interdependencies the military field are part of.

which means that the relationship between the state and the supranational organizations as a macro-structure and the structure of individual people's emotions and identity as a micro-structure *is a mutually dependent relationship*.

5.2 Doing the Fieldwork

5.2.1 Preparations and Arrangements

5.2.1.1 Considering the Sample

Officer Candidate Education

The background for this dissertation was the quest for research on the *Norwegian military profession*, and the doctrine which aimed to develop a common professional identity among the officer corps. Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960) and Græger (2006) argue that a profession is characterized by a monopolized educational system which is important in the maintenance of professions status and the transmittance of the professions' values and ideals. In addition, we have seen previous research on gender and military issues argue that the very processes of *becoming* a soldier, and thus an officer, involve the construction, negotiation and reproduction of gendered identities, and this process is critical to the Armed Forces. Moreover, Ellingsen et al's (2008) pilot study on where it would be adequate to conduct research in order to gain knowledge on women's opportunities in the Norwegian military organization concludes that recruitment, selection and education, as well as leadership, play a crucial role in the shaping of military culture. Since officer education is a leadership education, all these elements are part of officer education. Accordingly, officer education – understood as monopolized education and socialization into the military profession – is selected as the overall sample for the micro-level inquiry.

Officer education in Norway begins with a two year long education and training at the Officer Candidate School[139] (GBU[140]). This education consists of one year schooling and one year compulsory service as a sergeant with assessment and guidance. After completing the Officer Candidate School the officer candidates can apply to a three year bachelor education at the Military Academy (GOU[141]). Consequently, the Officer Candidate School usually[142] represents the basic socialization and education into the Norwegian officer corps, and thus the

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[139] In many countries a distinction is made between non-commissioned officer (NCO), or sub-officer, educated through different versions of officer candidate schools/courses, and commissioned officer (CO), educated at military academies which often includes academic instruction leading to a bachelor degree. However, as a result of a class struggle in the period between World War I and II, the Norwegian Armed Forces have a uniform officer school system following the pattern from "comprehensive school" (Græger, 2006). NCO usually includes all grades of corporal and sergeant, and service such as leaders/commanders at squad and platoon level. CO usually includes grades from second-lieutenants and up.

[140] Grunnleggende Befals Utdanning (GBU) – Basic Commander Education

[141] Grunnleggende Offisers Utdanning (GOU) – Basic Officer Education

[142] Since 2008 it has been possible to apply directly to the Military Academy. Then, you will receive a four year long education where the first year is a preparatory military training for the further three year bachelor education at the Academy. The one year preparatory training will basically ensure that these students receive corresponding training foundation as those who begin in the Officer Candidate School. Thus, it can be claimed that these students have to go through a compact officer candidate education first.

military profession – if the military profession is to be understood in line with Huntington/Janowitz' 'definition of the professional group.

In a situation where culture, identity and gender are in question, The Officer Candidate School is an important venue to study because it is the main gate toward becoming an officer in Norway. Yet, it is also the first obstacle on the path because the education begins with an extensive selection process. It is often[143] the first meeting with military culture for officer recruits, and a targeted venue for the transmission of cultural values. Moreover, it is a recruiting arena and a foundation for further officer education and professional appointments. Thus, it has implications for retention. Not least; in the second year of the education the officer candidates serve as sergeants, i.e. usually as instructors and squad leaders for conscripted soldiers. Since Norway will extend conscription to women from 2015[144], it is of special interest to investigate education and socialization of the personnel who will be the conscripts' closest leaders.

Selecting Branch and Service Specialization

The Norwegian Armed Forces have several different officer candidates' schools[145], some of them offering a module based, decentralized and practice-oriented education to a range of different services[146]. Above it was explained that a multi-sited ethnography was chosen as the method partly because of the decentralized organization of the education (se chapter 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.3). Still, I had to make a sample of sites and activities where the fieldwork could take place. We will consider the selection of services first.

In chapter two Edström et al (2009b) argued that an overreaching common professional culture would risk internal tension concerning the military profession's exclusivity compared to *other* professions in the organization, including the relationship between different branches, units and services (cf. 2.2.1). Ydstebø (2010) argued further that it was clearly apparent in the debate about warrior culture that the professionalization of the Norwegian Armed Forces creates clearer subcultures which define themselves by their difference from, what are defined as, the less operative parts of the military (cf. 2.2.2). Huntington (1957) defined the expertise of the military officer to be management of violence, and explained that the medical doctor

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[143] Some applicants to the Basic Officer Candidate Schools have previous experience as conscripted soldiers.

[144] According to the Norwegian constitution of 1814 all fit male citizens are subject to conscription. Voluntary service for women was introduced in 1985. In June 2013 Norway's parliament voted overwhelmingly to extend conscription to women, and become the first peacetime European and first NATO country to make military service compulsory for both genders. The gender neutral conscription will apply to Norwegian women born on 1 January 1997 and later, and will be introduced as of 2015. Although conscription is basically a duty, it does not mean that everyone will have to do military service. As of 2014, approximately 9,000 cohorts out of 60,000 (men and women) have been called to military service.

[145] The Army Officer Candidate School, The Home Guard Officer Candidate School, The Navy's Officer Candidate School, The Air Forces Officer Candidate School, The Technical Officer Candidate School, The Norwegian Defense School of Engineering, Norwegian Defense Intelligence and Security School.

[146] For the Army Officer Candidate School services are: border guarding, reconnaissance/ ISTAR (The Garrison in Sør-Varanger/Kirkenes), infantry, guard and security service (The Kings Guard, Oslo/Elverum), light infantry and mechanized infantry (2.bataljon, Skjold), combat engineering (The Engineering Battalion, Skjold), ammunition, supply, transportation and maintenance (Combat Service Support Battalion, Heggelia/Bardufoss), communications (Communications Battalion, Heggelia/Bardufoss), artillery, (Artillery Battalion, Setermoen), cavalry and mechanized infantry (Tank/Armored Battalion, Setermoen) and medical service (Medical Battalion, Setermoen).

managed *another* profession within the military system (cf. 3.2.1.1). Similar views can be recognized in the Norwegian Armed Forces' division into combat and support services. On this basis, I decided to follow officer candidate education specializing for service in *one combat and one support service.*

In the Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 07) the *medical service* is referred to as a support service but with operational orientation, and as different from other services in that it is regulated by international and national law, especially the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, an important reason for choosing to focus on officer education to the medical service, among other possible support services, was undoubtedly due to my own background. I volunteered for military enlistment in 1993 and was "politely" directed to the medical service, because that would be the most proper service for women. Ever since I spent that year running around in mud, sand and deep snow with a patient on a stretcher, I have heard that women are not fit for military service because they are not able to carry fellow soldiers in the event of injury[147]. Ever since, I have wondered: if women cannot serve because they are unable to carry fellow soldiers in the event of injury, why were we, the women, directed to the medical service where carrying patients on a stretcher was a central part of the service? In other words, the medical service is seen as a proper service for women, as well as a support service with an expertise belonging to another profession. Yet, medical personnel follow combat units and are trained to operate when things go wrong and people are injured in combat. For such reasons, female personnel have been working in the frontlines, yet they have been described as *attached* rather than assigned to combat in countries where women are formally excluded from combat positions (see for instance King, 2013). In view of these factors, I thought that the medical service would be an interesting venue for a study of gender identity, as well as professional identity.

Having identified which *support* service to focus on, I wanted to select a combat service that was clearly part of the military profession according to Huntington's definition of professional expertise as the 'management of violence'. Ultimately the selection of which combat service to follow, among several possible, came down to practical reasons. Candidates from the *Army's* Officer Candidate School, who would be selected to the medical service, would be educated in the Medical Battalion located in Setermoen, Northern Norway. This is also the place where the Armored Battalion is situated, and where army officer candidates selected for service in cavalry and mechanized infantry would be educated. The specialized expertise of the Armored Battalion is to conduct combat operations utilizing maneuver and armor-protected firepower in order to destroy the enemy (implement/manage violence). Accordingly, selecting the service education in the Armored Battalion would enable me to do fieldwork in one support battalion and one combat battalion, yet in one settlement.

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[147] Chapter two referred to Kvarving (2010) who wrote it is constantly repeated that "it is fair enough with women if they are strong enough to carry me to safety if I get injured" (cf. 2.2.2), and Cohn (2000) has identified this as a key argument against women in the military.

Consequently, I decided to investigate officer candidate education at the *Army's* Officer Candidate School, and follow candidates specializing for 1) medical service with training in the Medical Battalion, and 2) cavalry and mechanized infantry with training in the Armored Battalion. These service specializations lead to functions as, respectively, sergeant/vehicle commander of evacuation vehicles (ambulance)[148] and sergeant/vehicle commander of the heavy tank, Leopard II[149] or the armored infantry combat vehicle CV90[150]. The services constitute the mechanized military, which means the military on wheels or caterpillars. An important point is that evacuation vehicles are often attached to combat vehicles in operations. As one of the informants from the Armored Battalion said when referring to his experiences in Afghanistan: "*The evac vehicles are always out there rolling with us. We would go nowhere without them*". However, while the specialized expertise of the Armored Battalion is to take life, the specialized expertise of the Medical Battalion is to save life.

In addition, I chose to take field notes from my own experience as a vehicle commander of an evacuation vehicle in the Home Guard Rapid Reaction Force during the period in which this study was conducted. The Home Guard's human resources are mainly based on a draft of personnel educated in the Army. The officer candidates I studied are, thus, likely to be transferred to the Home Guard, if they choose to return to the civilian life.

5.2.1.2 Formalities, Access and Permissions

Before any gathering of personal data could take place, it was mandatory that I prepared a presentation of the project's purposes and registered it at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). By registering at NSD I committed to following the applicable standards of ethics and anonymity. The project was recommended and registered with the project number 24438 (attachment one). The project was then clarified by the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) by my employer at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences/Defence Institute (NSSS/DI), which are a part of NDUC.

At the time I was planning the study, NSSS/DI was a contractor in The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment's (FFI) project "research on cohorts" (cf. 1.1) and FFI took on the process of gaining access and clarifications for the present study as well. It was arranged for me to receive a full feature of emails with permits and contact information for each of the sites I wanted to visit. Eventually I received emails with the signal to go ahead from the Ministry of Defence, the National Service Administration, the Defence Staff, the Army's Staff, the Army's Officer Candidate School, the Tank/Armoured Battalion and the Medical Battalion. In one of the emails it was stated that it was essential the project be linked to White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) on increased recruitment of women. Beyond this, I took it upon

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[148] The vehicle commander of an evacuation vehicle will be in the command of a MB 300, a sisu or caterpillar taking the passenger seat, maps and communication equipment. The team will often comprise four: the vehicle commander, a driver, medic 1 and medic 2. The vehicle is usually fully equipped as a civilian ambulance.

[149] The vehicle commander of a leopard, the heavy tank, will usually have a team of four: himself, a driver, a gunner and a charger.

[150] The vehicle commander of the CV 90 will have a team of three: herself, a driver and a gunner, and in addition the vehicle can carry a squad of 8 foot soldiers.

myself to contact the Home Guard Staff and got approval to include in the project my own experiences from service in the HG Reaction Force.

Upon arrival at the different sites I gave oral information about the purposes and objectives of the fieldwork to the group(s) I was allowed to follow. I also made clear that any participation in interviews and conversations with me was voluntary. Those who were interested received an information sheet about the participant observation (attachment two). Prior to interview informed consent was obtained (attachment three). The information letters and consent form were approved by NSD beforehand.

5.2.2 The Participant Observation

5.2.2.1 The Sites

As mentioned before, the education provided by the Army's Officer Candidate School consisted of several different activities, exercises and courses[151]. During one of the school years in the period 2010 to 2013[152] I participated in the following activities, meeting a range of officer candidates and officers/instructors from different services (battalions):

1. **Joint Selection to the Norwegian Armed Forces Officer Candidate Schools** (summer, 15 around-the-clock days). To be admitted into one of the Officer Candidate Schools applicants need to go through a selection process known as FOS[153], which is organized collectively for all military Officer Candidate Schools, as well as the 4 year degree course at the military academy (cf. 5.2.1.1). The selection takes place over a three week period and comprises three phases. Phase one takes place at Kjevik base (Air Force's education center) and consists of physical tests, interview with officer, doctor visits, etc. Selected applicants from phase one are admitted as aspirants for phase two. Phase two takes place at Evjemoen firing range and consists of a field exercise where the aspirants are divided into companies with troops consisting of squads with +/- 8 aspirants who have the same military branch/school and service as priority in their application. Phase three takes place at Kjevik base and consists of re-testing, information on different schools and services, and finally, distribution and admission to the different schools and services. I took part in the officer/instructors preliminaries[154] phase one[155], phase two (the

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[151] The Army's Officer Candidate School has been through several re-organizations since the shift of the millennium. The year the study was conducted the first educational year consisted of Joint Selection (three weeks), basic military training (Drill school) organized by the battalions (two months), service education and training organized by the battalions, Joint Education Module 1 (three weeks) and Module 2 (two weeks) organized by the Army's Officer Candidate School's headquarters (HQ). The second year consisted of a service obligation as sergeants, and Module 3 which discussed and built on their practical experience.

[152] I order to provide the cohort and troops with some chance of anonymity for outsiders I will not explicitly which school year the study was conducted.

[153] Felles Opptak og Seleksjon = Joint Admission and Selection

[154] I participated in the preparatory training of the officer who was going to conduct interviews with applicants in phase one and those who were going to serve as selection officers during phase two/the field exercise.

field exercise) and phase three[156]. Under the field exercise I followed six different squads (one each day) consisting of aspirants who had either the Medical Battalion or the Armored Battalion as priority in their application. The squads were also followed by a dedicated selection-officer.

2. **Service Education in the Medical Battalion**, Setermoen (autumn and spring, 5 + 3 days). Activities were: advanced first aid course (level 3), training on infantry activities, maintenance of equipment, leadership evaluation and closure of the final coping exercise. The coping exercise was organized jointly with the Armored Battalion and the Artillery Battalion.

3. **Service Education in the Armored Battalion,** Setermoen (autumn and spring, 5 +3[157] days). Activities were: tower/canon course Leopard II, weaponry course MG-3, activities at the shooting range, lectures in communication equipment, maintenance of equipment, leadership evaluation and closure of the final coping exercise.

4. **Joint Education Module 1** at the Officer Candidate School's HQ, Rena (late autumn, 15 days). The Module lasted for three weeks and was conducted for officer candidates from three and three battalions/services at the time. The module contained five subjects: military leadership, attitudes, military skills, military physical training, teaching methods (pedagogics). It was planned that the candidates from the Medical Battalion and Armored Battalion should participate together, but due to a change in other activities the Armored Battalion had to participate at a subsequent accomplishment of the module. Accordingly, the candidates from the Medical Battalion were present together with candidates and their officers/instructors from two other battalions from Northern Norway.

5. **The NATO Exercise Cold Response**[158] (10 around-the-clock days). At this site I participated with the Home Guard Rapid Reaction Forces. This provided me with 1) the possibility to do full participation observation at a full scale exercise with 16,000 troops from 15 nations, and 2) gain shared experience with officer candidates from the biggest military event in Norway for many

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[155] During phase one I was allowed to observe interviews with some applicants (voluntary approval from interview officer and applicants were obtained), physical testing and some lectures which were held for the groups of applicants to keep them busy between the different stations they had to go through.

[156] In this phase I observed maintenance of equipment after the field exercise, information on further service and a party for the staff of officers who had participated in the field exercise. In addition, I got the chance to do interviews with some of the aspirants I had observed during the field exercise.

[157] The three day visit to the Medical Battalion at the end of the school year overlaps with the three day visit to the Armored Battalion, because the three battalions organizing officer candidate education at Setermoen (the Artillery Battalion being the third) arranged the final coping exercise jointly. Due to lack of time and finances I did not have the opportunity to take part in the entire event.

[158] Regarding the security political situation of Norway and Cold Response, Åtlanda (2014) writes: "The Norwegian government identifies the northern areas as its number-one foreign policy priority and is committed to safeguarding the country's economic and security interests in the region" (p. 156) . Accordingly, Norway has "tried to draw NATO's attention and resources in the direction of Northern Europe [...]The problem is, of course, that the country's big neighbor to the east—Russia—has a tendency to respond negatively to almost any aspect of an increased Alliance presence in the region. For instance, the Cold Response exercise in Northern Norway […] was perceived in Russia as 'a provocation'" (p. 157).

years. A couple of candidates from the Armored Battalion were practicing in combat vehicles that our evacuation vehicle was supporting during a period of the exercise.

As a Home Guard sergeant I also got the opportunity to participate in two courses which officer candidates in the Medical Battalion were to undertake: First Aid Level 3 – Evacuation (7 days) and First Aid Level 3 – Mobile first aid station (10 days)[159]. Candidates from the Army's Officer Candidate School were, however, not present at these sites.

In total, the time I spent in the 'field' resulted in 72 days of note-taking[160] fieldwork.

5.2.2.2 Focus and Note taking

According to Fangen (2010) and Hammersley & Atkinson (2007), the overall objective in a fieldwork is to describe what people *say and do* under conditions which are not organized or prepared by the researcher. Thus, the research takes place in natural settings "in the field". Observational data are (traditionally) recorded through written notes. The data collection in a fieldwork is relatively 'unstructured', and, "does not involve following through a fixed and detailed research design specified at the start" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 3). Instead, the researcher stays open to record whatever happens in the field. This does not, however, mean that the researcher enters the field without any idea of what to concentrate on. A fieldwork will provide access to large amounts of data about many different topics, therefore, doing fieldwork requires the researcher to have a plan of what he/she is looking for.

Using the problem area as defined in the project description for a basis (essentially that which is presented in chapter two), I chose to focus on activities and accounts that said something about culture[161], identity, gender, skills, body and physics. With these as the over-arching themes I directed particular attention to how participants judged themselves and each other, and included are accounts that say something about who fits and who does not fit in the military, and who are seen as good, and who are seen as bad performers in the field.

With this as a starting point on which to focus, I visited the sites/activities described above (cf. 5.2.2.1) and wrote down what was going on, in terms of activities, events, statements, shouts, conversations, etc. As a consequence, recorded observations were of *both a verbal and non-verbal character*.

A condition that characterized the sites, and which was of great benefit to my ability to continually take notes along the way, was that most participants in the field actively used

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[159] The professional responsibility for these courses is held by the Armed Forces' Medical Service which is a joint institution for the whole Norwegian Armed Forces. Thus, the education in the Home Guard and the Army should be relatively similar.

[160] Due to my civil employment at the NDUC-NSSS/DI and military service in the Home Guard, I have participated at other events of relevance to the present study on several occasions. Thus, the 72 days are only comprised of events where I have continuously taken notes and written full field reports for each day.

[161] Keeping in mind the perspective presented in chapter four, I understood culture as classification- and value systems (cf. 4.1.2). Therefore I focused on how people and things were classified and valued in the field: as good, bad, masculine, feminine, important, not important etc.

notebooks themselves. Officers always had a notebook to hand to write down assessments of the candidates, while the candidates were actively trained to use a notebook as part of the learning strategy. Thus, in several situations in the field the candidates were ordered to take notes. As a result, I did not distinguish myself from the participants in the field if I wrote records, and I could pretty much continuously write down observations in the form of "real time scratch notes" (Sanjek, 1990).

Accordingly, I had the opportunity to record word-for-word annotation of language and expression in the form of shouts, statements and shorter conversations. In circumstances where it was inconvenient or not possible to take real time notes, e.g. because I had to run to keep up with the squad or because it was pouring with rain, the events and statements were memorized as closely as possible until a time when they could be written down in the form of "head notes" (Sanjek, 1990).

Additionally, more detailed descriptions of activities and settings, as well as my own reflections, were written down each evening. When I was out in the field (in the military meaning of the word field) the more detailed descriptions and reflections were written by hand in the tent or in a vehicle. At the sites where candidates were in a schooling situation and lived in barracks I rented my own room and reflections of the day were written directly on a laptop.

In the days following completion of the fieldwork at Joint Selection and the two visits to the battalions during the autumn, I began to (re)write a field journal on a computer from the hand written "scratch notes", "head notes" and "end of day reflections". This was very time consuming. After a while, I decided it was unnecessary to transfer all the handwritten material into digital material, so I instead wrote down reflections from the fieldwork on the computer and organized[162] the handwritten material for the subsequent analysis.

By the end of the project the written material from the 72 days of participant observation had accumulated to a total of approximately 120, 000 digital words, plus seven handwritten a5 notebooks[163].

5.2.2.3 Non-Verbal Data

According to Fangen (2010), the field researcher often assumes that he/she will gather observations of what people in the field do in the form of non-verbal data. But as Fangen says, with reference to Hans Skjervheim, interaction between people largely happens through the use of language or *in* the language. Fangen (2010) warns, therefore, that large parts of the data collected in fieldwork will be of the oral kind, which was also true of my fieldwork. This type of data will be discussed as oral accounts below.

When it comes to non-verbal data, I noted down what kind of activities were happening at the time. During physical activities I tried to record who performed well and who struggled to

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[162] Organizing it here meant that I made sure everything was marked with "technical" details: place, date etc.

[163] The number depends on how it is counted, for instance, I have considered two smaller notebooks to be one a5 notebook.

keep up. I also tried to keep record of who managed practical exercises, such as to disassemble and assemble weapons, well and quickly, and who had problems solving such tasks on time. Beyond this, I tried to note which candidates took the lead, who helped out, and who sneaked away. Since a previous study (Rones & Fasting, 2011) had indicated that tall people were 'automatically' considered to be good leaders, I noted down an estimated height of aspirants/candidates who were in focus.

However, many people were involved in the activities at the different sites; for instance approx. 1,500 aspirants were present at Joint Selection. During phase two I followed a new squad of eight uniformed aspirants who often interfered with other aspirants on a daily basis. It was then difficult to distinguish the individuals from each other, and keep track of who did what – at least as far as the men were concerned. A bias in the study is, therefore, that this problem only applied to the men. Because there were far less women, and the women were also divided one by one to the different squads, I immediately managed to identify the woman in the squads I followed as one and the same person. Previous research on women in the military has also indicated that women experience being highly visible in the military, and that everything they say and do is noticed (Ellingsen, Karlsen, Kirkhaug, & Røvik, 2008; Diamond, Kimmel, & Schroeder, 2000; Kristiansen, Boe, & Skjæret, 2010). The women's visibility in the field is reflected in my field notes in that I have referred to women in the definite singular form. For example, I wrote: "the girl ran first/last", while the men are featured in the indefinite form written as: "one of the boys ran first/last". Despite the fact that early on in the fieldwork I became aware of representing men and women differently, the men were so alike in uniform that the problem continued throughout the entire fieldwork. The male officers were not part of a group in the same manner as the aspirants/candidates, and I managed to identify and represent the male officers who either observed or led the activities I took part in as individuals and not only "one of the guys".

5.2.2.4 Unsolicited Oral Accounts

Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) distinguish between unsolicited and solicited oral accounts. Unsolicited oral accounts refer to accounts and information not asked for by the researcher. Such accounts will be the natural talk provided by participants to one another, but can also sometimes be given by participants to the ethnographer. However, as Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) also note, there are some places and situations where the exchange of accounts among participants are more likely to take place, and the same is true for exchange of unsolicited accounts with the researcher.

In the fieldwork I conducted there were far more situations where I got access to unsolicited and free talk between the officers than between the candidates. To a large extend this was due to the candidates being kept busy with lectures, tasks and cases, and they were also only given very short mealtimes where they could sit down and talk freely. Thus, the conversations observed between the candidates mostly centered on tasks and subjects initiated by the officers. However, some unsolicited conversations between candidates or between the candidates and me were recorded. These conversations mainly took place in the breaks

between lectures in the schooling situation by candidates taking part in joint education (Module 1) and the branch education, as well as during maintenance of equipment.

The situation was completely different in regards to the officers. Especially during exercises or activities out in the field, officers were often in a position of observation while the candidates solved tasks or cases, and many situations did not require continuous attention from the officers. As a result, there was time for spontaneous conversations both between officers and between me and the officers. Such situations also occurred during lessons in camp, either because the candidates were put to work, or because only one of the officers present carried out the teaching. In addition, there were situations where one officer followed a squad of aspirants/candidates through "trials" out in the field. Most of officers I followed in such situations explicitly stated that they thought it was both pleasant and helpful to have me with them because then they had someone to talk to and discuss their observations with. Accordingly, situations where I followed a single observing officer gave access to a number of accounts which dealt with the assessment of the aspirants/candidates under the officer's supervision, but also involved that I risked participating in the selection, assessment and evaluation of the aspirants/candidates.

To summarize, the fieldwork I conducted gave me good access to officers' unsolicited perspectives and assessments of candidates, while I had poorer access to candidates' perspectives. To gain access to the candidates' unsolicited accounts and perspectives, the formal interviews played an important role as candidates often wanted to discuss more about their life, situation and sometimes frustrations, after I had finished the formal interview. Thus, I came to approach the formal interview in a way I had not planned in advance. This will be discussed under the formal interviews.

5.2.2.5 Solicited Oral Accounts

Solicited oral accounts refer to conversations in which the researcher takes the initiative and asks for information. In other words, these can be accounts produced by an informant responding to the ethnographer's questions. Yet again, a distinction can be made between informal conversations and more formal conversations, e.g. in the form of interviews. When it comes to informal conversations I had plenty of opportunities to ask officers about what was happening. For the most cases, they seemed to think it was nice that someone was interested in what they were doing and were happy to talk. Hence, on several occasions my questions resulted in officers providing thorough introductions for me into, for example, the curricula of a subject, their teaching methods, their work with assessments and evaluation of the candidates, as well as sightseeing through the camp or in the vehicle stable/garage.

5.2.3 Formal Interviews

According to Hammersley & Atkinson (2007), interviews in ethnographic research range from spontaneous, informal conversation in the course of other activities to formally arranged meetings in bound settings. With informal conversation, the dividing line between participant observation and interviewing is hard to discern. On the other hand, formal interviews can easily be separated from other conversation, often because they are held as scheduled

meetings, Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) claim. However, I did not arrange any scheduled meetings for interviews. Instead people were interviewed in the field during my visit there when situation and time allowed for it. Still, what I consider to be formal interviews are easily separated from other interviews (like conversation) in that formal interviews are used to refer to the conversation where a sound recorder and an interview guideline were used. These conversations gained a formal character in that I obtained a signed consent[164] from the interviewee before the sound recorder was turned on.

5.2.3.1 Preparing the Formal Interviews

The following quote by Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) is roughly a description of how I viewed and approached the formal interviews.

> The main difference between the way in which ethnographers and survey interviewers ask questions is not, as is sometimes assumed, that one form of interviewing is 'structured' and the other is 'unstructured'. There is a sense in which all interviews, like any other kind of social interaction, are structured by both researcher and informant. The important distinction to be made is between prestructured and reflexive interviewing. Ethnographers do not usually decide beforehand the exact questions they want to ask, and do not ask each interviewee precisely the same questions, though they will usually enter the interviews with a list of issues to be covered. Nor do they seek to establish a fixed sequence in which relevant topics are covered; they adopt a more flexible approach, allowing the discussion to flow in a way that seems natural (p. 117).

In other words, I did not ask each interviewee the same questions. Yet, I prepared semi-structured interview guidelines which contained some predefined topics/themes to be covered during the conversation. Under each topic I prepared a bullet list with suggestions for more or less broad, open-ended and non-judgmental questions.

I considered this approach would provide me with flexibility while still enabling me to retain some control over the proceedings. Firstly, I wanted to give the interviewees the opportunity of a free interpretation and construction of the topic in question. Secondly, I wanted to be able to pursue upcoming issues in the conversation, but still retain the possibility to return to the research agenda. Moreover, I wanted to be able to quickly identify more suggestions for questions on the predefined topics if they came up in a different order, instead of dragging the interviewee back to a predefined sequence of questions.

From an ethnographic perspective, the topics and issues for the interview guide should ideally be developed from what emerges in the fieldwork. This is because ethnography often has an exploratory character with the purpose of producing new understanding and insight into a topic by avoiding predefined categories and issues built into the instrument for data

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[164] Prior to each interview the interviewees were given the opportunity to read through the information sheet approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). In addition I gave the interviewee oral information that I wanted to use the sound recorder, that the participation was voluntary and that they had the opportunity to withdraw from the research without any consequences, at any time. Then, signed consent was obtained before any sound recording started.

collection. However, the officer candidate education began with three intensive weeks at the Joint Selection which I considered to be an important site for this study because it is an explicit arena of inclusion and exclusion, and the first venue for the transmission of cultural values to new actors in the field. But, this is also a venue with a great many people involved who will not stay together after the event. Since I wanted to interview people at this site in order to understand who were selected and who were not selected for the further education, I prepared the first interview guidelines before I started the fieldwork. Therefore, the interview guidelines were developed based on my previous field experiences from research on related topics in the military field[165].

Because I wanted to interview both aspirants/candidates and officers I prepared two different interview guidelines. Moreover, as I would be visiting different sites over a prolonged period of time, the interview guidelines for each group were adjusted to the sites, activities and events that took place during my visit. Roughly speaking, I constructed interview guidelines to be used in the beginning, middle and end of the school year. Below is an overview of the topics I prepared for the interviews. (See attachment four and five for examples of interview guidelines from the mid phase).

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[165] I had previously conducted a shorter fieldwork including 15 interviews on the topic "the best soldiers" in the Home Guard Reaction Forces (master thesis) (Rones, 2008).

Time of School Year	Candidates	Officers
Beginning	Initial question: interviewees background Reasons to apply OCS Experiences at joint selection Who fits/does not fit in the military? Relevant skills and attributes Physical skills/requirements etc. Women From civilian to military Military culture Closure	Initial question: interviewees background Reasons to work in the military About joint selection Who fits/does not fit in the military? Relevant skills and attributes Physical skills/requirements etc. Women From civilian to military Military culture Closure
Mid	Initial question: interviewees background Reasons to go to OCS Experiences at OCS Who fits/does not fit at the OCS? Physical skills/requirements etc. Quotas – Women International operations From civilian to military Closure	Initial question: interviewees background Reasons to work in the military About OCS Who fits/does not fit at the OCS? Physical skills/requirements etc. Quotas – Women International operations Military culture Closure
End	Introduction Reasons to go to OCS Physical skills/requirements etc. The social milieu in the candidate group The school year The service obligation Being a role model Diversity Military culture Further career Closure	Assessment of the candidate group The social milieu in the candidate group The school year The candidates' jobs in the service obligation Diversity Military culture Being a role model Reasons to work in the military Physical skills/requirements etc. Closure

5.2.3.2 The Interviewees

I conducted 65 formal interviews or conversations where sound was recorded. This was more than twice as many interviews as planned[166]. On the other hand, a good number of the interviews were much shorter than planned. The reason for the change was in the first place, that the fieldwork gave little access to talk with the candidates since they were kept busy and stressed. The numbers of interviews increased mainly in the mid phase when candidates were taking part in schooling activities, and I got the opportunity to talk with them in the evenings (their activities usually finished at 20.00). After the formal interview the candidates often stayed behind to talk further about their lives and experiences at the Officer Candidate School. Some of the candidates stated that they seldom or never had the opportunity to be alone, that it was an intense milieu with competition in the group and that it was nice to get away from the others and just sit still talking to me. One candidate stayed behind and talked for more than two hours, but staying behind for 20 to 30 minutes was more common, and not all stayed behind. In this way, the formal interviews allowed for informal and free

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[166] Initially, I had planned to conduct ten interviews at the Joint Selection (beginning of fieldwork/ education), ten midway and ten at the end of the school year.

conversations with candidates where they, and not I, could set the agenda. Some of the interviewees spoke positively about the interview situation to other candidates. For instance, in a break between lessons when I was coming toward a group of candidates, one of the interviewees said: "*It was so nice to be interviewed*". Then, candidates who had not been interviewed asked when it was *their turn* to be interviewed. I answered that I hadn't planned to interview everyone, but quickly realized that this was an insult and that it would be polite to interview them. Accordingly, I agreed to interview the candidates who asked for their turn, in order to save the situation. Since still more candidates wanted to take part in the interview and the interview situation allowed for informative informal conversation, I chose to set no limits by number.

Moreover, during the visit in the battalions it dawned on me that the number of women in squads, troops and units was a recurring theme, and that I was going to face major challenges with anonymity if I were to write something about this subject with interviewees selected only from the first year cohort in the Medical Battalion and the Armored Battalion. Since the three weeks of Joint Education (Module 1) gathered personnel from two more battalions[167], I decided to include candidates and officers from all the battalions present at Module 1. This was also convenient as candidates from the other battalions were among those who asked for their turn to be interviewed. Additionally, I decided to include second year candidates who were present as instructors for the first year candidates in the battalions I visited for branch education. Extending the interviewee sample was, therefore, a method to provide better possibilities for anonymity at group level, and for the few women in the Armored Battalion. Accordingly, the selection of interviewees became both larger and different than planned.

The 65 interviews were recorded at the following sites with the following personnel:

- Beginning School Year: 15 interviews were recorded at Joint Selection to the Officer Candidate Schools. Those who were interviewed were:
    - Five male and five female officers participating in the selection of aspirants/candidates[168]. On a daily basis they were working either at the Army's Officer Candidate School's HQ at Rena, Eastern Norway, with officer candidate education in four different battalions in Northern Norway or with recruitment for the Norwegian Armed Forces/The Army.
    - Five short interviews with five female aspirants[169], where three of them were admitted to the Medical Battalion or Armored Battalion and thus present at the sites visited later.

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[167] Which battalions the other candidates came from will not be revealed due the issue of anonymity.

[168] These officers were selected because they had key position in 1) organization and education of selection officers, 2) management of the company/troop of aspirants and selection officers I followed, or 3) had positions as the selection officer in the squads I followed.

[169] During the field exercise I had mentioned to some officers that I would have liked to interview aspirants, but that the opportunity had not arisen. When we returned to base after a full night's march, the officers allowed for interviews with aspirants in the time leading up to dinner, which was two hours. I had not slept during the last 33 hours, and little before that, while the aspirants had hardly slept *at all* for one week. Given the aspirants' condition I decided it would be better to have

- Mid School Year: 40 interviews were recorded during the fieldwork conducted at joint education in Rena (Module 1), and the branch education in the Medical Battalion and the Tank/Armored Battalion. Those who were interviewed were:
  - 28 first and second year candidates[170] coming from four[171] different battalions in Northern Norway. Two of these were among the female aspirants interviewed at Joint Selection, and therefore were interviewed for a second time.
  - 12 officers working either at the Army's Officer Candidate School's HQ or with officer candidate education in the Medical Battalion, the Tank/Armored Battalion or one of the two other battalions from Northern Norway present at the Joint Education.
- End School Year: 10 interviews were recorded during the spring visit to the Medical Battalion and Armored Battalions. These were with:
  - Seven candidates ranked among the top three, mid three or bottom three by the officers in their battalion. Four of the candidates were interviewed for a second time.
  - Three officers from the two battalions were interviewed for a second time[172].

In sum:

- 40 interviews were recorded from 18 female and 16 male candidates[173] from four different battalions. This means that six of them were interviewed twice.
- 25 interviews were recorded from 7 female and 15 male officers. This means that three of them were interviewed twice.

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short conversations with more aspirants, than full interviews with one or two. Since the opportunity to interview aspirants came suddenly, the strategy for selection of aspirants and choice of topic for much shorter interviews were based on first impulse. In five of the squads I had followed during the field exercise there was a lone woman. The fact that the women were spread out one by one over many squads, rather than being two or three together in fewer squads, had been a topic of discussion the whole week. Therefore, and because the women had been easier to identify as individuals (cf. 5.2.2.3), I decided to interview the five female aspirants with whom I had spent a day. The topic for these interviews became the women's experience of being a lone woman in a squad. Since the aspirants were worn out, I informed clearly that the participation in interview was completely voluntary. However, all the five women said yes immediately, and stated that they saw this as an offer to get away from the group and the other tasks for a few minutes. The longest of these interviews is 15 minutes and the shortest five minutes.

[170] Some candidates for these interviews were selected by me asking the officers which male and female candidates were ranked at top, mid and bottom of their ranking list. I did not tell any candidates that selection to interview was due to their position on the officers' ranking list. The rest were interviewed because of the reasons described in the main text.

[171] The four different battalions are not the same as the four different battalions the officer interviewed at Joint Selection came from.

[172] The officers were in charge of education and evaluation of candidates in the Medical Battalion and the Armored Battalion. At this time they were asked to sum up the school year and account for their impression of the candidates.

[173] Here, candidates refers to both aspirants and first and second year candidates.

- 32 of the interviews were with women, 33 with men. All were ethnical Norwegians. Candidates ranged from 18 to 24 in age. Officers ranged from 21 to 53 in age.

These interviews resulted in 32 hours[174] of recording.

5.2.3.3 Transcription

The oral interview material was made available for analysis through transcription. The transcription was conducted by a professional transcriber from the Norwegian Text Center (NTS) who had previously taken part in a reliability check[175] of transcripts following Kvale's (2004) recommended procedures[176]. Then, in preparation for the line-by-line coding (cf. 5.3.2.1) I listened to the audio file and compared it with the transcript. There were not many significant differences between the sound recording and the transcript. Basically, I had to fill in the names of vehicles, weapons, military procedures and some military, technical and medical jargon. Quotations from the interviews which have been selected as examples through the analysis were checked against the audio file before they were translated into English by me. The process of translation, however, inevitably resulted in a change in nuance, and some words used in the oral accounts/Norwegian transcripts are more or less untranslatable.

5.3   Analysis and Interpretation

According to Woodward and Jenkings (2011), previous analyses of military identities have been "configured around *pre-existing analytic categories* which prioritize the conceptualization of military identities around gender issues" (p. 255). Furthermore, in chapter three we saw these authors claim that a conceptual turn to 'doing' rather than any essential categories of 'being' seems to be key to understanding individual military identities. In this chapter I will explain how I approached the data in order to develop fresh analytic categories based in doing.

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[174] Longest interview: 59.38 minutes, shortest interview: 5:42 minutes. Shortest interview without the five short aspirant interviews was 17:23 minutes.

[175] According to Kvale (2004) the transformation from oral to written language must be seen as an interpretation since it inevitably results in a change of the original context. Thus, he argues it is important to question the transcription's accuracy.

[176] This was done by both me and the professional transcriber writing down three interviews recorded for my master thesis (Rones, 2008) upon which our written representations were compared. The differences could be classified as insignificant for the content. However, the transcriber's transcripts were easier to read because small unimportant words and sounds were cut out. The differences that emerged were mostly due to the transcriber's unfamiliarity with some military words and phrases, and were rectified in accordance with my understanding. According to Kvale (2004) transcript validity must be viewed in conjunction with *the purpose of the transcript*. As long as the transcription is not meant for, for example, psychological interpretation or linguistic analysis it can be sufficient that the content is rendered in accordance with the spoken material. Therefore it was concluded that although the professional transcriber's form of transcription could not be said to be the most literal and accurate, it was still very honorable in the "translation" from oral to written language in terms of meaning. Accordingly, I chose to use the same professional transcriber and the same type of transcripts for this study.

5.3.1 Kathy Charmaz' Constructivist Grounded Theory Method

The development of analytical categories has been *inspired*[177] by Kathy Charmaz' (2006) constructivist interpretation of doing grounded theory. According to Charmaz, grounded theory methods can simply be stated as consisting of "systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories 'grounded' in the data themselves" (p. 2). In short, constructing grounded theory means to build levels of abstraction directly from the data, and subsequently gather additional data to check and refine emerging analytic categories in an interactive process, which culminates in an abstract theoretical understanding of the studied experience.[178] However, before describing the process of analysis, I will account for the choice of analytic method and discuss whether the method coheres with the ontological and epistemological assumptions which underlie the interactional perspective of Bourdieu and Elias.

Charmaz (2006) explains that grounded theory methods emerged from the sociologists Glaser and Strauss, and, "marries two contrasting – and competing – traditions in sociology as represented by each of its originators: Columbia University positivism and Chicago School pragmatism and field research" (p. 6-7)[179]. Charmaz reminds us that pragmatism informed symbolic interactionism[180], and explains that "Strauss adopted both symbolic interactionism and the Chicago legacy of ethnographic research" (p. 7). Glaser and Strauss together with Corbin, however, took grounded theory further in somewhat divergent directions. Since that "grounded theory has been packed with multiple meanings, but also fraught by numerous misunderstandings, and complicated by competing versions" (p. 177), Charmaz proceeds. Although the originator fought the dominance of positivistic quantitative research, in the 1990s grounded theory became known for *its* positivistic assumptions. However, Charmaz argues that "we can use basic grounded theory guidelines with twenty-first century

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[177] Charmaz (2006) refers to: "in their original statement of the method, Glaser and Strauss (1967) invited their readers to use grounded theory methods flexibly in their own way" (p. 9). Accordingly, Charmaz also emphasizes that what she offers through her interpretation of grounded theory methods are "flexible guidelines, not methodological rules, recipes, and requirements" (p. 9).

[178] Charmaz (2006) asserts that more researchers claim to have used grounded theory methods than profess to have constructed theory. She then argues that if you peruse articles whose author claims to have construed a finished grounded theory, various views on theory can be found, such as "1) an empirical generalization, 2) a category, 3) a predisposition, 4) an explication of a process, 5) a relationship between variables, 6) an explanation, 7) an abstract understanding, and 8) a description" (p. 133). Charmaz explains that she "see[s] grounded theory as offering plausible accounts" (p. 132) and *theorizing* as a *practice*. Considering theorizing, it "entails the practical activity of engaging the world and of constructing abstract understandings about and within it" (p. 128). Thus, Charmaz claims that "the fundamental contribution of grounded theory methods resides in offering a guide to interpretive theoretical practice not in providing a blueprint for theoretical products" (pp. 128-129). However, Charmaz explains that constructivist grounded theory lies squarely in an interpretive tradition in which definitions of theory emphasize *understanding* the studied phenomenon, rather than explaining it in causal terms. Yet, a constructivist approach does more than interpret, for instance, why individuals view their situations as they do, it also acknowledges that the resulting theory is an interpretation that depends on the researcher's view and values, and that the interpretation is contextually situated.

[179] While Glaser's positivist training imbued grounded theory with rigorous codified methods and emphasis on emergent discoveries, Strauss' Chicago School heritage and pragmatism "brought notions of human agency, emergent process, social and subjective meanings, problem-solving practices, and the open-ended-study of action to grounded theory" (p. 7).

[180] Ouellet (2005b) proposed that effort should be taken within military sociology to re-energize the Chicago School's interpretative tradition, and recalled that Janowitz' central thesis is that the military profession must be examined in its *process of change* (cf. 3.2).

methodological assumptions and approach" (p. 9), and through that complete other approaches to qualitative data analysis because the classical text of grounded theory "provide[s] an explicit method for analyzing processes" (p. 9). Accordingly, Charmaz builds her constructivist grounded theory on a symbolic interactionist theoretical perspective, and it can be argued that it coheres with the ontological and epistemological assumptions assumption which underlies Bourdieu and Elias perspective.

Charmaz explains that in their classics "Glauser and Strauss talk about *discovering theory* as emerging from data separate from the scientific observer" (p. 10). Unlike this Charmaz argues that neither data nor theories are discovered. Instead she argues that "we *construct* our grounded theories through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, perspectives, and research practices" (p. 19)[181]. Keeping with the Chicago School antecedents, Charmaz argues for acknowledging these constructions and explains that her approach to grounded theory methods "explicitly assumes that any theoretical rendering offers an *interpretive* portrayal of the studied world, not an exact picture of it" (p. 10). Then, because grounded theory attempts to develop *fresh categories* from data instead of being configured around *pre-existing analytic categories,* and since Charmaz' version of grounded theory is built on a symbolic, interactionist, theoretical perspective which again emerges from the Chicago School also Elias resembled, I have chosen to set out with Charmaz' guidelines for analyzing my data.

5.3.2 Development of Categories through Coding

Unfortunately, I came across Charmaz (2006) too late to learn from her guidelines for gathering data. However, Charmaz suggests using ethnographic methods[182] and interviewing as tools to produce rich data. What I have taken advantage of is Charmaz' approach to coding and *development of categories*. The method consists of two main steps of coding:

1) initial line-by-line coding, a strategy which prompts you to study your data closely – line-by-line and begin conceptualizing your ideas, and

2) focused coding, which permits you to separate, sort and synthesize large amounts of data (Charmaz, 2006, p. 11)

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[181] Similarly, Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) explained that the pursuit to discover data belongs to the tradition of phenomenology/hermeneutics, while constructivist/interactionist perspectives all have in common that they assume that the meaning of an action or a phenomenon is created in the interaction between people or between people and things, including the researcher (cf. 5.1.1).

[182] According to Charmaz (2006) grounded theory study takes a different form than other types of ethnographies from the start. Grounded theory ethnographers give priority to the studied phenomenon or process rather than to a description of a setting, and, likely move across settings to gain more knowledge of the studied process. Other ethnographic approaches, Charmaz argues, often focus on topics such as kinship networks, religious practices and usually take a more structural than processual approach. According to Charmaz' division I would think of the present study as a grounded theory ethnography, yet I did not plan, nor claim it as such. However, as we remember, Elias resembles the Chicago School's use of ethnographies, where grounded theory and symbolic interactionism have their roots. Thus, in an attempt to take into account Elias' ontological and epistemological perspective, as well as the critique raised by Mik-Meyer & Järvinen (2005) toward research inspired by interactional and processual perspectives, the fieldwork was planned to give priority to the studied phenomenon or process – rather than the setting itself.

Charmaz defines coding as "naming segments of data with a label that simultaneously categorizes, summarizes, and accounts for each piece of data" (p. 43). However, what is important with Charmaz' approach to coding is that the code "attempt[s] to portray *meanings and actions*" (p. 45). Therefore, the code should *not* be written as a topic or theme, but as a short sentence with actions embedded in the codes. In order to embed action in the codes, Charmaz learns from Glaser who used the gerunds i.e. a noun made from a verb by adding '-ing'. Consistent with Glaser, Charmaz stresses using gerunds in coding- and memo-writing because adopting gerunds fosters theoretical sensitivity. Charmaz explains that "these words nudge us out of static topics and into enacted processes: "Gerunds prompt thinking about actions" (p. 136). I found this linguistic approach to the coding to be in coherence with Elias' (1978) claim for new means for speaking and thinking. He has criticized our language for being constructed in such a way that it causes what he calls 'process-reduction'. Elias (1978) exemplifies that one would say "the river is flowing" and "the wind is blowing" as if the river or the wind were a thing at rest which, at a given point, begins to move or blow from a state of rest[183]. Thus, I decided to follow Charmaz' advice and write the codes as short sentences having a gerund/verb[184] in the forefront. I will now explain in more detail how the coding was conducted.

5.3.2.1 Initial Coding

The initial line-by-line coding was very time consuming and a selection of data had to be made for this type of coding. Since the field notes described quite different activities from day-to-day, and the content of these data were fresher in my mind than that of the interview transcriptions, I decided to do the initial coding on a selection of interviews. The following interviews were selected for this process, yet not all were coded in the same detail since more focused codes emerged gradually during the process of coding:

- the five short interviews with female aspirants from Joint Selection
- one male and one female officer from the Army's Officer Candidate School
- one male and one female officer from the Medical Battalion
- one male and one female officer from the Armored Battalion
- one male and one female officer candidate from the Medical Battalion
- one male and one female officer candidate from the Armored Battalion
- one male and one female officer candidate from the other battalions present at joint education

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[183] Elias explains this is because European "languages tend to place at the forefront of our attentions substantives, which have the character of things in a state of rest" (p. 112), and then express the attribute of the verb, such as change, action and process, as something additional rather than integral.

[184] The gerund form is more common in English than in Norwegian, and since I coded my data in Norwegian I strived to write short sentences beginning with a verb in present tense.

The selected transcript was coded line-by-line in MaxQda 11. This resulted in a great number[185] of codes, all at the same level, written as short sentences summarizing the content in each meaningful section in the interview. After finishing the interview coding, I compared the codes and coded similar codes with a new code, striving to use gerund/verb sentences. Using MaxQda was very convenient for this process. The program offered the possibility of writing new codes and dragging the first line-by-line codes into the new code; and through that building a hierarchy of codes. As a result, the great numbers of line-by-line codes were collected into fewer and fewer codes. Below is an example of some initial line-by-line codes written from the interviews with the five female aspirants:

- acceptance easier when a lone girl
- forming of boy and girl groups when more than one girl present
- expected girls would hang with the girl(s) if more girls are present
- escape the competitive stuff when no other girls
- calming down when there are no other women to compete
- receiving the guys' attention alone when other girls are not present

To collect these and similar line-by-line codes, I wrote the code "preferring to be the only woman" and dragged the 'first level codes' into that 'second level code'. The code "preferring to be the only women" was later dragged in a 'third level code' and so on. See example in attachment six showing how hierarchies of codes were progressively built up in MaxQda.

However, the coding was a far more messy process than it appears here. I created several different MaxQda files to try again. At first attempt the list of initial line-by-line codes became so long that it was difficult to compare the codes. Yet, this was a part of the process: learning to know the data and progressively refining the great number of initial line-by-line codes into a manageable number. Also, as warned by Charmaz (2006), invoking a language of action rather than of topics felt strange at first. This meant that it took some practices before I managed to write codes formulated as sentences with a gerund/verb in the forefront, and still several codes were *not* written in accordance with this ideal. Yet, after working through the data for quite a while and seeking to group the line-by-line codes into larger codes covering the most frequent and relevant content for the research questions, some codes started to take form as conceptual categories with possible theoretical meaning. Having developed seven (9) codes which I considered would make analytical sense to use for categorizing larger amounts of data, I turned to the process of focused coding. These codes were as follows, yet re-formulated several times before landing at this formulation:

- Requiring tractability, conformity and submissiveness
- Requiring "the right attitude"
  - Requiring self-drive, self-leading, commitment, competitiveness and winning instinct

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[185] For instance, 298 line-by-line codes were written from the five short aspirant interviews, while 254 codes alone were written from the interview with the female officer from the Army's Officer Candidate School.

- o   Requiring proper style, moral and culture
- Requiring proper bodily appearance and fitness
- Requiring fellowship, social skills and contribution
- Requiring exemplary tidiness and care for the equipment
- Disqualifying and inappropriate behavior
- Feeling undervalued/striving for recognition and acknowledgements

The code "requiring 'the right attitude'" was divided into two sub-codes because 1) it was the far most frequent code, and 2) the notion "the right attitude" referred to content which could be understood as both power resources (commitment, competitiveness and winning instinct) and forms of regulation (proper style and moral) (see introduction to part 3, p. 155).

5.3.2.2   Focused Coding

It should be mentioned, as Charmaz notes, that moving from initial to focused coding is not a linear process, and being able to create several MaxQda files I returned to the process of line-by-line coding for some interviews, after having started the process of more focused coding for others. Yet, the focused codes that developed from the line-by-line codes were applied to the rest of the interviews, progressively in lesser detail as saturation was reached in more and more topics. I also applied the focused codes to the most relevant parts of the digital field notes. The handwritten field notes were browsed over to see whether anything interesting or relevant had been left out, and sequences of interest from this material were written into the field notes directly in the MaxQda file so they could be included in the codes.

Since all the line-by-line codes were written as short sentences summarizing the content in sections in the interviews, printing the code system from MaxQda gave me a helpful and hierarchically organized summary of the content in the data coded with each of the focused codes (see attachment seven for a print of a code system in progress, showing how the coding produced a summary of the data). Through reading the emerging code systems and using the function in MaxQda to retrieve segments of data coded with each code, I re-formulated the focused codes to better cover the growing content being labeled by the codes. Parallel to this process, I started to reformulate the codes into typologies (first level headlines) in a Word document, pasting in illustrative segments of data[186]. I developed the following typologies in the Word document, each referring to the code used to categorize the data:

- The Tractable and Conforming Candidate [Requiring tractability, conformity, and submissiveness]
- The Self-Motivated, Committed and Competitive Winner and Leader [Requiring self-drive, self-leading, commitment, competitiveness and winning instinct]

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[186] The Word document grew to approximately 90,000 words. The 65 interview transcripts contained from 917 to 6395 words. The fieldwork resulted in 120,000 digital words, rewritten from parts of the handwritten material.

- The Benign[187], Moral and Civilized Warrior [Requiring proper style, moral and culture]
- The Physically Fit and Military Body [Requiring proper bodily appearance and fitness]
- The Socially Competent and Contributing Buddy [Requiring fellowship, social skills and contribution]
- The Skilled Instructor Who Cares Properly for the Equipment [Requiring exemplary tidiness and care for the equipment]
- The Failing Candidate [Disqualifying and inappropriate behavior]
- The Undervalued Soldier [Feeling undervalued/striving for recognition and acknowledgements]

Under each of the typologies/first level headlines 'requirements'[188] and 'responses'[189] were written as the second level headline, and the selected data was sorted as to whether it was an example of the requirement (preparing to answer research question number one) or illustrated responses to the requirement reflected in the code/typology (preparing to answer research question number two). We will now turn to the process referred to as the interpretation.

5.3.3 Interpretation and the Writing Process

Separating the processes of designing the study, gathering data, analysis and coding, literature reading and procedure of interpretation must be seen as an artificial division. For instance, Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) assert that an ethnographer has to continually make interpretations, not only to understand the process he/she engages in, but also in order to act appropriately in the field he/she enters. It is referred to above that the data produced for analysis and interpretation are themselves interpretations, and the final research product is an interpretation derived from interpretations that have taken place throughout the entire process. Acknowledging the interpretive character of the research process, a report on (qualitative) research usually should account for how the researcher's position and perspective influence the data production and interpretations leading to the final product. This will be done in the next chapter. Yet, some procedures and techniques have been used to strengthen and/or challenge my interpretations along the way, and these techniques will be described here. Firstly, as Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) claim:

> there are distinct advantages in combining participant observation with interviews; in
> particular the data from each can be used to illuminate the other [...] experience as a
> participant observer can have an important effect on how one interprets what people

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[187] The headlines were developed in Norwegian. Using the word 'benign' in the English translation was inspired by Belkin (2012) later in the process, since the content in this category was recognized in Belkin's work.

[188] In order to answer the research question: "What is required from men and women respectively to do military officer appropriately?"

[189] In order to answer the research question: "How do men and women with different forms of capital respond to different formal and informal requirements in the military field?"

> say in interviews [...] The effect may also work the other way. What people say in
> interviews can lead us to see things differently in observation (pp. 102-103).

Similarly, I would argue that combining the fieldwork (micro-level inquiry) with reviewing management documents and previous literature on macro-level conditions led to a process where the macro-level interpretation affected how I interpreted what happened in the field, and vice versa. Thus, I experienced that multi-sited yo-yo fieldwork with the combination of observation, interviews and document collection, as well as the combined macro- and micro-level analysis, facilitated what Charmaz (2006) refers to as an interactive research process: where successive levels of abstraction and interpretation are built through comparative analysis and testing of previous ideas against new data and sources[190].

However, as stated in the book *The Language of Knowledge: Writing as a Research Method* (Johansen A. , 2012), the importance of language and writing as a tool for discovery and knowledge production are neglected, and what happens when writing is seldom discussed. Yet for many researchers writing and using language are the most important tools for investigation and interpretation. Also, in several books on methods, as for example that of Charmaz (2006), memo-writing is recommended as an intermediate step between data collection and writing drafts of paper because writing memos prompts you to analyze and interpret the data. I find it difficult to distinguish between writing memos and drafts, but Charmaz (2006) advocates for memo-writing as a method for the researcher to find freedom in writing and escape from "an outline with a predictable beginning, middle, and end", which may move the researcher straight into reporting without first having engaged in "the discovery, exploratory phase of writing" (p. 85). I consider engaging in discovery and exploration through free writing to be a crucial part of learning, thinking, analyzing and interpretation. However, I agree with Fyhn (2012) and others in the book *The Language of Knowledge,* referred to above, who claim that the necessity to write in a second language deprives the writer from his/her best tool for knowledge production, since knowledge production *is* language production. Thus, where Charmaz argues that the draft moves the researcher into reporting, I would argue that writing in English moves me into reporting what I already know, and I would claim that writing in a second language has been a barrier for knowledge production, interpretation and discovery in and through language. In particular, I experience that the text lack the linguistic precision that could have been achieved if the text were written in Norwegian.

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[190] In addition, possible interpretations and meanings of data selected in the Word document, referred to under the process of focused coding (cf. 5.3.2.2), were discussed with my supervisor Professor Kari Fasting (Norwegian School of Sport Science) and Professor Rachel Woodward (The School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University) who I visited during a Visiting Research Fellowship, as well as two fellow Ph.D. students.

5.4 Considerations

5.4.1 Reflections on The Researcher's Position and Epistemological Bias

"While the concept of reflexivity has been used extensively across the social sciences over many decades, its impact on studies of the military has remained marginal", Higate & Cameron (2006, p. 219) claim. They proceed by saying that "reasons for this go to the heart of the dominant epistemological foundations of a military sociology that implicitly assumes that researcher bias can be neutralized by adhering to the traditional positivist model of sociological research" (Higate & Cameron, 2006, p. 219). Challenging this model, Higate & Cameron argue that

> there is much to be gained by reflecting on the process of doing research, and 'writing in' the authors where appropriate, particularly within the context of research on the military. In appraising the quality of research projects, it is helpful to know more about the motivations of researchers (especially given that many are veterans), the ways in which access to the military samples were negotiated, and the criteria placed upon researchers and their projects by military funders.

Regarding debates on whether research should be 'value-free' (objective) or that it is unavoidable that research will be 'value-laden' (subjective), Elias' stance is that "the problem is not *whether* subjectivity influences perception – it does – but *how* it frames perception" (Baur & Ernst, 2011, p. 120). Hence, Baur & Ernst claim that Elias' inspired methodologies should explicate the researcher's theoretical and personal perceptivity, and reflect on how this forms the interpretation. In Bourdieu's "Reflexive Sociology" (Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) reflexivity is a *cornerstone*[191]. Accordingly, Higate & Cameron's (2006) request for writing in the researcher's position cannot be neglected in a study inspired by Elias and Bourdieu.

Bourdieu is concerned with three types of biases which may blur the sociological gaze (Wacquant, 1992). The first is singled out by other advocates of reflexivity and regards the social origins and coordinates of the individual researcher (class, gender, ethnicity, etc.). The second is linked to the position of the researcher, including the researcher's position in the academic field with regards to possible intellectual positions/perspectives. The third bias regards the researcher's presuppositions and, for example, how these are built into instruments, concepts, codes etc. It has already been discussed how I have tried to avoid building presuppositions into the research through codes and the use of concepts[192]. In this

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[191] "If there is a single feature that makes Bourdieu stand out in the landscape of contemporary social theory, it is his signature obsession with reflexivity", Wacquant claims (1992, p. 36)

[192] Firstly, due to Belkin's (2012) claims that glorification of the relationship between masculinity, authority and military institutions "has obscured scholarly understanding of what military masculinity is and how it works" (p. 4) the research questions were developed without using concepts of masculinity and femininity (cf. 3.3.4). Secondly, due to Woodward and Jenkings' (2011) note that analyses of military identities have been dominated by pre-existing analytic categories which prioritize the conceptualization of military identities around gender issues, grounded theory method was used to develop fresh codes grounded in data (cf. 5.3). Thirdly, Bourdieu's open concepts, as that of the field, were chosen as a concept to

section I will account for my motives and positions in the field. I will also discuss how my different positions may have influenced access and understanding.

5.4.1.1 Why do I Study this Topic and for Whom?

I volunteered for military service in 1993. To enter I signed a declaration for female military personnel undertaking full mobilization and service obligation, which implied taking on the same rights and duties as conscripted men until the age of 44. After completing 12 months of military service I returned to civilian life, but was enrolled to the Home Guard and annual[193] military service. In 2006 I enlisted in HG's Rapid Reaction Forces[194] (HG RRR) with an extended[195] annual service. The same year I attended the master program in outdoor education and pedagogics[196] at the Norwegian School of Sport Science (NSSS). Since the Defence Institute at NSSS had an ongoing project on development of expertise/optimal performance in relation to cold weather operations (see Eriksen, 2011), master's students from the outdoor program were invited to attach to the topic. I took the opportunity, but started to read up on the military transformation (cf. 2.1), which led to my research interest in optimal military performances and also to the establishment of the HG RRF I had recently attended. I realised that *the best soldiers*[197] were sought, recruited and developed to solve *unknown tasks*. Accordingly, for my master thesis (Rones, 2008; 2011) (cf. 3.2.1.3). I set out to investigate which criteria were used to judge who were "the best soldiers" when the task that "the best soldiers" were to solve was explicitly stated as unknown. Afterwards, I was employed as a civilian research assistant at the Defence Institute at NSSS, and later given the opportunity to develop the topic for a PhD scholarship under the principle on academic freedom, which resulted in the present dissertation.

5.4.1.2 Different Institutional Belongings – Different Acceptance

As part of the employment at the Defence Institute I did fieldwork for the project "research on cohort"[198] initiated by The Ministry of Defence, in parallel with doing fieldwork for the present study[199] (cf. 2.1). Due to this, and the fact that the Defence Institute has a double affiliation through its belonging to the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) with

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think of people in a room of relations and positions, instead of thinking of them in predefined categories like "class" or "women" (see footnote 95).

[193] Conscripted enrolled to the Home Guard are obliged to participate in service up to six days per year (Ot.prp.nr. 36, (2005-2006)).

[194] Following the quality reform described in the White Paper (White Paper No 42, (2003-2004)) (cf. 1.1 and 2.1) the HG's Rapid Reaction Forces were established in 2005/2006 as a high readiness force with better trained and equipped personnel.

[195] Enlisted personnel in the HG's Rapid Reaction Forces can be called for training up to 30 days per year (Ot.prp.nr. 36, (2005-2006)).

[196] Regarding Bourdieu's second bias linked to possible intellectual positions and perspectives, this means that I am not a sociologist. Instead I have been trained to apply different perspectives, including sociology, on physical education, outdoor education and risk-sport.

[197] According to the recruitment campaign, the HG's Rapid Reaction Forces should become a flexible and mobile *spear-tip* with '*the best soldiers*' within the Home Guard. It was thus emphasized in the material that the Home Guard were dependent upon recruiting and identifying '*the best people*' in order to solve their future task and duties (Home Guard Staff, 2004-2008).

[198] The project is administrated by *the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.*

[199] In a four year Ph.D. scholarship 25% of the time is to be used for other tasks for the institution. In my case that was "research on cohorts"

location at NSSS[200], I came to present myself differently to people I met at different sites in the military field. I quickly realized that the response and acceptance I received in the field differed largely depending on which institution I said I came from, and for whom my research was being done. If I said I belonged to the Norwegian Defence University College I experienced that officers at a certain level instructed officers of the lowest ranks to be careful how they acted when I was present. Moreover when I did research on behalf of "research on cohort" I was met with a lot of suspicion. On the other hand, if I said I came from the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences and were a soldier in the HG's Rapid Reaction Forces, officers were eager to share a lot more with me.

At one site I met an officer who had been very suspicious and negative toward my presence at a previous site, but during the fieldwork at the latest site his attitude changed toward me and he became friendly and eager to discuss things. As I got to know him I revealed to him the contrasting attitudes, of either suspicion or eagerness to share, I had met in the field, which seemed to change depending on my institutional and financial belonging. I also told him that I thought it was strange because I had expected the opposite[201]. He said: "*That's not strange at all. That's because of the ALFA case*". This remark refers to an article in a popular men's magazine[202] launched in 2010, where soldiers from the professional unit Telemark Battalion were portrayed as warriors, with quotes such as "war is better than sex". The article became front page news in the daily press, and a major from the battalion became a public figure pictured in a Viking helmet, after a video was published showing him motivating his troops in Afghanistan by shouting "You are the predator. Taliban is the prey. To the Valhalla!"[203]

The officer I talked to explained that many officers had felt that the military leadership and the politicians had treated the lower level leadership very badly and unfairly in the public discussion following the ALFA article. The experience of poor treatment was also reflected in several of the interviews. For example another male officer said in the interview:

> The Armed Forces are well regarded and have a solid position in society, [among the people] really. It's amazing, the amount of thrashing we get, we rise back up. You saw it with the ALFA-case and all that stuff. We shake it off us and get back up, even though I really mean it when I say that the politicians are doing their utmost to throw shit at us. I'm not – I hope you will delete this!204 – I'm not terribly impressed with the top level in the Armed Forces either when it comes to leadership. Then I am talking about the military top level. I'm not impressed! [Shaking his head] (Interview).

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[200] The Defence Institute is situated and integrated to the Civil Institution NSSS, yet, it is subject to the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC).

[201] I expected that they would be more positive toward someone representing any of the military institutions, than to someone coming from outside, representing a civil institution (although the Defence Institute at NSSS is subject to the military organization)

[202] The title explicitly referring to the Alpha male that the magazine sought to construct/portray.

[203] The media discussion on the representation of Norwegian soldiers and the warrior masculinity presented/or constructed in ALFA magazine is discussed in an article by Langeland (2012)

[204] I believe I can refer to it as long as anonymity is ensured.

The officer to whom I talked about my acceptance in the field explained that when people associated me with the Norwegian Defence University College or the Ministry of Defence/"research on cohort" they assumed I was sent out with the task of actively searching for negative aspects of military culture to be weeded out; because this was what the leadership promised they would do in the ALFA case media debate. On the other hand, he explained, if I was a student from the Norwegian School of Sport Science, and, on top of that, happy enough with military culture to voluntarily enlist to the Home Guard Rapid Reaction Forces and spend time "on the ground", then they hoped that I could tell their story. Because of this experience, I added the question: "What do you think about me being here to observe and do research on you?" as the final question in the interview guidelines. This resulted in answers such as: "*It is good that at least someone seems interested in what we educators do*".

What can be understood from this is that connection to elite military institutions prevented/deterred access in the field, while civilian student-status with extended service at ground level in the Home Guard Rapid Reaction Force provided acceptance. Accordingly, the contours of a class or level conflict were revealed through the different institutional belongings I claimed. We will return to this conflict in the results. We will now turn to how the researcher's previous experience of the field can influence the ability to interpret and understand what goes on in different ways.

5.4.1.3 A Transmigrant[205] Position

A common typology used to describe researchers' positions regarding epistemological bias is that of the insider/outsider. However, this dimension is surrounded by myths Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) claim, and they refer to Styles (1979:148):

> In essence, outsider myths assert that only outsiders can conduct valid research on a given group; only outsiders, it is held, possess the needed objectivity and emotional distance. According to outsider myths, insiders invariably present their group in an unrealistically favorable light. Analogously, insider myths assert that only insiders are capable of doing valid research in particular groups and that all outsiders are inherently incapable of appreciating the true character of the group's life. Insider and outsider myths are not empirical generalizations about the relationship between the researchers' social position and the character of the research findings. They are elements in a moral rhetoric that claims exclusive research legitimacy for a particular group (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 86-87).

Yet, at the same time, the insider/outsider distinction does capture something important Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) continue. For instance, "those defined as outsiders or insiders are likely to have immediate access to different sorts of information" (p. 87), and, "are also

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[205] According to Wikipedia: "Transmigrant is a term, greatly developed by the work of Nina Glick Schiller, which is used to describe mobile subjects that create and sustain multiple social relations that link together their societies of origin and residence".

exposed to different kinds of methodological dangers" (p. 87). So, which position applies to me?

In an article on *Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants,* Lomsky-Feder, Gazit, & Ben-Ari (2008) "suggest that society may benefit from looking at reserves both as sorts of social and organizational hybrids or amalgams" (p. 593). In order to "illustrate the unique social position of reservists, the authors develop a theoretical model that likens them to transmigrants" (p. 593). Albeit, the description of reservists provided in the article is unfamiliar in a Norwegian context, I think it makes sense to conceptualize my position in the military field as a transmigrant: being on the move between the civilian and military worlds, neither insider, nor outsider, yet both.[206]

According to Bourdieu, an insider position involves a habitus structured or socialized with classifications, values and meaning systems specific to the field of inquiry. Thus, an insider position may provide the researcher with knowledge and understanding of the game, while an outsider habitus may lack necessary schemata for interpretation and understanding of what is going on in the field. A commonly phrased exchange between fellow HG-soldiers can be used to illustrate how transmigrants have a degree of reflexive knowledge on the different schemata for interpretation and understanding which has to be used in the different fields he/she migrates between. When greeting each other upon showing up for a new training HG-soldiers often add: *"Then it's time to switch to green channel again"*

The phrase refers to switching between radio channels and green channel refers to thinking and acting green; that is in military manners. Thus, I would argue that the phrase illustrates how the Home Guard soldiers both need and have the ability to switch interpretations and meanings systems when migrating between "the green/military field" and civilian life[207].

However, while an insider habitus has some advantages with regards to understanding the game, it can also act as an epistemological obstacle. For instance, an insider habitus can cause difficulties in seeing the field from outside, because the researcher has learned to see what the participants have learned to see. Accordingly, the insider risks contributing with nothing more than to give his/her support to the fields specific, unspoken and doxic beliefs about the world (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Even more, the insider runs the risk of passing judgments that he/she has learned from the prevailing culture. Thus, it should be mentioned that during my own service in the Medical Battalion female soldiers were warned about passing by the barracks of the neighboring Armored Battalion. Moreover, there were several nick names used to describe the soldiers in the Armored Battalion in negative and dumb ways, and the culture was pictured as macho. However, this was almost 20 years ago and I did not have any personal negative experience with the Armored Battalion. Yet, I had to reflect upon doing fieldwork in one battalion where I, myself, had served, and another which I had learned to

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[206] Being employed as a civil researcher at the Defence Institute located and integrated in the Civil Institution NSSS, it is the conscription and HG experience that influences my military habitus.

[207] That is not to argue that full time military personnel lack the same ability. On the contrary, they will also have to act appropriately in civilian life from time-to-time.

fear and down-talk. In doing the fieldwork I did not experience that these learned judgments meant much, and, as far as I can consider myself, I have not judged the Armored Battalion any more negatively than the Medical Battalion. However, there is no doubt that my habitus was far better equipped to understand what was going on in the Medical Battalion and what the interviewees from the medical service talked about, than it was to understand what was going on in the Armored Battalion, and, especially, what they talked about when referring to technical terms and operational procedures. However, after Cold Response (se chapter 5.2.2.1) it was easier to understand what the interviewees from the Armored Battalion talked about. This was due to that the Home Guard evacuation-vehicle I served at came to be attached to a professional Tank/Armored Battalion. I was thus able to see better how the combat vehicles operated[208]. Still, there is a bias in relation to my achieved understanding of the two services in focus.

5.4.1.4 Involved or detached?

Elias' rationale for researcher reflexivity is that "all social research is partial, as researchers themselves are always part of figurations and social processes" (Baur & Ernst, 2011, p. 121). Being part of these larger patterns of human interdependence means that the individuals, including the researcher, are "hemmed in and moved uncomprehendingly hither and thither" (Baur & Ernst, 2011, p. 121) (cf. 4.3.2). This presents the social researcher with a dilemma in that they are required to avoid partiality and must adopt an analytically *detached* outsider-perspective, refraining as much as possible from being affected by the constraints and struggles for positions that mark wider society[209]. At the same time, the researcher needs insider knowledge and must fully participate and *involve* themselves in the research process in order to achieve understanding (*Verstehen*)[210] (Baur & Ernst, 2011) (see Elias, 1956). Accordingly, verstehen and partiality are entwined in the actual research process and factual questions are rarely distinguished from 'political questions'. However, Baur & Ernst (2011) explain that Elias believed the researcher could make "constructive use of the tense balance between commitment to the object of research and detached analysis" (p. 121). But then, "it is the researcher's utmost responsibility to make her partiality and perceptivity as clear as possible" (p. 121), and while the researcher has to be involved in the research process and topic of investigation to achieve understanding, he/she should avoid being involved in the struggle for position in the field of inquiry. Therefore, hopefully my lack of officer education, which is a necessary entrance capital to compete for positions in the military field, has provided me a *detached insider-perspective.*

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[208] The professional soldiers also took the time to introduce me to the vehicles and the service while we spent a long time waiting for something to happen.

[209] Wacquant writes, likewise, in the introduction to his dialog with Bourdieu that "sociologists, like any other cultural producer, always owe something to their situation in a field where all define themselves in part in relational terms, by their difference and distance from certain others with whom they compete" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 39).

[210] According to Baur & Ernst (2011), one can distinguish between reflected and non-reflected subjectivity, i.e. detached and involved subjectivity, in Elias' terminology. According to Elias an involved subjectivity (the traditional insider-perspective) is necessary to understand meaning (verstehen).

5.4.2   Ethics and Research Purpose

Researchers have an ethical responsibility not to harm society and its citizens and doing research for the military, or on military culture, is *packed* with ethical challenges[211]. In addition, doing ethnographic fieldwork involves several ethical challenges. Accordingly, pages could be filled on the ethical issues I have met and thought of throughout this process of research. Yet, ethical and moral questions seldom have a given answer, and for several ethical questions I have not taken a final position, or at least not solved them. Since much could be written in the form of debate with no conclusions provided, I will instead share a list of the ethical challenges I have faced.

However, having set out from ideologically contrasting research purposes and traditions (cf. 3.1), where some have sought to find out how fighting spirit can be produced and others to reveal how men have been lured into fighting, it is proper to say something about my position in this regard. Initially, I believe that even the most ideologically contrasting research on military culture, identity and gender seeks to understand different sides of the same coin, and that new knowledge is to be found in the intersection between ideological and disciplinary traditions which are seldom combined, and this is also a rationale behind the extended literature review in this dissertation. That said, my research purposes are inspired by research purposes suggested by Bourdieu and Elias which would fall into a tradition of "enlightening"; if we are to refer to the division between enlightenment and functionalism discussed in chapter three.

In Bourdieu's view, an important task for researchers is to understand the "the paradox of doxa". This involves understanding 1) how "the established order, with its relations of domination, its rights and prerogatives, privileges and injustices, ultimately perpetuates itself so easily" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 1), and 2) how the dominant is dominated by his/her domination, in that he/she is "forced" to make investments in the social games that are held to be crucial and highly valued in the society. That can be games of recognition, honor and war (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Elias (1978) used the metaphor of 'games' as didactic models to demonstrate how the course of the game itself gains power over the behavior and thought of the individual players. Accordingly, Elias argued that the matter for sociology is to make networks of ever-shifting power balances and intertwined processes "more transparent and thereby to prevent them carrying their members along with them so blindly and arbitrary" (p. 103). On this basis, the purpose of the present inquiry is to interpret and understand better the socially organized powers in which officers' lives are embedded, and how they become involved in social game

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[211] For instance, we saw in chapter three that anthropologists have boycotted working with or for the military, and that the field of military sociology has remained marginal within the broader field of sociology due to ideological reasons. It was argued that military sociology has been oriented toward effective management of military forces, and the review of literature also revealed attempts to identify how fighting spirit could be encouraged. Debates about integration of women have been framed in a lack of other personnel resources, and concerns linked to whether women would destroy unit cohesiveness and, thus, military efficiency. In addition, we saw that military strategists discussed whether culture and identity could be manipulated in order to "blow more combat spirit into a population".

processes which may have unfortunate effects. For instance Åtlanda (2014) has written: "In order to avoid a new military build-up in the Arctic, it is important to be able to appreciate the potentially harmful effects that fear and uncertainty can have on regional security dynamics" (p. 162). In other words, it is important to understand how social factors, such as misrecognition/recognition and shifting power balances in a network of people, work in such a way that "the society" or "the institution" takes a *course which none of the individual players has planned, determined or anticipated*.

Below is a list of other ethical challenges I have faced during the research process, and for which I have tried to find an ethically acceptable balance to handle them:

- How to remain 'objective' when accepted in the field as someone who can "tell their story" and challenge "the elite story"?
- How to tackle the eager interest in sharing?
- What to do when asked to keep an eye of an officer suspected for using unwanted methods against candidates, report back but not write on it?
- What to do when told things and subsequently being asked not to write about it?
- In a field with a large number of changing people involved; how to continually inform the different people on my presence and role as a researcher?
- How to relate to people who don't understand my role as a researcher?
- Realizing that officers found it difficult to make appropriate assessment and evaluations of 'their aspirants/candidates' and likely asked for my opinion; did I influence selection, assessment and evaluation of the candidates?
- Did I lure someone to share more than they would have done if I had explained my role as a researcher better?
- How to ensure anonymity for a small milieu(x) and people in a small milieu(x)?

5.5   Judging the Quality of Qualitative Research

For years qualitative researchers have tried to reformulate the traditional positivistic criteria that form the basis for distinguishing between good and bad research (validity, reliability and generalizability) to make them fit philosophical assumptions which underlie qualitative research. Denzin & Lincoln (2005) characterized the debate as 'the crisis of legitimation'. However, the debate has led to an endless amount of books and articles where writers have come up with alternative criteria for judging qualitative research. Hammersley (2008) explores whether agreement between the debaters is possible, and argues that "fundamental differences in assumptions generate the methodological pluralism that is characteristic of qualitative research today, and that this has profound consequences for the prospect of agreement about criteria" (p. 176). Thus, Hammersley concludes that common criteria would

be desirable, but barriers for agreement are formidable. Others, like Smith J. (2009) conclude that

> all social and educational research, including the supposedly 'scientific' research, is a matter of telling stories. And when it comes to judging stories, as we are all aware, there are no and can be no 'fixed' criteria. Thus, our judgments about what is good versus bad research are always contestable because our criteria change as we change and we change as our criteria change (p. 91).

Charmaz (2006) based her interpretation of grounded theory on a symbolic interactionist perspective and declared that the approach "explicitly assumes that any theoretical rendering offers an *interpretive* portrayal of the studied world, not an exact picture of it" (p. 10). Accordingly, Charmaz (2006) claims that "researchers' finished grounded theories – are *constructions of reality*" (p. 10), and this is also what I claim this dissertation to be.

Yet, according to Smith J. (1989; 2009), qualitative inquiry is not only a matter of offering interpretations or constructions of reality. An interpretation can *become reality* to the extent that the interpretations are agreed upon or accepted by others. Thus, we may say that the finished work is the researcher's interpretation of a social context rendered through a story which can become valid if the reader interprets it so. Accordingly, this study can be claimed to be intersubjective in that it "needs the other (for example, the reader) in order to develop a dialogic relation with the phenomenon, and thus validate the phenomenon as described" (Manen, 1990, p. 11).

However, regarding criteria for evaluating the quality of qualitative research, Charmaz (2006) holds that the criteria "depend on who forms them and what purposes he or she invokes" (p. 182). Yet, to give the researcher an idea of expectations for grounded theory research, Charmaz suggests the criteria credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness (pp. 182-183), and provides a list of questions to consider under each of these. Charmaz explains further that "a strong combination of originality and credibility increases resonance, usefulness, and the subsequent value of the contribution" (p. 183). Though, she proceeds, these criteria "account for the empirical study" (p. 183), while making claim to a scholarly contribution also requires a careful study of relevant literatures, including those that go beyond disciplinary boundaries and a clear positioning of the work in relation to previous debate.

According to Sparkes & Smith (2014), Lincoln and Guba's (1985) and Guba and Lincoln's (1989) criteria for judging qualitative research currently constitutes the gold standard in qualitative work in sport, exercise and health. Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Guba and Lincoln (1989) proposed the criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, which taken together should constitute the trustworthiness and thus the 'quality' of qualitative research studies. Yet, these criteria are also disputed. To that background, Sparkes & Smith (2014) provide a flavor of the debates and different positions and strategies available to defend and/or evaluate qualitative work. They find that "a number of scholars in recent years have suggested various *lists* of criteria" (p. 197) and note that the term *list* should not be taken for referring to enclosed or specified items. Instead any list of characteristics should be seen

as always "open-ended, and ever subject to constant reinterpretation so that items can be added to the list or taken away" (p. 197).

Since "criteria that might have been thought of as important at one time in another place may take on diminished importance at another time and place" (p. 200), Sparkes & Smith (2014) conclude that criteria can be selected from several lists and mixed and matched in relation to purposes and rationale. To the researcher, working with lists can then be seen as a pedagogical tool to encourage reflexive thinking on the quality of their own work. To consumers on the other side, a list of criteria or questions can serve as guiding principles which may help to judge the work in relation to the contribution's internal meaning structure, yet consumers may need to ask other questions to assess the quality of the research quality for their specific context and purpose.

Accordingly, in order to think reflexively about my own research I developed a list of guiding questions for judgment. Since Kvale & Brinkman (2008) define the concept of validity as a quality of craftsmanship which rests on continually checking, questioning and playing devil's advocate toward the findings and interpretations, I thought it would be useful to work with a list of questions. The list is inspired by Charmaz (2006), Hammersley (2008)[212] and the different criteria and lists presented and discussed in Sparkes & Smith (2014). From Sparkes & Smith (2014) I have especially considered the criteria developed by Lincoln and Guba (1985), Guba and Lincoln (1989) (the current gold standard) and a list developed by Tracy[213]. Tracy's list forms the trunk of my list, because I thought it summarized many of others' suggestions in a well arranged way. Based on the suggestion above, the following list was developed to serve as a pedagogical tool to encourage reflexive thinking on the quality of the present study:

Is the topic worthy and original?
Is the topic of the research relevant, timely, significant and interesting? Is the topic clearly outlined and sufficient rationale provided for its significance?

Is the study characterized by rich rigor?
Does the study use sufficient, abundant and appropriate theoretical constructs and methodical tools to meet the stated objectives of the investigation? Does the study use sufficient sample(s) and time in the field to produce information that is appropriate for the level of precision required in the analysis? Are the analytic techniques likely to ensure discovery of the full range of relevant and significant themes and topics of interest?

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[212] In his thoroughfare of the debated issue of quality in qualitative research referred to in chapter 5.1, Hammersley (2008) outlines what criteria could be used in assessing respectively the adequacy of research reports and the significance of research findings.

[213] Tracy offers the criteria: worthy topic, rich rigor, sincerity, credibility, resonance, significant contribution, ethical, meaningful coherence (Sparkes & Smith, 2014).

Is the study characterized by sincerity? [214]

Is the study characterized by transparency about methods and challenges? Is an audit trail provided with detailed descriptions of the process and path toward the final product? Can the data material and code system be inspected? Is the study characterized by adequate and sufficient, yet not too much, self-awareness about subjective values, biases and inclinations of the researcher?

Is the research conducted in a credible manner?

Is the research marked by thick description, concrete details, explication of tacit knowledge, and showing rather than telling? Has the research achieved intimate familiarity with the settings? Are the data sufficient to merit the claims? Do the categories cover a wide range of empirical observations?

Is it likely that the study will offer resonance?

Is it likely that the research will influence, affect or move some readers through aesthetic, evocative representations, naturalistic generalizations and transferable findings? Are the creations of the story believable and authentic? Do the interpretations make sense to the participants in the study or others who share their circumstances?

Does the study provide any significant and useful contribution?

Does the study add something new to existing knowledge and is the new insight of any importance? Does the analysis provide a new conceptual rendering of the data? Does the study include literatures that go beyond disciplinary boundaries, and does it take a position in relation to previous debate? Does the analysis offer interpretations that people can use in their everyday worlds?

Is the study provided within ethical acceptable frames?

Is the study conducted within acceptable ethical and moral boundaries?

Is the study characterized by a meaningful coherence and consistency?

Is there coherence and consistency between the paradigmatic assumptions (ontology, epistemology and methodology), the selected methods, and the move from data production to the story told in the dissertation? Does the study answer the research questions raised?

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[214] These questions consider the study's "reliability". Yet whether it is appropriate to discuss possibilities for repetition and reproducibility in relation to qualitative research, and fieldwork in particular, is highly disputed. For instance, Sparked and Smith (2014) refer to Wolcott (1995) who argues that "reliability remains beyond the pale for research based on observation in natural settings [...] [Because] fieldworkers do not try to make things happen at all [...] In other words, we cannot step into the same stream twice!" (p. 180). Accordingly, Sparked and Smith explain: "Walcott (1955) suggests that qualitative researchers need *not address reliability at all* in their work 'except to make sure that our audiences understand why it is not an appropriate measure for evaluating fieldwork'" (p. 180). Qualitative researchers who are concerned with reliability, although they recognize that reliability in a quantitative sense is impossible, such as Guba and Lincoln (1989), argue that researchers can achieve the parallel notion of dependability by providing an audit trail, showing that the process is logical, traceable and documented (Sparkes & Smith, 2014).

Part 3:

The Military Field from a Micro-Perspective

Introduction to the Presentation of Data

Arrangement of the Data for Presentation

In this part of the dissertation the results from the micro-level investigation will be presented and discussed. The two research questions developed in chapter 4.4 will be answered. The research questions were formulated as follow:

1. What is required from men and women respectively to do an officer role appropriately? (Requirements)
2. How do men and women with different forms of capital respond to different formal and informal requirements in the military field? (Responses)

Analysis of the data resulted in the following codes which answer the first research question:

- Requiring "the right attitude"
    - Requiring self-drive, self-leading, commitment, competitiveness and winning instinct
    - Requiring proper style, morals and culture
- Requiring proper bodily appearance and fitness
- Requiring fellowship, social skills and contribution
- Requiring tractability, conformity and submissiveness
- Requiring exemplary tidiness and care/love for the equipment

Requirements and responses to the requirements were often intertwined in the data material. Accordingly, data which answers the second research question on responses were included in the 'requirements code'.

In short, the data showed that actors in the field characterized the culture in two separate ways, using the names: "the performance culture" and "the feedback culture". Comparison of these findings with Belkin (2012) and Skeggs' (2004) development of Bourdieu's theoretical perspective revealed that requirements and their respective responses could be divided into:

1. Power resources (capital) and power relations, which can be summarized as a "performance culture" (masculinity)
2. Regulation impositions and adaption issues (paradoxical submission[215]/resistance), which can be summarized as a "feedback culture" [216] (femininity)

So therefore, it could be concluded that doing an officer role appropriately is dependent on the ability to embody power resources and obey regulation impositions at the same time. In other words, the study supports Belkin's (2012) claim that "military masculinity is structured by contradiction" (p. 173), and that the military compels the soldiers/officers to dominate and subordinate and thus embody masculinity and femininity at the same time. This will be shown and explained further.

Since it has been found that successful integration in the military field is dependent on the ability to embody power resources and obey regulation impositions *at the same time*, some requirements for the 'whole person' will be introduced in chapter six under the headline *An Ideal Role Model with the Right Attitude*. The chapter is based on data coded as:

- Requiring "the right attitude"

What it means to be *An Ideal Role Model with the Right Attitude* will be further explored in chapters seven and eight.

Chapter seven is devoted to illustrating the power resources that are required to appropriately perform the officer role. These requirements result in *power relations and hierarchy struggles*. Thus the heading of chapter seven is *Power Resources and Power Relations*. The chapter is based on data coded as:

- Requiring self-drive, self-leading, commitment, competitiveness and winning instinct
- Requiring proper bodily appearance and fitness

Chapter eight will illustrate regulation impositions that an officer is expected to obey, and how he/she is molded into appropriate behavior by the social fellowship. These requirements result in adaption and resistance. Thus, the headline is *Regulation Impositions and Adaption Issues*. The chapter is based on data coded as:

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[215] The radical form of acceptance that involves voluntary submission and conformism to the rules and premises inherent in the game/field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).
[216] Both namings of the culture were provided by actors in the field themselves.

- Requiring fellowship, social skills and contribution
- Requiring tractability, conformity and submissiveness
- Requiring exemplary tidiness and care for the equipment

Under the headline *Micro-level Responses to Macro-level Requirements* chapter nine looks to examine local responses to the following macro-level requirements[217]:

- Contributing to international operations
- Conforming to an appropriate (Norwegian) culture
- Recruiting more women

Finally, chapter ten answers what is at stake in the social struggle over who can take part in the military profession/field, which was formulated as the aim of the dissertation.

Before we turn to chapter six it is necessary to inform on group sizes at the sites where the fieldwork was conducted, and the abbreviations that will be used to anonymously refer to the different categories of personnel that were present at the sites.

Group Sizes

At the Joint Selection (cf. 5.2.2.1 for information on the sites) 1500 youths selected from approximately 4700 applicants were competing for approximately 700 school positions. The youths who took part in the selection will be referred to as *Aspirants* (A). *Officers* (O) from all the different schools and services were present to organize the selection.

245 youths were admitted as *Candidates* (C) to the Army's Officer Candidate School. They were organized in candidate platoons in nine different battalions with approx. 25 candidates per battalion, and a group of approximately five officers/instructors were dedicated to each candidate platoon. *Second Year Candidates* (SYC) were practicing in the battalions, sometimes as instructors for the first year candidates. The number of female candidates admitted to education in the *Medical Battalion* (MB) was slightly higher than the number of male candidates. The number of female candidates admitted to service education in the *Armored Battalion* (AB), as well as the other battalions, was very low, between one and three persons, but women were present in all battalions.

At Joint Education all candidates and some of the officers/instructors from three different battalions participated together with officers/instructors working at the Army's Officer Candidate School's *Headquarters* (HQ), approx. 65 candidates and +/- 20 officers. The latter group of officers/instructors organized the Joint Education.

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[217] 'Contributing to international operations' was a sub code under 'requiring fellowship, social skills and contribution'. 'Conforming to an appropriate (Norwegian) culture' and 'recruiting more women' was sub codes under 'requiring proper style, morals and culture'.

Likewise, at the final coping exercise, candidates and officers/instructors from three battalions participated, approx. 60 candidates and 15 officers. The coping exercise was organized by the officers/instructors working in the battalions themselves.

Female officers were present in the Medical Battalion and among the officers working at the Army's Officer Candidate School's Headquarters. In addition, other officers, instructors, psychologists and chaplains were present at all the different sites, helping with for instance selection, evaluation of candidates, organizing of cases, exercises, activities and lecturing. Due to issues of anonymity, all chaplains will be referred to as *he* although there were also female chaplains.

Abbreviations

Since the data material is confidential, anonymous abbreviations referring to gender, position and place for service will be used.

Gender:	F= Female
	M=Male
Position:	A=Aspirant
	C= Candidate
	SYC= Second Year Candidate
	O=Officer (instructor)
Service:	MB=Medical Battalion
	AB=Armored Battalion
	OB=Other Battalions
	HQ= Head Quarter (only officers)

Due to the low number of women in some of the groups, gender and service will not necessarily be referred to at the same time. When it is important that a candidate is from the Armored Battalion, he/she will be referred to as Candidate (position) Armored Battalion (service), which will be CAB. This abbreviation will then include both men and women.

When it is important that a candidate is a female with experience from a battalion with few women, including the Armored Battalion, the candidate will be referred to as Female Candidate Other Battalions (FCOB). This means that female candidates from the Armored Battalion will sometimes be included in Other Battalions.

If it is important that an officer is a female, this will be referred to as FO, and the reference will include officers from both the Medical Battalion[218] and the HQ. If it is important that an officer works in the Medical Battalion, he/she will be referred to as OMB which then will

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[218] In the medical battalion two female officers were interviewed. One of the female officers in the HQ also came from the Medical Battalion. In addition, two female second year candidates who were working as sergeants in the Medical Battalion were interviewed. On one occasion it will be referred to that a quote derives from a female officer from the Medical Battalion: this could be any of these five women.

include both male and female officers from that battalion. Likewise, if it is important that an officer works at the Head Quarter (HQ), he/she will be referred to without reference to gender, which will be OHQ

Chapter 6: An Ideal Role Model with the Right Attitude

Analysis of the data material revealed that doing an officer role appropriately is dependent on the person's ability to embody power resources and obey regulation impositions *at the same time.* This means that some *requirements for the 'whole person'* apply to the actors in the field. Such requirements were the ability to learn (potential), certain personal/leadership characteristics, "the right attitude" and being a role model. In this chapter the requirements for the 'whole person' will be illustrated and compared to written material, which describe some of the desired goals and objectives in the officer candidate education provided by the Army's Officer Candidate School. The chapter will end with a discussion about *why* having "the right attitude" is found to be a particularly important requirement in the field.

6.1   "Pay attention to what they can become"

This dissertation departed from an observed struggle over what should be required from military personnel. Thus, there should be no surprise in the great variety of opinions which accounts for what it takes to be judged as doing an officer role appropriately. Among the officers interviewed there was firstly an awareness that the requirements vary with function and mission:

> OHQ: For example, look at the Army, there are many different weapon types [...]
> everything from assault troops in the Armored Battalion with the primary function to
> cause the enemy losses quickly and brutally, to the logistics department whose
> primary task is to re-supply maneuver battalions. So, the mindset or the way of
> thinking must be different for whichever task you are to do (Interview).

Secondly, it was argued that the requirements which apply to the individual will change as the individual changes position in the hierarchy:

> OHQ: There is no definitive answer as to what constitutes a good military leader. It
> requires a good portion of social skills. But, the lower down on the ladder, the greater
> need to be practically skilled. Because at the lower level you achieve trust and
> credibility by showing that you are highly skilled. The further up in the system you
> climb, the less there is need for practical skills. Then, the requirements change to
> social skills, the ability to organize, to use the resources at the right time, more than
> the ability to raise a tent (Interview)[219].

Thirdly, the officers are aware that the selection and assessment of the aspirants/candidates is based on subjective criteria, and that requirements of the individual will therefore change

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[219] The interviewees' and actors' statements often reflect the theory and management documents used in the field. A figure illustrating the referred relationship between practical and leadership skills at the different levels in the hierarchy ladder is to be found in the document *Goals and guidelines for the leadership development at the Army's Officer Candidate School* (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. b)

depending on who is judging. For example, it is stated that what is required of candidates receiving education in a certain battalion will change if the management changes:

> OHQ: If you are replacing a commander you can get completely different
> requirements. It's largely dependent on the person. It is not obvious that the Medical
> Battalion sets much stricter requirements than the Communication Battalion, but it
> may be that the squad leader does it this year, just because he is the squad leader
> (Interview).

So, the officer explains that the requirements which apply to the individual officer will vary with function, task and position in the hierarchy and the management's requirements. On the other hand, it is also stated by the officers that the selection process to the different officer candidate schools has been uniformed and standardized through a joint selection. Thus, the officers convey that relatively similar requirements[220] apply to everyone who wants to enter the field, regardless of later function and position:

> OHQ: As for now we select broadly, applying the same criteria to all. In the old model
> [before the establishment of Joint Selection] those who wanted to become 'clubmen'
> they applied to the 'club fighting school'; those who would engage in medical supplies
> they applied to another school. It is the greatest weakness with the selection model we
> use now, if you ask me (Interview).

Accordingly, it can be said that *entrance* to the military profession/field has been restricted by some standardized premises, logics and rules[221], which have to be applied by those who are authorized to judge who is allowed to enter and what those who wish to enter must live up to. However, a field is defined as an arena of struggles and several officers question whether it is expedient with the standardized and joint selection procedures, as exemplified in the quote above.

Regarding the kind of capital required to enter the field and the kind of judgment criteria used by, or expected to be used by the selection officers, few references to specific skills and competence were found. Instead, the data highlighted the "ability to learn" as an important entrance capital. Lack of the ability to learn was also referred to as something that should have disqualified candidates who had been allowed to enter:

> I: Is there anyone who was admitted that you think should not have passed the
> selection?
> OHQ: Yes, there is. They are not many, but there are some.
> I: What's the case with them?
> OHQ: It's just that they do not have the ability to absorb learning (Interview).

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[220] See 5.2.2.1 for information on content in the three phases in the selection. See 7.1.2 for information on the physical requirements.

[221] The standardized premises, logics and rules for entrance to the field (selection) were transmitted to officers at the preliminary training for those who were to function as selectors at Joint Selection.

In the second quote in subchapter 6.1 it was, however, argued that it is important for young officers to exercise skillfulness if they are to gain credibility from the soldiers they are supposed to lead and teach when they become sergeants, i.e. at low level. But the required practical skills for these tasks are taught and trained during the first year of the Officer Candidate School. Therefore, possession of skillfulness in certain skills was not held to be important in the selection phase. Instead, the candidates had to show that they had the ability to learn and absorb the teaching. The "ability to learn" emerges as a requirement in interviews, field notes and written material used in the field. In the paper *Guidelines to Selection Officers at Joint Selection,* "ability to learn" and "potential" are listed as respectively the second and third factors which are to be observed and evaluated through lectures, which are organized to test the aspirants' ability to absorb teaching in the selection phase (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a, p. 3).

The argument for placing importance on "ability to learn" and "potential" was however based on a more general argument: that the selection has to pay greatest attention to qualities that cannot be learned or are hard to change, such as intelligence and personal characteristics. A reason why many officers hold this opinion may be because it is written in management documents[222] and was explicitly taught to the selection officers in preliminary lectures on the criteria to be used in the assessments at the selection:

> Instructor 1: You must avoid diagnosing the aspirants. That means to evaluate them in terms of who they are. You must pay attention to what they can become. For example, you must not allow yourselves to be dazzled by those who are especially skillful in something (Field notes, Joint Selection, Selectors Preliminaries).

Instead of being dazzled by skills, the officers were told to pay attention to personal characteristics. Following a passage on the difference between personal characteristics and skills, an instructor summarizes:

> Instructor 1: Skills can be learned, while personal characteristics are more stable. Thus, the selection is to be based on characteristics (Field notes, Joint Selection, Selectors Preliminaries).

The instructor continues the lecture with a thorough passage on *five leadership[223] characteristics* used to evaluate the aspirants, and which are communicated to the aspirants as assessment criteria in recruitment material and information brochures. The five leadership characteristics that are constructed as important entrance capital are the ability to 1) exercise initiative, 2) manage uncertainty, 3) build trust, 4) be caring, and 5) make independent and

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[222] In the document describing *Goals and guidelines for the leadership development at the Army's Officer Candidate School* there is a figure "illustrating the relationship between different criteria for selection" and explaining how stable the different judgment criteria used in the selection are deemed to be. In a line from "much stable" to "less stable – easier to develop" are listed: IQ, Personal Characteristics, Knowledge, Physical Abilities (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. b, p. 13)

[223] Personal characteristics and leadership characteristics were used interchangeably by the actors in the field.

sound decisions. These characteristics are explained and exemplified in detail in the paper used in the lecture (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a, p. 2)[224].

As we understand, several documents describe the criteria to be used in judging the aspirants during the selection, and also how later education will develop and evaluate those who are admitted as candidates. The written criteria and intentions were often reflected in interviews and conversations with the actors in the field. But yet again, a Bourdieuisan field is defined as an arena for struggle, and this study departed from an observed struggle on what should be marketable capital in the field, which is also reflected in the results. For example, the instructor in the lecture referred to on page 162, stated that the selection officers should avoid becoming dazzled by skills that could be learned. In the following lecture held by a different instructor another message was taught to the same audience of selection officers:

> Instructor 2: I must say that I find it a bit annoying that it is stressed so highly that personal characteristics are more important than skills, because at the level of squad commanders it's 90% about skills and 10% about the ability to engage the others [the subordinates], and different types of people can be good leaders (Field notes, Joint Selection, Selectors Preliminaries).

Albeit the data material contains divergent opinions, there is a broad agreement among most officers and candidates expressed in interviews and reflected in the field notes that "the attitude has to be right". As with "the ability to learn" and "the personal characteristics", attitude is seen as being stable and difficult to change, thus making it important that "the attitude is right". Yet, as we will see, attitude is also explicitly defined as something to be worked on and developed.

6.2   "The Attitude has to be Right"

Having "the right attitude" or "good attitude" emerges as the most important and frequently expressed requirement. It applies to aspirants, candidates and officers, or to use other categories: subordinates, superiors and buddies[225]. This is an example from an interview with an officer in the Armored Battalion:

> OAB: Those who have the right attitude, those are the ones we think will become good officers (Interview).

During the field observation the following expressions were often heard:

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[224] The five leadership characteristics are established as qualitative assessment criteria under the chapter on "guidelines for selection" in the management document *Service Regulations for Officer Candidate Education in the Army* (The Army, 2005)
[225] Having "the right attitude" or "having your head in the right place" were also the most important valuation criteria found in my previous thesis on "The Best Soldiers" (Rones, 2008).

"You need to sharpen up your attitude".

"That is bad attitude".

(Field notes, frequently used phrases)

These expressions, or similar, were most often used by officers to correct the aspirants/candidates, but officers and aspirants/candidates also used them to comment on their buddies/colleagues, and even their own action and behavior. Referring to Bourdieu, these expressions can exemplify how symbolic violence/power is exerted through communication of misrecognition "that is a *bad* attitude". Thus we can say that those who were in a position to pass judgments could use these expressions to teach the others, most often their subordinates or equals, to understand, think, feel, judge and *act in an appropriate way*. This involves inscriptions of classification categories in habitus.

However, although it is said that "the attitude has to be right", the correction of attitude indicates that attitude is worked on and is in fact explicitly stated as an area to be consciously and actively developed through the education.

Firstly, "development of attitudes" is listed as one of five development areas[226] in both the *Guidelines for the Selection Officers at Joint Selection* (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a) and the *Goals and guidelines for the leadership development at the Army's Officer Candidate School* (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. b). In the latter document the following it is written under the headline "development of attitudes":

> Attitudes provide direction for our actions. If the Candidate's actions are to be consistent with the commander's intent and the Armed Forces' values, the school must work consciously with attitudes. After completing Officer Candidate School the candidates will convey this attitude to our soldiers. If this is to be done with credibility, the Armed Forces' and the candidate's own attitude must 'melt' together as one (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. b, p. 8).

Secondly, one of the five subjects taught in Joint Education Module 1 is "Attitudes". In the curriculum used at the school the subject goals were formulated as follows[227]:

> The subjects shall provide the candidates with an understanding that good attitude is the foundation for everything you do as an officer and helps to determine whether one succeeds in one's mission (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. c, p. 1)[228]

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[226] The five areas for development listed in the guidelines for selection officers (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a) are: Development of the leadership role (action, leadership behavior), Development of leadership characteristics (being-appearing as), Development of self-understanding, Development of self-efficacy, Development of attitudes

[227] In the national curriculum for Officer Candidate Education in the Norwegian Armed Forces the subject aims are formulated as "The subject aims to develop leaders with the attitudes that underpin the Norwegian Armed Forces legitimacy and rationale" (National Curriculum, 2010, p. 6).

[228] In the subject's prescribed text, the following topics were covered: basic ethics, the Armed Forces' legitimacy, military professional identity, unit moral, culture, religion, code of conduct, international law on war, HSE - Health, Safety and

In the following quote a second year candidate also explicitly stated that the education has provided her with a visible and recognizable "attitude" in mind and body, which new recruits lack:

> I: How do you find it, as a young and newly educated sergeant, to gain trust from the soldiers?
> FSYCMB: I think it's easy, actually, because when they arrive here they do not understand that much. It takes some time before they realize that – "oh yes, you went to the Officer Candidate School last year". They only see that you have a rank on your chest and that you automatically have the attitude that they don't have; both in your head and your appearance (Interview).

In other words, it seems as though the young, newly educated female sergeant experienced that 'the military attitude' she has learned during the Officer Candidate School's educational year (the first year), differs or distinguishes her mind and bodily appearance from new recruits of the same age, and that the acquired 'attitude' gives her the necessary authority to lead the recruits 'with ease'. What is contained within 'the attitude' which seems to help this sergeant to do her officer role appropriately, and through that gain respect/authority from her subordinates, will be analyzed further in chapters seven and eight. However, having the right attitude is part of another requirement for the 'whole person' that we will consider in the next subchapter: being an ideal, a role model or an example to emulate. In the document *Goals and guidelines for the leadership development at the Army's Officer Candidate School* the main goals for the development area "attitudes" are formulated as follows:

> The candidate shall, during the school year, have acquired basic knowledge of military attitudes and ethics, and be able to affect, *live and be an example* of this in his/her primary function (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. b, p. 8)

From the findings presented so far it can be argued that the Norwegian military has an institutional character in that the officers are encouraged to evaluate the aspirants (candidates) first and foremost in normative 'whole person' categories as shown above. The claim is made with reference to Moskos (1986) who argued that an essential characteristic of an institutional organizational model is that it is based on normative values and tends to evaluate its personnel in *'whole person' categories* (cf. 3.2.1.1). This means, according to Moskos, that it relies heavily on qualitative and subjective evaluation, *such as attitudes, norms and values*, while an occupational military tends toward judgments relating to specific performance standards. As we have seen from above, performance standards in practical skills seemed to be regarded as less important in the selection phase, since the required skills can be learned if "the person is right", i.e. he/she has the right attitude and the ability to learn.

Environment (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. d, p. content). According to the national curriculum the subject "Attitudes" consists of seven topics of which one is "gender". The goal for the topic is formulated as to "develop leaders with the necessary insight in gender-related issues in the organization, as well as in the operational theater. The purpose of this is to strengthen the diversity in competence in own departments, as well as to strengthen efforts against the, presumably, most vulnerable groups in the conflict areas" (p.7). Gender was not taught during the fieldwork I conducted.

6.3 "We are supposed to be the best […] always an ideal to imitate"

As already mentioned, another requirement is that candidates/officers must be a good example for others to follow; thus, they need to have the right attitudes. But, it is argued that the candidates also need to be "the best". The following is from an interview with a female candidate who was asked how she experienced the education at the Officer Candidate School:

> FCOB: It is very much about us having to be the best, always. That we shall become much better than others, and therefore we have tougher requirements than others [conscripts]. [...]
> I: You feel that you have to be better than others?
> FCOB: We *must* be better than everyone else. We are supposed to be the best always, always switched on, always an ideal to imitate – because that is the purpose. But it's great fun to be with people who are motivated to be here and who always want to do their best. [...] It has been imprinted on me that I always have to be the best, and that I shall always be looked up to and stuff like that. So you have to feel like someone who is the best too! Perhaps I have always been a bit conceited, so that's fine for me (Interview).

The requirement to be an ideal example was also reflected in the curriculum and theory taught at the Officer Candidate School, which may be the reason why the candidate is quoted above as saying "it has been *imprinted on me* that I […] always shall be looked up to". She was interviewed at Joint Education where the importance of being an example for others had been repeated in numerous lectures preceding the interview. In the field notes the following expressions declared by officers/instructors who were teaching had been noted:

> "Remember, you are supposed to be an example to follow at any time."
> "Your performance has to be exemplary".
> (Field notes, Joint Education, phrases used by OHQ in lectures)

In other words, the officer candidates were explicitly taught to ensure that their performances were high class, since they were becoming an example for others to emulate. However, the teaching officers did not only state that the candidates were to become role models. The officers also emphasized that the candidates present were already a selected sample, the crème de la crème, and thus had the ability to become better than others. For example, in an introduction session to Joint Education Module 1 in which the headquarter officers presented themselves and their subjects to the candidates, several officers provided the message that the program was very tight and demanding, with a lot of content to be absorbed in a short time. But the demands of the program should not become a problem for the candidates because, as one officer said:

> OHQ: You who are present here are not a cross-section of the community's youth. Perhaps in your intelligence scores, but when it comes to the ability and capacity to work you are far above the rest of the youth. You are the cream of the Norwegian youth. You are selected. That is why you are here. Therefore, we can expect more

from you than we would have done with normal youths (Field notes, Joint Education, Lecture).

In later lectures the following or similar phrases were passed by officers teaching:

"Remember, you are selected, you are the crème de la crème"
(Field notes, Joint Education, phrase used by OHQ in lectures)

Similar phrases were however also used by officers in the officer candidate platoons in the battalions. And again, there seem to be disagreements and contradictory opinions about practice in the field. At a site I visited during the fieldwork a chaplain[229] came over to me and said:

Have you realized how often officers tell the candidates they are the crème de la crème? I answer: "Yes, that is a phrase I have written down several times". The chaplain continues: "Can I ask you what you think of that, because I keep wondering whether it can be any good for their self-image to give them these ideas that they are better than everybody else?" (Field notes, anonymized site).

A reason for the practice of telling candidates they are la crème de la crème, and thus have the ability to become better than others, was explained by an officer as being part of the development of self-confidence and "self-efficacy"[230]. Another reason why it is considered important for the officer candidates to be encouraged to become as good as possible is expressed in this interview:

OHQ: The officer candidates [who are going to be sergeants] are the core of the Army. The sergeants we educate are those who are going to meet the soldiers who are serving. When the sergeants are as good as possible, it has an effect throughout the entire Army. A positive effect! If we can do this well then it comes back on ourselves (Interview).

Also, 'the power of example' was taught as a pedagogical method the candidates could use to "manipulate behavior of others" (Field notes, Joint Education). In lessons where concepts such as 'figure effects', 'person perception' and 'mirroring theories' were communicated, it was explained to the candidates that it was important to be a good ideal and to always do their very best; if they wanted others to do their very best. Moreover, it was explained and demonstrated how postures and voice could be used to affect the behavior of others.

Again, interview statements and field notes resemble the content of the curriculum and prescribed texts. For example, in the document on *Goals and guidelines for the leadership development at the Army's Officer Candidate School* (The Army's Officer Candidate School,

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[229] Chaplains were present at all sites visited and were involved in teaching.
[230] Development of self-efficacy is also listed as a development area in *Goals and guidelines for the leadership development at the Army's Officer Candidate School* (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. b).

n.d. b) "the power of example" is listed as a method that officers can use in order to develop the candidates' attitudes and leadership role. In a prescribed text, *Basic view on leadership,* there is a section on "the power of example" reading:

> You, as a leader, will appear much more inspiring to your employees if you are a good example. This means living and acting according to the values you espouse. […] As a leader what you do will get noticed by your employees. You should thus strive to be a role model through your way of being (The Army's competence center for management and education, n.d., p. 6)

The Army's Officer Candidate School has also developed its own value document (The Army's Officer Candidate School, 2011)[231]. In the list of values, or requirements, is written: "Lead from the front with the power of example: Follow me!".

To summarize the findings so far, it is apparent that officer candidates are encouraged to become role models with the appropriate attitude for the next generation of soldiers to emulate. "The power of example" is consciously used as a pedagogical method in the military socialization process and character development.

6.4   The Thin Line between Warrior and Murderer: "Monster with breaks"

In this sub chapter the findings summarized above will be seen in relation to some of the documents that seek to organize the military personnel into a network which speaks and acts as one unit (cf. 5.1.2.1). It will also be explored *why* having "the right attitude" is found to be a requirement of particular importance, and suggest what is at stake regarding attitudes.

The obligation to be a role model with "the right attitude" is a requirement for the 'whole person' that emerges from the data material. This is also a requirement found in the doctrine in the chapter on *The Military Profession*:

> The requirement to identify with the military profession and to act in accordance with the profession's values and attitudes applies to everyone in uniform. This requirement is however even stronger for leaders in the military. *Through attitudes and actions the leaders inspire everyone else to live up to the Armed Forces' ideals* [...] To *be* an officer in the Norwegian Armed Forces is to have incorporated the military profession as a part of one's personality, and in action to exercise leadership in accordance with the values described in the chapter. *The power of example is total* (FFOD 07, p. 162).

Inspired by Connell's gender and power hierarchy (cf. 4.1.3), it can be claimed that the Officer Candidate School seeks to produce *normative ideals* to which the subordinates will be encouraged to aspire. However, as Connell emphasizes, the normative ideal in a given pattern of social relations is not a fixed character type that is always the same. Instead the normative

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[231] In this document it is written that "The Army's Officer Candidate School's core values will govern all activities at the school, and have the vision: 'We educate actionable leaders!'. The vision contains the core values of leadership, responsibility and excellence" (The Army's Officer Candidate School, 2011).

ideal is contestable and subject to change[232]. This is shown in the struggle over what should be required from candidates who are to be formed into the normative ideals. The results show, however, that the present and local ideal norm is often expressed in doxical terms as: "having the right attitude". Looking to Bourdieu we can therefore claim that "having the right attitude" is dependent on an incorporation of the field's doxa and nomos in habitus, which imposes on the officers/candidates to adhere to the field's dominant ideals, values, illusio, laws, rules and code of conduct. Therefore, we will explore further what the doxical norm of "the right attitude" contains. We will start with documents that describe the *desired* attitudes and values in order to try to understand reasons *why* the "right attitude" is seen as a particularly important valuation criterion in the military field. We will then turn to chapters seven and eight to investigate what "having the right attitude" means and contains at the local military sites investigated.

The doctrine explains that the values that should guide the officers' attitudes are based on and reflect Norwegian society's norms and values:

> The Norwegian Armed Forces represent and are composed of individuals from
> Norwegian society. This means that the values which are central to our society,
> including human equality and the belief in democratic principles, are also important in
> the Norwegian Armed Forces (FFOD 07, p. 161)[233].

It is also explained that the Norwegian Armed Forces are *a value based organization* which *defend* Norwegian society's norms and values[234]. Following Bourdieu's theory this means that the Norwegian Armed Forces constitute the symbolic violence that structures the social life: i.e. the powers to make a particular understanding of reality emerge as objective, true and legitimate[235].

In the doctrine it is further detailed that the military professional's attitudes are guided by *The Norwegian Armed Forces' Values* and the profession's *Code of Conduct*. This is in line with

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[232] As referred to in chapter three, I have previously utilized Bjørnstad's (2005; 2011), Friis' (2000), Rones' (2008) and Ulriksen's (2002) studies to discuss how the 'outdoor man' and 'polar hero' were constructed and reconstructed as "the national ideal character" (hegemonic national masculinity), and thus "the ideal soldier" for others to emulate in the traditional Norwegian defense discourse. This traditional national/military ideal has however been challenged by the Anglo-American warrior (hegemonic military/global masculinity) and the female soldier in recent years (Rones, 2011; 2013).

[233] In chapter three Johansen (2013) argued that the doctrine follows the line of Huntington (cf. 3.2.1.4). Regarding values, I would argue that the doctrine follows the lines of Janowitz. This claim is made because a main difference between Huntington and Janowitz lies in how they look at the profession's autonomy and relation to the current social values in the society they are to protect. Where Huntington believed that military forces had to be separated from society in order not to be influenced by, what he saw as, counterproductive liberal and individualistic values, Janowitz argued that military personnel have to be integrated into society because it is crucial for the military organization's legitimacy that it shares and represents the values they are set to defend.

[234] This reflects White Paper No 42 (2003-2004) reading: "The Norwegian Armed Forces shall *defend* the values and principles the society is based on" (p. 88). Thus, it is declared in White Paper No 42 (2003-2004) that the Norwegian Armed Forces values "must be given attention in all education, as well as in all service by the various departments and units in the military" (p. 89).

[235] See Bourdieu's critique of Elias (cf. 4.3.5). Extending Elias (and Weber) Bourdieu "defines the state in terms of the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, where the monopoly of symbolic violence is the condition for the possession and exercise of [legitimate] physical violence" (Bourdieu, 1989-1992).

Huntington's emphasis on the officer corps being a community in which the behavior of men is *governed by a code* (cf. 3.2.1.1).

Considering *The Army's Code of Conduct* (The Army, n.d.), this one page document aims to be "a guideline for the traits and *attitudes* presumed that an officer shall live by". It is based on the Norwegian Armed Forces' and the Army's Core Values[236]. The code of conduct reads that as an officer: "I will strive for the glory of my department, and shall in all my conduct strive to be courageous, energetic, skilled, caring and loyal".

Regarding the values, the doctrine was launched in 2007 and refers assumedly to *The Norwegian Armed Forces' Values* from 1998 (Norwegian Armed Forces Head Command, 1998). In this document it is stated that:

> The Norwegian Armed Forces anchors its ethics in society's historical and cultural
> core values as they appear in our society's Christian and humanistic tradition, the UN
> Charter, the UN's Human Rights and International Law (p. 9)[237]

The values document from 1998 contains a section on "Human dignity and equality" with the subtitle "Enrichment through diversity" where it is written:

> Every human being has an inherent value and dignity, regardless of background,
> abilities and achievements. Therefore, we must ensure that everyone is treated equally
> and with respect, regardless of background, sex, religion, ethnic or cultural affiliation
> [...] equality in the Norwegian Armed Forces is a part of the equivalence (p. 10).

The part of the quote in italics is used as the title of a research report written by Mæland (2003) based on his studies of Norwegian officers in Kosovo 2000-2002 (Mæland, 2004) (cf. 3.2.1.4). In the 2003 text, Mæland, who is a chaplain in the Norwegian Armed Forces, reported that the deployed Norwegian officers developed negative attitudes toward "strangers", such as contempt, superiority and lack of interest. He stated that this could hardly be in accordance with the Norwegian Armed Forces' values. Mæland (2003) concluded, accordingly, that there was "*every good reason to emphasize the importance of working preventively with attitudes*" (p. 20). He recommended that the Armed Forces' management set strong focus on attitudes and that a revised set of values could be a tool to clarify the changed

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[236] According to Brunborg (2008), *The Norwegian Armed Forces' Values* (1998) received a mixed reaction. It was considered too 'pink and fluffy', too general to have any effect and too distanced from the reality of war. In recognition of this, the Army launched its own core values, which later became the Armed Forces' core values: respect, responsibility, and courage (with the Norwegian abbreviation RAM).

[237] *The Norwegian Armed Forces' Values* (1998) were revised and expanded to apply to the entire defense sector with *The Defence Sector's Values* launched in 2011 (Ministry of Defence, 2011) In the revised 2011 document 'openness' and 'far-seeing' were added to the three previous core values of 'respect, responsibility and courage'. The 2011 document illustrates the emphasis made on attitudes in the military field by highlighting Winston Churchill's quote: "*Attitude is a little thing that makes a big difference*". In the 2011 revision an addition was made to state that society's values are *constantly evolving, created and recreated*, and that the Norwegian Armed Forces mission is to *promote* values (the symbolic violence). However, since this document was not yet implemented in the field when the study was conducted, I will leave this document with this note.

context and aim of the Armed Forces. He also emphasized the great demand for low-tech knowledge, such as *respect* and understanding of others. Mæland's report resulted in a public debate on military attitudes and professional ethics between himself and the Chief of Defence[238], followed up by a longer debate in *Pacem*, the Norwegian military journal on ethical and theological reflection.

The debate contributed to a revision of the Norwegian Armed Forces' education in attitudes and ethics. Lunde (2008), who is also a chaplain, states that ethics and values came in to focus with the launch of *the Norwegian Armed Forces' Value* document in 1998, and that the most important reason for the increased focus on ethics was the changed mission and use of military power that followed the end of the Cold War[239] (cf. 2.1). Lunde refers to Major General Werner Christies[240] who writes:

> When the Norwegian Armed Forces was solely about national self-defense the task was set. It was neither necessary nor desirable with profound moral discussions when the enemy was standing at the door. Now we are to participate in so-called "peace operations" – we have become crusaders who fight for ideas (Christie I: Lunde 2008, p. 3).

Accordingly, Lunde (2008) proceeds that the changed use of the military power makes ethics more important than before, yet also more difficult than ever before. He explains that discussion on ethics was especially brought to the table with White Paper No 42 (2003-2004), where morals and ethics were brought in as justification and motivation for the use of military force[241]. That meant that a wider perspective on security interests was adopted with fundamental ethical values (i.e. symbolic violence) *included* as a security political interest[242]. Consequently it was, as Lunde (2008) refers, stated in the Defence Committee's Recommendation to White Paper No 42 (2003-2004) that "current international operations require forces that are *robust and well-trained, physically, mentally, ethically and morally*." (Innst. S. nr. 234, (2003-2004), p. 3.8).

The ethical guidelines from the political level were operationalized in an action plan on *Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership*, referred to as HEL[243], launched in 2006, with a revised version in 2009 (Ministry of Defence, 2009). Both versions emphasize the importance of a

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[238] According to Lunde (2008), the debate between Mæland and the Chief of Defence thematized two possible ways of anchoring ethics: where Mæland laid weight on individuals' attitudes (and ethical judgement), the Chief of Defence argued that individual's attitudes were of *less* importance because the military profession is a collective in which its actions (and ethics) are regulated and controlled by an external authority.

[239] Lunde (2008) explains that focus on ethics often increases after a scandal. Thus, the corruption scandal which involved the Norwegian Armed Forces in 2006-2007 should also be considered as a mechanism behind the increased focus on ethics.

[240] Werner Christie (1998) "On ethics and moral", The Home Guards Journal No. 10, p. 3.

[241] In chapter two it was explained that the first major steps in the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces were then taken with White Paper No 45 (2000-2001), in which anti-invasion was abandoned as a valid concept to the advantage of out-of-area operations (cf. 2.1).

[242] According to Lunde (2008) this was further emphasized in the Norwegian Report (NOU - Norwegian Report, 2007:15) where the phrase "values and interests" is consequently used.

[243] HEL = abbreviations for Holdning (Attitudes), Etikk (Ethics) og Ledelse (Leadership).

strong focus on attitudes and ethics in all military education. In addition, ethics and values were integrated as part of the military professional identity in the Norwegian Armed Forces' doctrine from 2007 (FFOD07).

At the educational level, lessons in ethics have mainly been provided by the Chaplain Corps who have, as mentioned above, revised the military educational program in attitudes and ethics. Changes in military ethical education are a main topic in Chaplain Hagesæther's (2010) dissertation on Norwegian military professional ethical discourse 1959-2009, referred to in chapter three. In short, the Chaplain Corps developed an ethical program which aimed to *develop attitudes* and build a moral character to live by, instead of only introducing knowledge. The program, known as RAM 05[244], was based on the Norwegian Armed Forces' value document from 1998 and the Army's core values: respect, responsibility and courage (RAM), later adopted as the Norwegian Armed Forces' core values (Hagesæther A. P., 2010). RAM is referred to in the doctrine as the *core* in the Norwegian Armed Forces' ethical fundament.

At the Army Officer Candidate School attitude and ethics training was covered in the subject "*Attitudes*"[245]. *Prescribed texts*[246] were, among others, the Army/Norwegian Armed Forces Core Values (Respect, Responsibility and Courage (RAM)), the Army's Code of Conduct, the chapter on the military profession from the doctrine (FFOD 07), the media article on warrior culture written by the Chief of Defence which inspired this research (cf. 2.2.1), and Shannon E. French (2003)*The Code of the Warrior: Why Warriors Need a Code*.

According to the prescribed text by French (2003), warrior cultures throughout history and around the globe have constructed codes of behavior *based on that culture's image of the ideal warrior*. The code seems to hold the warrior to high ethical standards, with violators being shamed and ostracized, French argues. The codes restrain the warrior, set boundaries on his behavior and distinguish honorable acts from shameful acts, which according to Bourdieu means to impose on the warrior a classification/value system. Such codes define not only how the warrior should interact with his warrior comrades, but also how the warrior will treat citizens and the people he conquers[247]. The primary purpose with a code, French proceeds, "is to grant nobility to the warriors' profession" (p. 113) and help the warrior to *balance on the profoundly important, but very thin "line between a warrior and a murderer"* (p. 117).

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[244] RAM = abbreviations for the three values; 'Respekt (Respect), Ansvar (Responsibility), Mot (Courage)'. 05 refers to the program being launched in 2005. RAM and HEL have developed as "need to know" abbreviations in the military field, referred to in various settings and documents. RAM and HEL knowledge is also regularly provided in the Home Guard Rapid Reaction Force

[245] For the conscripts the RAM-program has been developed to the credit-rewarding subject "Ethics and Military Power" (Hagesæther A. P., 2010). For the 2013 cohort of the officer candidate school the subject "Attitudes" was developed to the subject "The Military Profession" (Forsvarets Forum, June 2012).

[246] Prescribed texts such as Shannon E. French (2003)*The Code of the Warrior: Why Warriors Need a Code* should be considered as collected data material. See chapter 5.1.2.1 on written material as actors in the field .

[247] As was shown in chapter two, a debate on warrior cultures emerged in the Norwegian media between a professor criticizing the public for not being impressed by snipers' achievements in Afghanistan, and the Defence Minister who replied that we do not have a tradition for a warrior culture where we exult over slain enemies, and should not strive in that direction (cf. 2.2.1).

From chapter four we remember Lawler (2008) and Woodward (1997a) who explain how the concept of identity has a capacity for exclusion and marking of divisions between 'us' and 'them', especially seen in extreme forms of national and ethnic conflicts such as in the former Yugoslavia. This was where Mæland (2003) studied Norwegian officers' morals and attitudes and subsequently became concerned with their attitude toward "the other"/"the stranger". Regarding this topic, the prescribed test by French (2003) refers to Dave Grossman's work *On Killing* from 1996 in which the practice of dehumanizing the enemy through use of abusive or euphemistic language is illuminated as "a common and effective tool for increasing aggression and breaking down inhibitions against killing" (p. 111). French quotes Grossman:

> If your propaganda machine can convince your soldiers that their opponents are not
> really human but are 'inferior forms of life', then their natural resistance to killing
> their own species will be reduced (Grossman, 1996, p. 161 I: French, 2003, p. 111).

However, French refers to Grossman who found that soldiers "who persisted in viewing the Vietnamese as 'less than animals' were unable to leave the war behind" (p. 111), while soldiers who admired Vietnamese culture appeared to live happy and productive post-war life. Concerning the soldiers' post-war life French, thus, advocates for a code where the enemy is treated with respect, worth and dignity, which also seems to be Mæland's concern that resulted in a discussion on professional ethics and attitudes in the Norwegian Armed Forces.

To consider the thin line between murderers and warriors we should recall Creveld's (1991) argument: that those who engage in killing with no risk would not earn the respect and honor reserved for the warrior (cf. 3.2.2). From chapter two we also recall that after the fall of the Soviet Union NATO identified its *new threat image* to be arising from "serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes" (NATO, 1991), and furthermore that classical realism-based strategies and theories on inter-governmental war failed in the face of the *asymmetric*[248] conflicts which began to show up in the 1990s and 2000s (cf. 3.2.2). The classical theories were based on the idea of uniformed soldiers fighting uniformed soldiers guided by codes provided in International Humanitarian Law, which governed relations between states: such as The Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions[249]. The fall of the Soviet Union and the following Global War on Terror unsettled everything: the risk for the superior Western military power, that opponents were

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[248] Asymmetric warfare refers to conflicts where the military power and resources of the belligerents differs significantly. According to Creveld (2006) asymmetric warfare causes a moral dilemma for the strong part. The moral dilemma is related to his argument that killing with no risk would be judged as murder. On the other hand, he proceeds that the weak part "can take casualties and commit atrocities without losing their self-respect or the respect of the world" (p. 7).

[249] Matlary (2009) explains that since no *formal* war had been declared, according to law, the Norwegian Prime Minister and Minister of Defense avoided using the word 'war' for the situation in Afghanistan as late as 2007. Yet they acknowledged that Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan could "experience" that they participated in "war like actions". Matlary argues that security politics, the war and the soldiers' actions were camouflaged in soft values, and that the diffuse war/peace-dimension in modern guerrilla warfare, with nation building as proclaimed purpose, allow for a rewriting of war to peace at the strategic level.

uniformed and would follow "the rules", the protection of medical personnel by the Geneva Conventions etc.

With this changed context in mind we return to French (2003) who explains that the moral requirements of the soldiers become much murkier when warriors must battle "desperate men and women" (p. 116), who see no other way of advancing their objectives than employing methods that "are viewed as horrific and appalling by the rest of the civilized world, such as terror attacks on civilian populations" (p. 116). Facing that situation, French argues that "the most serious 'cons' that the West must consider before '*taking the gloves off*' is that it would be a violation of our own values to engage in a war with no rules" (p. 116). She argues that a victory from such a war would be doubtful, and advocates for the importance of a warrior code that restrains the warrior, concluding that a code is the shield that guards the warrior's humanity: a "moral and psychological armor that protects the warrior from becoming a monster" (p. 114). Using Bourdieu's approach it follows that *the classification of warrior/soldier versus monster/murder, civilized vs. uncivilized, constitutes a stake in the struggle on soldiers' attitudes.*

This is perhaps a reason why a phrase recorded in the field notes was: "the challenge is to create monsters with breaks" (Chaplain, Joint Selection; OHQ, Joint Education). It can be argued that this phrase also summarizes the finding in this study: that doing an officer role appropriately is dependent on the ability to embody power resources (monster resources) and obey regulation impositions (having breaks). According to Ingdahl (2012) the phrase "monster with breaks" originates from the Chaplain in Telemark Battalion who defended the battalion when it was criticized in the media for having developed a warrior culture, previously referred to as the ALFA-case (cf. 5.4.1.2). Accordingly, building a warrior culture can also mean building a culture where the soldier's behavior is governed, restrained, and regulated by a code[250]. This is also a message in Coker's book (2007), *The Warrior Ethos*, referred to briefly in chapter three. Like French, Coker argues that the warrior code/ethos remains essential for psychological and humanitarian reasons.

With Elias, it can be argued that inscription of 'a code' in habitus helps to create the social conditions under which the Western/Norwegian military forces can fight an enemy, referred to by French (2003) as 'desperate men and women', in the name of civilization or in the name of certain values. The reason Elias began to analyze etiquette manuals and socially accepted behavioral codes was in order to understand how England and France came to legitimate their fight against Germany by the name of 'civilization'[251]. With reference to French (2003), who

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[250] In the debate on *Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation* (cf. 2.2.1) Edström et al (2009b) question what the terms professional culture and warrior culture really mean and contain. For instance, the Defense Minister seemed to interpret warrior culture as a culture in which slain enemies were celebrated, while Ydstebø (2009b) argued that: "For the warrior cultures, the war is not only a mean but an end in itself" (Ydstebø, 2009a, p. 29). For French and some of the Chaplains, warrior culture seems however to be a culture that is governed by a code that grants the military profession nobility (see also chapter 8.1.2).

[251] An important work in the justification of the "mission civiliatrice" was Rudyard Kipling's (1865-1936) *France at War on the Frontier of Civilization* (1916). In the aftermath of the Spanish-American war, in which the US won the Philippines from Spain, Kipling wrote the poem 'The White Man's Burden' (1899). In the poem Kipling promoted and justified the idea that superior white people had a moral responsibility to raise savage people to a higher level of civilization. The poem had the

claims that the purpose of a warrior code "is to grant *nobility* to the warriors' profession" (p. 113) warning the Western forces not to take off its gloves, we may argue that an officer still needs to be a kind of a "gentleman" prepared to fight with his "gloves on".

The traditional phrase "officer and a gentleman" (warrior with gloves), as well as the less camouflaged/civilized phrase observed in the field "monster with breaks", can be held up against Belkin's (2012) (cf. 3.3.4) claim that military masculinity is structured by contradiction. As was shown in chapter three, Belkin argued that the military establishes social control over the troops through *masculine beliefs combined with unmasculine (feminine) practises.* Moreover, he argued that the US military's production of that contradiction "in, on, and through service members' bodies and identities has contained and camouflaged" (p. 25) the problematic sides of military power and practises through the construction of a benign façade. Belkin (2012) then leads us to the theoretical reason why the more detailed content of the requirement to do an officer role appropriately will be discussed as Power Resources (monster, warrior, masculinity) and Regulation Impositions (gentleman, gloves, brakes, femininity).

Belkin's use of masculinity and femininity, when he argues that the military has compelled soldiers to embody masculinity and femininity[252], falls close to Skeggs' development of gender concepts after Bourdieu. From chapter 4.2.4 we remember Skeggs' argument that where masculinity can be understood as symbolic dominant capital (power resources), femininity is a form of regulation rather than domination. Combining these remarks with Bourdieu's view I have conceptualized masculinity as an imposition to accumulate power resources needed to achieve victory, honor and recognition, and through that become classified as masculine. Femininity is understood as a form of regulation that comes with impositions to avoid shame and misrecognition, and we can add; brutality, unregulated violence, dehumanization and uncivilized behaviour.

As we saw in chapter three, the military has often been represented and therefore been seen and researched as an institution that offers individuals the possibility to achieve, perform and enact (hegemonic/hyper-) masculine status or identity. Accordingly, a traditional argument regarding the contentious issue of women's service has been that succeeding in the military, for men and women, depends on the ability to perform masculinity (act like a man) and reject femininity (don't be a sissy). Although few others than Belkin challenge that view, the

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subtitle *The United States and The Philippine Islands* and describes the American "duty" to civilize the Filipinos who are "new-caught, sullen peoples, half devil and half child". According to Belkin (2012) the American empire was established and consolidated in the period 1898 (the Spanish American War) and 2001 (the 11 September attacks). During this period, Belkin argues, military masculinity played a central role because those "American who served overseas and enforced or threatened to enforce American power at the point of the gun sometimes joined the military because they wanted to attain masculine status" (p. 42). I would claim that Elias and Belkin support each other in that where Elias seeks to understand the politics of civilization, Belkin seeks to understand the politics of scapegoating. As explained in chapter five, The Civilizing Process originates from Elias need to understand the long-term process in which the term 'civilization' came to express the self-consciousness of the West; i.e. "the social conditions under which […] the term [civilization] came to embody 'evolutionary', colonial, racist and derogatory sentiments" (Hughes, 2008, p. 170) (cf. 4.3.3).

[252] For instance dominance and subordination, barbarism and civilization, filth and cleanliness.

contradictory requirement to embody masculinity *and* femininity, understood as requirements to be powerful and subordinate or to discipline/regulate at the same time, is something aspirants/candidates expect from military education, as can be seen in this statement:

> CAB: I had expected it to be physically hard, that I would have to be switched on all the time, and that it would be ordered and disciplined and things like that. Up to now it has turned out that way, so yes I am satisfied! (Interview).

Chapter 7: Power Resources (Capital) and Power Relations

As mentioned in the introduction to the data presentation (cf. p. 155), the requirements to do a military officer role appropriately at the local sites could be divided into requirements to embody 1) power resources, and 2) obey regulation imposition. In this chapter we will look into the power resources an officer is encouraged to embody. We will also look into the actors' response to these requirements.

The first part of the chapter (7.1 *Power Recourses Required to Do an Officer Role Appropriately*) is devoted to the requirements: research question one. The typologies that were developed from the aforementioned codes (cf. 5.3.2.2) will be used as headlines:

- The Self-Motivated, Committed and Competitive Winner and Leader
- The Physically Fit and Military Body

The second part of the chapter (7.2 *Power Relations and Hierarchy Struggles*) is devoted to the response: research question two. We will then look into how to the requirements and interests to be a physically fit and competitive winner/leader result in power and hierarchy struggles between women and men with different types and amount of resources (capital).

The headlines represent the trends in the data material; meanwhile, the selected quotes will also illustrate nuances and disagreements in the field.

The results will be interpreted and discussed in the third part of the chapter (*7.3. Interpretations: The Chosen Body, Meritocracy and Quotas*)

7.1   Power Resources Required to Do an Officer Role Appropriately

7.1.1   The Self-Motivated, Committed and Competitive Winner and Leader

In the introduction session to Joint Education Module 1, the officer who was welcoming the candidates said:

> OHQ: The goal with the training is that you shall become energetic leaders and damn good instructors (Field notes, Joint Education).

This goal is reflected in interviews and field conversations with officers who emphasized that the officer candidate education is in fact a leadership education, and that, accordingly, the candidates would have to like being in a leadership role. However, this seemed not to be the case with all the candidates who were admitted. Lack of willingness to lead was referred to as an inappropriate attitude and something which, according to some officers, ideally should have prevented candidates from being admitted to the Officer Candidate School:

> OAB: What disappoints me the most is the selection made at FOS […] There are a couple of candidates who have been admitted [to the Officer Candidate School] and at

the selection it must have been possible to see that they were not able. A candidate
came to me, after half a year…I gave him a warning and said: "You need to sharpen
your attitudes". Then he was able to answer: "Yes, but I do not know if I want this,
because I do not like to lead people". Then, I thought: "If you do not like to lead
people, what are you doing here at the first place?" (Interview).

The education also focused on the candidates becoming inspiring leaders with self-confidence
who could motivate others to never give up. To demonstrate this ability a YouTube video
showing the American football Coach Flower's energetic pre-game motivation speech *I Am a
Champion*[253] was used in lessons during the fieldwork[254]. In class discussions following the
display of the video it was emphasized that Coach Flower firstly *used* self-confidence to
convince his team that defeat is *never* an alternative. Secondly, he *produced* self-confidence
in his team by convincing them that they were the best and that if they stood together they
would be able to conquer what had never before been conquered. Also, it was emphasized
that Coach Flower let nobody wonder who the leader was. "Who is the leader?" was a phrase
often utilized by officers to push candidates they considered to be too invisible or uncertain in
the leadership role. On occasion, officer candidates in such situations were also reminded
about Coach Flower, which means that Coach Flower was used as a kind of leadership ideal
by some of the officers.

Furthermore, passion was found as an important valuation criterion and as an aspect in
"having a good attitude":

> I: You, said, they need to have a good attitude? What do you mean by that?
> OHQ: Yes, as I said, a good attitude is that you have a passion, or a glow, in what you
> do. You have a desire to make a good job (Interview).

Seriousness and commitment were also seen as important factors. Some saw them as a
prerequisite for the candidates to gain respect from their subordinates in their second year role
as sergeants:

> OAB: The most important thing is that the person is engaged in what he does. Beyond
> that he may have many strange characteristics and ways of doing things. As long as he
> manages to be serious and knows what is required of him, not just in the job, but from
> the guys so that they are able to respect him, so he can get credibility, […] so, at least

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[253] This is an excerpt of what Coach Flower yells to his team with energy and confidence: "I will conquer what has never
been conquered. Defeat will not be in my creed.[…] WHO AM I? …. I AM A CHAMPION!!! […] Never shall I fail my
comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong and morally straight […] WHO AM I? …. I AM A
CHAMPION!!! Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well trained warrior. […] I will never give
in to the evil that is weakness […] WHO AM I? …. I AM A CHAMPION!!! Energetically will I meet my enemies, no one
will challenge me, no one will stop me from my goal. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will
fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Champion's word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall at the hands of my
enemy and under no circumstances will I ever surrender […]" See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1GWBB7qrBA
[254] It was used at the selection officers' preliminary training to Joint Selection, and in a lesson for all the candidates in Joint
Education Module 1.

they need to be serious in what they do. That's what I think of as the foundation of a
good officer [...]
I: Is it difficult for them to gain respect from conscripts?
OAB: For some it is difficult, while others – it depends very much on how seriously
you take the leadership role in the first year, I think. [...] You have to be, indeed,
committed to your job (Interview).

The requirement to be serious was also reflected in the field notes. For instance there was an
episode where two officers were discredited by several other officers for being unserious. The
reason for the misrecognition of the two officers was that they had not been tough enough
with their subordinates when it came to 'setting requirement standards' and demanding
seriousness from them. "Setting requirements" was a frequently used phrase in the field and
was often framed in the discourse of caring. To care therefore meant to require a training
standard that would enable the subordinate to survive in international operations. In particular,
officers with experience from Afghanistan seemed to be engaged in the importance of "setting
requirements" and being serious. One officer who had recently returned said that:

In Afghanistan we were damn rough with each other in terms of what we were good
and bad at. We had a feedback culture where we said straight out to each other that at
this point you[255] are not able enough, and at this point you need to improve. We used
Petter Northug as an example of the importance of paying serious attention to the
tiniest details and constantly trying to figure out how details could be improved in
order to improve the overall performance. It was all about care for our own and others'
lives (Field notes, anonymized site).

It was, however, discussed among officers at the Headquarters, who had an overall
responsibility for the education the candidates received, that officers who had recently
returned from Afghanistan with shocking personal experiences could be too tough in "setting
of requirements" and demanding seriousness from the candidates.

Another fairly frequently found requirement was to be self-motivated and also to be able to
re-motivate yourself and never give up. These requirements are illustrated below in the story
from the Joint Selection. The team I followed was allowed to sit down for a while before
going to have an evaluation on their experiences and effort so far:

The female aspirant in the squad takes off her jacket. Her t-shirt is soaking wet. She
says: "Bloody hell. We are rolling in our own sweat!" I smile at her, so she says to me:
"It is not that I am physically tired, but my feet are very sore and I am so tired
mentally. We have to dig really deep into ourselves to find motivation and to get
motivated again and again for all these new cases and tests we are going through
constantly". […][A bit later] One of two officers present asks the candidates how they
are doing. The female aspirant answers immediately: "We are really, really tired now

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[255] Petter Northug is a Norwegian cross country skier and double Olympic champion.

and every time we arrive at a new case-station the officers there are yelling that we are not good enough, that this can be done much better, and that we are not fit enough, not able enough and so on. We never get any real feedback. Only spank and flop". She explains that this makes them lose their self-confidence all the time. Officer 1 asks what she thinks is the purpose of that. She answers: "Well, I guess it is about testing us." Officer 2 replies: "Even when something takes the spirit from you we need you to continue standing out as an energetic and enterprising leader". Officer 1 continues: "We are not here to motivate you. You will have to do that yourself. And if you cannot motivate yourself you should not be here" (Field notes, Joint Selection).

The requirement to be self-motivated is also reflected in this female aspirant's experience of the selection officers:

A: I experienced them [the selectors] as a constant stress factor, in a way. A mental challenge, […] while we are going through all these cases and are tired their job is to rush us and see whether we can perform under stress. So, I experienced it at times to be quite mentally exhausting. Because you are never told that you are doing something right. They focus only on the negative. But as they say, they are not here to motivate us. We are here to motivate ourselves (Interview).

However, in chapter six and above we have seen that an ideal officer should be able to *develop* motivation, self-confidence and self-efficacy in his/her team. It should, therefore, be noted that, firstly, most of the aspirants/candidates (like the one quoted above) seemed to have a conscious understanding that the officers were testing their performance and motivation under mental stress. Secondly, that the methods used by the officers ranged between breaking down and building up the candidates' self-confidence and motivation[256]. Joint Selection phase two and the coping exercises were notable arenas for breaking down the aspirants/candidates. In chapter six it was referred to that the officers often used phrases such as 'you are the crème de la crème' to build up the candidates' self-confidence in educational lessons. The changed approach to the candidates' motivation and self-confidence is reflected in this interview:

CAB: [What I liked the least] was perhaps in the beginning when we were often punished, and told that we were not good enough at anything. That was boring to go through. But later we were told that we were not as useless as we were told then (Interview).

However, although the officers worked with the candidates motivation 'between extremes' they clearly expect the candidates to be highly self-motivated. For instance in a lesson at Joint Education the teaching officer opened the lesson by saying:

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[256] This seems to be in accordance with Creveld's (2008) description of military education quoted in chapter three, reading "Even as it humiliates trainees, a well-considered, well-carried-out program will also instil in them pride and self-confidence" (p. 50).

> OHQ: You have, after all, pushed yourself through the selection to be allowed to sit here, so I expect that you are motivated and are here to learn and that you want something with this (Interview).

Also, the officers claimed that whether the candidate will succeed or not depends on their motivation, and that the candidates can choose to be bad or good performers:

> OAB: Based on the motivation he [the candidate] can choose if he will do well or poorly. Is he – or she – an 'ambulatory person' who can pull himself together? Then we will facilitate a foundation for him to develop (Interview).

Moreover, it seemed to be important that the candidates had the ability and willingness to never give up, even when a situation seemed hopeless. As officers and candidates learned from Coach Flower: "defeat is *never* an alternative". This requirement was reflected, for example, in that giving up in competitions to save energy for later tests was seen as an inappropriate attitude, as described here:

> A: We were in an obstacle course the other day and then there were some [in the team] who found out that we were in a bit trouble and were going to lose anyway. They stopped running and started to walk, because they thought it would be silly to wear ourselves out, because we would certainly have to do more stuff. Then the selector opened his mouth and was really annoyed, yelling: "That is a bad attitude!" (Interview).

Following the requirements to never give up, it was also important that the candidates had the ability to push themselves and not give up when in pain. They needed to have the ability to differ between pain in the body and "pain in the strength of will" (ability to fight through pain):

> OAB: There are different definitions of injury and pain in the strength of will, and those things. In the beginning it was a bit like: "I have pain in my leg". In my mind then: keep running. Now they've got it, so now there are many who are taking it as far as they can. And that's good to see (Interview).

How the candidates learn that it is a requirement to withstand or ignore pain and 'keep running/marching' is reflected in this story from the field notes written at Joint Education:

> A small-sized female candidate tells the other candidates that I [the researcher] was marching with her team in the night march at Joint Selection. I say that I remember she was not marching but running to keep up with the guys, and constantly, for hours, saying; "dammit, dammit, dammit…". The candidate laughed and says: "I had so much pain in my legs that I could hardly stand it, and then the officer came over and said: "An officer does not have pain in his legs!" – so, then I just had to continue" (Field notes, Joint Education).

Whining and complaining were also found to be something that disqualified candidates. When questioning whether there were some in the team who should not have been admitted, an aspirant answered:

> A: There is one that has complained a bit, but we have told him not to bother us with that: "You drag us down, you drag everybody down". It does not help to sit there and tell us how tired you are, because everyone is tired (Interview).

Phrases such as "pain in the strength of will" and "your complaining drags us down" sends signals about inappropriate behavior: it is a communication of misrecognition. According to Bourdieu, the embodiment of a field's common schemata for classification in habitus imposes on the individual a sense of what he or she has to do, or should do, in order to avoid misrecognition and shame. In the following description a female candidate's shame and concern for how the officers were going to judge her for not taking part in a physical exercise at Joint Education reveals the importance of taking part, never giving up and withstanding pain:

> I am waiting for the candidates to arrive at the obstacle course for physical exercise. Three candidates in uniform arrive before the others, so I assume that they are not going to take part in the physical training. One of the candidates comes toward me and informs me that she has been injured and that the doctor has strictly forbidden her to take part in the training. […] A bit later the injured female candidate comes over to me again. She says: "It is really embarrassing and awkward not to take part in the training. Especially since the officers here [at Joint Education] don't know my attitude and may think that I'm a 'draft dodger?'" (Field notes, Joint Education).

The female candidate's embarrassment at not being physically fit, at that moment, is probably because she has learned to classify "draft dodging", "giving up" and not taking part in the exercises in spite pain/injury as inappropriate behavior. The practice to push bodies in pain is, however, questioned, as shown in this conversation:

> MOHQ: It [physical fitness] is very important, but it depends on what you put into it.
> I: Mm. What do you put into it?
> MOHQ: Today I personally believe that, firstly, we need to get some knowledge so that we do not injury our bodies. As I've done. The knowledge [on how to prevent injuries] is starting to get better. But, the officers also need to be trained in that. And secondly, I believe that there need to be greater demands on robustness than endurance. We are mechanized, we are in vehicles, we do not need to run 3000 meters in less than 13 minutes. We must become stronger. We carry heavier stuff, simply. And if you are more robust and have more strength, then you can withstand more strain.
> I: Why are bodies injured?
> MOHQ: Well, it's footwear and experience, I think. How far is it necessary to take it? Is it necessary to destroy someone's legs on a coping exercise by marching versus

> maybe… there are many other ways to cope other than marching. Often people are
> injured for two to three weeks because of that, and that causes problems for the unit –
> when people are out. […] So we should be able to preserve their bodies. If you destroy
> your body there is nothing left for you here (Interview).

To sum up, an officer is encouraged to embody self-motivation, passion, commitment, seriousness, ability to fight through pain and never give up in order become a leader and winner.

The requirements described so far are reflected in the doctrine where it is written: "In our profession, the will to succeed and strive toward unprecedented results constitutes the difference between success and failure" (FFOD 07, p. 160). The presented requirements are also reflected in the Army's code of conduct. A keyword in the code says that an officer is energetic, which is explained as: "The officer is pushing and is a source to fighting spirit and faith in victory" (The Army, n.d.). In the document *Guidelines for Selectors at Joint selection* (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a) mindset, mood, motivation, *commitment, enthusiasm,* interest, winning instinct and effort are listed as examples of good attitude[257]. In other words, there seems to be a relatively good correlation between requirements and ideals expressed in military documents and requirements expressed by actors in the local field investigated.

The requirement of being able to fight through pain is also in accordance with previous research from the Norwegian Military Academy. Sødergren (2012) writes: "It appears that the injury itself is accepted, but that it is less plausible that the injury is made visible. It is pointed out that the cadets are expected to withstand pain" (s. 17). This leads us to the next main category of requirements: the physically fit body.

7.1.2   The Physically Fit and Military Body

Along with the requirement "having the right attitude", physical fitness emerged as the most frequently expressed requirement to do an officer role appropriately. In the following statement the combination of physical fitness and the right attitude are linked to the ability to enforce your (the military authorities') will (the symbolic violence, cf. 4.2.1) on other people; which can be said to be the purpose of the Armed Forces.

> OHQ: The Armed Forces character, as I know it from the Army, involves enforcing
> your will on other people. [...] In order to impose your will on others by force you
> must have the physical ability to do it, but not least, you must have a clear and good
> mind with a good attitude, basically the ability to make good and appropriate
> assessments. That means that people who are not physically fit or do not have attitudes
> in accordance with what we want, they are incapable (Interview).

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[257] In the Guidelines for Selectors at Joint selection (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a) desired attitudes are exemplified as: "Maturity, reflectivity, pride of honor, discipline, respect, courage, honesty, mindset, mood, motivation, commitment, enthusiasm, interest, reliability, responsibility, social, winning instinct, selfless, preparation, conduct and effort".

The importance of physical fitness as a valuation criterion in military cultures is documented properly in previous research (cf. 1.1 and 3.3).Thus, in chapter one we departed from White Paper No 14 (2012–2013) *Competency for a new era,* where it was argued that there is an increasing need for employees with competency within a number of *other areas*, and aimed to understand what is at stake in the struggle over requirements such as the fitness standard. In the White Paper it was argued that the Norwegian Armed Forces uniform system with standardized criteria for selection based on physical skills could "result in a cultural and competency-related reproduction of the existing organization and thereby a continuation of the existing gap in competency" (White Paper No 14, (2012–2013), p. 32). On the other hand, in chapter one we were presented with female officers who argued the importance of *maintaining* 'harsh physical requirements' that apply to all categories of personnel in order for women to be recognized as being in the field for legitimate reasons (Egeberg, 2010; Kollbotn, 2013; Moilanen, 2014; Ringvold & Wenaas, 2009) (cf. 1.1 and 4.2.2.3). The opinion that physical requirements had to be maintained was frequently found in the present study's data material among both men and women:

> FOHQ: The [physical] requirements must not be in any way modified (Interview).
> MOHQ: When the Taliban shoot an anti-tank missile at the vehicle, they do not ask whether it is women or men who sit in the car. To sum it up, the job requirements must determine the requirements. That is my opinion. But this is stirring up a wasps' nest. Politically, there is a strong desire to increase the percentage [of women]. Yes, do that, but it must not be at the expense of physical demands. If ladies meet the requirements, then they are kindly welcome (Interview).

This male officer's statement illustrates that *possession of physical capital determines whether an actor is welcome to enter the military field/profession or not*, as was also indicated by the female feature article writer. Moreover, from chapter one we recall a male cadet from the Norwegian Military Academy who argued that the suggestion to utilize persons with civilian education[258] would require civilians going through physically and mentally demanding trials where they would have to *prove themselves fit* to be military professionals. The cadet argued that this would *ensure that the military profession was reserved for the best*, and that *such trails would benefit the best civilians who could then "get papers which document their capabilities, - that they are selected"* (Størkersen, 2013, p. 36). The cadet's text reveals clearly that the ability to pass physical and mental tests and trails is an *important requirement to create a feeling of being selected*[259], and that *being the "best" in this field is related to physical prowess*. Previous research presented in chapter three found that youths of both genders who want to serve in the military are tempted by personal, physical and mental challenges (cf. 3.3.2). This is also confirmed in the present study:

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[258] The cadet's argument was based on suggestions in White Paper No 14 (2012–2013) to utilize actors with the required competences from civilian education to fill the gap in competence requirements.

[259] Chapter three referred to Creveld (2008) who explained that military education has been arranged with mentally and physically demanding tests "as part of a well-considered plan" (p. 48) to offer status and pride to those who succeed.

> CAB: You arrive here with the expectation that there will be a lot of challenges and
> the possibility that you are to be tested properly, both physically and mentally. Get
> real challenges.

Considering the physical test and requirements, a formal physical fitness test applies to all officers in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Firstly, passing the physical test is a prerequisite to being admitted as an aspirant for phase two at Joint Selection. Then there is a "mandatory annual physical test" for officers, comprising in part the same test scheme as the entrance test[260]. The test scheme is gender and age differentiated. The test consists basically of a 3000 meter running test, push-ups, sit-ups and hang-ups. The minimum requirement to pass the 3000 meter running test for women is 15.00 minutes. According to Dyrstad et. al (2012),[261] the average running time of 3000 meters for Norwegian adolescent women in the period 2000-2009 was 17.02 minutes (n= 673). The minimum requirement to pass the test for men is 14.00 minutes. According to Dyrstad et. al (2012) the average running time for Norwegian adolescent men in the period 2000-2009 was 13.42 minutes (n= 810). In other words, the 3000 meter running test seems to be relatively much harder to pass for women than it is for men.

In addition to the standardized physical fitness test there are formal physically and mentally demanding tests in the form of field exercises, such as phase two at the Joint Selection and some coping exercises during the education. Such exercises often involve marching with backpacks. The ability to march with a heavy backpack has been found to be an important valuation criteria in previous research on the military (Ellingsen, Karlsen, Kirkhaug, & Røvik, 2008; Hockey, 2002; Rones, 2008; Sødergren, 2012). This study also found that the ability to march with backpacks gives the actors credibility in the field, as shown in this statement from a female aspirant about another female aspirant's abilities:

> A: She [a female on another team] was very able. I needed help with the backpack
> almost the entire march tonight, while she carried everything herself. She seems rock
> hard (Interview).

Physically demanding activities in the outdoors with a backpack are also something the aspirants/candidates expect from the military. That is 'the image' of the military, as this female aspirant states:

> I: What have you liked best about what you have been doing so far?
> A: I must say the field exercise. That is what has been most challenging, the most
> interesting and might have given us the image of the military as I have always had.

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[260] Only aerobic endurance is part of the mandatory annual physical test for officers, i.e. the 3000 meter run. It is however possible to conduct alternative endurance tests such as 500 meter swimming, 10 km cross country skiing or 20 km biking. This is not possible at the entrance test, where the only option is the 3000 meter run.

[261] The study compared 3000 meter running test results in the period 1969 to 2009 in a cohort of Norwegian high school pupils, aged 16-18 years. 4981 test results were collected. 2827 were boys.

> Being outside, tent, struggle, backpack and stuff. I am very, very pleased with that week now (Interview).

However, also in accordance with previous findings (Rones, 2008) several actors in the field convey that running 3000 meters in shorts and trainers requires a different body and different physical capital than that of marching with a backpack.

> OAB: There is a difference between he who performs well at 3000 contra marching with the backpack, where people fall off. It is then that your shortcomings are revealed. You will fall through at 3000 meter as well, but that is not that physically demanding (Interview).

Vanderburgh's (2008) study on body mass bias in military physical fitness tests confirms that the 3000 meter running test, as well as the strength test used in the standardized physical fitness test, favors persons with a smaller body mass and penalizes larger, not just fatter, service members. On the other hand, larger persons tend to be better performers of marching with a backpack and in service related fitness tasks such as heavy lifting and material handling[262]. From observations made in the field, it seems as though the different bodies required performing well on the standardized physical entrance tests and the backpack marching caused an extra challenge for women. Firstly, the formal physical fitness test favors women with a small body mass out of a group that, on average, are smaller than the group of men in the first place. Secondly, the gender differentiated 3000 meter test schema makes tougher demands on women and is therefore more difficult to pass for women with higher body mass than it is for the larger men, if Dyrstad et. al's (2012) average running times for men and women are correct. Whether it is necessary for all personnel to be able to carry a heavy backpack on longer marches is questioned in the data material as well as in previous research (Ellingsen, Karlsen, Kirkhaug, & Røvik, 2008; Rones, 2013; Ulriksen, 2002). Yet, the dominant opinion at the local sites investigated was that performance with a backpack mattered, and it seemed to matter more than 'training-center fitness'[263], such as performances in the 3000 meter run. Likewise, Sødergren (2012) found in her investigation on the ideal officer at the Norwegian Military Academy that "if you are not able to carry a backpack it does not help that you are a good leader" (p. 18).

In light of previous discussions about the fitness standard, the physical requirements in the field, other competence needs and the aim to increase the number of women, *the NDUC-*

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[262] Due to the body mass bias, which can be explained by biologic scaling laws, larger persons tend to receive lower scores than their lighter counterparts, Vanderburgh (2008) explains. Since promotion is based, in part, on fitness test performance, Vanderburgh proceeds that "lighter personnel have an advancement advantage, although they tend to be poorer performers on many tests of work-related fitness" (p. 1538).

[263] For instance, one officer said: "I have an impression that we are now facing a fitness center generation. They are damn well trained and do it better than ever on the physical tests as long as they can wear sneakers and shorts. But once they get into the forest there are chafing and blisters, grumbling and complaining and trouble" (Field notes, Service Education, Medical Battalion).

NSSD/DI were given the task of revising[264] the physical fitness test scheme in 2013/2014 (Physical Test Committee, 2014). Accordingly, the perceptions and opinions of Norwegian military employees about physical training, physical tests and job demands were recently investigated in a survey conducted by colleagues (Stornæs, Aandstad, & Kirknes, 2014). Results from the survey[265] show that:

> 90% believe that all military personnel should have a mandatory annual physical test. Nearly 60% completely or partly agreed that civilians should have compulsory physical tests on par with military personnel (Stornæs, Aandstad, & Kirknes, 2014, p. 3).

Regarding the service and job demands, officers interviewed in the present study refer to these not being especially physically demanding. Both in the Medical Battalion and the Armored Battalion reference was made to the service being in vehicles:

> I: How are the physical challenges in the service as a medical officer?
> OMB: For my part?
> I: Yes.
> OMB: Very few. There are sometimes none and then suddenly we need to run the 3000 and then it's okay to be ready. And suddenly there is a winter march and then you have to carry backpacks and stuff. But that is very little, actually. We are driving here and there.
> I: We talked about physical challenges in the service.
> OMB: When we were at an exercise recently we didn't do anything. We drove a car (Interview).

> I: What are the physical requirements in the daily service?
> OAB: Ehh - yes. In addition to the requirements that are set by the Officer Candidate School for admission, of course we set requirements beyond that, but not any formal requirements. [...]
> I: But when you're on exercises, what is it that is physically demanding then?
> OAB: For those who are vehicle commanders on Leo and CV90, there are clearly not that many physical challenges, such as for those who are receiving education as squad leaders for foot soldiers[266] (Interview).

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[264] The prevailing physical test scheme is regulated in *Service Regulations for the Norwegian Armed Forces (TjF) - Group 43 Physical Fitness in the Armed Forces*, released in 1998. The scheme is based on recommendations from the previous 20-35 years (Physical Test Committee, 2014).

[265] A representative sample of a total of 2,134 employees from all units in the Norwegian Armed Forces was invited to participate in the study in the autumn of 2013. The response rate was 47.4 percent, n= 1011. 92.8 % were male, 9,8 % were female. 53 % of the male and 42 % of the females had served in international operations (Stornæs, Aandstad, & Kirknes, 2014).

[266] As referred to in chapter five (cf. 5.2.1.1), the vehicle commander of the CV 90 will have a team of 3: herself, a driver and a gunner. In addition the vehicle can carry a squad of 8 foot soldiers. Thus, foot soldiers are also part of the Armored

In more detail, carrying patients on a stretcher and lifting the heavy objects that constitute the mobile first aid station are reported to be the most physically demanding and heaviest job demands by officers in the Medical Battalion. Regarding the Armoured Battalion one officer reported that:

> OAB: The heaviest thing we do is to run with snowshoes in winter combat techniques, where you have to run, throw yourself down and roll around. Outside of that this service is on par with the other services. It is not very heavy (Interview).

This requirement refers to the foot soldiers. Another officer in the Armored Battalion said:

> OAB: As a vehicle commander you will not need to run very far with heavy stuff, or stuff like that. It is more being able to be on mentally for long time. [...]
> I: What is the heaviest thing you do physically in your daily work?
> OAB: Daily work. I do not know if there is anything very physical [laughs], but there are things on the vehicle. When it comes to lifting heavy stuff, ammo, guns, belts and stuff like that. Most demanding is the mental bit, I think, to stay awake for long periods of time (Interview).

Regarding international operations, officers who had been in Afghanistan reported that the training provided in Norway was realistic and that the physical requirements were the same as they were at home: ranging between "zero" and "physically demanding" depending on service:

> MO (five contingents abroad): The physical requirements are the same as they are at home (Interview).

> I: How were the physical requirements in your service abroad?
> FO (two contingents abroad): Like zero. Now, I was on the [in camp], so I had no other physically hard service other than staying awake. The shifts were long. The requirement before I left was quite simple, it was to run 3000 meters. The requirements were pretty slack (Interview).

> MO (five contingents abroad): It was physically demanding. We are very tied to the vehicle, but it becomes very physical when we set off. For instance, we were assigned to walk forward to a rebellion that was waiting for us, and we were to go in and take them on foot. Then it quickly becomes physically demanding when you have to start climbing up the hills and slopes. It is some altitude to climb as well and the pace is high, and at the same time you know you are going to fight. Instead of walking there and thinking that you are tired and that this is heavy, you must have the energy to think about what could happen and how to solve it (Interview).

Battalion. They received infantry training in the second battalion at Skjold at the time I visited the battalion for service education.

Results from Stornæs, Aandstad, & Kirknes' (2014) survey shows that 70% of their respondents rarely experienced endurance or strength demanding service. The most common activity that is experienced as physical demanding by the respondents is "lifting objects that are experienced as heavy". Yet, 50-60% believe that endurance and muscular strength is important in their service.

Based on their investigations in relation to the revision of the physical fitness standard, the Physical Test Committee, i.e. Stornæs, Aandstad, & Kirknes (2014), conclude that:

- Exact physical work demands for military personnel are difficult to define.
- It is obvious that some positions in the military require high physical capacity, some moderate physical capacity, whereas still others basically do not require a specific physical capacity at all.
- The vast majority of enlisted men and officers want all military personnel to carry out physical tests regularly, including those who do not experience the service as physically demanding.
- There are on average quite large differences in physical capacity between men and women. Accordingly, similar requirements for men and women will lead to either fewer women qualifying for the military, or virtually all men meeting the physical requirements.
- There is a stated goal that the military shall recruit broadly and diversely, and that the proportion of women shall be increased. Similar physical requirements will complicate this (Physical Test Committee, 2014).

Looking to the fitness standard and women's possibility of entering the military field, we saw in chapter three that analysis of data from the Norwegian National Service Administration's survey[267] found that the youths' physical condition is a very important factor for whether they consider serving, or not (Fauske, 2013). Previous research has also found that the fitness standard leads to self-selection and prevents possible female applicants from attending the military, although they would like to serve (Fauske, 2013; Hennes, 2009; Thorshaug-Wang, 2009)[268]. Utilizing Bourdieu it can be argued that this observation is an effect of inscriptions in habitus which impose on women (and probably also men) who lack or believe they lack necessary physical capital: a 'sense of one's place'. In other words, it leads them to deny themselves from the military field/profession based on expected physical fitness requirements (cf. 4.2.2.1). The present study found that the women who did apply and who were admitted

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[267] Which is mandatory for all Norwegian men *and women* at the age of 18.

[268] Thorshaug-Wang (2009) examined reasons for dropout among women invited to the Joint Selection of the Officer Candidate Schools in 2009. Of 402 invited women 96 opted "no" to attend the Joint Selection (23.8%), 42 said "yes" but did not attend (10.4%) and 28 (6.9%) withdrew voluntarily during the selection. Thorshaug-Wang (2009) found that lack of faith in their physical skills or lack of preparation for the physical requirements was an important cause for the dropouts. She writes: "Some of the respondents stated that they believe they must be elite athletes to cope with the demands, others believe that they only need to do some more exercise to achieve it […]. Some of the interviewees believe that the physical tests are the main essence of the Joint Selection and do not attend because of that" (p. 7).

considered whether they were in possession of necessary physical capital to have a chance of passing the field's physical entrance tests before they applied:

> FCMB: I do not know if that [the fitness standard] had much to say for my interest, in wanting to apply. But it was a criterion to be admitted, so I had to know that I was good enough to pass.

Expectation of the physical requirements also played a role in which services the aspirants/candidates considered to be as relevant for themselves:

> FA: I have thought of the Armored Battalion. But I have to think ahead in life […] and then I think medics would be nice. You will still learn a lot about yourself, if it is [medics] in the Army. It's worse if you're in the Air Force or Navy because then there is not that much training. There's almost as much training in the medics in the Army as it is on the other services in the Army, just a little more specific with stretchers and stuff like that. But I'm a little afraid that it will be boring […] but the Second Battalion and the Engineer Battalion are currently very difficult for girls. There it is usually just guys who are very well trained. Then it will be boring to always be the one who takes the team down (Interview).

In sum, the required fitness standard prevents actors who lack or believe they lack necessary physical capital to enter the military field, and who may have other kinds of capital desired by the military authorities, such as expressed in White Paper No 14 (2012–2013). At the same time, the physically and mentally demanding trails and tests motivate both men and women who want to prove themselves as being able to enter the field. In chapters two and three it was revealed that the process of becoming a soldier through construction of an exclusive identity is critical to the Armed Forces, in order to attract recruits that may risk their lives for things to which they may be quite indifferent to (cf. 2.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.3). As Creveld (2008) explained, military education is arranged with mentally and physically demanding tests "as part of a well-considered plan" (p. 48) to offer status and pride to those who succeed. But,

> tests in which what counts is not results achieved but honest effort made and which everybody is allowed to pass, cannot carry out this function. In this sense the success of most depends on the failure of some (Creveld, The Culture of War, 2008, pp. 48-51).

This means that a gender neutral physical test scheme would either be unable to carry out the function of producing an exclusive or selected identity for men, or it would hamper recruitment of women. On the other hand, a gender differentiated test scheme could result in women in the field being seen on an unequal footing from men. The latter has been indicated by the female officers who advocated in the public media that "harsh physical requirements" and "set minimum requirements" must be kept and should be equal for men and women (see (Egeberg, 2010; Kollbotn, 2013; Moilanen, 2014; Ringvold & Wenaas, 2009). Although some actors in the field argue that women in particular want equal physical requirements (which

may be due to some women's visible struggle for the fitness standard), the conducted interviews show that many women prefer the gender differentiated requirements:

> FA1: I think it's okay [that women have different physical requirements to men] since we are different physically. If we are to have the same requirements as the guys, then the requirements would automatically become higher compared to them. We, women, carry the same in the backpack, so we actually have tougher physical requirements in the field than the guys. I really think it's okay the way it is now (Interview).

> FA2: I think that it is fair. The guys, in physics, they have an ace up their sleeve. [...] It would probably be very tough for a woman to be admitted with the same requirements as the guys. And I do not think that means anything about how good a leader you can be. How many hang-ups you are able to do is quite immaterial, for you have many, many, many others qualities (Interview).

A female officer, however, was of the opinion that the appropriateness of gender differentiated requirements would depend on the job:

> FOHQ: It depends on how they [the women] will be utilized. [...] .I think that as a woman I can say that I believe women may not fit being in a combat unit. [...] I've provoked officer candidates who think that I should never say such things, because they are fighting the severe struggles. But I mean it! But I also think that if two out of ten women are fit for a combat unit, they should be allowed. Then they will be allowed to be there. But I think that eight out of ten [women] do not fit (Interview).

Stornæs, Aandstad, & Kirknes (2014) measured the women's and men's attitudes to gender differentiated tests and found that:

> When asked if there should be similar requirements for women and men, 28% said 'no', 41% 'yes, but only for some services' and 28 percent 'yes, men and women should have equal physical requirements'. Among the women it was 11% and among men it is 29% answering 'yes, men and women should have equal physical requirements' (Stornæs, Aandstad, & Kirknes, 2014, p. 3).

The reasons why a physical fitness standard is seen to be important among actors in the field are various. Some think of it as an important external motivation:

> I: Why is the importance of physical requirements?
> FO: Because of goal-setting theory. If you do not have a goal, you do not know what you should strive for. If you do not have physical requirements, then you have no minimum standard you can relate to. Now, you become what is measured [...] Call physical testing an external motivation, then, a requirements demand (Interview).

Many had the opinion that a certain fitness standard was important in order to have enough energy and especially to tackle lack of sleep:

MO: It [physical fitness standard for officers] is particularly important.
I: Why?
MO: To be able to keep up with coping exercises, the field exercises where they do
not get much food and where they get little sleep, and where things happen constantly.
Then it is important to have enough energy, and that applies to everybody. Physical
fitness is important (Interview).

Most often the fitness standard seemed to be linked to the officers' ability to keep up with
coping exercises in the job as an instructor and educator of subordinates. It was then linked to
the pedagogical method "the power of example":

I: Why is a physical fitness standard important?
MOHQ: You are supposed to be a good example for your soldiers (Interview).

Physical fitness was also seen as a prerequisite to gain trustworthiness:

FOHQ: We need the officers to keep in shape. It is the same as the police need to keep
in shape. If we are to be trustworthy, we must train (Interview).

Asking the interviewees what training and fitness meant for them, it was found that fitness
was seen as an important factor in order to be a proper person with good attitudes:

I: What does physical training mean to you?
MO: Physical exercise for me – that means – yeah, now I'm not a super-training
fanatic where training is everything, but it becomes clear that it means a lot. Not only
to be in good shape. But it also creates some attitudes in order to be – what can I say –
an 'ambulatory person', in terms of that. Yes, it creates a lot of good attitudes to
things. You challenge yourselves, you push yourselves, you perform, not only in sport,
it is transferable to whatever else you are doing as well. In addition, when we are out
on a field exercise and if you are in poor physical shape, you will struggle to keep up,
mentally as well (Interview).

Physical fitness was also seen as important for bodily appearance and, in particular, actors in
the field seemed too concern about other personnel's bodily appearance and fitness, which
can be shown in this story from the field notes:

The aspirants are going to swim. Two female officers observing the event start to talk
about bathing, undressing among men and bodies. A bit into the conversation one of
the female officers says: "It's not that everyone needs to be so freaking fit, it is not, but
at the military academy, there was a woman who was plainly obese and that should
not be possible. As a woman, you run slower than men, so then you should pull
yourself together and do what you can to be able to run fast enough. And that means
that you cannot put everything you want in the face/mouth at all hours" (Field notes,
Joint Selection, Phase Two).

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Men were also concerned about other men's bodies. This is shown during this conversation on the gender and age differentiated fitness standard:

> I: What is your opinion about women having different physical requirements to men?
>
> OAB: I thinks that's stupid. My opinion is that there should be equal requirements for everyone.
>
> I: What is your opinion about elderly officers having different physical requirements to younger officers?
>
> OAB: Oh? I have not been encountered that before. The officers?
>
> I: Yes. The requirements are reduced gradually by age.
>
> OAB: Oh yeah? I was not aware of that. No, I guess that is something they have had to do. It's as simple as, well this is known, the older people get in the military, the less they train, and they will struggle to stay in the same physical condition as when they were nineteen. So to keep people in the game, I guess it had to be done. In this service here, when I see higher officers that walk around and look like they have not trained for twenty years, then I become irritated. But there's nothing I can do about that, of course. It is just how it is (Interview).

In the two latter conversations there is a communication about misrecognition of bodies that do not visually appear to be fit enough. Bourdieu notes that signs of misrecognition will impose on individuals a sense of what the actors in a field have to do and how they should appear, in order to avoid misrecognition and shame. This means that although conversations like this are not a judgment of the persons who are present, they *teach* these persons what are recognized as appropriate bodies. Accordingly, persons in the field may feel that a certain bodily appearance is required to be recognized as "a proper or ambulatory person" in the field, as referred in the quote above. For instance, some officers refer to training in order to prevent themselves from becoming fat:

> MO: My motivation to train should perhaps be the job, and then I should have trained more and better and specifically for that, but I train to keep myself in shape. I train so as not to be fat, and not to sit around inside. I know that if I get injured I will easily put on weight and therefore I have to exercise to keep my body fit. That is the primary motivation (Interview).

Grades at the physical fitness test and muscles related to appearance were also reasons to train:

> I: Why do you exercise?
>
> MCOB: There is, firstly, to get a high grade on the strength exam, but also because it's good to be in good shape. I like to muck in and be able do a little more than what might be expected of me. And it is not wrong to develop muscles either. It looks nice! (Interview).

Finally, it seems as though being at the Officer Candidate School increases the actors' interest and/or concern about their bodily appearance:

> MCAB: I've always liked to exercise, always liked to be in good shape. But it was when I first started at the Officer Candidate School that I started to enjoy being in good shape, and wanted my body to look good and stuff like that. I've been training a lot this year and that is very good, feeling that I have grown a bit (Interview).

Concern about the appearance of others also applies to the uniformed body. Here an officer articulates how this affects the perception that others have of you, because looking good is an easy method of giving the impression that you are professional:

> FO: I am concerned about appearing correctly, which refers to what I talked about regarding people's perceptions of you. I know that you can manipulate others by appearing correct. To those who fight against it, and say, "Yes, but there are skills that matter, it does not matter if I'm unshaven and go around in dirty clothes". I say, "No, it has nothing to do with your department, but it's to do with how others perceive you". It's a very simple way to set things straight, in this respect an easy way to manipulate with. Telemark Battalion in Kosovo, they looked very, very stylish when they were there. It was noticed. People think they are very professional when they look great (Interview).

In sum, the above findings on physical fitness are in accordance with the Physical Test Committee's (2014) conclusions: "Physical testing in the military is not only about work requirements. It is also linked to a physically active lifestyle, identity, tradition, health, capacity to withstand high demand ("spare capacity"), as well as being a role model (2014, p. 13).

The requirement to be physically fit is also found in documents governing the field, such as the Army's Code of Conduct which reads: "The officer has physical and mental strength". In the Army Officer Candidate School's value document a listed criterion is: "Exercise good physical strength and endurance!" (The Army's Officer Candidate School, 2011). In the doctrine, physical fitness is emphasized as one of three dimensions (moral and intellect are the two others) required to solve the military profession's responsibilities. It is written that "a substantial part of our identity is to be in good physical condition" (FFOD 07, p. 158). Additionally, in her investigation on the ideal officer at the Norwegian Military Academy Sødergren (2012) found that:

> Physical fitness is a requirement that weighs so heavily that even if a cadet is exhibiting leadership well, but does not live up to the physical standard, he will not be counted as an adequately suited soldier (p. 18).

During the last visit to the field, after the final coping exercise a candidate summarized the school year as a physical and mental test of spirit, requiring the ability to take things as they come and not dread what comes next:

> FCMB: It has been about testing your body, finding out what you can bear, to a large extent. Otherwise, it has been about the mental part, keeping your spirits up: do not worry about what comes next […] Those who fall through are those who dread all the things that are going to happen next. It is about taking things as they come. OK, now we just do it, and after we finished what was perhaps a little dull, we do something else. That's what it is about. And also the physical requirements. We're in the military, and we are to be trained for war, so you ought to be physically strong (Interview).

7.1.3 "A Performance Culture"

The requirements above can be summarized in a cultural characteristic provided by several actors in the field:

> MO: It is a performance culture. Very clearly a performance culture. That is the basics, I mean, in a military culture. A performance culture and strong fellowship – everybody says that (Interview).

Military culture is however often characterized as being a masculine culture or macho-culture (cf. 3.3). Several informants also referred to the military culture as a macho-culture. Based on the pre-definition of military culture as a macho-culture and an interest in understanding military culture better, I asked interviewees about their opinions of macho-culture. Macho-culture was then often explained in a discourse of performance and getting the job done:

> I: What do you think of as positive sides to a macho-culture?
> OAB: It is positive in the sense that I think it is necessary to perform, in combat. I have to think about it – macho – I think of it as aggressiveness and attitude toward what you are going to do. You need to have such a culture to be able to do the job (Interview).

The actors' overlapping description of the performance culture and the macho-culture was partly a reason why I have found it relevant to conceptualize masculinity as impositions to accumulate power resource (such as physical capital) and become a winner and a leader; that is to perform, succeed, conquer and/or dominate (cf. 4.2.4 and 6.4).

To sum up the findings so far, chapter six has highlighted that the officer candidates must be shaped into high performing ideals ("we are supposed to be the best") who display/exemplify the appropriate attitudes for the next generation of subordinates to emulate. In this chapter we have seen that self-motivation, commitment, a physically fit body as well as willingness to withstand pain and never give up, can be considered important power recourses, which the officers are encouraged to embody in order to perform and become a winner, leader and ideal. The culture is, accordingly, described as a performance culture (macho-culture). "The power of example" emerges as an important pedagogical method which is used to encourage recruits in the field to embody the desired power resources and create a performance culture. This is reflected in the Army Officer Candidate School's own Core Values: "Lead from the front with the power of example: Follow me!" (The Army's Officer Candidate School, 2011).

By position of self-motivation, self-confidence, seriousness, commitment, physical fitness and ability to fight through pain and motivate others to muck in, the candidates are to become energetic leaders able to impose the military authorities' will on opponents by force and win wars. However, position of the described power resources (capital) *also* enables individuals in the field to exercise domination and wield power in the social relations of which they are part. This also means that embodiment of these resources enables the actors to capture and maintain positions in the military field/profession's hierarchy. We will therefore turn next to power relations and hierarchy struggles as they can be said to be responses related to 'the performance culture', where being the best (cf. 6.3), the leader and the winner are an important valuation criterion.

7.2 Power Relations and Hierarchy Struggles

In chapter six and above we have seen that officer candidates are encouraged to become "the best" (cf. 6.3), the leader and the winner. But, everyone cannot be the best, the leader and the winner at the same time. In this part of the chapter we will look into social interactions at the Officer Candidate School and investigate how men and women with different types and/or amounts of resources/capital respond to the requirements to be a physically fit winner and leader. The results will be presented under three topics that emerge from the data analysis: 1) strong personalities, competition and performance need, 2) domination by physical capacity, and 3) pride and selected/quotaed.

According to Bourdieu, competition is at the core of any field[269]. A field can thus, with caution, be compared to a game. The aim of the game is the maximization of the resources and merits that are most valued, i.e. the field's symbolic capital. The actors' interest to compete and play the game is, according to Bourdieu, driven by illusio. Illusio is the belief that the "game" the actors agree to play is worth playing, and that stakes are important and worth pursuing. By paying attention to conflicts and competition between individuals with different levels of commitment to pursue the stakes, and different amounts of the symbolic capital which distributes actors into positions in the hierarchy, this section aims to provide us with some insight to the struggle over who can take part in the military field/profession.

7.2.1 Strong Personalities, Competition and Performance Need

As a consequence of the requirement to be an energetic, committed and competitive leader and winner, the social milieu at the local sites investigated was characterized by many actors with 'strong personalities' and desires to be 'the boss'; something which led to conflicts between individuals:

> FCOB: There are many strong personalities, so there is quite a bit of conflict between
> individuals. Some quickly become angry at each other, because everyone wants to be
> the boss and have opinions (Interview).

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[269] This is a consequence of a field in, Bourdieu's terms, being constructed as soon as a network of people struggle and compete for positions, influence and authority, and in the course of the struggle, to establish control over the capital which gives access to positions, authority and recognition (cf. 4.2.2.2)

This was especially apparent in the Medical Battalion where two sub groups of women[270] experienced challenges in getting along with each other:

> FCMB: It [the social milieu in the platoon] has been very fluctuating. At first it was just chaos because nobody knew anybody, neither the women, nor the guys. Then it became pretty divided into two girl gangs. Actually it has been like that since. [...] So, I'm good now within both the gangs. But I know that there are problems between the women in the platoon (Interview).

The two sub groups of women were frequently referred to as the *boy-girls and girl-girls* by the male candidates:

> MCMB: As I said, there are different types of women in the platoon. It appears that the two homogeneous groups get along well, that the girl-girls stick together and the boy-girls stick together (Interview).

At the beginning of the fieldwork I wondered why the two girl gangs were referred to as the girl-girls and the boy-girls, because it was impossible to tell which girls belonged to which gang based on bodily appearance. Both gangs had feminine looking girls with pearl earrings and different kinds of braided headbands[271], and only one of the girls in the group could be classified as a bit masculine in appearance by the researcher. However, the reason for the 'girl-girls' and 'boy-girls' label was revealed by the officers, who also referred to the two girl gangs in these terms, but in addition they referred to the boy-girls as the extrovert girls and the girl-girls as the introvert girls[272].

> OMB: When we have so many women it affects the culture to a great extent. I have never experienced anything similar before, and I'm very excited about how this will eventually turn out. I do feel that it [the number of women] can have a negative impact if it becomes too dominant, because in addition, we *have a lot of very extroverted [273] women* (Interview).

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[270] The number of female candidates admitted for officer candidate education to the Medical Battalion was slightly higher than the number of male candidates.

[271] The girls said that since they needed to wear a uniform and so had few opportunities to dress up and vary their appearance, they used different kinds of braided headbands, and had a kind of ongoing competition making advanced braids.

[272] Several officers in the field had a special interest in human relations, personalities and personal development. Regarding the use of extrovert and introvert the officers referred to Carl Jung's theory of personality types with the four pairs of dichotomies: extraversion - introversion, sensing - feeling, thinking - intuition, judgment - perception, and *A Practical Introduction to Jung* by Ringstad & Ødegård (2003). In the Guidelines to the Selection Officers (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a) used at Joint Selection it was written that the selectors should record whether the aspirants seemed to be extrovert or introvert.

[273] In an analysis of personality characteristics among officer candidates at the Air Force Officer Candidate School, Hansen & Larsen (2006) find that "the group of officer candidates [n= 60] scored significantly higher than the population in general on the domains Neuroticism and Extraversion" (p. 44). Hansen & Larsen (2006) used NEO PI-R personality test. They conclude among other things that it is difficult to consider personal characteristics through observation during Joint Selection. Yet, the selection emphasizes the importance of taking initiative and being action-oriented, which they argue can be

The existence of the two girl gangs and the definition of them as extrovert and introvert continued throughout the school year:

> OMB: I think that I mentioned it earlier, and it's still the same case. The women are clearly divided into two gangs. You still have the extrovert women and you have the introvert women (Interview)

The officers who were referring to the two gangs of women as the extrovert and the introvert point to a difference in types of personality, which also emerged as an explanation from the girls in the 'introvert gang' as to why the two girl gangs had problems getting along:

> FCMB: There's a lot going on there [in the platoon]! [Laughs out loud] There are so many strong personalities that have been admitted. There are a lot of leaders in the group. There are some cliques and some discussions. [...]. They are the very much the opposite of me [...] they're *really switched on all the time*. I'm getting tired of it, and then we start to yell and argue about it. I'd like to have it quiet and nice in the room while they want to have a party, to put it like that. There are very many strong opinions in the group (Interview).

Another woman from the 'introvert girl-girls' gang described it as being difficult to find a space in the milieu because it consisted of "a great bunch of out-going people":

> FCMB: I think I'm pretty adaptable. I have been traveling, and it was really no problem to adapt. When I came up here it was really quite difficult to find a space in the gang, because they're all… they are a great bunch of out-going people who would rather show off all at once. There was so little space […] So I really think that it was a bit toilsome in the beginning, but then I started to fall into place gradually. But you find out very quickly who people are when you live so close. But in the beginning it was a bit hard and *too much* (Interview).

While the girls referred to as the introvert girl-girls described the milieu as annoying and/or *too much*, the girls referred to as the extrovert boy-girls observed the division into two girl gangs, but did not refer to the milieu as annoying or tiresome in the same way as the introvert girls did. The following description comes from one of the girls from the extrovert/boy-girls gang:

> FCMB: I think it's a good atmosphere, but still it is divided. I must say it is divided. There are two girl gangs and a bunch of guys. But all goes along too. So there are some cliques that people from outside do not understand, but which we internally have no problem with. So, divided – I do not know how to express it (Interview).

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compared with extraversion. In a comparison of the candidates' personality traits and their obtained grades in military matters, Hansen & Larsen find that it is not possible to predict high grades by using the NEO PI-R test.

What the introvert girls found tiresome and problematic with the extroverted boy-girls was 1) their strong extroverted and tempered personalities, 2) their never-ending competiveness, and 3) their strong need for attention.

Firstly, considering the extroverted and strong-tempered personalities, a girl in the "introvert" gang described some of the extroverted girls as being so tempered that it must be a joke being played against the officers:

> FCMB: I think all of us sit down and think; "why the hell are they here?" It has something to do with the attitude, it may have to do with the physics, it has to do with the way they are in general, as people. We have some that are incredibly strong-tempered, for example. Some are fired up so easily by others, because, yes. There are many strong personalities, it must be said. There are some… you sit down and wonder whether it is all a bad joke from the selectors' side, whether the selector officer wanted to take revenge on [the name of the platoon commander]: "This is the payback for the joke you played on me at the Christmas party", or something like that (Interview).

Secondly, regarding competiveness, a girl from the introverted girl-girls gang argued that the extrovert boy-girls, or the "roaring gang" had a really strong instinct for competition with a malicious pleasure of winning:

> FCMB: Many of the girls in the class are very strong-willed, some of them extremely so. [...] I think there are many [of the women] who are so reckless. They hope that those they do not like will not succeed. […] We note that there is some malicious pleasure in the gang. If someone is a bit off track: *"Ha-ha! Cool!"* [Imitating]. In particular there are some of the girls that really like competition – yes, that's this "roaring gang" who have such a really strong instinct for competition. It is very extreme at times. And this is something that I know the gang I hang with think is very tiring. We are more focused on having fun, while they are more like*: "We have to conquer! Now it is a competition and we will win even if it has to be blood, sweat and tears!"* [Imitating with strong enthusiasm]. It is a rather hot-headed atmosphere. I think it's funny when they fail, because they become very sulky and sour for days after it. It is very fun (Interview).

From the latter statement in the quote we can, however, see that the malicious pleasure seems to go both ways. Nevertheless, the strong drive for competition is echoed by the extrovert, or competitive, boy-girls themselves. This is from an interview with one 'boy-girl' at the end of the school year:

> I: Has there been competition?
> FCMB: Yes! All the time!
> I: What do you think about that?
> FCMB: I *looove* competition! [Hugh emphasis on love]. I do, but I realize that some do not. But I love to do examinations, to get the best result, and trying to show off.

Not that you should do that – it's a bit like that – I do not know if people understand my attitude. I want to be the best, but it's not that I have the attitude that I must be the best. I have the attitude that I will do my best, and if I put in the effort required for me to do my best then I think it will be good enough to do the best performance. So all the time my mindset is that I shall do my best. And then the results come thereafter. If I know I have done my utmost and yet it is not the best, then it's okay (Interview).

The tension between the two girl-gangs in the Medical Battalion is explained by the officers as being due to different levels of ambition:

OMB: There have been conflicts. Among the candidates, [...] because some of the officer candidates aim very high, make high demands, want much more, they are more ambitious than the other candidates are, and not all the candidates are happy with that. This leads to some dissatisfaction. For example, when candidates that are not as ambitious are in the leading position, then it may be that they do not try as hard as the others want, and they think it leads to poorer results for them. This creates some frustration for them (Interview).

Thirdly, the introvert girls describe the extrovert girls' need for attention as annoying:

FCMB: The group of women that I'm with is perhaps those who are calm and like to take it cool and easy, and we are not the kind that must have attention all the time. We like to withdraw and have fun and enjoy ourselves, in contrast to the other gang who are very much the other kind - ATTENTION! [shouting] But I do not think that we have any leaders, really. It is very different – we are a very relaxed gang, in contrast. [...] What I have heard from some of the men is that they find it [the women] quite annoying. Especially because many of the women have a high need to get attention. [...] Perhaps the men thought it was interesting at first, but then they started to get to know people and then it becomes a bit tiring (Interview).

To sum up so far, the social milieu of the officer candidate platoon in the Medical Battalion was characterized by strong 'extroverted' personalities who had a great need to compete, perform and get attention. This led to irritation and friction between the competitive ('extrovert') boy-girls and the calmer ('introvert') girl-girls. The competitive boy-girls thought the calm girl-girls were not ambitious enough, whereas the calm girl-girls thought the competitive girls were annoying and *too* much.

No similar tensions among the male candidates in the Medical Battalion[274] were recorded, but, as was shown above, it was reported that the milieu in a battalion with few women was also characterized by strong personalities and conflicts between individuals. In addition, some

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[274] Yet, there was a struggle between the group of men and the (two) group(s) of women, which will be explored in the next section and chapter nine.

officers report of a culture characterized by competition and desire to be the best among the colleagues:

> OHQ: I also experienced it a bit in the Armed Forces earlier, you feel that some of the colleagues you work with are more concerned with getting a better service statement than you and doing it better than you, than as working together as a team (Interview).

But, several tasks in the military field are not about individual performance. Thus, the actors with strong performances need are dependent on other actors' effort and performances. As was referred to by the officer from the Medical Battalion above; the tension between the girls in the Medical Battalion was linked to a different level of ambition by which the competitive actors became irritated when results from less committed actors were poorer than their expected/desired standard. Likewise, this female officer reported getting annoyed at people who did not deliver in accordance with her expected standard, especially if it put her in a bad light:

> FO: But I have myself an extreme desire to perform and like to appear as able. And therefore I also get annoyed at people who do not deliver, especially if that puts me in a bad light (Field notes, Joint Education).

Such factors of interdependence between other peoples performances and own results, image and appearance seemed to result in a concern about the effort of others. The following story from a lunch break at Joint Selection shows how a squad's performance can reflect back on to the officer:

> A female officer tells the other officers that she really strives to adapt to the role as a selector officer. She explains that she is so competitive and that being a passive observer she is not allowed to intervene in situations in the squad and is required to suppress her desire to compete. She proceeds: "I feel that the squad's performance reflects on me as a squad leader. So, I really want to intervene and push the squad. I must really restrict myself from taking over the position of squad leader, when they are struggling in no direction, I want to take over and… *get on*!" (Field notes, Joint Selection, Phase Two).

Similarly, an officer from one of the battalions conveyed that the quality of the officer candidates they educate reflects the quality of the battalion as a whole. Then he revealed a strategy they use to create a good image of the battalion's (their own) educational results:

> MO: We send the best candidates to sergeants' positions in other battalions. This reflects quality in our battalion, and we can keep those with poorest quality within our own walls. It is political (Field notes, anonymized site).

In particular, it seems as though young female officers set strong performance demands on other female performances, with interest in the image of women as a group. This is reflected in recorded phrases from the fieldwork such as "I hate women who are not able to carry their

own backpack", and explicitly in "this is no place for women who are not physically able because it affects all women" (Field notes, Joint Selection, Phase Two). These are phrases said by younger female officers who were observing struggling female aspirants at Joint Selection. In the below quote from an interview, an elder female officer refers to the setting of strong performance requirements for female soldiers under her command when she was younger:

> FO: But I have not personally, not that I can remember, experienced it as being very painful and difficult to be a women, other than that I know very well from my time as a young sergeant that we set very clear requirements to the female soldiers: "Carry your own backpack!", "Curse you, if you don't make it" and "You're here voluntarily!". That type of thing. But now I'm on another level in my career. Now I am with adults who are finished with that kind of nonsense (Interview).

Although the data material indicated performance need/pressure and competiveness among the men, a strong desire to perform was much more prominent in interviews with women than it was among the interviewed men[275]. In an interview with a female candidate from a battalion with ≤ 2 women the need to perform and "be the best" was so prominent that I came to ask her:

> I: Is it important for you to appear tough?
> FCOB: Yes, it is! For example, when it comes to clothes, I can wear lots of different clothes, but certainly nothing that looks cute: I cannot do that. But anything else I can wear. I think it has to be like this… that I want to appear as tough. As long as I am absolutely not cute, it's fine (Interview).

The question arose from the situation in the interview and was not asked to other interviewees. However, the study may have benefited from the question being asked to more interviewees. One of the officers in the Medical Battalion said that the milieu in the candidate platoon was characterized by the admission of several small-sized girls who had a strong motivation to disprove the stereotype of being a cute and petite girl. Because of this the officer argued that they were striving hard to perform and appear as tough and able leaders.

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[275] An explanation for this *can* be due to a difference in the motivation, interest and expectation that lies behind the investigated men's and women's decisions to join the military. In accordance with previous research (cf. 3.3), a frequently used argument as to why the aspirants/candidates applied to the officer candidate school was that they were tempted by personal development and the ability to use their body and test their limits. This was however most frequently referred to as the motivation among female candidates. The men had *more varied reasons* than the women as to why they had applied to the officer candidate school. As such, it *seems like* the officer candidate school attracted a group/type of women who were tempted by prowess/doing something most women do not do, while the men had a more normalized relationship to the military. Regarding officers, all females except one had been tempted because it was tough and involved challenges. The latter females were tired of school and wanted to do something practical outside. The female officers continued due to job satisfaction, challenging positions and experiences of being seen and being given responsibility. The majority of the male officers had chosen to become officers because they were poor or intermediate school performers who wanted to do something practical outside, and had experienced coping and satisfaction during service as conscripts. The male officers continued because they liked to work with people, had good buddies and a varied job with a combination of theory and a lot of practice and activities outside.

However, it was found that some of the female actors in the field wanted to prove that women could beat men, or manage the same strains as men:

> FSYCMB: I had always wanted to beat the boys, for I did not quite believe the thing
> that they were physically stronger than us. And I wanted somehow to prove it
> (Interview).

Proving that women could do it was as also referred to by this female aspirant as a reason for not giving up the strain they had to go through at the selection:

> FA: I am a little proud, because I would not have liked to come home and say that I
> didn't make it–no, I would not have liked that. Most likely it has to do with self-
> respect, and pushing yourselves extra hard. And then I think that women should prove
> that they can manage it, it's not just guys who can manage it (Interview).

Similarly, a female officer told of her strong need to perform and of wanting to be 'one of the guys' when she was younger. So it also suited her really well to be the only woman:

> FO: I was the only women for years and that suited me really nicely. I had no desire
> for there to be more women. I had an intense pressing need to perform and I wanted to
> be one of the guys (Field notes, Joint Selection).

The five female aspirants who were interviewed at the end of Joint Selection and asked about their experience of being the only women in the squad (cf. 5.2.3.2) were also satisfied with being a lone woman. Positive sides of being a lone woman were linked to a decreased pressure in competing with other females:

> A: I really think it has been okay [to be a lone woman], because then I have been more
> relaxed with the competition stuff. If there had been more women I would probably
> have been more competitive, I'd have felt a more pressure. So I really think it has been
> great (Interview).

In addition, it was argued that being a lone woman made it easier to become 'one of the guys':

> A: You become much closer to the guys. You get to know them better. If there had
> been two women, then it might have been the two of us together instead of becoming
> familiar with the guys (Interview).

However, where some women preferred to be a lone woman in order to become one of the guys and escape competition with other women, negative sides of being a lone woman were linked to the women's ability to compete with men in the physical challenges:

> A: I have trained a lot and I have always been in very good physical shape. I have
> been on long hikes with big backpacks and I have always been one who takes care of
> those who struggle. But here I'm not in such good shape, and I needed some help. And

that's a bit strange. Going from one of those "come on, you'll make it!" to being the one who must be pushed and needs help with the backpack and stuff like that. I feel inside myself that this is a bit miserable. But apart from that I think it's great to be with guys (Interview).

Accordingly, women who found themselves to be the one struggling the most in the physical challenges argued that it was fine to be the only women most of the time, but, that it would be desirable to be with more women when, for instance, on a march:

A: That's a bit boring [to be the only women in the squad]. Especially when we are on a march – since I'm so short it's hard to keep up with the others. And then you feel all the time that you are the one slowing down the squad. […] But overall with the group I am happy to be the only women. [...] So it is fine except when we are on the march (Interview).

It seems like the aspirant desired for some *weaker* women who struggled as much or more than her on the march, and not necessarily for stronger women who would leave her to still be the one who struggled the most. The experience and opinions held by the female aspirants who had struggled to keep up with only the men at Joint Selection, were shared by three out of the four interviewed female candidates[276] who had been admitted to a battalion where they were the only woman in their unit[277]:

FCOB: Back home, I am used to being the best. In my old school, I was used to getting the best grades, and I'm used to being in the best physical condition… roughly. Not that I was always the best, but almost always, at least. And now I'm not even close to being the best anymore. Maybe that is the big difference. Especially, such as the 3000 meter run, when we ran it last time I did it in 12.30. I was pretty happy with that. I had improved a minute since the selection and I gave everything, really. But still, I had the second to last finishing time. So, I went to my room and thought "no, 12.30 is not good, then". And then I came here, met the Medics and the women said "12.30? – It is better than all of us!" It's a little different with women. I was the slowest among all the guys in the 3000 meters, but if I had been in the Medics I'd have been the best – Among the women, of course (Interview).

A similar experience was reported by this female candidate:

FCOB: I'm the only girl […] And I notice that there is no advantage to being a girl, whether we are running or whatever we are doing.
I: How do you think it is to be the only girl?
FCOB: It is all right, but I wish that there were one or two more, perhaps [...] I think there are many girls who are frightened by the physical requirements. One thing is that

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[276] The fourth was physically stronger than several, maybe most, of the men.
[277] Two of the women were in the same battalion/candidate platoon, but in different units within that.

> it's physically hard, but maybe you will be the one to find it hardest, because there are
> so few girls.
> I: How would you describe your own physical shape?
> FCOB: It's not too good. Now I compare myself with the boys in the squad, and then
> I'm bad. But if I compare myself to other girls I am quite similar. But still I do not
> think I'm good enough (Interview).

As this female candidate indicates, an outcome of the selection is that the weakest are rejected and it becomes tougher, and then you become the one at the bottom of the local hierarchy:

> FOOB: It's been tougher than I thought, compared to Joint Selection. Now, in a way
> the best are selected, and you lose the weak, and then you are the worst and that is
> gloomy (Interview).

As a consequence of not being able to keep up with the men, one of the female candidates reported that although she had been skeptical about Joint Education, because of being together with all the women from the Medical Battalion, it was in fact nice to be there. Partly this was due to there being women who were worse than her in the physical exercises they took part in:

> FCOB: When we had physical exercises with a lot of women, it was really nice, I
> think. Because then there were many that were much worse than me. But normally it
> isn't like that. Then it's always me who struggles the most (Interview).

In other words, it seems as though women in the field engage in a hierarchy struggle in which they welcome weaker women, but are fine without female competitors.

However, some of the officers of both genders had a conscious relationship to competition and struggles in the field, and worked actively to promote cooperation among colleagues and groups of subordinates. For instance, a female officer told competing female candidates that they would not benefit from competing with each other at every moment. In the interview this female officer said:

> FO: I support what was talked about in the network for female officers. We were told
> that women are women's worst enemy, and that we do not have to compete with each
> other. Instead we can also support each other. That I learned at the female network.
> That has been a flagship initiative for me ever since, so when I get new female
> colleague, it is "welcome and there's no competition between us, I will do what's in
> my power to make you the best, and competition between us women is not allowed".
> Because at the Military Academy there was *a really cruel* competition between the
> cadets. Not between women, because we were ranked pretty far down anyway. *There*
> it is a culture (Interview)

The last part of this quote, "not between the women, because we were ranked pretty far down anyway", indicates that the interest in competing may depend on the experienced possibility

of reaching higher positions in the hierarchy. As we have seen, the female candidates/aspirants referred to above, who found themselves to be the ones who struggled the most after the selection/among men only, reported that it was "a bit miserable" to have become "the worst". Such factors may be a reason why it seems as though some of the officers in the field who had yet not attended the Military Academy denied themselves further military careers. For instance a female officer said that she would never join the Military Academy because she expected it to be a misogynistic place with really cruel competition:

> FO: Oh! - A misogynistic place: the Military Academy! KS[278]. There, I never would
> have begun in the Army. Never! Never! At the Air Force Military Academy, I could
> have started. But I feel that I am very Army in my heart, and that's where I want to be.
> But not at the Military Academy. Because I do not know any women who speak
> positively and exclusively positively about it (Interview).

It was, however, two male officers who were teaching officer candidates in two of the battalions who reported that their military careers were coming to an end with the position of instructor at the Officer Candidate School, because further engagement would require them to attend the Military Academy. Both these male officers said that they would not like to expose themselves to the competition that characterized the Military Academy, and that this was the reason they chose not to apply for further military education.

The results described above indicate that actors who find the competition tiresome or challenging, or who experience that they are not in a position to compete further on the dominant premises, chose to leave the field[279]. This can be said to be a consequence of the actors' "sense of their place", where those who have embodied the kind of capital (resources) which gives them recognition and abilities to succeed continue; whereas those who lack the appreciated capital chose to leave the field[280]. As is claimed by the candidate below, once there is a competition they will compare themselves with others, and make up an impression about who is in which position on "the competition ladder", i.e. the local hierarchy:

> MCMB: You will always have an opinion [on who will be admitted] because once you
> are there [at Joint Selection] there is a competition. From the impression I have,
> everybody is trying to compare themselves with others. "How am I doing it in relation
> to him or her?" And then there will perhaps be some you place a bit further down the
> competition ladder (interview).

The actors' ability to compare themselves with others and a sense that their place in the hierarchy is dependent on the value system of that culture has been incorporated in habitus.

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[278] Abbreviations for the Norwegian Army's Military Academy.

[279] The claim is also supported by Sødergren (2012), who found that male and female cadets had chosen to quit education at the Military Academy due to strong personalities and competition among the cadets who were used to being the best and toughest.

[280] Symbolic communication of recognition (success) and misrecognition (failure) imposes on the individual a 'sense of one's place', and thus serves to reproduce the field's criteria of valuation (cf. 4.2.2.1).

7.2.2 Physical Capacity and Power

The value of physical capital as the field's "trump card" (symbolic capital, cf. 4.2.2.2) could result in a display of superior physical capacity being used to dominate over others. It means also that those who are in possession of the highest amount of physical capital have power to define who is in the field for legitimate reasons[281]. In this section we will look at three examples were physical capacity were used as power. First we will see how male candidates in the Medical Battalion used superior physical capacity to "psyche out" the smallest women. Then we will see how a strong woman used her superior physical capacity to dominate over men, yet she felt that she had to be careful not to take it too far. Finally, we will see how officers used women's physical effort to place performance pressure on men. There was among the male candidates in the Medical Battalion the opinion that some of the women should not have been admitted due to physical capacity linked to their body size:

> MCMB: But there are some girls here who are very short – now, I suppose that the height should not count that much – but when they have trouble carrying standard equipment, and have to have special backpacks which don't have enough room, then it becomes a problem. Particularly for the rest of the squad who must carry their equipment in addition to our own equipment and the squad's equipment. And, also the thing with weapons. Now we have the HK419, which really is not a particularly heavy[282] weapon, but I see that there are some who are struggling to keep it straight. When we train – what's it called? – fire assaults with real ammo and you are lying there next to a girl you know is struggling to keep the weapon straight, then it is a little scary.
> I: Does this apply to the small women or to all the women?
> MCMB: It applies actually to smallest women, yes. The tall women, I have not seen that they have problems to keep it [the rifle] straight. The reason for that, I do not know (Interview).

When visiting the Medical Battalion at the end of the school year the officers recounted that some of the men had not been as mature as expected. These men held the opinion that they were better than the women, and had used physical superiority to demonstrate that:

> OMB: My impression is that there are some guys who are not quite as mature as they should be. Whether it's the extrovert gang who are tormented – it's very rare that it is the extroverted, it's more often the introverted – they [the guys] join together and really plot against them, as a group. […]
> I: You said some of the men were not as mature as they should be. Can you tell me a bit more?
> OMB: Yes. Certain statements such as "I'm better than you" and "I know I'm going to be admitted there rather than you". And when the platoon is on a march they like to

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[281] As Bourdieu (1995) notes, those with the highest volume of legitimate capital have power to pass judgment and to *make that judgment count*.
[282] 3,4 kg unloaded.

walk at the front and speed up the pace so the smallest women cannot keep up, with
that as the intention. And it is also generally how the guys are, for example that some
of them crab in the soot after having used the multi-fuel just to look like a field-pig,
something only young guys do (Interview, Medical Battalion, End of School Year).

Another officer from the Medical Battalion who was also interviewed at the end of the school
year said that the high number of women had threatened the men's position. The men had
rebelled and engaged in men-against-women-bullying. The rebellion was linked to them
living in mixed-gender rooms, something which will be discussed further in chapter nine.
However, in order to "psych out" the women the men "stack the women in the side" during
physical activities and speed up with purpose when they were walking together. This resulted
in the women feeling they were not equal to the men and not strong enough physically. The
situation of bullying was however solved when the officers became involved:

> OMB: The group has been characterized by the fact that we have a large number of
> women compared to men, in relation to previous years. This has actually been a bit
> special with this group. The women are the majority, and it affected the men to a big
> extent. There was a slightly different group dynamic because of it. The men have
> almost been like… they've felt that they have been in a threatened position. For a
> while it was a rebellion there. It was before Christmas. The guys wanted to live in
> male only rooms [they were living in mixed-gender rooms[283]]. The guys wanted to do
> men's stuff with the guys and didn't want to be together with the women. For a period
> we had a sort of rebellion in some way because of it. But it has worked out. Overall,
> the group is very good and positive. They are a nice gang.
> I: What happened in the rebellion?
> OMB: We arranged a meeting to find out what it was all about. Because women had
> come to us and said they were dissatisfied with the situation. They did not feel equal
> to the guys, and felt that the guys trampled on them and stacked them in the side when
> they were not strong enough physically, and not good enough in combat techniques.
> And the men wanted to change rooms. The room was kind of the icing on the cake.
> [...] but eventually no one wanted to change rooms. It helped to have it discussed, and
> some things were brought out [...]
> I: What were the things that came out?
> OMB: It was first and foremost that the women felt a bit trampled on, that they did not
> think the guys treated them any good. And it is unusual, because usually in other
> platoons the guys treat the women very well. They tend to care for the women in their
> platoon. Maybe because they were so many it seemed to be a bit toward the natural,
> how it usually occurs. When they [the platoon] were on a march up to the firing range,
> the guys took the lead and speeded up, because they knew that a couple of the women

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[283] As indicated in this quote, the situation between the men and women in the candidate platoon in the Medical Battalion was
linked to both the number of women and the mixed-gender room. The men's story will be investigated further in chapter
nine.

would fall off. And the women had very bad feelings about that. There were
tendencies of bullying. At least some of the women felt that.

I: Did they speed up on purpose?

OMB: Yes. Simply with the purpose to psyche them out. There were a couple of guys
in the lead, in particular, and then it became a bit of a group suggestion. But it came to
an end after we got involved and talked about it. And I do not think that the guys knew
how much we knew about it. [...] So it was resolved pretty well. The men claimed that
they were tired of all the women's stuff, and they felt that the women were not as good
as them. That was why they wanted to change rooms. [...] They made comments like,
"I wish that there were no women in the platoon", and the whole time they made small
comments and stings that really hurt the women. But I think that when the guys were
aware of this it may have become a little bigger than they might have meant it to be,
then it was solved. [...] So yes, there was bullying and the bullying was like guys-
against-women-bullying. It's a bit unusual (Interview, Medical Battalion, End of
School Year).

The method used by the men in the Medical Battalion to mark their superiority over the
women was physical capacity. It was however not only men who used superior physical
capacity to dominate over women. A woman with superior physical capacity grappled several
opportunities to dominate over the men in her squad during Joint Selection. Here is an
example:

> The female aspirant has been carrying the squad's 25 liter water can almost all day.
> The selector officer asks: "Is it your permanent job to carry the water can?" The
> female aspirant answers: "Yes, the guys are tired – poor things. So I will carry it so
> we're able to make any progress" (Field notes, Joint Selection).

As a result of more similar observations, I asked the strong female aspirant if she had any idea
what the men in her squad thought about her being in much better physical shape than them:

> FA: I heard that really often. I joked a bit with them about it, when they started to get
> tired. Like "oh my god, pull yourself together, there is a woman who is running away
> from you now". But, you should not joke with them all the time, because they got
> touchy. Especially tonight when I was the squad leader [on the night march], I had a
> lot more to give and they requested breaks constantly. So I said "no, now we are going
> to march for an hour and then we'll have a rest". Then it was like "oh my God, you're a
> bad leader, you have no consideration for your team". But otherwise, I've gotten very
> positive feedback from them. They said they were impressed, and that's nice to hear
> (Interview).

As the female aspirant realized herself, she could not use her superior physical capital to
dominate the men too much before the men felt trampled upon. They got "touchy". However,
some male officers expressed great admiration of her and other strong females, and also said

that they were just impressed by female colleagues who were able to "march the shirt" off them:

> MOOB: I've worked with women who have marched the shirt off me with backpacks, and I had zero problems reconciling myself with that. I was just impressed (Interview).

Finally, some officers used women's physical effort against the men in order to push them to give more:

> Several squads with aspirants are marching with backpacks toward the next case station. One of the selectors runs up the forest side. From the top of a little hill he shouts in a deep commander's voice: "There is no time to lose. You are supposed to be at the next station now. You must take action to be on time". The squads speed up, still marching. A really small girl (+/- 155 cm) loses the back of her squad buddies and starts to run to keep up. The selector with the commander's voice shouts: "Look at her. She is 150 cm and runs faster than you. What is wrong with you? Come on! You are being overtaken by a girl" (Field notes, Joint Selection).

This situation resulted in the men also starting to run and the short woman who had run to keep up with her marching buddies was left lagging behind.

7.2.3   Pride and Selected/Quotaed

We have seen above that actors in the military field have argued strongly the importance of maintaining harsh physical and mental requirements which apply equally to all personnel in order for 1) women to be recognized for being in the field for legitimate reasons, and 2) create a feeling of being selected and ensure that the military profession/field are reserved for the best (cf. 7.1.2). This means that actors in the field struggle to maintain physical prowess as a basic merit that everybody must acquire to enter the field. In accordance with Creveld's (2008) description on military education systems (cf. 3.3.1), the physically and mentally demanding selection process leads to pride and self-confidence. This can be seen from the quotations below, in which the candidates directly relate their pride at attending the Officer Candidate School to it being a selection that many did not pass:

> FCOB: It was not easy to become one of the selected ones. There are many who do not pass. So you have to be proud that you were admitted (Interview).

> MCMB: I am very proud to have been admitted. Just the fact that there was a selection and I managed to be admitted, I am very proud (Interview).

The candidate below recounts that it was the first time she achieved something properly, and that there was a lot of pride attached to being better than many other high quality applicants:

> FCMB: Being better than so many others, in a way. And this year there were many applicants, and they were high quality applicants. It is the first time I feel that I have

achieved something, properly […] There is a lot of pride attached to that – there is (Interview).

The same is stated by this male candidate who thought it was "extremely special" to have achieved a place in the most popular Armored Battalion:

> MCAB: There were many who applied; a few were admitted to the selection. There were 1300, if I'm not completely wrong, for 219 places in total. 28 places in the Armored Battalion. You feel that it is a bit special when you manage to pass. The fact that you achieved it is extremely special, really (Interview).

Passing the selection can be seen as a defining moment in a candidate's identity transformation. They have become the selected few who are given the chance to become officers and learn the skills monopolized by the military profession. Further success will then depend on the ability to absorb learning (cf. 6.1), which from a Bourdieuian perspective will mean to incorporate the military's value system in habitus and embody the attitude and resources that are necessary to do the officer role appropriately.

At the end of the school year all the interviewed candidates report achieving great personal development from testing their body physically and mentally:

> I: What do you think that you've gotten out of this year?
> FCMB: Great personal development. As I said just now, to get out of the comfort zone you are normally within, it's not that often I've been out of it except for in the military, really. You grow like hell it when it comes to personal development. Finding out who I am, what I stand for, what my body can withstand both physically and mentally (Interview).

In particular, the candidates express great self-satisfaction and a sense of achievement from having finished the final physical and mental coping exercise, which, by achieving a demanding merit can be seen as another defining moment in the identity transformation:

> I: How has it been? [The coping exercise]
> MCAB: It has been both hell and educational, and sometimes quite funny.
> I: Why has been a hell?
> MCAB: Your feet are completely destroyed. I feel now that I am two shoe sizes bigger than usual. My hands are completely swollen and I cannot pinch my hands together. You're hungry, your body is heavy, carrying a sack of 10 kg is extremely heavy. […] Now I have pain in my whole body. It's a very good feeling of accomplishment after having survived through this, having completed what I believe is the worst week of my life. I can sit here and smile afterward (Interview).

In addition, most of the officers also answered that they were very proud of being an officer. Like the candidates, some[284] officers related their pride to being one of those who had managed something which not everybody can achieve:

> FOHQ: It is not for everybody, to become an officer. You've earned it when you are one [an officer]. I am proud of the education I have and that I have come so far in what I've done. It's not everybody who can manage it (Interview).

There was only one person in the material who replied that she was not proud to be an officer. That was a female officer who in informal field conversation also said that she did not like the idea of being better than everybody else:

> FO: I feel that this is a job like any other job. I have perhaps a tendency to define pride as something that goes slightly against something negative, or swollen. That might mean that they consider themselves a little better than everybody else. "I am an officer, and that's much better than being for example a nurse or to attend to the BI or something like that". Now I'm kidding a bit, because we have just been joking about it at the exercises (Interview).

The referred opinion that being/becoming an officer was something more exclusive than being/becoming something in the civilian sphere was found among both officers and candidates. For instance, it was claimed that the military offered a possibility to test yourself that could not be found in a civilian context:

> MCMB: You can test yourself in a completely different way than you are able to in other contexts in civilian life (Interview).

It was also claimed that military education was different from civilian education because it had to be merited, while everybody could get a civil education:

> FCOB: That is not a thing I will not talk about, to put it that way! You know you've been working for it and you've merited a place that many people want. It is different from attending a civil education. Everybody is able to get a civil education. But not in the military (Interview).

As can also be seen from this quote, the female candidate thought that having merited a place wanted by many others was *something to talk about*. However, the female second year candidate in the story below had learned that she had *no reason to brag*, because all women had been admitted to the Officer Candidate School by affirmative actions:

> I am at the lunch room at the Medical Battalion's headquarters. A female second year candidate comes over to me and says she is very interested in talking to me, since she

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[284] Most of the officers answered "yes" to the question about whether they were proud to be working in the Armed Forces; however several added "but". Their "but" was related to topics that will be discussed in chapter nine.

has heard that I do research on women in the military. She asks if I know whether they use affirmative actions for women at Joint Selection, and adds quickly that if I know I better tell her the truth right now. I answer that I cannot account for the selection. She tells that she was at Joint Selection together with a girl who ran the 3000 meters in 15.03 [requirement being 15.00], and she knows that she was not admitted. But, later she has heard that all the girls were admitted. She tells that when she came home after the selection and was really, really proud to have passed it, she was told that this was nothing to brag about because all the girls had been admitted. Another time, she continues, they had been watching a movie at the barracks after the coping exercise which she was proud to have managed, but then the guys she was watching the movie with said that this was not something to be proud of because she had carried 10 kg less than the guys. She raises her arms and shouts, "What??" "I did not carry 10 kg less. I carried as much as the guys!" Perhaps, I was not the one who carried the MG for the most of the time, but there were many guys who did not carry the MG for the most of the time either. She says: "Why can they not tell us whether they use affirmative actions for women or not". She asks if I know about the girls that have been admitted now (the first year candidates), whether they have passed the physical requirements or not (Field notes, Service Education, Medical Battalion).

Likewise, a second year candidate I met at Joint Selection told that she was "completely gob-smacked" when she realized that "70 percent" of her classmates, men *and* women, believed that the women had been admitted by a quota:

At Joint Selection I am talking to one of the female second year officer candidates from the Air Force who is helping out at the selection (first week as second year candidate). I ask her whether they will make any assessments of the aspirants. She says no, but that they have been asked to report if they see anything out of the ordinary, and that negative attitudes toward women have been emphasized; something which she was really, really happy about, she adds. I ask why. She tells me that they had had Joint Education for all the Air Force Candidates – approximately 150 candidates – and in the subject attitudes [cf. 6] they had a lesson on attitudes toward women, which was the topic that resulted in the biggest discussion. Due to the discussion, she recounts that the instructor/officer asked everybody who believed that the women were in the military because of quotas to raise their hand. "And more than 70% raised their hand!" she says with enormous enthusiasm. "Girls also! I was compleeeeeetely gob-smacked ! I could not believe my own eyes!" But the instructor was really good, she says. He said that nobody had been admitted without passing the physical requirements and he asked why they thought the women were quotaed. But, then the discussion turned to the idea that the girls were quotaed because they had other physical requirements than the men. But the instructor said that a 60 kilo woman carrying a 25 kilo backpack during the field exercise carried almost half her body weight, while a 90 kilo man carried only one quarter of his weight. "So, who had the toughest physical requirements in the field then? Who was quotaed?", he asked. The

> second year female officer candidate then said she had worked hard and deserved her
> place since she was 60 kg and had had to carry a 30 kilo backpack on an exercise they
> had been through. Half my body weight I carried!" (Field notes, Joint Selection, Phase
> One).

So, the proud women who believed they had achieved something and were "one of the
selected" experienced that others were of the opinion that there was no reason to be proud or
to brag, since they had been admitted under easier physical requirements than men. This
shows that *physical prowess plays a key role in determining the symbolic capital possessed by
an officer.* The data material contains no records on discussions about whether women passed
more easily through the intelligence-test, the psychological tests, the medical examination, the
entrance interview, the leadership evaluation and so on. The recorded discussions about
whether women were admitted to the Officer Candidate School by quota were related to the
physical requirements and the *average grade on the ranking list* which emerged from
summing up the numerical grades the aspirants had obtained in the different tests at Joint
Selection[285].

To look firstly at the physical requirements, the story above shows that some have the opinion
that the gender-differenced schema in the formal physical fitness test is seen as an affirmative
action for women[286]. Accordingly, we have seen that some female officers have argued
through feature articles that men and women should have similar physical requirements (cf.
1.1 and 7.1.2). Yet, as was referred in the section above, Stornæs, Aandstad, & Kirknes,
(2014) found that only 11% of the women wanted equal physical requirements for men and
women, against 29% of the men.

Secondly, there was a discussion regarding differences of being *qualified* and *selected among
the best on the ranking list* which summed up the results from the selection. A leading officer
at the headquarters argued that all women admitted to the Officer Candidate School were
qualified:

> OHQ: I was, myself, part of the admission council and that was a purely mathematical
> assessment based on what was emphasized in the officer assessment, interviews and

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[285] "The purpose with Joint Selection is to select "the best" candidates to the Armed Forces Officer Candidate School. Who
are "the best" candidates is shown using *a mathematical ranking list.* The ranking list is obtained by summing up numerical
grades the aspirants obtain at the tests they need to go through in phase one and two. The grades are 6-1, where 6 is the best
grade, 2 is a pass and 1 fail. From the entrance interview (phase 1), the aspirants receive one grade that indicates his or her
school prognosis (academic potential) and one grade that indicates his/her leadership prognosis (leadership potential). These
two grades count for 20% each. The results of the physical tests (3000 meters, push-ups, sit-ups and hang-ups) are summed
up in one grade that counts for 10%. The selection officer's leadership assessment conducted during the one week field
exercise (phase two), results in one grade that is set in cooperation between the selection officer, company leaders, platoon
leaders and levelmans. This grade counts for 50%. (Only those who have passed the medical examination and the minimum
standard in the intelligence test conducted at the national service administration session are qualified to attend Joint Selection.
If there are more qualified applicants to the officer candidate schools than can be handled at Joint Selection those with the
best school grades are taken to selection. Normally, two and a half to three times as many as the officer candidate schools
will need/have place for will be called in to the selection (Rones & Hellum, 2013).
[286] This is in accordance with Cohns' (2000) findings in the article with the illustrative title *How Can She Claim Equal Rights
When She Doesn't Have to Do as Many Push-Ups as I Do?*

physical tests. All those who came into the year were eligible. Only those who
qualified were admitted (Interview).

Another officer who provided insight in the mathematical assessment and selection argued,
however, that admitting all the *qualified* women meant that women with lower average
grades, and thus lower rankings, had been admitted in favor of men with higher rankings on
the list:

I: In recent years there has been considerable focus on women in the military. What do
you think about that?
OHQ: It is a good thing, but everyone should be treated equally. A difference is made.
A good example of that – something that really provokes me – is Joint Selection.
Everybody gets the grades one to six. All the girls who received the mark two were
definitely admitted. That is a wrong way to do it.
I: While men would not be admitted if they had grade two?
OHQ: Yes! Then you select from the average grade – those who have the highest
grade. Those with the highest grade are admitted, and then you have the lowest which
was perhaps three. That was how I understood it. It is absolutely the wrong way to do
it. Instead they should begin by recruiting more girls. When they get more female
applicants, they will maybe get more girls who are over a grade two (Interview).

The system for selection of men and women from the ranking list was also discussed by
officers at the officers' preliminaries before the selection. In a lesson for the selection officers
a male officer raised his hand and said that he wanted the best among everyone, and not a
proportion of the best women and a proportion of the best men:

"You are saying all the time that we are going to select the best. At the same time you
say that we need diversity. And that will be at the cost of the best. What do you
actually want?" The question results in a discussion. One officer says: "I think it is
wrong to select 30% of the best girls and 30% of the best men, instead of 30% of the
best. Another officer says: "I do not care if it's a man or a women, I want the best,
bottom line" (Field Notes, Joint Selection, Officers' Preliminaries).

A similar argument was put forward by the female officer referred to in the story in chapter
one. She said: "If there are 200 persons at the selection, then it must be the 100 who are the
best who are allowed to enter, and not a quota with men and another quota with women." In
other words, a system where women with poorer average grade (ranking) were admitted in
favor of men with better average grade (ranking) was experienced as being unfair.

In addition to the discussion on affirmative actions for the admittance of females to the
Officer Candidate School, many officers had the opinion that women got precedence to job
position and seemed able to climb the ranks very fast:

OHQ: The attitude toward affirmative action is that it should not happen. If two
persons are equal, then take the woman. That's okay. But that women who stand

poorer should be assigned by quota, the attitude is that it should not happen. Especially among the women I talk to. They are often strongly opposed to affirmative action, for they know that it carries a negative backlash on themselves as female officers. "You just fill the quota. You are here because you are part of a quota".

I: Do you have any idea whether quotas are used in the military today?

OHQ: Yes. I suppose I can say that it happens. There are moderate gender quotas, which take place. And that is okay. But in some positions, when you get up a bit in the rank system, then there are very many ladies who are climbing very fast up the ranks (Interview).

The male officer below conveyed that the politics on increased recruitment of women had led to a growing skepticism toward women's qualifications. This, he argued, caused women to feel they had to prove that they were *as good as the paperwork says that they will be*:

MOMB: I think that for the women, they have so much more to prove, or must prove, precisely because quotas are spoken so much about. Very many have a skeptical light directed toward the women who are admitted, exactly because of the focus from the – I call it – the politics. I think it becomes harder for women to live up to the expectation. The guys become more skeptical. They want to see more, they want to actually test and approve those girls who are admitted. It is a skepticism that is growing over time because of the bad light in which the quotas are seen. And I feel it may prevent development. But again – when they have this expectation from others, when there are claimed requirements from others, then I often feel that many of the women want to prove that they are as good as the paperwork says that they will be, and they seek to live up to it, which I think becomes a form of competition with themselves (Interview).

Female officers also reported having to prove that they were qualified and good enough:

FO: We were two girls and we applied for [operative] service at [...] When we got up there, there was a platoon leader who disliked us. We were put into administration in the platoon's central control room and were not allowed to go out on patrol with the squad. At the boot camp we had been ranked for physical abilities and other abilities, and we came out really well, both of us. So we should certainly have been on patrol, we could certainly have been squad members or patrol leaders. But we were not allowed. So already then I noticed discrimination. One of the first things we learned was that "at this place no discrimination will be made in favor of you, because you are girls". And then we experienced negative discrimination from day one. I have experienced a lot of that in the Armed Forces. It is not everyone who does it, and few do it consciously, but many have unconscious attitudes toward girls. We have a saying that "as a guy you are automatically tough and accepted until the contrary is proved, but as a girl you are automatically unable and incapable until proven otherwise". I have talked with many other girls who really agree. We must prove that we are good enough. [...] But, all the time I had to disprove that I should be incapable (Interview).

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Some of the female officers reported, however, that the need to prove that they were just as good as the men was something they had felt more strongly about when they were younger:

> FO: I do not feel it as much anymore, but when I was younger I always felt that I had to perform better to prove that I was just as good as the men. So then I rather had to be a bit better (Interview).

Both older male officers at the HQ and younger male officers in the battalion observed and reported that the women needed to prove themselves to gain respect and be accepted:

> MOHQ: Yes. Female sergeants, new sergeants in particular, have a need to prove that they are as good as the guys, especially when they are young, to gain respect (Interview).

> MOMB: I think a lot of the women think it's unfortunate [about the quota] because they may feel a little frowned upon and as though they must perform better than the guys to be accepted in the same way. I have certainly seen that in practice through some years of service that the women must perform considerably better to get the same acceptance as the guys (Interview).

Female officers reported that they themselves had to ensure that they were the best applicants for positions they had been given:

> FO: The rumor runs quickly if anyone has gotten a position they should not have. It also creates uncertainty among us women who have received positions. When I got my position, I competed with three men. Afterwards I was checking the requirements, and yes, I was the best qualified. [...] I was not quotaed into my position (Interview)

Accordingly, all the interviewed women in the field were against quotas for women, but in particular the female officers:

> FO: I feel that all these years since I attended the Military Academy, the focus has been on women, women, women. And we womenfolk who will absolutely not be on a quota in any way. We will work for what we shall achieve (Interview).

Again the female officer from the story in chapter one argued that women would work for their achievements. She said, "There's a term used *all the time*, and that is *to lift up the women*. But I tell you, we do *not* want to be carried a damn meter! […] we are dependent on performance. *We have to feel that this is exclusive*!". But while the women refused to be lifted, one of the leading officers at the headquarters argued that he had "to kick women harder in the bottom" to get them forward than he had to with men. He also reflected on the reason why women had to be pushed and thought it could be due to how military culture makes the women feel:

> I: What experiences do you yourself have working with women in the Armed Forces?
> MOHQ: I have good experience, very good experience. I have no problem. I note that

in order to get to the women forward, you often need to kick them harder in the bottom than you have to do with the guys. I have an example with a woman who is at the Military Academy now. When we talked about that: "You have to apply to the Military Academy, you have potential", she did not apply. So, I wondered why on earth she did not do it. Then she said that there were so many talented guys who applied that she did not think she would succeed in the competition. Then she got a kick in the butt, and a serious talk. So, next year she did apply, and was admitted. So, I think the women are very self-critical. If it has something to do with the military culture, if they feel it, I do not know, but they often need to be pushed (Interview).

Looking to the view that men have about the evaluation system which measures their qualification to attractive positions and promotion, field conversations revealed that several male officers found it unfair that physical test requirements took into consideration women's physical weaknesses (and thus provided them with good grades), while non-academic men were not given advantages in the theoretical exams they struggled with. This feeling of unfairness was linked to several of the male officers performing poorly in school and, in fact, becoming officers as a consequence of mastering practical tasks during conscription:

> MOAB: I became interested [in the Armed Force] when I was forced into service as a conscript, which I didn't want. I did what I could to avoid it. But then I realized that it was [the military] for me. Because I was not particularly good at school, but suddenly I was good at something. I used my body and did it pretty well overall. Then I realized that this fitted me pretty well (Interview).

> MOHQ: The basic service gave me a taste for it, to put it that way. I got a chance to do something good, for the first time in my life. I've never been good at school or been the clever guy. I have might been more the – what shall I say – the troublemaker. Something like that. So for my part, it fitted perfectly, the way things are structured and how it works, and that you actually are allowed to be a bit aggressive in certain situations (Interview).

This category of male officer also questioned to what the degree class distinctions were being developed in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and suggested that men who lacked the ability to talk fell short in the competition, while those (men) who were now selected to the Officer Candidate School lacked practical skills:

> MOMB: I have the impression that candidates do not come with skills anymore. Earlier, they were able to use a screwdriver and fix a car. But now a culture is developing where the officer candidates more often come from Oslo's west side [a bourgeois background], while the ordinarily workers become grenadiers. We are getting an upper class with officers who can do little else than leadership, and are unable to drive a truck. That's the drawback with higher demands for school grades. And then we have an evaluation regime which comes down to the ability to talk. Then it helps to have a best bourgeois background, while those who come from the

countryside fall short in this competition. But, really, I do not understand why the west side kids have been tempted by the Officer Candidate School (Field notes, Medical Battalion).

It was argued that the mission in Afghanistan had increased the status[287] of the Norwegian Armed Forces:

MOOB: Before, it was a jerk and a fool who worked in the Armed Forces, while now after the terrorist attack against the Twin Towers, and when Norway has been quite heavily involved in Afghanistan, there has been much in the media, and the image [of the Norwegian Armed Forces] has changed a bit: from being a fool who runs around in the woods here in Norway to becoming someone who actually does something abroad and actually risks their own lives. So it has changed for the better in recent years (Interview).

At Joint Selection an officer who had conducted interviews with aspirants observed that several of his interviewees aimed for civilian careers but wanted to attain the officer candidate education first, because it was "important":

MOHQ: There are many officers candidates now who are saying that they will get an officer education, and then they will go on to civilian education. It is important for them to get an officer education. Where they get that from, I do not know. [...]. But there were many who said it in the interview [at Joint Selection], that they wanted to go to the Officer Candidate School because that was important (Interview).

In the Armored Battalion one officer questioned the long-term perspective of the selection, since candidates who only wanted military training for civilian careers had been admitted:

MOAB: I question the long-term perspective a bit, in who they select. Some [candidates] have been reasonably honest from the start. They want only to complete a year at Officer Candidate School, do their year as a duty sergeant, and then apply to civilian schools. I think it is a little silly that they do not reveal that at the selection and say "thanks, but no thanks". But, it is probably a bit about what people want to get out of it.
I: Are there many who have that attitude?
MOAB: Not many, but three or four of them, which I think is a little silly when we

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[287] Reviewing the field of military sociology showed that the transformation of military missions experienced over the last half of the 1900s was perceived as an ongoing decline in relevance, legitimacy and prestige afforded by contemporary affluent society to the military profession. Accordingly, around the millennium US researchers argued that it was necessary to rediscover the professional character of the US Army and find ways to restore pride accorded to the service (cf. 3.2.1.2). The decision to introduce a professional character was made in Norway in 2005, in parallel with downsizing, modernization, increased attention on recruitment as well as increased media attention due to the operation in Afghanistan. The recruitment to the officer candidate school has accordingly increased since 2007. In 2014, 5030 applicants were competing for 640 school positions.

invest so much money into a serious education, and they only will stay for a year
ahead. We struggle enough with retaining people (Interview).

The officer's claim that some candidates did not intend to work in the Armed Forces was
confirmed in interviews with candidates who said their intention was to acquire a practical
leadership education before attending civilian studies:

> MCAB: But the thing is to study economics and to gain some leadership skills beside
> that. It's very good to have (Interview).

However, although it was claimed that due to a high number of applicants to the Officer
Candidate School, the quality of the candidates was better than before, the non-academic
officers were not impressed by the candidates' practical skills:

> MOHQ1: They say that they have admitted the brightest, in school grades. But the
> squad leader profession is a practical job, so in that respect I do not think there is any
> difference in these and those before. I think it is the same (Interview).

An officer claimed that some of the candidates were not on par at all when it came to practical
skills, and suggested that there was something wrong with the selection:

> MOHQ2: They may be clever at school theoretically, but when it comes to practical
> performance they are not on par at all. I think this has something to do with the way
> they are selecting […] You have to have practical talent. You have to. Without it,
> there is no hope (Interview).

7.2.4   Summary

1) As a consequence of the requirement to be an energetic, committed and competitive leader
and winner, the social milieu was characterized by many competitive and 'strong
personalities' with a desire to perform and be 'the boss'. Less dominant people found little
space for themselves in the milieu. It was reported that the situation easily led to conflicts
between individuals. In the Medical Battalion two sub groups of women had problems in
getting along. The sub groups were labeled the 'extrovert boy-girls' and the 'introvert girl-
girls' by their officers. This pointed toward a difference in types of personality and appetites
for competition, recognition and attention, which also emerged as an explanation for the
tension between the two girl gangs. For instance, interdependent factors between the
performance of others and own results and appearance seemed to result in concerns about
others' effort. In particular, it seems as though young female officers set strong performance
demands on other female's effort and physical standards, with interest in the image of women
as a group.

Moreover, it was found that several female officers and candidates desired to prove that they
were tough, 'one of the guys' and able to manage the same (physical) strain as men – or even
beat the men. Several females were also happy to be the only woman. The positive sides of
being a lone woman were linked to a decrease in pressure to compete with other females, and

making it easier to become 'one of the guys'. However, women who were used to being the best among women, but found themselves to be the ones who struggled the most among men said that it was fine to be to only women for the most of the time, but found it desirable to be with more women in the physical challenges. In other words, it seems that women engage in a hierarchy struggle where they welcome weaker women, but are fine without female competitors.

Some of the elder officers of both genders had a conscious relationship to competition and struggles in the social relationships in the field, and worked actively to promote cooperation among colleagues and groups of subordinates. Still, some officers experienced the social milieu being characterized by competition and desires among colleagues to be the better than everyone else; more so than to work together as a team. Finally, it seems as though some officers of both gender self-select from further military career advancements in order to avoid increased competition.

2) The requirement to be physically fit and, in particular, the value of physical capital as "the field's trump card" resulted in displays of superior physical capacity being used to dominate others and define who was in the field for legitimate reasons. For instance, some male candidates in the Medical Battalion were of the opinion that some of the women should not have been admitted due to physical capacity linked to body-size. The men used their physical superiority to demonstrate that they were able to leave the smallest women behind during marches. As a result the women felt that they were not equal to the men and not strong enough physically. In addition, it became apparent that women with superior physical capacity could use the possession of physical capital to dominate over men, yet not too much because that made the men "touchy".

3) Some actors in the field strongly argued the importance of maintaining harsh physical and mental requirements that apply equally to all personnel in order for 1) women to be recognized as being in the field for legitimate reasons, and 2) create a feeling of being selected and ensure that the military profession/field is reserved for "the best". It was also found that passing this selection process and completing the final coping exercises led to feelings of self-satisfaction, achievement and pride. Second year female candidates had however learned that they had *no reason to brag*, because all women allegedly had been admitted to the Officer Candidate School by affirmative actions.

The discussion about whether women were admitted to the Officer Candidate School by quota was related to the gender-differenced schema in the formal physical fitness test and the *ranking list* that emerged from summing up the numerical grades the aspirants had obtained in the different tests at Joint Selection. There was a sense of unfairness that qualified but lower ranking women had been admitted in favor of men with higher rankings on the list. In addition, many officers were of the opinion that women had precedence in job positions and climbed the ranks very quickly. It was explained that the politics on increased recruitment of women had led to a growing skepticism toward women's qualifications, causing women to feel they had to prove that they were *as good as the paperwork says that they will be*. Female officers were strongly against quotas for women and wanted to work for their achievements.

However, while the women refused to be "lifted", it was argued that women had to be "kicked harder in the bottom" to move their carrier forward than was the case with men.

In addition, field conversations revealed a sense of unfairness among several male officers that women's physical test requirements took into consideration their physical weaknesses (and thus provided them with good grades), while non-academic men were not given any advantages in the theoretical exams they struggled with. This feeling of unfairness was linked to several of the male officers performing poorly in school and, in fact, becoming officers as a consequence of mastering practical tasks during conscription. This category of male officer also questioned the degree to which class distinctions were developing in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and suggested that men who lacked the ability to talk fell short in the competition, while those who were now selected to the Officer Candidate School lacked the necessary practical skills. This category of officers also questioned the long-term perspective in the selection of candidates, as there were those with "best bourgeois" backgrounds who had been admitted despite only wanting military training for subsequent civilian careers.

7.3 Interpretations: The Chosen Body, Meritocracy and Quotas

7.3.1 The Chosen Body

From the results described above it can be claimed that the illusio of the 'chosen body' (cf. 3.3.1) calls forth an interest to investments in the military game and conforming to the field's inherent rules and requirements. Furthermore, it is shown that physical prowess and results in the numerical grade and ranking systems play a key role in determining the symbolic capital possessed by an officer (candidate). Legitimate presence in the field, recognition and positions in the informal hierarchy, as well as further career development, depend on these merits. But, as shown in chapter 1.1 the dramatic changes in the arrangement and missions of the Norwegian Armed Forces has set the criteria of traditional valuations at stake, and the recruitment of women and aiming for a wider combination of skills and qualities than those held by the traditional soldier have been a priority measure since 2006 (White Paper No 36 (2006-2007), White Paper No 14 (2012–2013). To use Bourdieu's (1998) words, this shift in focus alters "the established order, with its relations of domination, its rights and prerogatives, privileges and injustices" (p. 1). It jeopardizes the kind of capital that gives *certain people* access to social mobility and position in the military hierarchy, at the cost of people with other kinds of qualifications and characteristics. This is reflected in the argument that admitting a quota of men and another quota of women will be "at the cost of *the best*", when measured through a ranking system which is based on prowess that privileges most men above most women.

A sense of pride follows from being selected as "one of the best" through physically demanding tests in harsh competition with many other participants. As Weiss (2002) and Sasson-Levy (2008) have argued, the cultural script of militarism offers the possibility to be identified with the ideal of the "chosen body" – which traditionally sits together with masculine status. The results show that this status is also something that women who join the military strive to attain. Many of them want to become "one of the guys", or with reference to

chapter 3.3.1, they want to become "one of the few good men". In this regard, Belkin (2012) argues that military masculinity is "a set of beliefs, practises and attributes that can enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of an affirmative relationship with the military or with military ideas" (p. 3). In accordance with Bourdieu, Belkin explains that *the claim to authority and power depends on the "beliefs that military service certifies one's competence, trustworthiness, or authenticity"* (p. 3). This means that the possibility of soldiers/officers being identified with the ideal of the "chosen body" on the basis of being admitted to the military *depends on this kind of capital being measured and certified by the military;* thus converting it to a symbolic capital to be capitalized upon.

The result shows that female officer candidates have been told they have nothing to brag about or no reason to be proud because their physical capital has, allegedly, not been measured and certified. It can be claimed that this is a reason why some women decline to be "lifted up", request to work hard for their positions in the field, and advocate for maintenance of "harsh physical requirements". In this way women contribute to the reproduction of the field's traditional valuation criteria and classification schema, and in turn help to close the field for women *and men* with other kinds of capital. It can be argued that this is an effect of symbolic violence which calls forth a submission to the dominant group's interest, and that advocating to retain "set requirements" (cf. 1.1), in this respect, is an act of recognition. On the other hand, if harsh physical test requirements do not apply to all, the possibility to be identified with "the chosen military body" and to symbolize possession of (masculine) physical capital (merits) just by wearing the military uniform is at stake. And this seems to be an exclusive identity some of the women desire and, therefore, it is likely to suggest that some of the women also work for their own interest of being "one of the guys".

Moreover, it is also a likely suggestion that the small-sized girls, who (according to their officer) had a strong motivation to disprove the stereotype of being a cute, petite girl by joining the military, *are a particular* challenge to the masculine belief (illusio) on which the claim to authority depends. These women enter the military field with bodies that stand in direct contrast to skills and qualities associated with military requirements. The struggle to increase the value of backpack marching, decrease the value of "training center fitness"/3000 meter running time, and "march out the smallest women" can be interpreted as a struggle to increase the value of larger (male) bodies, and a desire to close the field to the women who most clearly challenge the image of the military body. *With their bodies women, particularly the cute, petite girls, set at stake the classification of the military profession as masculine and tough.*

7.3.2 Meritocracy and Quotas

In previous literature it has been argued that the military hierarchy was designed as a meritocracy where access to positions and power should be distributed according to clean merits (physical and mental prowess), and not by economic and social capital, such as family, network and group belonging. Despite the fact that access to the military profession has traditionally been dependent on belonging to a group of men, it has been argued that it is from the meritocratic perspective that the resistance toward quotas for women arises (cf. 2.2.2 and

3.3.1). The results show a massive resistance toward quotas, with women who decline to be "lifted up" and request to merit their position in the field through hard work.

According to Rice (2014b), meritocracy is seen to be a fair system. A common objection toward quotas is, therefore, that this takes situations that are fair and makes them unfair. However, a basic problem with the logic of fairness in meritocratic systems is the assumption that we are capable of recognizing the best without gender bias. For instance, "an increasing body of research, […] makes it clear that equally qualified men and women are viewed differently" (Rice, 2014a). This was already pointed toward by Bourdieu who argued that men and women are viewed differently due to unconscious acts of cognition and misrecognition based on gendered and gendering schemata for judgment inscribed in habitus (cf. 4.2.2.1). Meritocratic imaginations were exactly what Bourdieu confronted with his concepts of cultural capital and social reproduction (cf. 4.2.2.3).

According to Bourdieu & Passeron (1990), educational institutions reproduce and legitimate social inequalities, for example by assessing, recognizing and certifying the cultural knowledge, skills and ideals that are held by the dominant group. At least three factors contribute to enhancing the tendency for such reproduction in the military field[288]. Firstly, a meritocratic system which is based on the illusio of "the selected body" (hegemonic masculinity) privileges men above women, because it measures and certifies masculine physical capital. Secondly, it can be argued that the attributes held by the dominant group in particular risk being reproduced in the military since the aspirants/candidates seem to be evaluated in 'whole person categories', which rely on qualitative and subjective evaluation of 'the right attitude' instead of specific performance standards (skills) (cf. 6). Thirdly, the Officer Candidate School places emphasis on "the power of example" and seeks to mold its candidates to becoming normative role models which the subordinates will be encouraged to emulate. All these factors imply that similarity to an image of the ideal soldier (the selected male military body) will determine to what degree the officer role is done appropriately. Thus, insofar as military identity/imaginations sit together with masculine identity/imaginations, and feminine identity is constructed as an antagonism, it can be argued that women will be regarded unfavorably in subjective and unconscious assessments of expected military performance.

Also, insofar as boys and girls are encouraged to invest in different social games (cf. 4.2.1) during primary socialization, young men and women will be likely to embody capital that is valued differently in military culture. As Bourdieu & Passeron (1990) pointed out, those who have embodied cultural resources most similar to the dominant actors in a field, such as the

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[288] In addition to the three factors described in the main text, Kjellberg (1965) argues that the lack of a scientific basis for development of the profession helps to *reinforce the cultural aspect of the profession in that things are done because they are tradition*. (Kjellberg applies a theoretical model that assumes a profession to consist of the role of the teacher, scientist, practitioner and decision maker, and finds that *the scientist is lacking* in the military profession. As of 1965, he argued that this can be explained because the isolation, independency and critical distance which characterize the scientist role in other professions are difficult factors to adapt to the strong cohesion sought within the military profession). Creveld (2008) and Høiback (2011b) also state that military strategies and theorists have relied heavily on *history* as a tool for professional development.

teacher and the leading officer, are likely to get the most compliments and be recognized as the best performers. This is the kind of reproduction and unfairness in an assumed meritocratic system that a quota seeks to undo. As Rice (2014b) argues: "quotas do not get introduced in situations that already are fair. They are tool to pursue fairness – to correct unfairness". Therefore, when the women in the military field advocate against quotas and insist that they want to merit their positions in the field through (masculine) physical prowess and meet "the set requirements", they contribute to the reproduction of the dominant group's prerogatives. They accept the field's tacit rules and conform to the traditional logics for achieving positions and recognition, instead of challenging "the set requirements". Thus, they contribute to reproducing the symbolic systems of classification, perception and appreciation which anchor men in the dominant positions and make women inferior. This is *the paradox of doxa,* an effect of symbolic violence, i.e. the power to make a particular understanding of reality emerge as objective, true and legitimate.

Another common objection toward quotas is that they necessarily lead to a reduction in quality, as less qualified actors are selected in favor of better qualified actors. Rice (2014b) argues that this is the stereotype of quotas, and a classic case of basing conclusions on anecdotes which are treated as data. He refers that research, on the contrary, has shown the opposite to happen, and he explains that affirmative action attracts more highly qualified women which then raises the overall competency of the group by also raising the competence of the group of men. In sum, this means that mediocre men are being replaced by more highly qualified women. Among the literature to which Rice refers is Besley, Folke, Persson, & Rickne (2013) who write.

> The academic and popular debate sometimes sees the goals of diversity and competence as in tension with one another. For example, in the debate on gender quotas, it is often claimed that a supply constraint for women results in a quota replacing competent men by mediocre women. We have argued, to the contrary, that achieving gender parity through quotas can actually promote competence by reducing the number of mediocre men (p. 34).

According to Rice (2014b), quotas lead to "a realization of the classic argument that we need to make use of all of society's resources". This is also an argument used in White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) and White Paper No 14 (2012–2013) on the recruitment of more women to the Norwegian Armed Forces. On the other hand, replacing mediocre men with higher qualified women may *also* mean that lower class men's (cultural) competence, such as practical skills, are replaced by middle-class women's more highly valued and/or certified (cultural) competence, such as higher academic achievements.

The kinds of people that have value depends, therefore, on which types of cultural capital are assessed, recognized and certified by the military educational system, and thus convert to symbolic capital through the grade, ranking and evaluation systems that gives access to positions and promotions. Although it is argued in White Paper No 14 (2012–2013) that one of the "relatively standardized criteria for selection" is *practical skills*, the non-theoretical men did *not* seem to experience that practical skills and cultural capital from "the

countryside" were recognized in the grade and promotion system. They thought it was unfair that women's physical weaknesses were accounted for by lower requirements and quotas, while theoretical weaknesses and lack of the cultural training "to talk" were not accounted for.

Chapter 8: Regulation Impositions and Adaption Issues

As mentioned previously, analysis and interpretation of the data material revealed that doing an officer role appropriately is dependent on the ability to embody power resources and obey regulation impositions at the same time. This implies that an officer must be able to enforce physical/symbolic violence on other people (dominate) and at the same time subordinate to the symbolic violence, which involves a tacit acceptance of the rules and premises inherent in the game/field. With this as a background this chapter is devoted to *regulation impositions and adaption issues (paradoxical submission/resistance)*.

In the first part of this chapter (8.1) we will look into *regulation impositions* which also involve cohesion[289]. The data will be presented under the following headlines:

- The Socially Competent and Contributing Buddy
- The Tractable and Conforming Candidate
- The Skilled Instructor Who Cares Properly for the Equipment
- "A Feedback Culture"

In the second part of the chapter (8.2) we will look into adaption issues and explore how different actors in the field adapt to or resist the regulation impositions.

The headlines represent the trends in the data material, while the quotes illustrate nuances and opinions which are expressed only by some actors.

8.1   Regulation Impositions and Cohesion

8.1.1   The Socially Competent and Contributing Buddy

In order to do an officer role appropriately, social skills are a requirement:

> OHQ: It requires a good portion of social antennas (Interview).

Social skills were also seen as something you have or do not have. Lack of social skills would then result in you not fitting in the military:

> OHQ: […] Social antennas – if you don't have that, you will not fit in the military.
> Fair enough to be introverted or extroverted, but you must be able to talk to other
> people. So that is something I think is very important. Much can be trained, but social
> antennas are something we either have or not, usually (Interview).

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[289] This involves construction of similarities and uniformity between men; in other words, the doing of sameness and the effort to *coordinate* the human resources in military organizations through comradeship and common identity (cf. 3.3.3, 4.1.1 and 5.1.2.1).

The need for social skills is linked to the candidates becoming squad leaders and working with people. Thus, communications skills are also required:

> MOOB: Social competence is always important, because you are supposed to lead people and it is people who stand in the center of everything you do. And it is clear that if you fail to communicate all right with the people you have around you, then it becomes very difficult [...] If you struggle to work well with other people, this is not the workplace for you (Interview).

The ability to create a good social milieu where people can thrive was also emphasized:

> OHQ: As a military leader you must be able to reach the goals in what you do, involve people along the way, and create a workplace where everyone thrives […] This implies of course that you have to lead clearly and that you must have a certain charisma and social skills in order to create a good milieu. You must be strict with some things and have wiggle room with other things (Interview).

In other words, an officer must give room for subordinates to develop, and not stand in the way of their possibility to develop and grow through trying and failing:

> OHQ: I'd rather have a leader who has social intelligence and lets you try and fail, than a leader who is really professionally skilled but controls you like a puppet and does not let you grow. Every leader should listen to those under them, for that is the whole point, in my opinion (Interview).

Listening to subordinates and building trust and respect *downwards* in the hierarchy was especially emphasized by some of the officers:

> OHQ: A good officer must care for others. He must be empathetic, must be able to build trust downwards. It is important, especially at the squad leader level, you must be able to build trust with those under you, so that those under you respect you, that those under you in a way choose you and agree that you are their boss. And for that, you must possess some qualities. You must be able in your subject, so that they respect you professionally and respect you as a person. It is quite difficult to achieve, especially when you are young […] You must mold yourself. You must crack the trust-building code so that they respect you as a person and an officer […] Because now it's like that, especially in the professional units; if the soldiers there have no respect for you as an officer, you are not their boss when you go out [in international operations] (Interview).

An egalitarian style of leadership was promoted in the education, summarized in a frequently used phrase: "a good officer is the first among equals" (Field notes). Being "the first among equals" was especially related to trust and primary group solidarity (cohesion)[290]:

> MO: That [fellowship] is an important element in military culture. Performance, taking care of each other, caring, showing initiative, having trust in each other – that is very important, trust in your buddy, trust in your boss that he is able to keep his head cool when it bangs. I was present two or three years ago when there was a seminar on military professional identity. The Danish lieutenant colonel[291] who had been in combat and taken heavy losses, he talked a lot about that; having trust in your boss […] [it requires that]. He is with us at the front and leads from the front. It's a bit like that, funny: "Do not worry guys; I'm coming a bit behind you." They will not get trust. You will not follow him to Valhalla, or in a combat situation in Afghanistan (Interview).

In order to gain trust and motivate subordinates, a good officer should have self-awareness and the ability to understand how he or she influences other people, and uses this to "sparkle" as a leader. An officer should also have a passion for other people:

> OHQ: He or she is able to motivate the subordinates, either through his own charisma or personal or professional competence [...] In addition, a leader must have self-awareness. He or she must know how he influences other people around him. If you have a self-understanding that says OK, I'm introvert […], then you have to sparkle through professional excellence [...] If I am to summarize, I would say that the most important thing is that you communicate well, solve problems effectively, have the ability to take initiative and a passion for what you are doing. You should glow a bit about leading others. It is not like being a cashier at Rema1000 and just having a job. Teachers, priests and officers [292] should have a passion for other people (Interview).

Some also emphasized that social skills are particularly important in the Army and the Home Guard, compared to the Navy and Air Force. The argument being that people are the main tool in ground combat, while the main tools of the Navy and Air Force may require more technical skills:

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[290] As referred to in chapter three, Stouffer and his research team found that a major motivating factor as to why soldiers fought in combat was to keep their comrades and units safe and alive (Ryan, 2010). However, if the soldiers had no trust that the leader would *share their burdens*, their solidarity and willingness to fight decreased. Accordingly, primary group solidarity, loyalty and trust emerged as Tolstoy's factor X. This is often referred to as cohesion, which has been a field of research within military sociology since Stouffer's study was published (Ryan, 2010; Jacobsen & Krabberød, 2012) .

[291] This refers to the Danish lieutenant-colonel Kim Kristensen who was in charge of the Danish contingent in Helmand, Afghanistan in 2007-2008, and a seminar on professional identity held at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, February the 24th 2009. Kristiansen focused especially on the importance of a leadership embedded in care of the subordinates, which involved tough/hard training demands; thus, creating trust of the leadership among the soldiers. Lieutenant-colonel Kristensen's and his contingents' experiences in Helmand are portrayed in the book *I morgen angriper vi igjen [Tomorrow we will attack again]* by Kim Hundevdt (2009). Kristiansen's experiences came to be important in Denmark and Norway because he led the first Danish (Scandinavian) soldiers to take part in offensive war (Hundevadt, 2009).

[292] The officer refers here to the professions who are held up as important nation-building agents.

> OHQ: There is a difference between weapons and branches. The Army is working on
> the ground, so do the Home Guard. There are perhaps more people to lead in our units
> on the ground, in that people are the main tool; at least if you think of the maneuver
> and infantry units. While the Navy and Air Force, more roughly, have weapons
> platforms that require slightly higher technical skills, and do not have a human mass
> on the ground (Interview).

However, if an officer is to be accepted in the social fellowship it is required that he or she
will *contribute* where needed. "To contribute" was a frequently used phrase in the field, and
something which was seen as good attitude:

> I: What do you mean by good attitudes?
> MOAB: That they show that they want to contribute, and do what has been said
> without need of being repeated (Interview).

Lack of willingness to contribute and help out where needed was referred to as bad attitude
and dodging was then something which disqualified people from being accepted in the field.
One officer reported that dodging was a reason why an admitted candidate had been sent back
home:

> OAB: The last one[293] was sent out because of his attitude.
> I: What kind of attitude?
> OAB: He was a kind who did things only when we looked at him, and when we did
> not look at him he did not do his things. He did not bother to do anything when he
> thought we were not looking, even if we looked. He was dodging and seemed to be a
> bit of a fake (Interview).

In the Medical Battalion dissatisfaction was also expressed about having "eye-servers" in the
platoon, who did not meet the required standard when not watched over:

> OMB: There is no reason to hide that we have some "eye-servers" in the platoon?
> I: Eye-?
> OMB: Yes. When officers are present, things look very good. Once we're gone, it's not
> the same style (Interview).

In other words, to be accepted as a candidate with a good attitude he/she is required to do
whatever is expected and needed without being controlled. Some candidates, however,
reported that they thought their officers were failing to stand up as good examples when it
came to contributing and taking equal strain:

> MC: I think they [the officers in the platoon] are really all right most of the time. The
> power of example - there they are failing a bit sometimes.
> I: In what way?

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[293] The officer is explaining why they lost/sent home three candidates. The two others were due to medical reasons.

> MC: When we are out marching, then they might march without a backpack or with less backpack. They have different clothing. Stuff like that. Often they do not contribute in the polishing and maintenance of material. They just say: "Okay, now you do it, and then we come back in so and so many hours for control". But beyond that, they are really all right. They are very fair and stuff like that (Interview).

Moreover, some of the candidates did not appreciate the officers who placed themselves "on a throne" and looked down upon the candidates:

> MC: I am satisfied with two or three [of the officers in the candidate platoon]. The rest, I think are a little cocky […] We have someone who really sits on a throne and looks down on us, and it is quite difficult when we are totally new here and they have been in for years and take everything for granted because it comes to them naturally. But that demeans us when we do not get to do things right that are completely new to us. It gets a little discouraging. But we do have officers who manage to stay on our level, and I think that's very comfortable. We have respect for them (Interview).

In other words, some candidates also expect officers to contribute as a buddy and equal and "stay on their level", in accordance with what they have been taught through the phrases "first among equals" and "the power of example".

"To contribute" was also emphasized in relation to international operations to such a degree that it can be argued that international operations were framed in a discourse of contribution:

> I: Are you proud to be an officer?
> OHQ: Yes.
> I: Why?
> OHQ: Why? There's a bit of national feeling, that you contribute, that you are doing something important. For instance INTOPS, that we contribute to international reconciliation, at least the UN, support Norway (Interview).

Not being willing to take your part of the burden and contribute in international operations seemed to be unacceptable as far as the officers were concerned:

> OHQ: That they have not been out yet, I think is okay. It's not everyone who gets the opportunity. That they do not want to, however, that I think is completely wrong. If you work here, you have to be willing to contribute like everyone else does.
> I: What about officer candidates who do not want international service?
> OHQ: I also find that a bit wrong. If you choose a job here, then you select the entire package. You cannot just choose what you want. We are a small military today and then I think that everyone must be willing to pull the load together (Interview).

The willingness to contribute in international operations was also linked to the requirement to be committed to the job (cf. 7.1.1):

> OAB: I think that is weird [candidates wishing not to participate in international operations]. If you are to be an officer, you must in a way be prepared that you will need to travel and do the job that you are actually here to do. That is back to what I talked about earlier, about what it means to be a good officer and all that, you have to be – yes, committed to your job (Interview).

The latter officer also applied willingness to contribute in international operation to the candidates. Most argued, however, that the obligation to contribute in international operations did not apply to officer candidates. But, *if* they applied for further engagement in the Armed Forces, then they would need to accept the whole package and be willing to take their part of the strain:

> OHQ: You should be very careful to say [to candidates] that [if you do not want international operations] "then this is not for you", because that it is very categorical, it is very exclusionary. I think that this has to do with maturation […] but when they have finished [their duty service], they must make a decision. Then, if they seek further engagement in the military, they kind of accept the package […and] accept that you can be ordered out. When the unit is going, you must also take the strain (Interview).

One male officer was, however, very critical of international operations being framed in a discourse of "taking the burden". In a conversation that took place after the interview, the officer said:

> MO: It is many who say that they must go on operations abroad to take their share of the burden for king and country. And that also their wife who is left at home must take her share of the burden, and that she actually has the worst job. But, I do not believe any of this. They do not go abroad to take any burden or contribute to king and country, but to masturbate their own selves. They travel to cultivate their own ego through a career, and to see how far they can reach (Field notes, Joint Selection).

8.1.2 The Tractable and Conforming Candidate[294]

One of the leading officers at the Officer Candidate School's headquarters informed that they work actively with culture and attitudes, and that an important function of the selection is to test whether the candidates are adjustable and able to "swallow the culture" they seek to encourage:

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[294] The data that was coded under "Requiring tractability, conformity and submissiveness" differ from the rest of the data in that they were gathered only from leading officers who were working at the officer candidates school's headquarters and the chaplains. The data differ also in that the largest proportion of these data consist of field notes that summarized longer conversations where leading officers and chaplains explained to me how they worked with the officers in the battalions and the candidates, and what they emphasized in the general education and/or a certain subjects they were teaching. In sum, data under this code derives from two chaplains and three leading officers, from whom two also took part in formal interviews.

> OHQ1: We have a very high awareness about culture and attitudes. We work with
> culture, we build culture, and we try to insert in them the right attitudes. During the
> selection we consider whether they [the aspirants] will swallow the culture. If they
> will fit in, and if they are adjustable (Field notes, Joint Education).

Since the candidates will need to fit in and conform to the desired culture, they are required to
be tractable:

> OHQ2: As part of the culture – when they are admitted, and if they have leadership
> skills – we will discipline them and mold them. Either they are tractable or they will
> not conform to the culture. Those who do not conform to the culture, they will quit.
> Those who do conform to the culture and continue, they will evolve to become
> warriors. […] The best, hopefully, continue (Interview).

Moreover, it is expected that an officer will have a set of values that are within certain
parameters:

> OHQ3: But this is how it is in the military, we are in a box that we must stay within. If
> you go outside that box, you might get one chance to get into the box again. And if
> you do not want to be in that box, then there is no room for you in the military. For
> example if you are a bit to the right politically, if it turns out that you are a right-wing
> extreme and neo-Nazi, then you're outside the box. It's not accepted that an officer in
> the military has attitudes that some human races should be exterminated. We try to
> reveal this partly through the officer interview at Joint Selection. […] It may also be
> the case with attitudes toward gays. If you think that they should be shot and killed,
> then you are outside the box. If you think that it's okay to rape female soldiers in your
> squad, you are outside the box. But this is also true for teachers and priests. They are
> also expected to have a definite set of values that are within certain parameters. If you
> are a plumber and a neo-Nazi this is not a big deal, you can be a good plumber
> anyway [295]. He will probably not be fired (Interview).

Regarding the requirement to "stay inside the box", a chaplain who was giving lessons in
attitudes and ethics revealed that many candidates had attended the Officer Candidate School
to engage in a process of individual self-actualization. Thus, the chaplain found it necessary to
"tell the candidates that the military's aim is not to self-develop them, but on the contrary to
mold them and ensure that they would fight in a moral and acceptable way". The Chaplain
proceeded:

> "The military is a square-shaped box and our duty is to ensure that everybody is inside
> the box, and I say the same to the officers, because many officers disagree with the

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[295] Likewise, it is quoted in the doctrine that "a man can be false, superficial, false or corrupt in all areas and still be a brilliant
mathematician or the world's best painter. But there is one thing he cannot be, and that is a good soldier" (General Hacket I:
(FFOD 07)).

political leaders. But then I tell them that the Armed Forces are a political instrument and if they disagree with the politics, then it is them who will have to leave their job and not the politics that must change."[296] The Chaplain goes on to tell that he seeks to be as clear as possible with the candidates right from the beginning about what the Armed Forces is all about: "I tell them that their job will be to kill people, and I think it's very important that we are completely unmistakable and use the term kill straight out and straight forward." He says that "after the lesson in which it has been explained to the candidates that this is an education where you learn how to lead people to perform state-approved murder, then many go into the think-tank and wonder if this is what they really wanted." Moreover, the Chaplain reveals that the ideological basis for his education in ethics and attitudes is based on Clausewitz [cf. 3.2.2] and traditional warrior culture, as it is portrayed in the movie 300 with the famous quote: "Come back with your shield or on it"[297]. The chaplain explains that "this is the culture we will disseminate as a way of thinking that can protect the soldiers by them fighting in a moral way, because we care about the soldiers. This is how we work to avoid post-traumatic stress disorders" (Field notes, anonymized site).

The content in the quote "come back with your shield or on it", links martial discipline to primary group solidarity (cohesion) and loyalty to buddies in combat[298]. According to the Chaplain who was referring to French (2003), the warrior's code of honor restrains soldiers and protects them not only from becoming murderers (cf. 6.4) but also from coming home remorseful and shamed for having forsaken their buddies.

Meanwhile, there seemed to be a general agreement that an officer should exercise loyalty to his squad, there was, however, a discussion in the field regarding which larger culture the officer candidates should be influenced by, and where they should "hang up" their loyalty and identity. The discussion was related to the doctrine (FFOD 07) asking for the development of a common professional culture and identity with loyalty "hung up" in the officer corps, while the decentralized educational model resulted in candidates tying their identity and loyalty to

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[296] Similarly, chapter two referred to military-scholar Kvarving (2010) who claimed that the debate on uniformity versus diversity made it necessary to recall the overriding principle for the use of military force, referring to the doctrine which reads: "Application of military power is politics, and political objectives are always overreaching for a military operation or campaign" (FFOD 07, p. 30).

[297] The quote "Come back with your shield or on it" is also referred to in the prescribed text by French (2003) reviewed in chapter six (cf. 6.4). Regarding the quote, French (2003) writes: "Legend has it that when a Spartan mother sent her son off to war she would say to him, "Come back with your shield or on it." If a warrior came back without his shield, it meant that he had laid it down in order to break ranks and run from battle. He was supposed to use his shield to protect the man next to him in formation, so to abandon his shield was not only to be a coward but also to break faith with his comrades. To come back on his shield was to be carried back either wounded or dead. Thus the adage meant that the young warrior should fight bravely, maintain his martial discipline, and return with both his body and his honor intact. The warriors' mothers who spoke this line […] wanted their children to return with their sense of self-respect still with them, feeling justifiably proud of how they had performed under pressure, not tortured and destroyed by quilt and shame" (p. 117-118).

[298] In the debate on emerging warrior cultures, the Chief of Defence explained that fighting spirit for international operations could be achieved through systematic development of *a professional culture where self-esteem and self-respect rested on unwillingness to abandon comrades* (cf. 2.2.1).

the battalions in which they received their primary cultural influence and were molded[299,300].
In other words, the battalions had different cultures and developed different identities:

> OHQ2: And then there are very different cultures depending on which battalion they
> are admitted to […] When the gang from GSV[301] comes [to the HQ], we notice that
> these are the harsh outdoor guys. When the Armored Battalion arrives we will have a
> lot more testosterone in the classroom. They mold their candidates (Interview).

Accordingly, the Officer Candidate School was re-organized in 2013, so that the candidates
should have a 9 month joint education before specialization to services in the battalions.

8.1.3 The Skilled Instructor Who Cares Properly for the Equipment

As was quoted in chapter seven, a goal of the officer candidate education is for candidates to
become "damn good instructors" (Field notes, Joint Education). The candidates were thus
trained in pedagogics and instruction techniques, and being an instructor seemed to be the
most prominent function for the sergeants/second year candidates. In particular, the
candidates practiced how to teach the relatively standardized lessons in basic soldier skills,
which they themselves went through during initial training.

The instructor role was often linked to equipment due to a large proportion of military
practice being related to use, training, maintenance and control of equipment[302] (including
vehicles). During initial training candidates also learned how to classify and value the
equipment. For instance, on the very first day of the field exercise at Joint Selection the
aspirants went through several lessons on how to use, arrange and relate to the gear they had
been handed before they were sent out in the field[303]:

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[299] Some officers in the field were sceptical to the idea of molding all candidates to a common culture, and argued that
different services required different influence, mind-set and culture. For instance, in the Medical Battalion some argued that a
combat culture with infantry training as a common basis was partly irrelevant for service like medics; since medics are
supposed to be non-combatants and will sacrifice their protection under the Geneva Convention if they take part in offensive
combat or use offensive weapons. Other officers in the Medical Battalion, however, suggested that in today's wars the enemy
do not respect the law of war and target medics in particular. Thus, medics should be trained in offensive drills and weapons.
The US Marine Corps ideology was also referred to, 'Every man an infantry man', and it was argued that a medic should be
an infantry man first and a medic second. The debate in the medical service is part of two larger debates: 1) on how the
traditional and realism-based theories and laws on inter-governmental war have been insufficient in the face of internal, non-
governmental and civil war – like conflicts where the opponents do not follow the "code of conduct" (cf. 3.2.2) and, 2) which
priority and status should be given to respectively "the green service"/the military profession and the health and rescue
profession.
[300] The debate in the field seemed also to contain a clash between the egalitarian leadership role with loyalty to the
subordinates and the primary group which was promoted in the field, and a leadership model with the (higher) officer as a
manager of violence with loyalty to his superiors, as promoted by Huntington (cf. 3.2.1.1).
[301] Border guarding, reconnaissance/ ISTAR (The Garrison in Sør-Varanger/Kirkenes – The Russian Border)
[302] In chapter three, Huntington listed "organizing, equipping, and training of the force" as the first of three duties and
expertise that applied to the military officer (cf. 3.2.1.1).
[303] At Joint Education the candidates were trained to plan and conduct the lessons they took part at Joint Selection and Basic
Training/Drill School, such as the use of primus, personal weapon etc. They were also trained to plan and conduct lessons in
combat techniques, physical training etc.

Through different group lessons the aspirants are introduced to the equipment they have been handed to live in the field: the field boots, the field food-ration, the field cooking/heating stove, the tent, the field toilet etc. [...] Through the lessons the aspirants are taught how they are going to cook, eat the food, go to the bathroom, take care of hygiene and in which pattern they are supposed to sleep, [...] they are also told how their body will be affected by this; they will get "field fingers" and "field feet" [...] They are also told how they should relate to the different objects they are introduced to. For example the officer who gives the lessons on the use of a primus (cooking/heating stove) says: "This is a primus. You are going to love it. This will be your best friend, and if you want it to be your best friend you better handle it with love". The officer who introduces the fresh aspirants to the transportable field toilet says: "This is field toilet. It is called a BC. The letters stands for poop and carry and you are going to hate this thing". Another officer teaching the aspirants how to dismantle and assemble their weapon says: "It is very important that you become familiar with your weapon, and threat it like your lady" […] Some aspirants struggle to assemble the breechblock. The officers say: "This is a real man's arm, so you are allowed to be hard-handed. If you start to bleed you are allowed to baptize your weapon. Then you can smear a little blood on in and give it a name. Preferably a girl's name" (Field notes, Joint Selection, Phase Two).

The aspirants are taught that a squad leader's responsibility is to ensure that everyone on his team has control of their equipment, and thus they need themselves to have control of their own equipment (power of example). Group punishment and physical activities are used to teach the aspirants that it is a requirement to have control of their equipment:

It starts to rain. The aspirants' backpacks are lined up a bit away. The officer says: "double-quick, raincoats on – only jacket, no pants". The aspirants run off. When the first aspirants return back the officer shouts: "push-ups until the last man is back". The aspirants doing push-ups start to shout: "Hurry up!" "Come on!" When everybody's back they go on with the lesson. Yet, soon another officer comes over and interrupts: "Why are your backpacks open? Why are your backpacks not in line? Double-quick! Improve." The aspirants run off again. Those who return first are told to hold a plank, ready for push-ups. They start to shout: "Come one! Be quick!" When everybody's back push-ups start. While they are doing push-ups the officer starts the following conversation: "Number 321, why did you fetch your raincoat?", "Captain, aspirant 321, because it is raining", "Number 456, why was your backpack open if it is raining?", "Captain, aspirant 456, we are supposed to close the backpacks", "Number 247, what happens when your backpack is open in rain?", "Captain, number 247, everything gets wet" (Field notes, Joint Selection, Phase Two).

The aspirants were also taught that if one person lacks proper control of his equipment it is the whole squad's problem, and therefore that equipment control is alpha and omega:

We are on a march. An officer discovers that an aspirant is without his cap. The
aspirant is told to put it on, but he does not know where the cap is. It disappeared
during the break. The aspirants are yelled at and all the aspirants are told go through
their backpacks to see if they have the cap in their stuff. The officer says: "This is the
whole squad's problem, and if that cap is gone everybody needs to wear a helmet".
[...] "Now it's that cap, another time it's a weapon or anything that could get in the
hands of the enemy. Equipment control is alpha and omega. You must have control of
your equipment" (Field notes, Joint Selection, Phase Two).

In the Armored Battalion's garage named "The Stable"[304] there was a big sign on the wall
which described how the battalion's values are reflected in the Stable and the material in it.
The signs read:

In the Armored Battalion accuracy, focus on details and perfectionism is used to
describe our craft. This shall be reflected in our stable. During service in the Stable the
following points must be in accordance: [detailed list follows describing how tidiness,
system and control shall be conducted in the Stable] (Field notes, Service Education,
Armored Battalion).

As a candidate from the Armoured Battalion indicates, they soon learned to do as expected:

CAB: I had the expectation that the officers would be professional and teach us stuff
rather than making our everyday life suck. I am very, very happy. Because we soon
learned that if we do as we are told, then it is good. Then we can start on the education
rather than wasting our time with punishment. So, we understood (Interview).

Group punishment and group interdependencies meant that being scatter-brained and not
having control of your equipment was something that disqualified people from being
perceived as a good soldier.

I: Was there someone on your squad you thought right away would not be admitted?
FA: Yes, that was it. Some who were a bit scatter-brained (Interview).

The requirement to have systems and control over equipment was especially apparent in the
buddy evaluations and buddy rankings[305], in which the aspirants/candidates regularly took
part, where the words scatter-brained and dawdling were often used by aspirants/candidates to
justify why they ranked their buddies at the bottom or lower places in their personal ranking

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[304] The Armored Battalion's garage is called "The Stable" because of the now mechanized cavalry's historical origin as a unit
with horses.
[305] Buddy evaluations and buddy rankings were systematically used as a method for leadership development and
socialization. How the method was used varied however with the different officers' pedagogical skills.

list. Conversely, "she finishes first", "she has a system" and "she is punctual and tidy" were frequently used arguments for ranking women at the top of such lists[306].

8.1.4 "A Feedback Culture"

Just as the requirements in chapter seven could be summarized in the notion of performance culture, the regulation impositions can be summarized in a second cultural characteristic provided by actors in the field:

> MOAB: Another thing that helps to make us a good unit, it's the feedback culture
> which I know is special (Interview).

Several officers emphasized that the Norwegian Armed Forces have a very good system of personal development and leadership training in what they refer to as "the feedback culture". Yet, although the feedback culture results in development it also involves an imposition on self-discipline in order to improve in accordance with the expected standard:

> MOOB: I think we have a good system in the military, to ensure personal
> development of the individual in terms of service statements, feedback and such kinds
> of things, which also makes the sick rate go way down compared to civil society. You
> work to perform well, and in the military the individual also works independently to
> improve himself. That means self-discipline. And then I look at what we have in the
> battalion, the agreed values, […] we are always helping each other all the time to get
> better. We give each other constructive feedback. It's a feedback culture (Interview).

The feedback culture also involves correction of behavior:

> MOHQ: I imagine that we are good with people. I believe the biggest difference
> [between the military and civil society] is that we have a milieu that fosters people,
> that we are good with people. You work with people and you are constantly together
> with people, all the time. Working with them, you get feedback all the time. It is a
> very open culture to provide feedback, so that you get the possibility to correct
> yourself at all times. And the thing, working with people, it does something to you as
> a person. I think that's the biggest difference. There are of course exceptions, but as an
> organization we are good with people, we are good at taking care of each other. We
> are good at that because of the system we have (Interview).

"The feedback culture" requires personnel to be honest with each other and dare to tell others what they think:

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[306] Observations of the buddy rankings that took place in the field showed a *tendency* for women to be ranked either at the top, as the squad's mother/sister in control of equipment, systems and time, or at the bottom. In both cases women seemed to be considered as "something other" than the men who seemed to be ranked according to physical fitness and appearance. This applies to buddy rankings where the ranking criteria are "the best", thus opening up for comparison with the image of the ideal soldier. See Rones & Fasting (2013) and Rones & Hellum (2013).

> I: Must have good attitudes?
>
> MOHQ: Yes, as I said, a good attitude is that [...] you are honest; you dare to tell others what you think, even if it means unpopularity (Interview).

The feedback culture also requires people to tolerate feedback and without being over-vulnerable. Being over-vulnerable was seen as a particular challenge for women, who then had to learn not to take the feedback personally:

> FOHQ: And then it's a bit about how robust and touchy you are, I think. We [the women] are more vulnerable than men. And the women who are vulnerable, they do not have a good time. At my first year at the Military Academy, I was very touchy and took all the feedback very personally. It cannot be that way (Interview).

Chapter seven referred to an officer recently returned from Afghanistan who described how they had been "damn rough with each other" because they had a feedback culture where they "said straight out to each other that at this point you are not able enough, and at this point you need to improve" (cf. 7.1.1). Other officers also referred to developing a rough and honest feedback culture prior to international operations, through which they set clear expectations to each other's expected standard.

To sum up, in order to do an officer role appropriately in the local field investigated the candidates are required to have social skills and be able to build trust and respect with their subordinates (buddies), yet they should be loyal to their superior. Furthermore, an officer should have a passion for people, *contribute* where needed and take his/her share of the burden. The candidates must also be able to "swallow the culture", meaning they should be adjustable, tractable and conformable. It is also expected that an officer will have values within certain parameters, and that he/she will have the discipline to fight self-protectively in a way that maintains some ethical standards and does not forsake his/her buddies. Finally, it is alpha and omega that an officer has control of his/her equipment. The culture is described as a feedback culture in which buddy/colleague evaluation and buddy rankings emerge as an important pedagogical method that is used to correct behavior and mold the actors into the standard expected in the social fellowship[307].

Again, the dominant requirements found in interview and field notes resemble the official requirements expressed in management documents and prescribed texts. An exception is the requirement to take proper care of the equipment, something which according to Elias could mean that this requirement is not contested[308], and thus not necessary to mention in management document, nor talk about in interviews. Yet taking care of the equipment

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[307] Similarly, Sødergren (2012) finds that feedback and evaluation are a key part of the cadet's life at the Military Academy, and that feedback is actively used as a tool to provide social sanctions and correct behavior according to certain standards.
[308] In order to trace how a figuration changes over time, Elias suggests that one looks for power struggles and aspects which are contested. To do this he suggests comparing documents from different time periods. If an aspect is not mentioned it can be seen as either not yet important (before change), or established as a rule (after change), while aspects that are contested will be mentioned (Baur & Ernst, 2011).

emerged as a very important requirement in the field notes, which can mean that although it is a matter of course among established actors in the field, it has to be taught to new recruits.

However, according to the *National Curriculum* (2010), basic officer training is a mainstay in the professional military cultivation-project which has the vision of creating a strong military professional identity. The *National Curriculum* also supports that being an instructor/teacher is an important leadership function at a lower level and implies the tasks to "develop knowledge, skills and attitudes" and "educate and train subordinated personnel":

> Basic officer training (GBU) […] supports the Armed Forces' vision for education, which is to *create a strong military professional identity*. GBU is, in this context, *a mainstay in the professional military cultivation*[309]*-project* [...] GBU's overarching goal is to provide candidates with the best conditions to fill leadership functions and specialist functions at a lower level. This implies the following goals: To develop *knowledge, skills and attitudes* that are essential for the tactical level to work under demanding physical and mental conditions in the entire task-portfolio of the Armed Forces task portfolio, including: *To educate and train subordinated personnel*[310] [...] Particular emphasis is given to military leadership*, pedagogics* and development of a strong professional identity (National Curriculum, 2010, p. 2).

The responsibility for educating and molding subordinated personnel was also emphasized in the *Handbook for the foot squad in the field* that was used in lessons at Joint Education. The handbook opens with the text:

> The squad leader is *responsible for education* of soldiers with ability and willingness to kill the enemy and win the battle. In order to achieve this, the squad *leader must mold* his men to become physically tough and mentally robust soldiers […] When the squad is under fire, all attention is on the squad leader […] The squad leader must *by his personal behavior give the squad confidence* and faith in victory […] A squad leader will *never give himself the liberty he denies his solder. 'First among equals' summarizes the squad leader's leadership role* (The Army, 2010, p. 9).

In the *Guidelines to the Selection Officers at Joint Selection*, maturity, reflectivity, discipline, respect, honesty, reliability, sociability, selflessness, as well as behavior and contribution as a member on a squad are listed as examples of good attitude (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a). In the doctrine the moral dimension is related to combat being *a battle on the symbolic violence* (battle between wills) which according to Bourdieu constitutes the form of collective belief that structures the whole of social life (cf. 4.3.5). From this it follows that *ethical values, the will to succeed and strong cohesion* are essential in professional identity;

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[309] In Norwegian: Dannelse, in German: Bildung

[310] "To educate and train subordinated personnel" are listed as the first task. The next is "To be in command and lead troops in own unit", " To take responsibility and care for the personnel", "To display initiative and vigor to solve imposed missions in line with the higher commanders' intention."

something which summarizes the findings described in chapters six, seven and eight respectively:

> *The moral dimension is related to combat being a battle of wills*, and that those who most strongly affirm their will and unity achieve progress. The moral dimension encompasses the values and actions that govern this, and the ethical anchors that will help to act appropriately in challenging situations. This dimension is very important and means that the *will to succeed, strong cohesion and ethical values are essential in our professional identity* (FFOD 07, p. 158).

From stating that the military profession is a collective where those who most strongly affirm their unity will achieve progress, the doctrine holds further that "attitudes and actions that help to strengthen the cohesion are crucial" (FFOD 07, p. 159). Thus, it is also emphasized that values and attitudes that weaken the military unity are unacceptable:

> Unlike many other professions, we cannot exercise our profession alone - it makes sense only when we exercise it jointly. This means that the values and attitudes that strengthen our unity, such *as companionship, loyalty and self-sacrifice*, are essential, and that the values and attitudes that weaken our unity are unacceptable (FFOD 07, p. 160).

In *Goals and guidelines for leadership development at the Army's Officer Candidate School* it is written that this document "guides the planned leadership at the schools [...] In addition, an important socialization toward the milieu and the culture will take place that shall characterize the Army units" (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. b, p. foreword). It is further explained that reflection is necessary to link lessons from practice to the school's leadership development. The Army document *Basic view on leadership* explains that people are motivated by feedback, and that an officer needs to work with himself in order for it to become natural to give both criticism and praise (The Army's competence center for management and education, n.d., p. 7). The officers and chaplain(s) referred to above have a conscious relationship to cultural development and socialization of candidates. Where the power of example seemed to be an important pedagogical method used to encourage the candidates to embody powered resources (cf. 7.1.3), *personal feedback from officers and buddies seemed to be an important method used to correct the candidates' behavior and socialize them into the standards and norms accepted in the social fellowship[311], or in the primary group to which they were tied.*

The way in which the aforementioned management documents and the opinions expressed by actors at the local sites correspond shows that it is not always the individuals who are speaking, but rather the dominant discourse that speaks through them. This means that opinions and value systems produced at extra-local sites in the past and present have been

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[311] Chapter two referred to Ydstebø (2010) who argued that the narrow task force, which is the result of a deliberate and politically driven transformation, is dependent on a socialization process where individual traits will be socialized into the standards and "norms accepted in the fellowship" (p. 132).

incorporated into their habitus through, for instance, pedagogical actions and reading of the management documents, which *makes it possible to create a network that speaks and acts as one unit* (cf. 5.1.2.1).

8.2   Adaption Issues

This part of the chapter will explore how different actors in the field experience and respond to the professional socialization-/cultivation-process which is supposed to mold the candidates into an appropriate officer role. Issues of conformity, resistance, adaption and identity will be focused on in more detail under the headlines 1) development and self-satisfaction, 2) discipline, disrespect and resistance, 3) receiving and providing personal feedback, and 4) identity, gender and equipment. Responses to the requirements to contribute in international operations and conform to the culture will be looked at in chapter nine, since these are also answers to macro-level requirements. The results will then be interpreted together at the end of chapter nine.

8.2.1   Development and Self-Satisfaction

Under the headline *The Tractable and Conforming Candidate* we saw leading actors in the field argue that the military was not about individual self-development and self-actualization, but about discipline and molding into certain standards, attitudes and values. Likewise, in chapter two we referred to Heier (2010) who suggested that the citizen's desire for self-development, individual freedom of choice and co-determination challenged the military organization's requirements of discipline, cohesion, loyalty, obedience and subordination.

Yet, a large proportion of the interviewees perceived the practice they engaged in as personal development[312]. In chapter seven it was illustrated how the candidates experienced self-satisfaction and self-development from testing their physical and mental limits. The experience of personal development was also derived from learning how other people perceived them, referring to getting feedback:

> MCMB: [The school year] has been incredibly educational. Very demanding on many
> different levels. But all in all, a very educational experience […] You learn a lot about
> yourself, your limits, how far you can squeeze yourself. And at the same time how
> other people perceive you, and how you perceive yourself in these situations too
> (Interview).

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[312]Sasson-Levy (2008) has previously argued that the military's bodily practices, which are constituted of the two opposing regimes of discipline/self-control and challenges/thrill, presents *military practice as a fulfilling self-actualization where soldiers can ignore the political and moral meanings of their actions* (cf. 3.3.1 and 3.3.4). It can also be argued that *an individualized interpretation frame of* military practice is promoted by what Høiback (2010) refers to as Antoine-Henri Jomini's *methodological isolation of war from its political and social context, 'turning warfare into a huge game of chess'"* (p. 89) (or sport, as suggested by Creveld). Yet, in the case of the Norwegian Armed Forces one should not ignore the fact that for most of the time the military has been/ is a peacetime organization where *education and training dominate the practice*. Thus, the *role of the teacher/student seems to be more prominent than the role of the warrior*.

In addition several male officers[313] reported enjoying their job because they had a passion for other people and got personal *self-satisfaction from working with development of others*:

> MOHQ: I think the work here at "Joint Selection" is really joyful. I love to follow the development of people – or officer candidates in this case. And the opportunity to be in it from the start [...] Being allowed to be involved in the selection: to join the field exercise and guide them, and to see how people who have never met each other, in ten minutes, they work together and in the course of two days they know things about each other that nobody else knows. It is very rewarding. I get really geared up and happy just talking about it now. I live for it (Interview).

The officer quoted had just started in a new position and was generally more excited about the job than the rest of the officers. However, educating people was also referred to as a reason to continue in the job by officers who had worked with candidate education for a while:

> I: Why did you continue?
> MOAB: Mostly because I find it fun. I think it's fun to work with people and educate people. Be with them and see how they change as people. See young people who become adults (Interview).

Several of the male officers also said that seeing development in others was the most exciting part of their job:

> MOHQ: Well, most exciting, really, is to see the development of people: from the arrival to them leaving .You get some satisfaction from it (Interview).

Furthermore, an officer who had initially been sceptical of working in candidate education found it so rewarding to be part of the development of a new generation of combat vehicle commanders that he was almost regretful not to be continuing in the job:

> MOAB: So, it takes time to train officer candidates. And I feel for myself that it is a bit personal. It's something I've helped to create. It takes time to install attitudes and make them skilful [...] And I think we have managed to create the best we could have done from what we had [...] Maybe, I said it the last time as well, but I was very negative about taking this job, in the beginning. Then, I was more tempted by other things. This is really a lot of work – *really a lot of work!* […] and I dreaded it. […] But being an instructor has been – when I see it now when it comes to the end, it is almost a shame that I will not be part of it next year. Because many times its crap, but it's also fun, and when you can *see* that there has been a development, that the candidates have become skilful. That's a good feeling. As I have said to my candidates, [...] the only reason why we [the officers] are here is so you will become

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[313] Only male officers said that development of others was an important job motivation. The female officers seemed to be more driven by performance and prowess, while the male officers had more varied reasons for working in the military.

skilful. If they don't pass the examination, I've done a bad job. Everything stands and falls with them. Being allowed to contribute to developing the next generation of combat vehicle commanders, being responsible for that – that is *great fun*! In retrospect, one forgets the dull periods, because, really, it has been fun (Interview).

The male officers who were excited by working with the development of people also seemed to be quite popular among the candidates, who experienced that the officers cared for their development and wanted to make them the best:

CAB: [My officers] could not have been better, I think. I do not have much to compare with. I have some impressions, what others have said about their officers. But I'm very happy with our officers. They are diverse, they are strict, but they are people. You can chat with them; you can joke with them, while all the time you know what demands they make. And even if you have a unruly tone, so we know all the time that we cannot be too relaxed, although we are mates with them. And they are strict. We notice that they want the best for us; they will do us good and want to make us great. One can see that they also get great pleasure teaching us what they are doing. And it's an insane motivation to see that (Interview).

8.2.2 Discipline, Disrespect and Resistance

While many interviewees attended the Officer Candidate School for reasons of testing their limits and engaging in self-development, several interviewees were also attracted to the military because they were adherent to structure, order and discipline:

MCMB: It might have something with…say discipline and stuff; I do not have anything against it. I'm really big fan of it (Interview).

Structure, routines and discipline was also emphasized as a reason why some of the interviewees found that they fitted into the military and liked it there:

FO: When I was admitted the system suited me very well. Structure and discipline (Interview).

Being a tidy and orderly[314] person was referred to as an advantage that aided success at the Officer Candidate School:

MCAB: I'm a perfectionist by nature. Simply because I have a strict father, strict in the sense that – he is incredibly nice, don't get me wrong, – but things shall be kept in order. The house is clinically clean at all times, and it has been like I do not like to have disorder around me. I can have mess around me when I'm into things, but once I see it or notice it, then, I start to tidy up. It may well be that I do not notice it, even. I like to fix the little things. Except noticing it myself I can go around and straighten up

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[314] On the contrary, being scatter-brained, dawdling and unorderly was seen as a disadvantage (cf. 8.1.3).

the chairs, without thinking about it. So I may have the advantage that I'm an orderly
person (Interview).

Some were also a bit disappointed that the military was not as organized and structured as
expected:

> MCMB: I think the milieu [among the officers] is quite embarrassing because of how
> long the simplest things can take, and how many counter-messages there are […] I
> find it a bit boring to see that there is so little structure (Interview).

Some of the candidates had also expected to go through more episodes of push-ups, re-
cleaning of rooms and other types of disciplinal punishment than they did:

> FC: The first weeks were a bit like: Are we not going to do any more re-cleaning? Are
> we not going to do any more push-ups? I thought it would be like that all the time. But
> the officers said they were concerned with our learning since we had a lot we needed
> to learn. So then they had to skip all that re-cleaning, but it must be practically clean.
> So it is not that way. The conscripts are pestered much more with this than we are, the
> kind of unnecessary things, just to wear them out (Interview).

Several candidates without previous military experience said that the conscripts had to go
through more punishment and were 'pestered' more often than the officer candidates. Still,
the candidates who *had* previous military experience as conscripts[315] seemed to be those who
struggled the most to accustom to the disciplinary requirements at Officer Candidate
School[316]. In particular, two of the former conscripts experienced that Officer Candidate
School involved a constant correction of their bodily behavior, how they should dress, stand,
talk and walk:

> C[317]: There are so many strict requirements about how we should behave, because they
> are watching everything we do somehow, no matter what. That, I find a bit stressful. It
> becomes too much to think of all the time.
> I: What do you mean with requirements to your behavior?
> C: Well, it is everything from how we must stand and talk, to how we must walk from
> the barracks to the mess hall. We will hear that "you did not walk in two rows". Its
> things like that, little things. You have to be switched on all the time.
> I: Was it not the same when you were a conscript?
> C: It was like that in the beginning, but eventually it faded a bit. So, it was really
> relaxed and fun. While now it is like one hundred percent focus. So it was partially a

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[315] An impression from the data material is that those who had background as conscripts differed from the others, both among
the candidates and among the officers. In particular it seems like they were less driven by competition and performance need.
[316] All the previous conscripts had chosen to attend the officer candidate school because they had a "really great time" in
previous military service as conscript.
[317] Gender and battalion is anonymized due to the small number of candidates with previous military experience (n= 3 female
and 2 male). One female had additional experience as enlisted.

transition that sucked […] I believe that when we were conscripts there were somehow not such strict requirements for us […] While now they lay the foundation for the position we will have next year, so it is very important that we do well and behave properly […] But no, I behaved fine last year so it's really not a very big difference, but we have been scrutinized about that bit many times now, I think. A lot of bother (Interview).

A female *officer*[318] with military experience prior to her officer education also thought that the Officer Candidate School set strict requirements to the aspirants'/candidates' "style":

> FO: One thing that I find strange [with military culture] is for instance when one of my aspirants asked if she could turn her field cap backwards because then it held her hair away from her face while they were working, I did not think much of it, just said that of course she could do that. Then there were some [officers] who called attention to that afterwards at the platoon leader meeting. "One at your squad had their cap backwards." And – ha-ha – so they laughed about that. So, I said quite seriously "Are you not allowed to have the cap backwards?" And they all just: "Oa - ha-ha, you are kidding, right?" They think that is really crazy, you see. Because there is no logical reason for why it's crazy, it's just that it's a culture where it has become that you need to have your cap on the right way […] I did not bother to take it [the cap] any longer, so I just thought "they can laugh, but I stand on mine". Had it been up to me they could have worn their cap backwards, in the field of course. It's something else when you stand on a parade or are going to represent or anything like that, but when you are out in the field and are about to raise a tent and stand on your head, that was what it was about (Interview).

Other reasons why the previous conscripts struggled to adapt were 1) lack of respect, 2) loss of freedom and, 3) repetition. All these factors are present in the below quote from a candidate who, like the candidate above, experienced attending the candidate school as a transition, or re-adjustment "that sucked":

> C: I miss the respect, the common respect. It was somewhat expected, because I knew it was going to happen, but it is a bit unusual, and strange. But it has also become a bit as expected, so there are some things that just…yes, it sucks a bit, then.
> I: What is it that sucks?
> C: First and foremost, because there are so many nineteen year olds. There is very much repetition [...] It's not like it was. I lack freedom. That is difficult, really, very readjusting. It is as if you were going back again. After working for many years and then coming back and being whipped around. Pretty stiff, but… (Interview).

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[318] This was the only female officer who did not say she had chosen to be an officer due to prowess, see footnote 275.

Loss of freedom was also experience as an adaption challenge by some of the candidates who had no previous military experience. This was observed by an officer who described how spare time is taken away from candidates in order for them to become disciplined:

> OHQ: People [new candidates] are surprised constantly: "What? We must work til eight every night, maybe nine, maybe ten!?" They lose their own choices for almost half a year, many of them. Spare time is taken away from them and they are disciplined to do both one thing and the other (Interview).

Regarding respect, it has been shown that candidates did not appreciate officers who placed themselves "on a throne" and looked down upon them, particularly in view of requirements of having an egalitarian leadership style. Candidates expected officers to "stay on their level" and treat them in accordance with what they had been taught through the phrases "first among equals". One of the female aspirants also had an ambivalent experience of the military after Joint Selection, indicating that some officers who were very much molded by the military thought they were better than others:

> FA: In some ways it is great, and I think that this is something I want. But sometimes I think "oh my God, this is just nonsense." It is a bit difficult. The guy I had as a selection officer [in phase two] was a great type who could simultaneously be human and talk to you properly and treat you with respect, but could also say "come on, now you have to hurry". While some others [officers] you meet seem like they have been in the military for a long time and are too adhered to the system that exists and have been completely… I do not know what to say… who see themselves as much higher than others because they have a star or more. It is a bit like "what the heck is this? You're as much a human as I am!" […] I've heard several who say that the military is completely psycho and that one must avoid staying there for too long. Make sure you keep one foot in the outside […] because, yeah, you can be very affected and locked in, you become too molded (Interview).

However, for the candidates who had already served as conscripts the adaption issues and the lack of respect they experienced seemed to stem from a disregard for their previously accumulated military capital, skills and competence. All candidates were treated as equals independent of previous experience and, thus, had to go through the same basic education and drills. From the quote below it can be claimed that the former conscripts experienced the drill school and disciplinary process as being below his/her level and age:

> C: What I've liked the least? It was really the whole drill school, then. The worst of all was the repetition […] all the nonsense really […] it was a bit like "oh, I see!" It's too much double spoon feeding. Plus the fact that you have the freedom thing – you have to be inside the camp, you must be in bed at eleven. I find it a bit comical to be 2X years and not allowed to decide for myself when I am going to bed. That's what I thought was awful (Interview).

The quote below reveals, however, another reason that former conscripts struggled to adapt was that the buddies who had made their previous service such a great time were gone. Thus the drill school became a combination of the traditional mentally demanding 'bother' all new recruits needed to go through, repetition below their experienced level and sorrow over lost buddies:

> C: It [the drill school] was awful. Oh dear! When I came in and everyone was completely new and I somehow – Ohu! Am I going through all that again in the drill school? It was absolutely awful, simply. Absolutely horrible, it was. I was really demotivated in the beginning. I just wanted to go home. The new people I was with was nothing compared to those I had been with before […] But now I've got to know them and they are the great. But in the beginning it was hard […] None of my buddies were there – no, it was absolutely horrible. Then I spent a few hours with the chaplain, who helped a lot. Because, I started to cry on a parade, at the barrack square. It was that bad. I stood there in front of the entire company and only – uhuh! But now I really thrive. Because now we have started with the things that have to do with leadership development, and that is something I have not experienced before. So then it becomes more interesting [but, until now it has only been repetition]. That is boring. But that chaplain said that all those who had been conscripts first and went to Officer Candidate School, were in the same situation as me. They all felt like that. So it was certainly understandable. But for a long time I considered quitting (Interview).

Although this conscript had negative experiences at the candidates' drill school, she/he experienced that the officers present treated them with more respect than the sergeant at the drill school he/she went through as a conscript had done:

> C: As conscripts we had had some duty sergeants [second year candidates] and they were really cocky. They were absolutely horrible. But here I notice that the officers are much more professional, they have a little more tranquillity in their job compared to the duty sergeants. And I notice now. Those who went to the candidate school last year are sergeants now, and when I see them around here it is absolutely horrible! I will certainly not be like that! I've been through it before and I know what it's like to have that kind of a duty sergeant. So I know how I will not become […] There are some who will sit up there and denigrate the soldiers. I think that is completely wrong. It is possible to gain respect by lowering yourself a bit too, and speaking in a normal language instead of standing there yelling and screaming. Crisis. Ugh! (Interview).

Some former conscripts also claimed that all the officer candidates should have served as conscripts first, because then they would know what it is like to be on the other side and what kind of sergeant you should *not* become, as stated by the candidate above.

8.2.3   Receiving and Providing Personal Feedback

At the end of the school year interviewed candidates experienced that they had developed as a result of strict requirements and direct personal feedback:

FCOB: I have gained quite a lot. You develop quite a lot in such a situation. Actually, mainly because more is required from you, in a completely different way than it is at home where there are others who perhaps will fix things for you. You get much more direct feedback if you are not good enough (Interview).

The feedback system was part of the professional cultivation process and involved direct feedback from both the officer and buddies in an open group setting:

MOHQ: They [the candidates] get some personal feedback, which results in them having to work with themselves. In the professional cultivation[319] they get feedback from both their officer and their buddies, such as "you are perceived as an arrogant person and that results in us having no trust in you" (Interview).

Some experienced a great benefit from the buddy evaluations. A reason being that they learned about others' impression of them:

MCAB: You learn so insanely much from it, because you get to see other people's impression of yourself. So I have benefited greatly from such evaluations (Interview).

With knowledge of what others thought they should change about themselves, some candidates experienced being given an opportunity to develop:

MCMB: I think it's a very nice thing to do, since you are here to develop yourself. And the buddy evaluation is what makes you develop. It may be that there are some things I know about myself that maybe I should change, but I need to know it from others to be sure. However, it is also the things I don't know about myself that they can make me aware of. This will make me see it in a different light and I can develop in these areas (Interview).

The buddy evaluations were also experienced as being both "the good and the evil". If you had not performed well it was not fun to receive the feedback. It could also be uncomfortable if your self-impression was not in accordance with that of the others. Yet, with some distance from such events it was seen as a useful tool for self-development:

FCOB: [The buddy evaluation] is very helpful, really. But, it's a bit the good and the evil. If you have not done well, then it's no fun to hear it. Or, if you think you have done well and the others do not completely agree. But then it's more important to hear it. It can be quite uncomfortable when you sit there, afterwards. But when you get some distance and are able to see the overall picture, then it is a very useful tool to develop yourself (Interview).

Getting direct feedback could, accordingly, result in a whole spectrum of emotions from acceptance to tears and denial:

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[319] The Norwegian word used is dannelse; in German, bildung.

MCMB: There are some who embrace it, others begin to cry, and some just laugh and deny it. But most take it, and try to do what they can to improve (Interview).

Some others began to argue about the feedback:

MCAB: There are some who begin to argue a bit, but it's completely natural, I think, when you get the pepper.
I: Why do they begin to argue?
MCAB: Nooo – they perhaps agree, they know it, but they don't want to show it. Or they feel they are treated unfairly (Interview).

One candidate believed it was difficult for people to receive feedback when things they already knew about themselves, and struggled hard to improve, were given repeated attention. It could also be difficult if they were disappointed in themselves:

MCMB: I think it might be [challenging to receive feedback] when it is things about them that they already know and are struggling with; which they think are very hard. And when they are told it once again, that they have to work on it, then I think it gets harder and harder to absorb. Because they are aware of it but they are struggling to do something about it […] Or perhaps, they are disappointed in themselves, or may not have expected the critique at all. But it's kind of a good thing anyway, because they do learn a bit from it – that's the way I perceive it. I think it is a very good way to open up a bit of the hidden side of yourself (Interview).

Some said they had to learn to not be offended and take the feedback as a personal attack:

FCOB: In the beginning it was quite uncomfortable, but after a while you see things differently. And then it's okay, actually […] You realize that it's not a personal attack, and you learn not be offended. You realize that they actually say it for your own sake, that it is a tool for you, not an attack on you (Interview).

Some also experienced receiving feedback and being obliged to change oneself as one of the biggest challenges of the officer candidate education:

FSYCMB: [The hardest part at the Officer Candidate School has been] the performance pressure and getting feedback, and actually being obliged to change a bit how you look at things and how you do things. That has been a challenge […] When you get feedback about how you are, how you appear to others. To take it as feedback and not a criticism, and to go into yourself and change things you are used to doing, and how you appear to others. It is quite hard to hear sometimes (Interview).

Several said that the women started to cry more easily when they received feedback. The crying was not, however, seen as a problem as long as the feedback was taken into account:

MCMB: The women start to cry easier.

I: What do you think about that?

MCMB: No, that's no problem. It's a constructive thing, but they must be able to take it into account without becoming totally crazy, in that respect. They may well shed some tears, but they must be ready to take the evaluation into account in a proper way (Interview).

The officer below also believed that in general women take feedback more personally. Yet, he had also an impression that women received harsher and more brutal feedback than the men:

MOHQ: Well, I think, that women might get it more brutal, without me being able to prove the claim that they get harsher feedback than the guys. And I think maybe that the women take it harder on themselves than the guys do. But I cannot prove it beyond the impression I have from talking to the sergeants these past three weeks. The guys may have a greater tendency – it seems to me – to just throw it over their shoulders. "We go on. This I have to work with." Women take it more personally, but I can't demonstrate it with plenty of examples. In both the group works I had [in module 3], the women were also very open about things. That is also a difference between the guys and the women (Interview).

The buddy evaluations also required the candidates to be honest with each other and dare to tell their buddies about their impressions of each other. One candidate argued that it was okay to evaluate buddies as long as they realized the feedback was for their own good. It was also an advantage if the feedback could be linked to concrete examples:

MCAB: I think it is okay, as long as they are aware that I do it to be nice and not to be an asshole. Because then I say that I have been given the impression through an exercise or a scenario, and then they can take a lesson from it. As long as it's like that, it is good […] we often start by saying that this is for your own good, and there is no one who does not like you if they say this and that (Interview).

Some thought, however, that it was difficult and sometimes uncomfortable to provide direct feedback to the others. They needed to overcome the feelings that would usually restrain them from expressing their thoughts on others, and develop a professional relationship to providing feedback:

FCOB: I find it a bit difficult. It is not always so comfortable to say it to them. It is important to have a professional relationship with it and not to see it as a thing between buddies thing, but a thing between colleagues (Interview).

Some said that it took some time to develop the courage to go straight to the core and say exactly what they meant about the others:

MCMB: It's a little exciting, then. You are supposed to say your personal opinion about the person, whether it is positive or negative. But it's an important part. Daring

to say what you actually think is very important (Interview).

I: Do you dare to say what you mean?

MCMB: Yes. I dare to say what I think about a person, in a concrete way, but I must say that it took some time before I had built up the ability to dare go to the core and say exactly how I feel about a person (Interview).

It seems as though the feedback system resulted in a disinhibition process[320], whereby the candidates pulled down the social convention they had embodied in habitus through previous socialization. As this candidate said, she noticed that she had extended her social comfort zone and could now tell her friends at home things she could never have said before:

FCMB: [The education has been] very good. Challenging. Informative. You get out of your comfort zone. That's what it's all about when you are about to grow, you have to go somewhere where you are really not comfortable, but you have to solve the situation. This makes you extend your comfort zone. And I notice a great extension even in the things I say home. Things I never in the world would have said to my friends before, now I can say it without a problem, and I say what I mean like: "Listen to yourself! This is stupid!" (Interview).

8.2.4   Identity, Gender and Equipment

Considering the doctrine's request to develop a common professional culture and identity, the results of the present study indicate that *different identities cohere around the different objects and equipment that battalions and units are dedicated to using*: their specific professional skills – what they can do. As explained in chapter four, a culture is characterized by some degree of consensus between the members of that culture about how to classify and value things and persons in order to maintain some social order (cf. 4.1.2). The Armored Battalion's culture and identity were characterized by the vehicles they used, which were classified as powerful, aggressive, and brutal. Thus, the battalion attracted people who identified themselves with these categories, as shown below by a female aspirant who struggled to appear tough:

FA: I aim for the Armored Battalion.

I: Why do you think that will be suitable for you?

FA: I think that it is the aggressive line. In the front, a lot of big and brutal stuff, forceful and something like that. It seems to be the heavy stuff that fascinates me.

I: Why are you fascinated by that?

FA: I've always been fascinated by big powers. I have a buddy who has been an officer in the Armored Battalion and he has shown me some movies and we've talked

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[320] In his study on *Cultural Aspects of the Military Profession,* Kjellberg (1965) notes that "teaching might also be looked upon as a "negative" process: it does not involve exclusively a positive transmittance of learning, but also a *more or less systematic eradication of former attitudes and habits.* To some extent teaching will always be a question of both, but the negative aspects are likely to be more prominent in military training, since it aims at teaching people to act under circumstances that deviate fundamentally from the normal. This might create the necessity to impart new habits that go beyond mere skill, and are conveyed through a special style of behavior" (p. 287).

a lot about the vehicles. It's so big and brutal that you almost cannot imagine (Interview).

Several male candidates said they chose the Armored Battalion because it was the most popular battalion. The popularity of the battalion was linked to it having the "best toys":

MCAB: The Armored Battalion was the most popular service because of the vehicles (Interview).

MCAB: It is the Army who has the best toys! It is a bit like that. The Air Force – I thought a bit of becoming a helicopter pilot, but […] in the end it was the bit about the toys [in the Armored Battalion]. Big toys and engines and vehicles are great (Interview).

The Armored Battalion's vehicles were certainly classified as masculine, as shown in this statement recorded at Cold Response:

We had been in position with several CV90s overnight. They are about to leave and are testing their tower, swinging it around. One vehicle lifts up its cannon. One of the guys watching says: "Look at him. He is getting an erection" (Field notes, Cold Response).

Within the Armored Battalion there were different status, identity and culture linked to the three different services: Leopard-squad, CV90-squad and foot-squad:

OAB: I think there is a difference between the CV90-squads, the foot-squads and the Leopard-squads. The Leopard culture is that you have a personal relationship with your tank. It's your tank, your responsibility, and it will be in the best possible condition because it says something about you. We have a very strong focus on you and your equipment, because you have a personal relationship to it. And this is cultivated.
I: Is it not cultivated in the CV90-squads?
OAB: At least I understand it this way – that they are a bit slacker with that. I'm not saying that they are poorer, but I sense, at least in their attitudes: "Well, it's only four vehicles." Meanwhile for me it's a little bit more. But that's just what I am used to (Interview).

According to a candidate in a Leopard-squad, the different status between the Leopard and CV90-squads was linked to differences in the power of the cannon and speed with which they operated:

MCAB: It's pretty much your vehicle. No one will come and destroy anything on your vehicle. If someone borrows it and there is some nonsense, then you will be pissed. You really get a proprietary relationship to it. It's like the fifth member of the squad.
I: Do you experience a difference in status of being on a CV90 compared to a

Leopard?

MCAB: For me, who is on a Leopard, it is experienced as higher status to be on a
Leopard. In CV90 it is perceived as higher status to be on a CV90.

I: Why?

MCAB: Nooo – the Leopard is bigger and stronger and tougher, so I think it is
awesome. CV90 I think of it more like a big penis extender. We do not need them so
much. But they will go: "We do not need bigger cannons because we are so good
anyway." We have the biggest cannon so we have more power.

I: Why do they believe that CV90 is better than Leopard?

MCAB: It's the way they operate. They operate much faster than us, in a way. They
are not in one position for any length of time; they shoot more often, with less power,
but more often (Interview).

According to one of the officers, the Armored Battalion was perceived as macho and boastful
because it was hard to arrive somewhere with a heavy tank without taking up space, yet he
believed it was still possible to be a humble person:

MOAB: We are certainly perceived as a bit boastful.

I: By others?

MOAB: Yes. "Here we come", sort of thing. It's hard to come up with a heavy tank
and not to say "here I come". It takes up so much space anyway. But it is still possible
to be a humble person, even if you have a macho-culture and are perceived that way
(Interview).

At the end of the school year the candidates were to be distributed to different job positions
for their duty-service as sergeants. According to candidates in the Medical Battalion the
position that had the highest status for a medical sergeant was in the Armored Battalion, since
that would be a position in a "proper vehicle":

I: Are there any of the positions [you can apply to] that have higher status than the
others?

FCMB: Yes.

I: What kinds of positions have highest status?

FCMB: The Armored Battalion. Very many want to go the Armored Battalion, but
many want also to stay in the Medical Battalion. Stay in the Brigade.

I: Why does the Armored Battalion have the highest status?

FCMB: Actually I do not know. It is armored and it is a maneuvre unit, not least, a
maneuvre unit, you will be in a vehicle, a proper vehicle, at the front […] you will be
on caterpillar, out in the terrain, in the front (Interview).

In the Medical Battalion the equipment was also gendered, yet they had boy things and girl
things which resulted in a gendered division of labor:

I: Do everybody contribute during maintenance?

OMB: Yes. But there are some that do very much more than others. If we take periodic control of vehicles, for example, then there are some who are more interested in that, while others are more interested in the medical equipment, while there are some who are not so interested at all and slip through. […]

I: Who will take responsibility for the medical equipment?

OMB: Usually the girls. It's like boy toys and girl toys (Interview).

According to a female candidate they had a gendered division of labor where women took care of the medical equipment while the men took care of the vehicles, but this was not because of gender, she argued. She tried to explain that it was due to the men being more interested in the vehicles and managed to take care of them in a shorter time, while the women were quicker with the medical equipment. This mirrors Bourdieu's (1998) argument that the gendered division of labor is inscribed in the objects themselves, in that objects are assigned to different positions within the culture's classification system which is simultaneously a value system. Thus, through processes of identification and dis-identification with the classification of the objects "the division of the sexes appeared to be 'in the order of things'" (p. 8), Bourdieu argues, and, what's more, the division is accordingly perceived as normal, natural and even inevitable:

I: What are you going to do now?

FCMB: Maintenance […]

I: How do you do the maintenance?

FCMB: Usually, we have some who take care of the vehicles and some who take care of the medical equipment.

I: How do you decide who does what?

FCMB: It depends on what people want. Everybody can manage everything. But it's often that the guys really want to take care of the vehicles and we girls… "yes, here you are." It doesn't matter. As long as everything is done, then – it is a bit about time pressure too. If you know that the guys maintain the car in 30 minutes and two girls will spend maybe an hour, and the guys will spend maybe an hour on the medical equipment, for example […] So, it is a bit about what works best, what is the most effective [...]

I: So, it is distributed on the basis of gender?

FCMB: No, not *because* of it. There are many girls who can take care of the vehicles. But often the guys are a little more interested in it, and they want to do the vehicles. But lately several guys have come over and said: "Can't we do the medical equipment now?" – "Yes, yes, here you are". It's the all the same as long as everything is done (Interview).

The fact that the guys came over and asked the women "can't we do the medical equipment now?" shows that the medical equipment is the women's domain and the area where they are in power. To explore this topic further I will provide a story from the research diary I wrote throughout my own service in the Home Guard Rapid Reaction Force, during the year of field

work at the Officer Candidate School. The story shows how women can be superior to men on their side of the gendered division of labor. It also shows how gender influences how a situation is perceived, and how a group of men responded with misogynistic comments to a situation were they subordinated to women's superiority in the activity of washing:

> We are a group of six men (who I am together with) and five women. We have returned to base after a manoeuvre that has taken place in heavy rain, with an extended mobile first aid station raised on a newly cut football field. It is after midnight. Everybody is tired and wants to finish necessary work with equipment as fast as possible. The group of men (and I) unload the trucks which carry the first aid station, raise all the inflatable tents for drying, and leave to wash and tank all the vehicles. The group of women go through the medical equipment in a tempered depot: count it, clean it and refill it. When the women have finished and return to the big multi-task hall, they find no men, only wet tents *full* of grass. The women believe the men have sneaked away and start to clean the tents in anger. The men (and I) return with the vehicles and receive heavy reprimanding from the angry women. Buckets and rags are placed in the men's hands and the women command them to do their job properly and clean off the grass. Immediately the men obey and start to clean the tent - cursing and swearing. While they are washing the men go: "Fucking women", "Fuck them, this is why I hate women in the military", "Goddamit, stay at home. This is useless", "Back to kitchen", "How stupid is it to clean off wet grass with even more water". Since I am together with the men, and they say all these things about women without mentioning me being there, I ask why they don't tell the women that they think it is better to brush off the grass when the tents are dry tomorrow instead of cursing women. They answer that it is "useless to speak to women when they are angry" and "when they first think they have a smart idea". So, I go over and tell the female in charge of commanding the men to clean the grass that it will be easier to brush off the grass when the tents are dry. She gets really angry with me and says that I am *as* bad as the men, and that I sneaked away with them without having done the job properly. But, she calls the men over and says: "Okay, that's okay for tonight – Nina has said that she will clean the tents tomorrow morning". […] When we walk over to the barracks the men clap me on the shoulder and say: "Now you got yourself an enemy", "you betrayed the women-club." "I am married. I know that when a woman tells a man to clean, he has to clean. There's no room for argument. Particularly not about *how* to do the cleaning". "They will never see that we do all the dirty work while they are counting the pincettes". The men laugh and say: "And now *you* get to do the whole job tomorrow" (Field notes, Home Guard) .

In the first place the situation occurred to me as being quite absurd[321], and I did not understand why the otherwise energetic and wilful men immediately subordinated to the women and obeyed the order to clean the tents without defending themselves, or explaining that they actually had a plan to clean the tent. The story is probably an example of the *paradox of doxa*, referred to by Bourdieu as the astonishing fact that relationships of dominance and submission are broadly respected, and causes even injustices to be perceived as acceptable and natural (cf. 4.2.1). Yet, at the same time as the men obeyed the women's power and authority in practise, they reconstructed their symbolic dominance and thus, positions in the hierarchy, by discursively subordinating the women through the use of misogynistic comments.

Similar observations were made when female officers and candidates engaged in "behavior correction" of their male peers who challenged the field's dominant requirements, often on how to dress, and in particular on how to wear, or not wear, the head garment. How to dress can be considered a woman's domain and since the women also had the formal rules on their side, they were in authority. So, the men obeyed and put on/adjusted their head garment, yet seldom without adding comments that symbolically re-constructed their dominance. This is reflected in the following quote from a female officer who had concerns about how to wear the uniform, and thus engaged in the correction of others. She experienced being perceived as a "jerk", yet she could do it since those who were corrected *knew* that she was right:

> FO: And there is the thing of having to dig deeper to correct the behavior of your colleagues than five or ten years ago.There is a bit more of a requirement for me to go over to a colleague and say that I think he should wear his head garment. I did that yesterday. And then it he probably thinks I'm a jerk. But he knows that I'm right. Anyway, it's no fun for him to have his behavior corrected by me, because he is the same age as me (Interview).

In addition to men discursively reconstructing their symbolic dominance over women in areas where women had authority, officers at a lower level could discursively turn the military hierarchy up-side down by relating themselves and the higher level officers to objects of different status: "the boots" and "the desk". "Boots on the ground" provided the lower level officers with a "clear vision" and grounded them "in reality", while the higher level officers were positioned behind the desk "up in the fog-cabin (tåkeheimen[322])" where they could not see reality. Tåkeheimen is also used to name buildings where higher level officers have their office.

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[321] Since I was on the "wrong side" in this gendered division of labor, I was probably also the only one who did *not* understand the *gendered division of authority and power* that came into play between the two groups, and since I was a woman myself I was not 'forced' 'by nature' to obey the women's authority of washing in the same way as the men did.
[322] Tåkeheimen is a typical name for Norwegian mountain cabins.

8.2.5 Summary

1) Some actors in the field argued that the military was not about individual self-development but, rather, involved discipline and molding to certain standards. Yet, most of the candidates experienced the practice in which they engaged as self-satisfactory personal development. In addition, several male officers reported enjoying their job because of the personal self-satisfaction they gained from working with the development of other people. The male officers who were excited by working with development of others seemed to be quite popular among the candidates, who experienced that the officers cared for their development and wanted to make them the best.

2) While many interviewees attended the Officer Candidate School for reasons of testing their limits and engaging in self-development, several interviewees were also attracted to the military because they were adherent to structure, order and discipline.

Candidates who had previous military experience as conscripts seemed to be those who struggled the most to accustom to the disciplinary requirements at Officer Candidate School. They experienced a constant correction of personal behavior and conduct, loss of freedom, lack of respect from officers, lack of respect for their previously accumulated military capital, repetition below their level and loss of the buddies who had made their previous service such a great time. All these experiences coincided at the mentally demanding drill school which they had to go through a second time. The drill school was accordingly experienced as a "horrible" transition and re-adjustment that really "sucked".

3) At the end of the school year the interviewed candidates experienced a sense of development as a result of strict requirements and direct personal feedback. Direct feedback was a part of the professional cultivation process and involved feedback from both the officer and buddies in an open group setting. The buddy evaluations were experienced as being both "the good and the evil". Some experienced a great benefit from receiving feedback, one reason being that they learned about others' impression of themselves. Other experienced receiving feedback and being obliged to change themselves as one of the biggest challenges of the officer candidate education. Getting direct feedback could, accordingly, result in a whole spectrum of emotions, from acceptance to tears, denial and arguments. Moreover, the buddy evaluations required candidates to be honest with each other and dare to relay their impressions to their buddies. Some thought it was difficult and sometimes uncomfortable to provide direct feedback to the others, and needed to overcome feelings that would usually restrain them from expressing their thoughts on others. The feedback system, therefore, resulted in a disinhibition process by which the candidates pulled down social conventions they had embodied in habitus through previous socialization.

4) Different cultures and identities seemed to cohere around identifications with the objects and equipment the battalions and units were dedicated to using. The Armored Battalion's culture and identity were characterized by the vehicles they used, which were classified as powerful, aggressive, brutal and masculine. It was seen as the most popular battalion with the "best toys". In the Medical Battalion the equipment was also gendered, yet they had boy toys and girl toys which resulted in a gendered division of labor: the men took care of vehicles and

the dirty equipment, while the medical equipment was the women's domain. A story was provided to show how a group of men subordinated to women's superiority in the activity of washing. Yet at the same time as obeying the women's power and authority in practise, the men reconstructed their symbolic dominance by discursively subordinating the women through the use of misogynistic comments. Finally, it was shown that officers at a lower level could discursively turn the military hierarchy up-side down by relations to objects that grounded the lower level officers in reality and placed the higher level officers 'up in the fog'.

Chapter 9: Micro-level Responses to Macro-level Requirements

In the second part of chapters seven and eight we looked at responses to requirements promoted by actors at the local military sites. In this chapter we will investigate responses to requirements that, first and foremost, were set by actors at extra-local sites. These requirements were investigated in part one and involved, in short, requirements to

- Contributing to international operations
- Conforming to an appropriate (Norwegian) culture
- Recruiting more women

9.1   Contributing to International Operations

At local military sites it was found that international operations were framed in a discourse of *contribution*, something which can also be said to be the case at extra-local level. As was shown in chapter two, international operations were put on the agenda with White Paper No 38 (1998-99) where it was emphasized that Norwegian forces had to participate in international operations in order to *demonstrate solidarity* with the alliance, if we were to expect the allies' active involvement in our security issues. Thereafter it was gradually received in the general defence discourse that Norway "could best ensure its own security by *dutifully supporting the common NATO structure*" (Græger & Leira, 2005, p. 55) (cf. 2.1).

The findings presented under *The Socially Competent and Contributing Buddy* revealed that the requirement to take part in international operations did not apply to the candidates before they chose to make a more binding investment in the game (apply for further engagement). For the officers[323] who *had* made a more binding commitment to the game[324], it seemed as though participation in international operations was a "forced investment" they felt they had to make based on 1) feelings of misrecognition, 2) ensuring possibilities for promotion (and perhaps recognition), 3) desire to acquire experience/competence (symbolic capital) for credibility/recognition (which also involved a desire to have seen things with own eyes), and 4) need/pressure to follow the unit of belonging.

Firstly, feelings of misrecognition are visible in the quote below from a female officer who was asked about her experience of being a woman. She revealed that she had not experienced not being accepted as a woman, but rather had experienced not being accepted because she lacked experience of war[325]:

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[323] Seven male and two female officers had taken part in international operations. The total number of interviewed officers was fifteen male and seven female. Most candidates had not taken a position on the question. The operation in Afghanistan was also coming to an end with a result that candidates were unsure whether there would be any international operation for them to take part in if they wanted to go.

[324] With Bourdieu's words it can be said the officers who were "*caught by the game*".

[325] The female officer had experience from international peacekeeping operations.

FO: I have very many positive experiences [of being a woman in the military]. I have been in [support units], and because other women have fought the battle before me, I have never experienced discrimination or not being listened to, or overrun because I'm a woman. Never. I've had bosses who have been incredibly inclusive [...] But, I have experienced in the classroom, as an instructor for the guys from the professional units, that there it is a culture where they won't listen to me because I haven't been to war. "Who are you to stand here and teach when you haven't been to war yourself?" That, I've got to hear. I acknowledged that it was there. My [male] colleague said: "Can you feel it?" "Yes, I do!" (Interview).

A male officer also experienced being looked down upon and seen as a less competent officer due to the lack of experience/symbolic capital from international operations:

MO: I think the Army is extreme on this thing with international operations. If you work in the Army and have not been out yet — I've noticed it myself – you are looked down upon a little. You have not been a part of the big picture and you have not contributed. You have not supported the fellowship […] and you are viewed as a less competent officer because of that. But I know that they wouldn't do that in the Navy and Air Force. There it is like: "Yes-yes, you have not been there, but you are able in a lot of other things". But that is not the case in the Army. Very rigid in that area (Interview).

An officer from the Armored Battalion, who was one of those who also required willingness to contribute to international operations from the fresh candidates, said that none of the candidates had said that they would not participate in international operations. He suggested that this was probably due to them being afraid to say no, because they sensed this could have a negative impact on how they were treated:

MOAB: When they [the candidates] have chosen to join the Armed Forces and the Army and in particular the Armored Battalion, it [international operations] is a reality and something that will happen. And now it's – although it may not be enforced in the same way – a possibility to order you out for a time. So, not having thought it through, and taken a standpoint, that would be very stupid. My opinion is that if you are not prepared to do that, they [the candidates] can just quit and find something else to do, it's what our assignment is, as of now [...] there is no one who has said that they do not want it. And that is probably because they are a bit afraid to say no, because they believe that it will have an impact on how I treat them or look at them. And certainly it will perhaps do that, although I do not do it intentionally or anything like that. But I will think that they are not as serious, or that they do not know what they are getting into, in the same way as everyone else (Interview).

The feelings of misrecognition and necessity to acquire capital from international operations with an interest in professional recognition are also visible in this quote from a female officer who had twice taken part in international operations. The first time she "followed the flock".

The second time she wanted to acquire competence (capital) because it "sucked" to teach things she had not seen, and to listen to people talk about things she had not seen herself. Accordingly she felt a self-imposed pressure to take part, which can be said to be a forced investment.

> FO: The first time it was very much about the tendency to follow the flock of sheep. Then, the unit I was about to join was set up for deployment […] And if I was to work there, then it was a bit boring if I did not deploy with them. And it sounded exciting. It was tempting. Second time, it was really mostly because of professional competence. I was interested in [my profession]. I wanted to get some more experience rather than stand here and teach things I have never seen. That is boring. That was a pretty strong motivation and it was a long time since I had been out. And also, you get the thing that it sucks to be here all the time, and be the one who does not know what's out there. People come home constantly and tell, and you have not been there yourself. Then you feel a bit crappy, about not being a part and participating.
> I: Is there a pressure to participate?
> FO: Nooo, I don't feel that. You put pressure on yourself to take part. It is good to have been there and not just talk about it (Interview).

A male officer explained that he had chosen to take part in international operations in order to maintain his ability to compete for positions, because experience from international operations would be a criteria for attractive positions. This can also be seen as a forced investment. The officer also added that it had nothing to do with self-fulfillment:

> MO: The main reason [to join international service] was actually career. Should I be able to compete for positions and get out of them what I wanted, then I had to go out. Because, that is a part of the criteria when you apply for a job: "Is he qualified? Yes. Has he been abroad? No. OK, we put him at the bottom of the pile." You are rewarded for taking the load, and really, I think that is quite right. Those who are sitting in Norway and do not take their share of the load, they should not get first priority in the attractive positions […] So, the main reason was that I wanted to maintain my ability to compete for posts. It had nothing to do with personal self- fulfillment – it had not (Interview).

This shows that experience from international operations, preferably a war operation, is symbolic capital that gives those who possess it access to authority, status and positions in the military field. Thus it also allows those who possess the (symbolic) capital to make judgments that count. For one officer it was also necessary to take part in international operations in order to stay in the game:

> MO: Weeeell – it is really complicated. Because, when I joined the military, I was a conscript in the […]-battalion. So, I was in a way owned by the […]-battalion [...]. I was selected for an officer course, [...] then, the […]-battalion had to prepare a unit for Afghanistan, and they could pick who they wanted among those owned by the […]-

battalion. Those who were officer candidates were usually able and the […]-battalion
wanted us to come. Then we almost got an ultimatum: "Deploy or quit the officer
candidate course". It was almost like they said it bluntly: "You have a choice, join us
in Afghanistan or quit the course". There was no choice: "I will remain here in
Norway and do only the officer candidate course". But then I thought it was okay, to
get the chance to travel abroad. And then there are a lot of things about you not going
out when you are still in education and so on, so it was actually a giant ski jump that
they did it that way, and it certainly went behind many [official] lines.
I: What did you think of it being done this way?
MO: I was a bit skeptical in the beginning, when I got the 'join or quit' thing. It
thought that was a bit harsh and things like: "Can they push me to do this?" But, when
I had thought about it, and considered whether I wanted to go out or not, I found out
that I wanted to go [...] I met a lot of resistance at home, but then I really wanted to do
it. I found solidarity in the unit – I enjoyed what I did, so then going out became
natural (Interview).

Some officers in the material were, however, not willing to invest themselves in international
operations, although they acknowledged that they lacked a type of capital that allowed them
to teach military leadership/skills with credibility[326], as was visible in the previous quote from
the female officer. An important reason why some officers chose not to acquire the acclaimed
capital was that they had children, as expressed by this male officer:

MO: Traveling out to international service now at the risk of my own live, then I think
more about my family; kids who might grow up without their father. While, when you
are a 20 year old nothing matters. You see no limits. Being killed is something that
probably will not happen to you. You pay a little more attention to consequences when
you become a parent; I've really thought about that (Interview).

9.2 Conforming to an Appropriate (Norwegian) Culture

The Norwegian Armed Forces' participation in the operations in Afghanistan brought about
challenges. The debate reviewed under the headline *Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation*
showed that the emergence of actual or rhetorical warrior cultures was regarded as deeply
problematic by stakeholders both within and outside the military,. Under the heading
Different Institutional Belongings – Different Acceptance a later media debate about the
culture of Norwegian soldiers was referred to. This debate was caused by an article in ALFA,
a male magazine (cf. 5.4.1.2). Following the debate, the Norwegian Armed Forces
Management stated in public that they would weed out inappropriate culture from Telemark
Battalion The news article read as follows:

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[326] The feeling of not being qualified to say something about war also applied to officers who had experience of international
peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and the Balkans.

The Armed Forces Management will weed out the rush war and the romance of violence from the Telemark Battalion. Defence Minister Grete Faremo (Ap) says statements like "war is better than sex", are absolutely unacceptable and an insult to those who have given their lives to make the situation better in Afghanistan. An upset Defense Minister, flanked by the Chief of Defence Harald Sunde, said Monday that such statements show a fundamental misunderstanding of the mandate in Afghanistan. The Armed Forces is already underway to identify the extent of these attitudes, but will not yet speculate on reprisals and other forms of reaction (The Norwegian News Agency (NTB), 2010).

The media-expressed allegations about inappropriate culture (requirement about appropriate culture) caused emotional reactions[327] in the field, which were visible in the data material gathered from officers. For example, I asked a male officer whether he was proud to work in the Armed Forces and I received an answer that contained the following critique of the Armed Forces Management:

OHQ: I am proud of those I work with. I am proud of the colleagues I have. I think we do a good job. I'm *not* proud of those I have over me, to support me. I'm *not* proud. I'm *not* proud to have a defense minister who speaks against her own when she sent them to war, and when something happens, who acts on recoil. I'm *not* proud.
I: The Armed Forces Management?
OHQ: Yes. I am not proud of, how they handle some things. They are just too afraid of what the newspaper front pages will be, than they are interested in what is actually correct […] but, it is good with the documentary TV-show. It puts things in perspective when nine out of sixteen are wounded[328], some seriously, some have not recovered yet after the skirmish, and you get a politician who says "okay, perhaps it's dangerous down there" - and that's the furthest he will go. I feel that the support from society is okay, and the ALFA-case was not negative for the Armed Forces. It was not, but it was *handled* negatively. But generally it was not negative. The applications to the Officer Candidate School went up. It was really an eye opener for many about what the Armed Forces really was. But the Armed Forces must be more open […] and [the politicians/management] must know what they are doing when they are using the only means of power the state has – military power, military forces, armed force. When you use that, you have to be sure that it is right morally, what we do. Then you must also stand for it, and not try to lure away from it with the foolish words that we have not really done it, notwithstanding. Because it is a fact, that when we go to Afghanistan it is not because of ourselves. There are some who have decided it. If we do not go, we lose our job. And they must know. So I'm not proud of everything that is

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[327] A response to the allegations on inappropriate culture was that doing research on behalf of the Armed Forces management/The Ministry of Defence was met with suspicions, as explained in chapter five (cf. 5.4.1.2).

[328] On May 2th 2010, 16 Norwegian soldiers from the Coastal Ranger Command were taken in an ambush outside Ghorwmach in Afghanistan. Nine were wounded, some severe. Less than two months later on June 27t two of the soldiers who were taken in the ambush were killed as their vehicles hit an IED.

taking place above us, but I'm very proud of the organization I work in. I'm not proud of everything that happens there either – there are always things. It was fine with the ALFA-case because the organization had to look itself in the mirror. We saw ourselves in the mirror and we had a reality check. And we went back and – Do we have the right values? Do we have the right attitudes? Is there something here we need to change? And there was no doubt of that […] it is important that the organization sees itself in the mirror all the time. It was perhaps the most important lesson from the ALFA-case […]. That was a long answer (Interview).

Important aspects in the officer's critique are that those who decided to use military force "must know what they are doing" and "have to be sure that it is right morally" to do it. Thereafter they "must also stand for it, and not try to lure away from it with foolish words". Moreover, the stakeholders should know that officers/soldiers did not go to Afghanistan because of themselves, but because it had been decided by somebody else, and that they would have lost their job (opportunities) if they had not joined the operations.

Several officers felt there was a lack of openness related to the topic of international operations; something shown when one of my questions about freedom of speech related to gender politics[329] raised responses that referenced the ALFA-case/international operations. The answers also indicate that officers at this level of the hierarchy felt betrayed by the Armed Forces Management:

> MOOB: If you ask if I have a feeling that we do not have the openness that we maybe should have, I can agree with that. But that is not about gender. It is about many different things. There are many examples, those who have too many opinions; they will not necessarily gain promotion. And that is very sad, because the Minister and the Chief of Defense have been very clear that they want openness. I am in *no way* impressed, neither by the Armed Forces Management or the minister when it comes to the turbulent autumn we had in the media about the Telemark Battalion and the entire package there. I think it was very poorly handled.
> I: How?
> MOOB: Simply because they do not take care of their own. I know Rune Wenneberg[330] who in many ways became the main character in this. I did not know him very well, but I operated closely with him on the ground in Afghanistan for six months. I cannot imagine how the mission could have been solved in a more professional manner. Both when it comes to fighting, but also the cultural aspect vis-à-vis the Afghans. I have so many examples where he showed so much respect and

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[329] The interview guidelines were not designed to ask about the ALFA-case and/or the Armed Forces Management in relation to international operations, but since it been argued that men could not express their opinion on women in the military without being stamped as a male chauvinist (See for instance the story in chapter one and Mella (2011a; 2011b)) I asked to what degree they experienced freedom of speech with regard to gender politics.

[330] The officer who became a public figure in relation to the ALFA-case after a video was published showing him motivating his troops in Afghanistan by shouting: "You are the predator. Taliban is the prey. To the Valhalla!" (cf. 5.4.1.2).

responsibility and courage, which are our guiding values, facing the Afghan population, in terms of how we treat the Taliban, the people we had taken prisoners, how we treat the corpse which ANA[331] – those we work with – almost wanted to desecrate. There is really a lot. And it all comes to a peak when you know that the row of [Norwegian] generals do not have this experience. They have not experienced what it's like to lose people in their own company and within two hours need to go out and expose yourself to exactly the same risk. Then it is a fact that you have to get your guys motivated, somehow. I do not feel good about these things (Interview).

According to this officer, the mission in Afghanistan was solved in accordance with the Norwegian Armed Forces' core values of respect, responsibility and courage, while the Armed Forces Management did not live up to the values of openness[332] and care[333]. Similarly, the officer quoted in chapter 5.4.1.2 explained that he was not impressed by the military top-level leadership, because he experienced them acting in discord with the trained leadership ideal of being "first among equals" (cf. 8.1.1):

MO: I'm not terribly impressed with the top-level leadership of the Armed Forces when it comes to leadership. I am talking about the military top level. I'm not impressed. Because what I have learned and what I have practiced for years is that I am the boss, I stand in front! What happens behind me, I defend. The Chief of Defense and others ran like confused dogs when the Defense Minister was concerned about the ALFA-case. Instead of standing up: "These are my guys, you do not know what tough tasks they face, this is how soldiers relate to the world when they are in combat" (Interview).

A female officer said she was uncertain to what degree both society and politicians were up to date with the current requirements and risks imposed upon the military:

FO: I do not think that the society is up to date with how the military has also evolved and the requirements imposed upon us and the risks in the operations we participate in. I am also somewhat uncertain of whether the politicians know exactly what we're doing. They are not always on track with their comments. And these debates that have taken place in the media, where angry officers go out and are put to silence. That is a signal, too (Interview).

The experience that officers were put to silence if they had opinions about international operations was shared by other officers, who also believed that certain opinions would result in "clips on your record" if they reached the Ministry of Defense:

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[331] Afghan National Army

[332] *In the Defence Sector's Values* launched in 2011 (Ministry of Defence, 2011) 'openness' was added to the three previous core values of 'respect, responsibility and courage'.

[333] Taking care of your personnel was found to be an important valuation criteria at the micro-level (cf. 7.1.1, 8.1.1 and 8.1.2). Care is also one of the five leadership characteristics that are constructed as important entrance capita to the field (The Army's Officer Candidate School, n.d. a, p. 2).

MO: But unfortunately it is a culture that if you do not say the right things, or you say the wrong thing in the wrong place, you are marked. We talked about Rune Wenneberg [this is not the same officer who talked about Wenneberg above]. As far as I know he's been marked, because he was critical about some things. And that is not good! That is a negative thing about the culture. But the question I ask myself: "Is this part of the military culture, or is it part of the political regime that has been spread to some parts of our officer colleagues as well, which has produced given this effect?" [...] If there is a captain in the Army who is saying the wrong thing in the wrong place, then I do not think he will be marked in the Army, really. But if he expresses himself so that it becomes a controversial topic in the Ministry of Defense or something like that –well, well, then I think there will be someone who will put some clips on some records (Interview).

However, the officer I talked to about my acceptance in the field, who had assumed that I had been sent out with the task of actively searching for non-accepted opinions and negative aspects in military culture (cf. 5.4.1.2), linked the allegations of inappropriate culture to the recruitment of more women:

MO: And then [at Joint Selection] I believed you were here to support the politicians who urge us to recruit more women as a medical treatment to quick-fix our sick culture.
I: A medical treatment?
MO: Yes, that was what he said, the leader of the genius Man Panel[334]. We need women to fix our sick macho-culture. He said that when we had the corruption scandal?
I: Corruption scandal?[335]
MO: Yes, in 2007.
I: Did he say you needed women as a medicine?
MO: Yes, google it if you don't believe me (Field notes).

So I googled it and found several news articles from 2007:

The leader of the Man Panel, Arild Stokkan Grande, believes the corruption scandal in the Armed Forces is due to a closed macho culture. Female conscription will be a good medicine, he believes. Men need help from women to solve the problems we now see in the military, says Arild Stokkan Grande (Ap) to *Dagsavisen*. He refers to a corruption scandal which is now shaking the Armed Forces. Much of what we see now is due to the Armed Forces being too much of a closed, male-dominated

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[334] "The Man Panel" was a committee appointed by the Ministry of Children and Equality in 2007. The committee's objective was to discuss men's living conditions in Norway.
[335] This refers to the Siemens scandal where Siemens Business Services (SBS) was suspected of the over billing and lubrication of personnel in the Norwegian Armed Forces. In Oslo District Court in 2011 SBS was acquitted of allegations of over billing. No employees or executives were found guilty of illegal "lubrication" (corruption) (Wikipedia). Nevertheless, the scandal was also considered a driving force behind the increased focus on attitudes and ethics. See footnote 239).

organization that has given rise to a bad culture and a macho milieu (The Norwegian
News Agency (NTB), December 16th 2007).

This seemed to have invoked in the officer a feeling that recruitment of women was a priority
measure because females, assumedly, have a more appropriate culture than men. In White
Paper No 36 (2006-2007) it is stated that it is "natural to expect that key elements in the
military culture […] reflect that the organization is dominated by men" (p. 9), that "increased
integration of women will be an important part of the efforts to change the Armed Forces" (p.
9), and that "greater knowledge about the culture in the military will form a necessary basis
for evaluating the need for targeted interventions to change any *unwanted* culture" (p. 21).

9.3   Recruiting More Women

There has been an explicit political aim to increase the proportion of women in the Norwegian
military for almost 30 years, with 198 unique measures and initiatives implemented during
this time (Fasting & Sand, 2012). With White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) increased recruitment
of women became a priority measure followed up in several subsequent political documents,
and through relatively crystal clear messages from female Ministers of Defence, who
emphasized that the request to recruit more women should be considered a mission, as well as
an order (cf. 2.1). Some military personnel argued that the request to recruit more women
became so overriding that you risked being seen a male chauvinist if you criticized a woman
or questioned the gender politics (cf. 1.1 and footnote 329). This was also an opinion held by
some of the interviewees:

> FOHQ: It is easier for us as a minority to say what we mean [about women in the
> military]. Otherwise it is discrimination, immediately. If a man, a colleague, says that
> he believes that women do not fit in the infantry, then he is stamped on immediately.
> So the debate should perhaps come from women (Interview).

Although it was claimed that men in particular felt muted about saying anything about women
in the military, most of the men interviewed said that the gender policy was not the worst
thing to comment on[336] even though this topic could be a bit of a wasps nest:

> MOHQ: Yes, I do experience that [I can say what I want about women]. But, as said,
> it is bit of wasps nest to start to mess with. If the politicians at the top have decided
> that we will have a female share of 20 percent, then it is clear that if you are an
> aspiring battalion commander and say that you will not have women in the military
> because they are not physically fit and it just creates jealousy and drama, then you go
> against the politicians who make the decisions about whether you are going to climb
> to the next step of the career ladder. In this sense it would be unfortunate for his career
> to say something that goes against the politicians. But, I feel that I can say what I think
> about women in the military as long as what I say is evidence based, and I have an

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[336] As was explained above, questions on freedom of speech experienced in relation to the gender politics resulted in answers
related to the ALFA-case/international operations.

objective approach. I firmly believe that the job-specific requirements must determine access to positions that require special physical skills. That said, whether you are a gypsy or a Romany, a boy or girl, or whatever you are, as long as you meet the requirements, then it is okay (Interview).

Regarding attitudes toward women in the military, in the present study these were found to be more positive among male officers and male candidates in services with few women, than among male candidates in the Medical Battalion where there was a large proportion of women. The attitudes toward recruiting more women were also found to be more positive among men than they were among women. One of the officers who was positive to having more women in the Armored Battalion had experienced women being directed away from the battalion at Joint Selection by selection officers from other services:

> MOAB1: It's a good thing [having women in the military]. It's good. I think I also said that last time you were here –I'm surprised how few women we got among the 28 who were sent up to us in the first place, that there were only two girls. And I still think that is a small pity […] It surprises me that no more come here. It's probably because they have not applied, and I feel that those who did [apply] had selectors at Joint Selection who I know [...] And then, it might have been like the women who were on other squads [at Joint Selection] have been told: "you are not good enough", for some reason [...] So, I would not exactly say that we are increasing the proportion of women. It has to start from the beginning. I cannot do anything about it when I get 28 and there are two girls […] "this is what you are dealt, this it what you get". The selection is made at Joint Selection (Interview).

Another male officer from the Armored Battalion also thought there were far too few women there, and argued that more women would improve the social milieu:

> I: Recently, there has been a strong focus on recruiting more women into the military. What do you think about that?
> MOAB2: Awesome. I think there are too few – particularly in the Armored Battalion, [...] it creates a good atmosphere. It's strange, but it's amazing how similar we are, yet what different things we bring with us and what a good team we are together […] I think it is brilliant. Very important [...] It is, as I mentioned previously, it does something to the milieu. It's not like we're talking differently when a woman's around. On the contrary. It is very important. It spices up the milieu and I think that it is almost a requirement that there should be a girl in every platoon and unit (Interview).

Although some men believed that more women would "spice up the milieu", it was also argued that creating a cozy milieu was not an appropriate reason for recruiting more women:

> MOHQ: It's good with women in the military. Some say it's a bit silly that it's good for the milieu. I do not know if the milieu is the most important reason, but it is important that you have people with different backgrounds. It will of course have an

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impact on the milieu, but I do not think that a cozy milieu in the workplace is the main reason why it is good […] But we need to have women in the military. It's that simple. I do not see any reason why we should not have it.

I: Why do we need to have women in the military?

MOHQ: Otherwise it becomes a group-thinking, just a purely all-male culture. Then it becomes a purely group-thing (Interview).

Although most of the male officers expressed positive attitudes toward women in the military, not all were positive. Several added, as has been shown, that it was fine to have more women "*as long as they met the (physical/set) requirements"*. The most negative attitudes toward women in the military were expressed by an officer in the Armored Battalion, meaning that both the most positive (see above) and most negative attitudes toward the recruitment of more women were found there:

MOAB3: Women in the Armed Forces? Then I usually answer simply: it's fine as long as they manage to do their job. If not, then…But this is the case with the guys, too. But, considering that women are volunteering, and I see that women are here and are doing an inept job or do not enjoy the work and just hate life, then they can just drop out of the whole thing. Then it's only a strain, causes irritation, and provides frustration in daily life that we do not need [...]

And the quotas […] I do not understand at all why they should have that as a goal. We can admit women in the same way as guys. If they do a good job they are welcome. But we should not take in people who do not reach the requirements just because we should have them here. It's totally pointless.

I: Do you have the impression that it happens, that they take in people who do not reach the reach the requirements?

MOAB3: Yes! […] Sometimes we get women – to put it bluntly – who do not seem to be fit for very much. I really struggle to see what they are doing here and what they want to gain from it (Interview).

The officer's argument in the first part of the quote, saying that women must "enjoy work" and not "hate life" because they have volunteered, means that women are *not allowed* to complain or get bored, even when men complain or are bored. This argument has been used and discussed in the Home Guard Rapid Reaction Force. Both the Officer Candidate School and the HG RRF are services that is joined voluntarily by men as well as women; something which was held up against those who used the argument toward women who were complaining over poorly planned service during a discussion in the HG RRF. The reply was that although it was also voluntary for men to join the RRF, it was not *as* voluntary as it was for women, since the men were forced to choose between a poor service in the regular HG or a better service in the Rapid Reaction Force[337].

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[337] The discussion in the HG RRF ended with the hope that conscription for women will give women equal opportunities to express their views on the service quality.

However, several men who expressed that they wanted more women in the military linked this to male culture and argued that women calm down the guys:

> MOOB: Personally, I think it is good that we have girls around us. It dampens down
> the guys a bit (Interview).

This was also supported by some male candidates who found all-male culture a bit vulgar:

> MCOB: I think it's positive [to have women in the military]. You notice it in the
> squads who do not have women. We have two squads without women and one with.
> There is a different mood. They bring in something positive that makes it a bit more
> balanced and, – the thing is, when only men are together there is a tendency for it to
> get a little violent at times and a lot of nasty talk and so on. But as soon as a woman
> comes in they must behave fine all the time. I think that is very good.
> I: You find it all right?
> MCOB: Yes.
> I: What do you think about male culture?
> MCOB: It's not okay, really. It gets a bit too much for my taste (Interview).

While some men did not have a taste for the male culture, some women found the direct, sharp and somewhat "brutal" culture where you could joke with each other to be one of the things they liked about the military:

> FO: We're pretty special as an organization and a culture.
> I: What do you mean by special as a culture?
> FO: That is everything from the way we speak, from the expressions we use to the
> way we are. As a group we are a bit more direct and sharp and can maybe be
> perceived as a bit brutal for civilians who work in a completely different environment.
> And of course it is characterized by being male dominated, for sure.
> I: Do you think the military is characterized as a macho-culture?
> FO: Yes, it is.
> I: Do you think that is positive in any way?
> FO: YES! It's! Absolutely! [Straightens up, big smile] That's for sure! I could not
> have imagined me working in an opposite culture. I think that is too tiring. What I like
> so much is that we can be direct and make rowdy jokes without someone taking it
> personally. I think it is very loose, free and nice here (Interview).

After the interview was over the female officer told me that it made her "very happy" that I asked about positive aspects of macho-culture. She told me it was unexpected as "macho-culture is *always* talked about as something negative". She proceeded: "But, the culture is exactly one of the reasons why I am here. I liked the rough social convention" (Field notes).

As shown in the following quote, this next female officer also said that she could not imagine working in an opposite (female) culture. This thought was common among several female officers, many of whom were skeptical towards an increase in the number of women in the

military. They argued that an increase in women meant an increase in conflicts and female culture scheming:

> FO1: Historically, we know that all the conflicts are the in women's room at Madla[338], because women argue over men. But I believe they do that in all jobs in civilian life as well, so there's no difference. The women who work at the retirement home here in Rena argue too, for sure. It's something to do with how women are. In that sense the military is just a mirror of society (Interview).

According to another female officer, women will dispute over boys and engage in "backbiting", while men are much easier to deal with and have more of a sense of humor:

> FO2: When there are many women in the squads, there is so much backbiting, there is so much drama, there are so many disputes over boys, actually. "He's my boyfriend and not your boyfriend", and all that crap. With guys, you get a completely different group dynamic. The group becomes a bit easier to deal with, because then it is straight to the point. It is just how it is. "Done with that!" Some more hilarious humor with the guys. Certainly, the men have a little more vigor. Women are much more over-analytical, usually, and well suited to support jobs and all that. Many women together are usually not an entirely good thing (Interview).

Regarding the Medical Battalion in which there were many women, several informants reported that the high number of women *did something* to the social milieu. The social milieu was also often referred to as *special and different.* In particular, officers and candidates with previous military experience described the milieu as special:

> I: What do you think about the milieu in your platoon?
> FCMB: A lot! It's weird, simply! I'm not familiar with it at all! In my previous service we were a bunch of buddies and a couple of women, but all the women had their own bunch of guys to hang with. And now suddenly it's half-half, and it's so weird. Very special! You notice it, and it does something to the atmosphere in the whole platoon. There is a lot of scheming and strange things happening. Very special! (Interview).

Another female candidate from the Medical Battalion thought it was a shame that the two gangs of women in the platoon could not try to get along, instead of reinforcing female stereotypes:

> FCMB: It happens that there are actually people you do not get along with. But you are going to live close for a year […] You don't need to be rude and create a bad atmosphere. But this happens in the platoon, and I really don't like it. I've tried to bring it up, but nothing happens. So the typical women thing just happens, and I think

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[338] Norway's largest military boot camp where everyone who goes on to serve in the Navy and most of the personnel who are to serve in the Air Force attain basic military training.

that's a shame. At least I have tried to adjust and learn to know the other women, and it has actually worked out very smoothly. And I'm sure that everyone can get along if they just want to try. I think it's a shame that there is not a good atmosphere among the women in the platoon (Interview).

A female candidate from one of the battalions with only a few women, who was together with the Medical Battalion at Joint Education, said she was glad she was not in the Medical Battalion because so many women cliques would be created:

FCOB: I think that maybe I'm glad I'm not there [in the Medical Battalion]
I: Because?
FCOB: No, a lot of girls gathered in a small area and you start there and do not have a relationship with anyone. So, there will surely become some cliques. Now, I have not experienced the problem, but there could be a bit more plotting and a bit of bickering perhaps (Interview).

Another female candidate from a battalion with few women tells that she would not have chosen the medical service and explains that the reason for this was, firstly, because she expected it to be many women there. She then reveals that because she gets jealous quickly she prefers to have all the guys to herself:

FCOB: The x- service was my first choice. There is a big difference between x-service and medics – I wouldn't have done that!
I: Why not?
FCOB: First of all, because there are so many women there. It is the worst thing of all. And I'm not very fond of medics in general. We have had the level 2 course, and I think that was more than enough.
I: Why is it the worst of all that there are so many women there?
FCOB: As for now, when I'm used to being alone with only men, it's so incredibly annoying to be with women. There's so much drama immediately. It is so much easier with the men.
I: Do you experience that when you are with women?
FCOB: Yes.
I: Can you tell a bit more about it?
FCOB: I think that it has mostly something to do with me. I am very fond of attention, and I get jealous very quickly. I think it's okay to have all the guys to myself (Interview).

A female officer (cf. footnote 218 for issues on anonymity) from the Medical Battalion said that they needed to apply additional requirements within the battalion due to the high number of women:

FOMB: It is no secret that there are a lot of…You know, men-women, relationship. You have to be strict that there are actually rules here, in the military. It is often

important to point that out […] when it comes to soldiers and women I often think that there are many for whom it's pointless being here. It is good that this is anonymous! That is my opinion. There are many who really should not have been here. And we are not allowed to discharge them unless they want it themselves.

I: Why is it pointless for them to be here?

FOMB: It is physical robustness and…yes, it's hard to be in the military. If you are frail, small, then it is the physical part that you are not on par with. And then it becomes much like these women's things – slander and nonsense. And that's not good at all. Women are often malignant. We see that there is more plotting and nonsense in the units where there are a lot of women […]. There is backbiting. The guys are much easier to deal with. Easier beings. But by all means, I'm not saying we should not have women, but it must be the *right women* (Interview).

Some of the male officers also thought that women created ruses related to sexual relationships. For instance, an officer from the Armored Battalion said that young men and women living together resulted in relationships, which was not a problem in itself. The problem was their inability to distinguish between spare time and service, and also the jealousy, drama and tension created in the platoon, which resulted in officers having to deal with people in tears.

MOAB: The biggest problem is when there are romantic relationships and jealousy and drama and stuff like that. We cannot accept that, and every year we make clear what kind of approach they should have to that, and what we think about it and so on, but it happens. They are nineteen to twenty year old boys and girls. People live together for a year; it's not going to go away. I think that people will develop a relationship beyond being fellow soldiers. And this creates challenges, because it is not allowed. They must certainly have relationships in their spare time, but they don't manage to separate it from service. And then some become jealous, and then there are rumors and then the women become sad. It creates extra work, simply. It takes some focus away from what we actually do.

I: Do you as an officer go into situations like this?

MOAB: Yes, it happens.

I: What do you do then?

MOAB: No, then we ask about the situation and try to listen a bit. I had some examples last year. It created a split in the platoon and some drama and rumors about who did what and stuff like that. And so it ended up people sitting and crying in my office because they are upset about something, and then I have to spend time and energy to resolve the conflict, because I need a platoon that works together. But that's the way it is (Interview).

Another male officer argued that the problem with women and plotting/jealousy in the military was not due to the women but due to male officers who related to subordinate women:

MOHQ: My experience is that it [women] can often create some plotting. If you have a woman in a platoon, then it is often one of the guys who falls in love, often the commanding officer actually, and then the officers may begin to favor the women in his department and then there is dissatisfaction among the guys and jealousy, and then we use incredible amounts of energy on non-service things. But that's how humans are. I guess it exists in businesses as well [...]

I: Have you experienced women causing problems in the service?

MOHQ: [Pause] Mmm-no. I'll turn it around. I have found that women have caused problems for male officers – and we are talking about at the soldier level – male officers begin to go after female soldiers. And that's not good. The women are too smart for that. Female officers do not go after male soldiers; they are too smart to do that kind of nonsense. But the guys are not. And that has created problems in the departments. When I was head of a department, I was damned annoyed every time I heard about things like that. And it's especially things that take place out on the town. I do not go to the places where the 18 to19 year olds go. So if I, once a week, go out and take a beer, they're not there. So I do not see it myself, but hear it from others; because it creates noise. One thing is the ethical and moral issue that you do not do it; and the other thing is what is going on in the units. And the ones who must bite the sour apple, that's the woman.

I: Why?

MOHQ: Gold digger, is that the word? That some [women] go after people with power. And the guys see that. And in the group setting at the barracks – "will she benefit?" In the group setting in the platoon that is not acceptable behavior. It is not. So she will hear it. And the second is that as the commander, you should not do it. The problems I have had have gone that way. It does not apply to female officers. They do not hit upon things like that […] I spent a lot of time on this thing, and it irritated me constantly (Interview).

A male officer from the Armored Battalion argued that these kinds of challenges were first and foremost among the conscripts. He also added that friction was created for the men by an equality policy whereby everything should be equal, and men and women should live in the same rooms:

MOAB: Our challenges are first and foremost among the conscripts. It is very simple and banal things, but there are things that get in the way and influence the daily lives of the soldiers, considering that they live in the same barracks. And then there are some who believe that everyone should be able to live in the same room. There are supposed to be no differences. It is going to be equal; it shall be the same for everyone. We should not have a dedicated women's toilet or women's rooms. It's little things like that. It does not create any major problems, but it creates a friction for the guys. They get a little annoyed sometimes (Interview).

9.3.1 Living in Mixed-Gender Rooms in the "Girly Battalion"

As was illustrated in chapter 7 the male candidates in the Medical Battalion engaged in bullying and discrimination against the female candidates in their platoon (cf. 7.2.2). One of their officers referred to the men as being unsatisfied for having to live in mixed-gender rooms, and as a result they had a rebellion and requested room-change. The rebellion happened around Christmas. The interviews with the male candidates below were all recorded during the preceding autumn:

> I: What do you think of the number of women in your platoon?
> MCMB1: Oh! What should I say?
> I: You are allowed to say what you mean.
> MCMB1: I think there are too many women in the platoon, even though there are as many men as there are women. It's much too personal here. Some of my expectations when I was about to join the Army, I had heard a bit from buddies who had been in the Army, they had been in all males rooms[339] and it had been a good atmosphere with beer, joy and some that maybe fart in the room and feel like they are at home. There are a lot more barriers when there are men and women together – at least in the room. If there had been all male and all women sleeping rooms then maybe I would have a different opinion about the number of women in the platoon. So no, I do not think it's so cool with the women all the time, but it is very nice in other situations.
> I: Actually, I had planned to ask you what you think about living in mixed rooms.
> MCMB1: At times it is absolutely great, at other times it really sucks.
> I: In what way do you think it sucks?
> MCMB1: Then I should give you a concrete example, I think, for your understanding. It's about being able to trample around in your boxers, and maybe stand a bit in front of the mirror with arms and feel that you are a bit tough. The fact that men and women have mood swings, perhaps most often at different times, is something we have to be aware of. It seems to me that the women are a bit more sensitive so it does not take much before a small joke turns into crying. Not that it happens often, but you're a little afraid, and have to sense where the limits are to avoid nonsense. I'm not too fond of conflicts and stuff like that. So I rather become a little calm and quiet, maybe. But there are damn many cool girls. There are some tomboys in the platoon and there are some very girly-girls. We go damn well together with the tomboys, then. I have grown up in a milieu with a lot of tomboys and we are good buddies. I can joke with them as if they were my baby brother. But here you have to take the women into account in a slightly different manner, although it should not be that way. When we live so close and are welded together like this, I think it should be possible to give a hug and maybe a pat on the shoulder without the possibility that this should mean something either positively or negatively (Interview).

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[339] The candidates in the Medical Battalion lived in a mixed-gender room.

Another male candidate said that the hardest thing he had experienced during the officer candidate education was adjusting to living in rooms with women:

> I: What has been hardest so far?
> MCMB2: Most difficult? I would actually say that it has been perhaps to adapt to now living in rooms with the women. That can be a bit tiring at times. I knew a bit about what I was getting into, but I had no idea that we would stay in room with the women. That can be a bit hard at times (Interview).

The men emphasized that their problem was living in the same room as the women, not that there were women in the platoon:

> MCMB2: So, I know that there are several guys who want to live in one room, only guys. We have no problems with being in a platoon with the women – that is just awesome. But to stay in the room all day – yes, then there are many factors that come into play.
> I: Is this something several guys agree on?
> MCMB2: Yes, […] As we've talked internally, I know there are many of us who wish to move in together and live in a purely male room and let the guys who want to stay with the girls, stay with the girls. That we had an opportunity to choose. There are seven guys who I know would like to stay in a purely male room, and I think we could have had it pretty fine. We all agree that having girls in the platoon is no problem, absolutely not. But we could need to have some time for ourselves (Interview).

Some of the reasons why the men thought it was challenging to live in room with the women were: 1) they had not expected it; 2) it created more barriers; 3) they needed to be more sensitive to avoid crying, conflicts and interpretations; 4) they were afraid that their friendly behavior (pat on the shoulder) would mean something more. In addition, they were annoyed because the women got up early to fix themselves up and woke the guys who wanted to sleep longer, and in the evenings they gave them no room to lie on the bed and relax. Moreover the rooms in these (new) barracks had their own integrated bathroom; something which challenged the intimate zone:

> MCMB2: When we get up in the morning, many of us are irritated by little things. Lots of talk, they get up half an hour or forty-five minutes before us and begin to fix themselves up, turn on the light and wake us up when we want to sleep. It just builds up more and more […] And when we might want to just lie down on the bed and relax a little, then they are gathering and sit there and make noise […] It can be a long day, and that's why I appreciate being able to get out at the weekends to get some time alone. Because, it a bit of a strain not being able to go to the bathroom alone without someone being right next door (Interview).

Regarding the possibility (or impossibility) to relax in the rooms, this was also experienced as a challenge by the so-called introvert women in chapter seven. One of them said that the

social milieu in the platoon was tiresome because some women were so "*switched on all the time*" and wanted to "have a party", while she would "like to have it quiet and nice in the room". This challenge was, therefore, not necessarily related to gender but rather to different personalities, yet it may have been experienced as a gender issue due to the high number of so-called extrovert women[340]. A second year male candidate said he had considered quitting the Officer Candidate School because he struggled to deal with so many people in such close proximity, but did not relate this to gender. Instead he related it to his need to be alone. Yet the second year candidate also preferred to live in all male rooms, although he was not as negative toward the issue of mixed-gender rooms as the first year candidates were:

> I: What do you think about living in a room with women?
> SYMCMB: It – ehh – it runs fine. I wish that we had purely male rooms, because there are so many small things with girls, so much talking and worrying over little things that many boys do not bother to stress about. But it is in a way rather interesting too, because you get new opinions and new ideas that come into play. I've always thought that it is so hard for women to get along with each other. It takes so little before they become enemies, and often for several days. And it affects not only them. It affects everyone else around them because they spread their bad mood. Boys are much more likely to call a spade a spade and just get over what they have disagreed about. Deal with it there and then instead of dragging it into eternity [...] So here [in the Medical Battalion] I really wish that there were more guys and especially that we had a solely male room (Interview).

The little things men did not bother about were mentioned by several of the male candidates. One of the first year male candidates felt that the women were used to doing different things and thus lived different lives from the guys:

> I: What do you mean by there have been gender conflicts?
> MCMB3: It can be from the smallest things, that the guys, for example, use one shampoo, while the girls need eight each. I think it is more about what a girl is used to, what she wants. Her life and a guy's life are very different. For example, buying shampoo, buying clothes, being on the computer, doing ordinary, everyday things (Interview).

Returning to the challenges faced by the male candidates of living in a room with women who irritated them with "little things", it can be argued that there were warning signs in the interviews about the rebellion, referred to by their officers in chapter seven:

> MCMB3: When you're in the same room as a woman you cannot be as free as you are among the guys. And when you constantly have to be a buffer […] what shall I say?

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[340] For instance, one of the officers referred to in chapter seven said he felt that the high number of women could have a negative impact "because in addition, we have a lot of very extroverted women" (cf. 7.2.1).

[…] The urge to be able to unleash, I believe it grows and grows among most of the guys. Finally, it can explode (Interview).

So when I returned to the Medical Battalion at the end of the school year the officer reported that the men had plotted against the women, engaged in bullying and requested to change rooms. Although, one of the officers said that (s)he had not previously experienced anything similar to the men-against-women situation that had occurred in this platoon, the second year female candidates in the Medical Battalion described a corresponding relationship between men and women in their platoon. The female second year candidates differ, however, from the first year female candidates in that they did not report conflicts between the women themselves. They were fewer women and they did not divide into sub groups[341]. This was how a second year female candidate described the situation between men and women in the candidate platoon she was a part of the year before:

> FSYCMB: [The social milieu in the platoon] was very good to begin with. We were a
> group, we were about twenty all together, and it evolved the way a group evolves. […]
> Toward the end of the school year a bad atmosphere between the men and the women
> developed, but we managed to sort it out.
> I: What was the bad atmosphere about?
> FSYCMB: No, what should I say? It just happened, really. Sort of like, we started to
> upset each other, maybe. We lived close to each other. It's a whole year […]
> I: Had this something to do with you being men and women?
> FSYCMB: Yes.
> I: How?
> FSYCMB: It was about the guys' attitudes toward us, and that they saw themselves as
> better than us and we could not handle that they had that attitude. And the guys joked
> very much among themselves, and we did not understand the jokes in the same way.
> Then there was a little confusion about what they really thought of us, who might was
> brought to the surface, but when we brought the case further it became better
> eventually.
> I: What did they think about you?
> FSYCMB: In particular, they meant that girls should stick to the kitchen, and that the
> best leaders in the world were men, and that women could never be good leaders. All
> that. And it was a lot of kidding, just like women nagging. Sort of joking, that really
> was taken too far. They meant perhaps only to joke with us, but we tried saying that
> we did not like it.
> I: When you brought the case further, was it taken seriously then?
> FSYCMB: Yes. It was. We told our officers about it, and it was addressed
> immediately. They said that we do not accept this, and then it was settled (Interview).

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[341] FSYCMB: We [the women] had some disagreements sometimes, but we were always able settle them. I thought there were just the right number of women too, we helped each other through the year and supported each other (Interview).

The same was confirmed by another second year female candidate, who said that it was "not a clever move" to collect all the women in the Medical Battalion when they were already seen as the "Girly Battalion". She believed it was something that could make the situation worse, and they had already experienced discrimination:

> FSYCMB: There were six of us women, and that was okay. But now there are very many girls who have been admitted, and that's fine – it is. But to collect all the girls in one battalion, in the Medical Battalion, it might not be a clever move when we are already seen as the Girly Battalion, where all the girls are, and things like that. It can make it worse. We, the women in the platoon, last year talked a lot about that. There is a lot of discrimination going on, which we experienced to a great extent.
> I: How did you experience that?
> FSYCMB: There was a lot of that stuff about us being so weak. We had to listen to many nasty comments that men are better leaders than women. Hearing such things all the time gradually made us feel like a burden to the squad. We felt that now we are hampering, and now we are delaying and: "*sorry, sorry, sorry!*" It affected us quite a lot – we noticed that in the end we pulled back sometimes, because we felt much weaker than them.
> I: Did you bring it up in any way?
> FSYCMB: Yes, we brought it up in the end. It was perhaps a bit late. But we brought it up and the guys did not really understand what we meant. But that was how we felt. It was also brought up further in the battalion.
> I: What happened then?
> FSYCMB: We had some meetings; there was awareness. We noticed some difference. But when we were at the final coping exercise in mixed squads with those [male candidates] from the Artillery and the Armored battalion, then we did not experience the same thing. They had one girl in each battalion, and we felt like we were welcomed in a very different way than we were in our battalion.
> I: So you think it is better to be fewer women?
> FSYCMB: Yes, actually! (Interview, Medical Battalion, Mid Phase).

So, the female candidate believed it was better with *fewer* women in each battalion than to gather "all in one". She experienced herself and other women feeling more welcome among the men from the Artillery and the Armored Battalion, with whom they had been in squads at the final coping exercise, than they were among the men in the Medical Battalion. There were no reports of gender related bullying or discrimination from candidates in battalions with ≤ 2 women who were interviewed for the present study, but some of the female officers reported experiencing gender related discrimination in previous services with only a few women. Yet, one of the female officers said that the "worst place" she had served was in the Armed Forces' Medical Service (FSAN, Sessvollmoen). She said:

> FO: Two or three years after I had been a [...] I was in FSAN. That was an awful milieu! It was absolutely awful. There, I was so overrun, there were ruling techniques from my platoon leader and my company commander. And the two men conspired

toward me and another woman. We had such a horrible time! There were ruling techniques – invisibility, not being heard, withholding of information. We were frozen out, and the whole package. That was how it was there. It was absolutely awful. It ended up that both I and the other women got sick leave; we hit the wall [...] Then, I was saved by friends in higher staff, so to speak. They saved me out there and put me in [...] where I got the possibility to thrive and be myself again and get away from the monkey-cuckoos.

I: Why do you think it was like that in the Armed Forces' Medical Service?

FO: It was a shitty place. Yes, indeed it was.

I: But there are many women there, aren't there?

FO: Yes, there are. But it was not the women that were the problem. I felt often that we stood together, the women [...] It was really the guys that were bad, and they used ruling techniques.

I: Do you have the impression that there are more women who have received poor treatment in the Armed Forces' Medical Service?

FO: Yes. Quite a lot, actually. That year, when I and my friend got the sick leave, there were also two other women who got sick leave. There were four of us [...] simultaneously. But a [high level] boss found that they had witnessed a period with too many poor leaders[342] (Interview).

The second year female candidate quoted above pointed toward a possible reason for the increased negative attitude, found in this study, toward women among men in the Medical Battalion, when compared to other battalions: the classification of the Medical Battalion as the Girly Battalion. One of the male candidate said they were called the "Girly Platoon" by the Artillery men and the mixed-gender rooms were something that was joked about:

MCMB2: We are called the Girly Platoon, by the Artillery men. But otherwise it's just like that – joking back and forth that we live in rooms with girls and little things like that. There are a few guys that call us for the Girly Platoon since we have a majority of girls. But that's just a bit like teasing between the troops (Interview).

It was also recorded in the field notes that officers in the other services, the headquarters included, referred to the Medical Battalion as the 'Babe Battalion'. An officer from the Medical Battalion said that at parties he had been asked by other officers when he was going to "set free his herd of mares" (Field notes). Since the male candidates had stated that they were negative toward both the number of women and the mixed-gender rooms, I asked a group of conscripts who took part in the same medical training as the officer candidates what they thought about the number of women. They were more satisfied with the situation, but they did say that attention was paid to the battalion and they heard things when they were out at parties, though they believed the others were jealous.

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[342] An officer in the Medical Battalion said they sent the poorest officer candidates to practice as sergeants in the Armed Forces' Medical Service, because the service there would mainly consist of teaching first aid courses on repeat. Also, candidates said that this was the service they could apply to that had the lowest status.

Conscript 1: A soldier is a soldier. I do not think of them as girls, and we do not treat each other as some are men and some are women. It's more like others who pay more attention to it.

I: What others?

Conscript 1: Out on "The Strip[343]", at parties, we hear these things. We are in the girl battalion, the sissy battalion, the whore battalion and things like that.

Conscript 2: Yes, but I think they're just jealous (Field Notes, Medical Battalion).

Likewise, the second year male candidate said that others were interested in the women in the battalion. But he also noticed that the whole battalion was seen as a gang of girls:

SYMCMB: I think we are seen as such a girl gang, I notice that.

I: Have you heard that?

SYMCMB: Nieeeh – some people have mentioned it, but it's probably also something to do with there being so many nice girls in the Medical Battalion and there is so much sexual interest involved. But it is also that we are seen as gang of girls, and that everyone in the Medical Battalion is a girl (Interview).

All the officers from the Medical Battalion had the opinion that the medical service was much undervalued both in terms of the physical fitness requirements and the size of the medical syllabus:

I: How would you describe the medical service?

OMB1: […] and then the service is a bit underestimated. Many will say that medics are: "ahhh –Nurse in uniform." But they are not. If someone gets shot, we are the ones who will eventually save them. An underestimated service, I would say […] Undervalued, greatly underestimated (Interview).

The officers experienced, however, that the medical service's status had increased as a result of the involvement in Afghanistan, whereas previous to this they had been seen as "wimps" and perceived as "a bit puny" due to the number of women:

OMB2: That [the status of the medical service] is one thing that I think has improved greatly in recent years. For now there are so many officers who have been in international operations and have seen the effect of a medical platoon. Earlier, I know it's been a lot like: "Medics, they are wimps", that sort of thing. However, we have been noticed and done a very good job through several contingents abroad and have won respect among the maneuver units, which we might not have had before. But that is often how it is. They do not see how they benefit from the support troops before they really need them. It's a pity, but it has been better […] We have previously been seen as the girl unit and we may have been perceived a bit puny because we have a lot of girls (Interview).

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[343] The main street in the settlement Setermoen is referred to as "The Strip"

A third officer also believed that others' perception of the service had improved due to their contribution in Afghanistan. Yet people believed the service was not as physically demanding as other services, and they were seen as "half gay":

> OMB3: People's perception of the Medical Battalion is a bit like it is not so physically demanding, it's a bit…Slightly exaggerated, but those who do not have much faith in it – it's a bit half gay and lots of girls […] I believe people think that we have it very cozy. It is not so hard and it's a nice place to be. But I think that the perception is in the process of change after Afghanistan, because people have begun to realize that we actually do a pretty important job. They have seen the work we are doing there and the need for it. They have appreciated the medical service more than they might have done before. Because then it was sort of just the cool things that were fun. It was the warriors who were hot. So I think that the attitude toward the medical corps is about to change, slightly (Interview).

Some candidates from the other battalions also believed that the service in the Medical Battalion was easier and less serious than service in the other battalions, as referred to by this female candidate from a battalion with ≤ 2 women:

> FCOB: There's a bit chatting from us then [about the Medical Battalion], partly because we have been serious from the start and we have been outside in all kinds of weathers, while – at least the boys say: "ohhhh, medics, it is so easy because there are so many girls and that is taken into account", and stuff like that. But I do not know if that is what really goes on. I doubt it, actually. It would clearly not be the military's style doing it that way. But there is a bit of talk about the fact that there are so many girls in the medics. (Interview)

An officer from the Armored Battalion assumed that "someone" had seen their chance to increase the total number of women in the Norwegian Armed Forces by assigning a lot of women to the Medical Battalion where women would "naturally" apply:

> I: What do you think of the number of women in the Medical Battalion?
> OAB: I believe it has something to do with more women applying there. It is natural that more women apply there. Hence, also, I believe that it is easy to take the chance to get more women in there, if you think about it a bit cynically. (Interview)

The image of the Medical Battalion as "a bit puny" and "half gay" girl battalion is likely to result in increased resistance against women by men who expect "a good atmosphere with beer, joy and some that maybe fart in the room", as well as the possibility to "stand a bit in front of the mirror with arms and feel that you are a bit tough", as referred to previously by a male candidate. Saying that "ohhhh, medics, it is so easy because there are so many girls and that is taken into account", as referred to by the female candidate above, can be seen as a discursive domination of the medics provided by men in the other battalion. It was however not only the Medical Battalion who were discursively subordinated in the field. In particular,

the Air Force, who also has a larger proportion of women than other services, seemed to be subordinated by men who situated their own service at top of the hierarchy:

> MO: It's probably a bit tougher in the Army, a tougher performance environment, but also caring environment, than it is in the Air Force. You need not to write that [the interviewees name], but I think I can prove it. If you are going to make a career in the Armed Forces, you should be female in the Air Force. Then it takes off. You don't even need to be a pilot.
> I: Why?
> MO: They are good at taking care of and lifting up their girls. That's good! We have not been so good at that. But when you meet a major or lieutenant colonel you expect a certain substance, both service-related and in education, at least in terms of service. When that is missing, then you – if you compare a captain, these Army captains around here, with a lieutenant colonel from the Air Force, the latter falls through. [...][Army personnel] have a history that goes far over most officers in the Air Force in terms of military experience, military skills and so on. The big difference is that it is the Army who has taken the toughest tasks in international operations; the Army with some support from the Coastal Ranger Command and the Navy Special Operations Command. Trond Bolle[344], as you have heard of, he was from the Navy Special Operations Command, but that was an Army operation. It is the Army that has taken the toughest tasks. It's certainly nice to go on a trip to the Gulf of Aden with Fritjof Nansen [a frigate], but some of us call it a cruise! (Interview).

9.4   Summary

1) Findings presented under *The Socially Competent and Contributing Buddy* (cf. 8.1.1) showed that a requirement to contribute in international operations applied to officers once they made a binding commitment to the game, i.e. applied for engagement or education beyond the Officer Candidate School. For the officers who had made such commitment, participation in international operations seemed to be experienced as a "forced investment" they had to make to 1) avoid feelings of misrecognition, 2) acquire experience/competence (symbolic capital) necessary for credibility and recognition, 3) ensure possibilities for promotion, and 4) be allowed to stay in the game. The results, therefore, show that experience from international operations, preferably a war operation, is recognized as value (symbolic capital) which gives those who possess it access to authority, status and positions in the military field. Accordingly, it also allows those who possess it to make judgments that count.

2) The debate reviewed under the headline *Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation* (cf. 2.2.1) showed that the emergence of actual or rhetorical warrior cultures challenged the Norwegian

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[344] Trond Bolle was killed in 2010 in an IED incident in Afghanistan. Posthumously he was the first to be awarded the Norwegian War Cross with Sword for actions performed since the end of World War II. That happened in 2011 after longer political/media debates about whether war awards should be used for performances in international operations or not. The award was given for his leadership of a special operation in support of an operation enduring freedom in Helmand, 2005-2006. Bolle seems to have taken a position as an ideal figure (hero) in the Norwegian Armed Forces in recent years.

identity as a civilized peace nation. Later, an article in a popular ALFA-male magazine caused another media debate on the Norwegian soldier's culture. This debate resulted in public statements from the Norwegian Armed Forces' political and military management that they were on the way to weeding out war romance among soldiers. The media-expressed allegations of inappropriate soldier culture caused emotional reactions among the officers involved in this study. As a result, the data material contains some relatively strong critiques of the Armed Forces Management.

Important aspects raised in the officers' critique were that the politicians who had decided to use military force needed to know what they are doing, and had to be sure that it was morally right to do it. Thereafter they should stand by their decisions and not try to draw back from the situation with "foolish words", meaning that the actions/consequences of war do not disappear by being framed in a peaceful rhetoric. Then, the decision makers should know that officers/soldiers did not go to Afghanistan for themselves, but because the decision makers had decided it; and they (the officers/soldiers) would lose their jobs (opportunities) if they did not join the operation. Officers also claimed that the mission in Afghanistan was solved in accordance with the Norwegian Armed Forces' core values of respect, responsibility and courage, though they experienced that the *military* management, in particular, did not live up to stated values and leadership ideals such as openness, care for their subordinated personnel and being "first among equals". In sum, it seems that the officers at the level investigated felt betrayed by the higher level of officers. The allegations of inappropriate culture also made an impact on some officers' attitudes toward the recruitment of more women, because recruitment of women has been linked to unwanted macho-cultures on some occasions. Accordingly, a feeling existed that the recruitment of women was a priority measure because females assumedly have a more appropriate culture than men.

3) Looking now to attitudes toward women in the military, these were found to be quite positive among most of the male officers as well as the male candidates in services with *few* women. It was argued that it was necessary to have women in the military due to the simple reason that the military would otherwise be based purely on group-thinking. Some believed women would "spice up the social milieu", yet it was also argued that creating "a cozy" milieu was not an appropriate reason to wish for more women in the workplace. Other men did not have a taste for "all-male cultures". They found "the talk" too brutal and vulgar and welcomed women since that calmed down the guys. Yet, most interviewees had, in addition, the opinion that it was fine to recruit more women *as long as they met the physical requirements*.

While some men did not have a taste for all-male culture, some women argued that a culture characterized by a direct, sharp and "brutal" humor where you can fling jokes at each other was one of the things they liked about the military. There also seemed to exist a feeling among *both* men and women that the culture they liked and were a part of was a bad culture, always talked about negatively. Most female officers were also skeptical about female culture which they believed was characterized by plotting, backbiting and conflicts.

Officers were concerned about plotting related to sexual relationships. It was argued that the problem was that soldiers/candidates living in barracks did not manage to separate spare time from service, which resulted in jealousy, drama and tension within the platoons and crying people in officers' offices. It was also argued that the problem with jealousy in the military was not due to the women but due to male officers who engaged in relationship with subordinate women. This caused friction among the men since it was then assumed that the women would get advantages, in a culture where equality is important.

Female candidates from battalions with few women had partly chosen their services due to desires to be the only/one of few women, and had intentionally stayed away from the Medical Battalion because of the expected number of women. Regarding the Medical Battalion, several informants reported that the high number of women *did something* to the social milieu. Also, in the Medical Battalion, where women were in the majority, male candidates expressed negative feelings toward women. In interviews the men said that they had nothing against women in the platoon or service, yet, they had the opinion that some of the smallest women were not physically qualified to manage some of the tasks involved in the service, resulting in extra strain and risk for them. However, what the men found particularly challenging was living in mixed-gender rooms.

Several reasons were raised as to why the men found it challenging to live in rooms with the women: it was not something they (the men) had expected; it created more barriers and challenged intimate zones, and; they needed to be more sensitive to avoid crying, conflicts and "interpretations". The latter meant that the men were afraid that friendly behavior would "mean" something. In addition they were annoyed because the women got up early to fix themselves up and woke the men who wanted to sleep longer, and in the evenings they gave them no room to lie on the bed and relax. Regarding the possibility to relax in the rooms, this was also experienced as a challenge by the introvert women in the platoon. This challenge was, thus, not necessarily related to gender but rather to different personalities, yet was perhaps experienced as such due to the high number of so-called extrovert women with a great need to gain attention. In any case, male candidates said in interviews conducted during the autumn that the men's dissatisfaction was growing and could finally explode. Returning to the battalion in the spring, the officer reported that the men had rebelled and engaged in gender related bullying and harassment. Although one of the officers said that (s)he had not previously experienced anything similar to the men-against-women situation that had occurred, second year female candidates in the Medical Battalion described a corresponding situation in which men had engaged in harassment and bullying. As a consequence the women gradually developed feelings of being a burden, and that they hampered/delayed the squads. One of the second years female candidates argued that it was perhaps "not a clever move" to gather all the women in the Medical Battalion when they were already seen as the "Girly Battalion". The female candidate pointed toward a possible reason why this study finds a more negative attitude toward women among men in the Medical Battalion, than in the other battalions. Male officers, candidates and conscripts reported that they experienced men from other battalions being attracted to the women in their battalion, and "heard things" from guys in other battalions/services when they were out at parties in Setermoen. It was reported that

they were called the girly platoon, the babe battalion, half gay, wimps, puny and a gang of girls who were in a cozy folk-high school. A male candidate said that living in rooms with women was something to be joked about by others.

9.5   Interpretations: Doing Uniformity through Style

The scope of chapters 8 and 9 was to look into regulation impositions an officer should obey in order to become *an ideal role model with "the right attitude"* (cf. 6), and in particular responses to these requirements. In this chapter theory and previous research will be used to interpret the findings in relation to macro-level structures, since a key point in Elias figurational sociology is that individual people's behavior codes and identity is in a mutually dependent relationship with the state and the supranational organizations.

The project departed from a debate on military culture following from the internationalization and professionalization of the Norwegian Armed Forces (cf. 2.1). Firstly, concerns were raised about the possible emergence of actual or rhetorical warrior cultures and identities in the Norwegian Armed Forces, something which challenged Norwegian identity as a civilized peace nation. Secondly, it was argued that the Norwegian Armed Forces had come under crossfire amid traditional requirements of uniformity and postmodern norms of (gender) diversity, and *the functional basis for uniformity was debated*. Following the debate, previous research on military identity and role conceptions was reviewed (cf. 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.4). The participants in this study were not asked about their own role conception, but the impression from the conducted fieldwork is that the role of *the instructor*, or *the teacher*, emerges as the key role for officer candidates and officers at the rank level investigated. This is, of course, a consequence of the officer's basic educational system being the site of investigation. Yet, as was shown in chapter 8.1.3 and 8.1.4 the officer candidates were trained to become "damn good instructors" (see also 7.1.1), and an important part of their job as sergeants was related to teaching basic military skills to conscripts and to facilitating their training. This observation is in accordance with Kjellberg (1965) who argues that although the role of the decision maker (in the present study discussed as The Leader, cf. 7.1.1) *appears* to be the dominant role in the military profession, this should not blur the importance of the teaching activities engaged in by military officers:

> There is no doubt in fact, that much of the activity of military officers may actually be looked upon as a teaching process. In many ways *the military organization is an educational institution during peacetime*, albeit of a particular kind. *Instructor and teacher are indeed the key terms for the occupation* (p. 286)[345].

Considering the officers' teaching role, Kjellberg argues that *military teaching is characterized by some particular features that can help us to understand why there is a*

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[345] Huntington also lists "the organizing, equipping, and training of the force" as the first duty and expertise of the military officer (cf. 3.2.1.1). The dominance of teaching and training activities in the Norwegian peacetime Army is probably also a reason why the military practice in which the actors engaged was experienced as a self-fulfilling development of the self and/or others, more than a process of molding into disciplined and obedient warriors (cf. 8.1.2, 8.2.1 and 8.2.1).

tendency toward development of greater uniformity among officers than other professional groups[346]. The first characteristic Kjellberg identifies is that the instruction in a military organization "tries to attach the students more closely to their teacher than is usually the case within other professions [...] *by presenting themselves more clearly as a model*" (p. 287). Secondly, Kjellberg explains that the process of teaching involves a transmittance of three elements: knowledge, skills and style, which also include a transmittance of a particular culture and the ability to master certain symbols. There is however, a "difference between the ability to manipulate the cognitive symbols implied in the attainment of knowledge, and the mastering of the affective symbols that are implied in style" (p. 286). Kjellberg clarifies that different subcultures in society are distinguished from each other according to uneven emphasis of these symbols. Difference and distinctions based on uneven emphasis on the affective symbols implied in style is exactly what Bourdieu investigates in the Distinction (Bourdieu, 1995). He explains that signs, symbols and distinctive property/behavior only become visible as a socially pertinent difference if it is perceived by someone who has learned to read the signs and symbols as a difference, and to classify a certain style as a distinction (cf. 4.2.3). Kjellberg's point is, however, that the officers' profession deviates from other professions that share a common knowledge and skills, because the common and crucial element in the officers' profession is style (see also 9.5.3).

Similarly to Kjellberg findings, we saw in chapter 6.3 that 'the power of example' was taught as a pedagogical method which the candidates could use to "manipulate behavior of others"[347], and the candidates were explicitly encouraged to *present themselves as models* for the conscripts who would be under their command in their service as sergeants. In chapter 7.3 it was argued that the power of example was a pedagogical method that implies that similarity to a normative role ideal will determine to what degree an officer will do the job as model appropriately, and that this reinforces the risk of social reproduction, and here we can add uniformity, in military education. However, since the officer candidates were to become models it was emphasized that they needed to have "the right attitudes" (cf. 6.2), something which can be seen *as an emphasis on style*. This argument is based on the "right attitudes" being linked to the code of conduct and guidelines for waging war in an appropriate way/style, granting nobility to the officers'/warriors' profession (cf. 6.4).

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[346] Kjellberg's (1965) study is based on a larger research project on Norwegian professions, in which it was observed that the officers had a greater tendency toward uniformity in ideals and values than other professional groups, even though the officers were *not* recruited from a "limited milieu" with a common social background. Therefore, Kjellberg found it relevant to relate the uniformity among the officers to *educational aspects* in the military profession. Kjellberg (1965) applied a theoretical model by Vilhelm Aubert (*The Profession as a Systems of Roles*) that "assumes a profession to be composed of quite different activities, thus forming a 'system of roles'" within each profession. According to the model, the activities in a profession can be differentiated in four basic activities which correspond to the role of the teacher, scientist, practitioner and decision maker. Kjellberg argues then that *the military differs from other professions in that the role of the teacher is a key role*, and moreover that some particular features emerge from *the teacher role being of a particular kind* in the military organization.

[347] The candidates learned how to use posture and voice to affect the behavior of others (cf. 6.3). In chapter 8.2.2 we saw candidates with previous experience as conscripts argue that the officer candidate's school involved a constant correction of their bodily behavior: how they should dress, stand, talk and walk, i.e. *style*. They believed it had to do with the position they were to have as sergeants, i.e. *role models*.

Kjellberg argues that the importance of style in military organizations is strengthened by three features related to the specific teaching and learning situation in which the officers act. Since the findings in the present study are in accordance with Kjellberg's findings, but also deviate on a crucial point related to development of common identity, the three features identified by Kjellberg will be used as a framework to interpret the findings presented as regulation impositions (cf. 6, 8 and 9). The first feature we will explore is related to nationalism – an area that is undergoing important change (cf. 9.5.1). The second feature is related to the learning situation taking place in a total institution (cf. 9.5.2). The third and final feature has to do with the need for control in a profession characterized by a diffuse and diverse expertise (cf. 9.5.3).

9.5.1 The Struggle over the Symbolic Violence in the Genesis of a Unipolar World Order

According to Kjellberg (1965), the first feature that characterizes military education and gives strength to the importance of style in the officer's profession is that military teaching seeks to indoctrinate a feeling of "national identity". Accordingly, the Norwegian Armed Forces has also been described as an instrument for nation building (Friis, 2000; Græger, 2011; Ulriksen, 2002) (cf. 2.1 and 3.2.1.4). However, the transformation undergone by the Norwegian Armed Forces since the end of the 1990s is characterized by a move *away* from nation building and popular defense toward professionalism and the execution of military power in the global area (cf. 2.1, 2.2.1 and 3.2.1.4). Also, in the international literature, Moskos, Williams and Segal (2000) argued that a characteristic of the 'postmodern military' (cf. 3.2.1.5) is that it *loosens the ties with the nation-state* and becomes increasingly androgynous in makeup and ethos; meanwhile the previous modern military was masculine in makeup and ethos and inextricably associated with the nation-state.

According to Elias, we cannot understand nationalism and the nation-states if we do not see them in relation to the social structure, identities and *we-feelings* they involve (that is: *who is on which team* in the power struggle illustrated in Elias' didactic game models (cf. 4.3.2)), and *how these change*. Elias (1994) explains that nationalism is the powerful system of collective beliefs (doxa) that grew from an *increased relationship of dependencies between the social classes* in the industrialized state societies in the 19th and 20th century. The relationship of dependencies emerged at a particular stage of society's development where identity and we-feelings changed as a consequence of the shifting power balance, when elites from the middle class replaced the traditional aristocracy and upper class elites, i.e. the genesis of the Western democratic national states:

> All in all, it resulted in the public identification with fellow citizens becoming stronger, while the ties between people of the same rank and class in other countries were weakened. This change in the pattern of "we" and "them" emotions, the identification and exclusion, was one of the crucial conditions for development of national feelings, values and belief doctrines (Elias & Habermas, 1994, p. 20).

The escalating globalization and individualization process we have witnessed since the demise of the Soviet Union changed global power balance/figurations, can be interpreted as a new stage in the development, described by Elias, in which the opposite change in we-feelings and ties between people seems to occur. In other words, it is possible to interpret the need to move military identity (we-feelings) away from nationalism toward a professionalism characterized by a common identity (we-feeling) among the officer corps (cf. 2.2.1 and 3.2.1.4) as being a reflection of a dissolution of the interdependency chains between the social classes/fellow citizens inside the national states[348], and the formation of new ties between people of the same rank and class across the globe. From this perspective it *can* be suggested that we are facing the formation of a warrior class for a global power elite.

An important point made by Elias (2000) is that changes in power relations and interdependency chains (processes of sociogenesis) are fundamentally interrelated with changes in emotion management, affect control, behavior codes, and, thus, perceptions of the civilized style (processes of psychogenesis) (cf. 5.3.2 and 4.3.2). This means that changes in the figuration of the military organization (sociogenesis) also change what it takes for an officer to be perceived as dealing with the world in an appropriate way, and, therefore, be perceived as a good or skillful officer (psycogenesis). In addition, Elias has explained how human beings' biological capacity of and dependency on learning and socialization results in dispositions in habitus to feel, judge and behave in a way that is perceived as appropriate in the society and field(s) where the socialization has taken place. Accordingly, Elias (1994) also talks of *national habituses*.

Both the debate on warrior culture (cf. 2.2.1) and the ALFA-case (cf. 5.4.1.2 and 9.2) show that imitating the Anglo-American warrior image, which emerged as an attractive military identity toward which (some) soldiers in international operations strive (see also Bjørnstad, 2005, 2011, cf. 3.2.1.3), was regarded as *inappropriate style* in Norwegian habituses. Norwegian soldiers have traditionally been measured against the image of the peaceful outdoor and polar hero, with Fridtjof Nansen and Roald Amundsen as examples of normative role models for national/military identity[349] (see Rones, 2013, cf. 3.2.1.3). It can accordingly be argued that Norway's traditional masculinity-ideal, which includes a distinct style, was challenged by the masculinity-ideal that occupies the hegemonic position in the global area, which also indicates a shift in power and the doing of difference and sameness. As Connell (2005b; 2009) notes, when power changes hegemonic masculinity changes accordingly, and for such reasons Connell (2005b) emphasizes that geopolitical struggle and changing power

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[348] The argument is also based on instabilities arising from "serious economic, social and political difficulties" being identified as a new threat image in NATO strategically concept of 1991 (cf. 2.1), as well as French's (2003) claim that the moral requirements of the soldiers become much murkier when warriors must battle "*desperate men and women*" (p. 116), who see no other way of advancing their objectives than employing terror attacks on civilian populations.

[349] Regarding national identity and the pedagogical use of normative role models in military education, Prividera & Howard (2006) explain that the nation-states went hand-in-hand with a national archetype which signified what kind of characteristics and types of people were valued in the nation. Prividera & Howard argue that the national archetypes in particular were *used to measure the performance and worth of military personnel*, stating "the closer one's fit to the archetype, the better the soldier is" (p. 31).

relations in contemporary globalization must be part of our understanding of masculinities and gender relations.

Considering women, it has been argued that Norwegian identity as a "world champion in gender equality"[350] was challenged when it appeared that Norway's achievements, in terms of gender equality in the Armed Forces, were not particularly impressive compared to the other forces in NATO operations following 9/11 (Skjelsbæk & Tryggestad, 2011), and which according to Höglund (2010) were *justified in a discourse of women's liberation*. Thus, in order to realize the image of Norway as a gender equal society in operations abroad[351]a strong emphasis was placed on increased recruitment of female soldiers from 2006/2007. The officer who believed my research was to support politicians who urged for the recruitment of more women as a quick-fix medical treatment of the "sick" macho culture (cf. 9.2) indicated that the simultaneous debates on warriors' style/appropriate military culture and recruitment of women have been perceived as a misrecognition of men and men's culture and style, which should, therefore and preferably, be fixed by women's more appropriate culture and style[352].

However, the allegations of inappropriate culture referred in particular to the professional Telemark Battalion, which consisted of enlisted soldiers. Thus, instead of interpreting the allegations of inappropriate culture as a misrecognition of men as a group, the allegations can instead be interpreted as a misrecognition of *men with less valued cultural capital (which holds aspects of class)*[353] whose 'uncultivated' rhetoric, parlance and style challenged the Norwegian classification of the operation in Afghanistan from a humanitarian policy of peace (cf. 2.2.1, in particular footnote 20) to war by presenting themselves as warriors (or by being presented as warriors in the ALFA-magazine). Regarding social class and recruitment of women, Enloe (2007) who writes on *Globalization & Militarism*, claims that the desire to recruit women to the military forces *across the globe* is not motivated chiefly by a desire to liberate women or to lessen masculinized privileges. By contrast, Enloe argues that:

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[350] Norway has ranked among the top three in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report for several consecutive years, and was one of the first countries in the world to open up all jobs and functions in the Armed Forces to women, with combat positions open to women since 1984 (Skjelsbæk & Tryggestad, 2011).

[351] Rewiewing the argument used in the debate on increased recruitment of women Skjelsbæk & Tryggestad (2011) refer to the Minster of Defence arguing: "Both in Norway and abroad our Armed Forces must be a display window for our democratic political system which is based on human rights, ethnic diversity and gender equality" (p. 62). Likewise White Paper 36 (2006-2007) reads: "In international operations, the Norwegian Armed Forces must be a reflection of our own democratic society. A good gender balance at all levels in our forces will demonstrate gender equality in practice" (p. 10).

[352] It is also possible to interpret White Paper No 36 (2006-2007) this way. As was shown in chapter 2.1, the White Paper reads that it is "natural to expect that key elements in the military culture […] reflect that the organization is dominated by men" (p. 9), that "increased integration of women will be an important part of the efforts to change the Armed Forces" (p. 9), and that "greater knowledge about the culture in the military will form a necessary basis for evaluating the need for targeted interventions to change any unwanted culture" (p. 21).

[353] Bad feelings related to the media debates on military culture were, in particular, expressed by male officers; several of whom were also in the category of male officers (referred to in chapter 7.2.3) who questioned the degree to which a class distinction was emerging in the Norwegian Armed Forces. In interpreting the results in chapter seven reference was made to Rice (2014b), who argued that quotas lead to "a realization of the classic argument that we need to make use of all of society's resources", since it *replaced mediocre men with more highly qualified women*. Thus, it was argued that replacing mediocre men with more highly qualified women may also mean that (cultural) competence found in lower-class men, such as practical skills, are replaced by middle-class women's more highly valued (cultural) competence, such as "the ability to talk" properly (cf. 7.3.2).

Women in state militaries – if they stay in the roles the state assigns them – are there because government strategists think they will enhance 'national security': (a) they will *make up for the loss of middle-class men* […] (c) they will allow the government not to recruit 'too many' men from those ethnic and racial groups the government's elite doesn't respect or trust, (d) they will bring with them *higher levels of formal education than many of the country's young men achieve*, and of course, (e) they will *help make the government's military look 'modern' in the eyes of many of its own citizens and observers abroad* (pp. 65-66).

It cannot be claimed that all these arguments apply directly to Norway[354]. Yet, they have an indirect impact because of Norway's interest in taking part in a "world championship in gender equality". Thus it is important to note that the argument Enloe (2007) identifies is based on the military authorities' assumption that middle-class women will be *more loyal to the prevailing relationships of dominance and submission,* and also will represent the state's Armed Forces better than lower-class men due to a higher level of education. According to Bourdieu, higher levels of education come together with the dominant group's cultural capital (cf. 7.3.2), which consists of appropriate style and, thus, perhaps also the rhetorical skills required to balance the thin line between officer/soldier and murderer (cf. 6.4). Enloe's point can serve as an explanation for why the 'postmodern military' becomes increasingly androgynous in makeup and ethos.

Furthermore, Enloe (2007) proposes using the concept of patriarchy[355] to illuminate the complexity of militarization and globalization, because "patriarchy is a concept that allows us to shine a bright light on *a particular way of organizing relationships*" (p. 66). She explains that patriarchy is 'a structure' dependent on the continued acceptance of "a particular set of beliefs [doxa] (about how and why humans and nature behave) and values (the 'best', 'most moral', 'most rational' ways for humans and nature to operate)" (pp. 66-67). Bourdieu has described how such structures (belief systems), or relationships of *naturalized (masculine/patriarchal) dominance,* work through symbolic violence, which involves *the*

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[354] Skjelsbæk & Tryggestad (2011) found four main arguments used for recruitment of more women in the Norwegian debate: 1) Women must have the same rights as men to all positions in the NorAF; 2) The NorAF need different experiences and knowledge that different cultural groups represent; 3) The NorAF should be *a display window for the Norwegian democratic political system*; 4) NorAF needs a diversity of human resources to be a dynamic and well-acting organization. White Paper 36 (2006-2007) summarizes the rationale behind why the NorAF need more women in three main aspects: 1) equal rights and legitimacy, 2) usefulness (ensuring competence from the entire population), 3) diversity.

[355] According to Enloe (2007), a patriarchal group is based on the beliefs that: "Women and men are intrinsically and unalterably different from one another. These presumably natural differences explain why women and men (rightly) play distinctly different roles in society. Men are natural and superior income earners, explorers […] public authorities, and heads of household because of their (allegedly) distinguished traits (e.g. greater rationality […] greater physical strength). Women's allegedly natural inclinations (e.g. homemaking, child rearing […]) make them valuable in home-life and in comforting men, who, it is patriarchally believed, shoulder the heavy burdens of public life. A woman gives this comfort willingly and gratefully, believers in patriarchal social orders imagine, because women are so thankful for (and dependent on) men – the men who provide them with protection […] and […] use their natural masculine skills to protect the entire society. Feminized gratitude is crucial to any patriarchal system. While many discuss these patterns and beliefs […] most seem reluctant to assign the entire system a specific name. Most of us prefer to talk about 'discrimination', or maybe 'sexism; that is we shy away from talking about an entire structure of societal relationships, and we are more comfortable discussing attitudes" (p. 67).

power to make a particular understanding of reality emerge as objective, true and legitimate through pedagogical actions and symbolic communication of recognition and misrecognition (cf. 4.2.1 and 4.2.3).

Extending Elias' perspective with that of Bourdieu (see Bourdieu's critique of Elias, cf. 4.3.5), the globalization of the military forces, with moral and ethical values brought in as justification and motivation for the use of military force (cf. 6.4), can be interpreted as *struggle over the monopolization of the symbolic violence* that conditions the monopolization of the legitimate physical violence in the genesis of a global figuration (a unipolar world order[356]), in other words, a civilization process at a global level[357]. In the doctrine that formalized the move of military identity away from nationalism toward professionalism, it was stated that "the moral dimension is related to combat being a battle of wills" (FFOD 07, p. 158). In other words it can be argued that the moral dimension is related to combat being a battle on the power to impose the symbolical violence, which according to Bourdieu constitutes the form of collective belief that structures the whole of social life (cf. 4.2.1 and 8.1.4). The promotion of Western/Norwegian values (cf. 6.4) can accordingly be interpreted as a struggle on the power to impose the symbolic violence that *places some people in authority over other people in a global gender and power hierarchy* (cf. 4.1.3). This is important because monopolization of the symbolic violence involves the power to set the law and rules. The argument that there is no agreement regarding who will have the global authority to *define the rules of the game* and through that sustain and reproduce the privileges of some groups of people at the expense of others, is reflected in the text *Vladimir Putin's call for new world order* (Russia and India Report, 2014):

> "After all, *a unipolar world is essentially an apology for a dictatorship over both people and countries*," the Russian president said.[…] Commenting on Putin's speech, President of the [Russian] Institute of Strategic Studies Alexander Konovalov pointed out that historically, shifts in world order had been determined on the battlefield. "Earlier, a new world order *that defined the rules of the game* and the behavior of world powers was developed as a result of major wars […] The Cold War is over, but there was no peace agreement, nor was there an agreed principle of mutual relations.

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[356] From a state of multipolarity (1815-1945) the world progressed to one of bipolarity (1945-1989), characteristic of the Cold War, to the situation of *military* unipolarity with the US as the only superpower after the demise of the Soviet Union (Lundestad & Jakobsen, 2013). Whether we are still in the genesis of a "world-state", or whether we are already facing a fall of "the Unipolar Moment" (Krauthammer, 2003), remains to be seen. Among others, Lundestad & Jakobsen (2003) refer to structural realists' argument that "unipolarity is unstable because it is progressing toward multipolarity, as other powers will seek to break the hegemony of the superpower". From Bourdieu's perspective, the stability of a unipolar world order would depend on the hegemon's ability to make a particular organization of social relationships of dominance and submission be perceived as natural, legitimate and acceptable despite its privileges and injustice. In other words it would depend on the *paradoxical submission* which is the consequence of symbolic violence (cf. 4.2.1).

[357] In *the Defence Sector's Values* (Ministry of Defence, 2011) it is claimed that *The Norwegian Armed Forces' mission is to promote values* (cf. 6.4), something which can be interpreted as a "mission civiliatrice" (see footnote 251), a struggle to impose the symbolic violence, i.e. the power to make a particular organization of social relationships emerge as objective, appropriate and legitimate.

> We need to create them, but *no one knows who should define this new world order*,"
> Konovalov said.

It can be argued that the struggle on the power to impose the symbolic violence is also why schools, education and religion have been involved in the battle. According to Bourdieu, these are the institutions that incorporate the belief systems (doxa and schemata of classification) that structure the world and its social relationships. Therefore, Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) argue that "all pedagogical action [...] is objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power" (p. 5). In other words, pedagogical actions are symbolic violence insofar as the actions seek to (re)produce symbolic systems of classification (culture) and, thus, the appreciation and misrecognition that contribute to constituting relationships of submission and dominance *including women's position in relation to men*.

A consequence of the Norwegian military being part of a global struggle on symbolic violence and systems of classifications and, accordingly, organizing of social relationships, is that officers are required to represent and support the interests that accord with the hegemonic/dominant Norwegian and Western will. In Bourdieu's words, this means that the officers must be loyal to the established order, with its relations of domination and subordination. The officer must "stay in the box" (cf. 8.1.2) and have the right attitude (cf. 6.2 and 6.4). Thus, it is also of particular interest that actors in the field are able to "swallow the culture" (cf. 8.1.2), which means that they should incorporate the dominant classification and value systems to a doxic character in their habitus. Yet, there was a discussion in the field regarding which culture the officers/candidates should conform to, and where their loyalty and identity should lie (cf. 8.1.2). This can be interpreted as a reflection of the restructuring of the desired "we-feelings" that follows the dissolution of the ties between the classes in the nation and an ensuing move from a national popular defense to a professional political tool for the stakeholders/ dominant group(s).

The warrior code that should "grant nobility to the warriors' profession" (French, 2003, p. 113) and help the warrior to *balance* on the very "thin line between a warrior and a murderer" (p. 117) in the battle against "desperate men and women" (p. 116) involved classification of shameful and honorable actions. According to a chaplain this was the culture the military wanted to "disseminate as a way of thinking" in order to ensure that the soldiers would fight in a moral (civilized) way. This means that becoming an officer is not just about acquiring the practical skills and knowledge monopolized by the military profession. It is also about learning and adopting the classification and value system (culture) that grants a civilized status to the West and a terrorist status to the opponents (cf. 6.4). According to Bourdieu, the embodiment of the legitimate schemata for judgment and classification tends to guarantee "correctness" and "appropriateness" in the individuals' practice and style. But, as Elias has claimed, the appropriateness changes when the power relations change, and thus where Kjellberg found that the military profession tried to indoctrinate a national style and identity, this study differs from Kjellberg by that it is conducted in a time where the gender and class

relations that characterized the traditional nation-state are in jeopardy, and accordingly also the officer's appropriate identity and we-feelings.

9.5.2   Behavior Standards in the Total Institution

The second feature that strengthens the emphasis on style in military education is that military teaching takes place in a "total institution", something which involves the whole person in all aspects of daily life (Kjellberg, 1965). As explained by Goffman (1961), a central feature of total institutions is a breakdown of the kinds of barriers that ordinarily separate the three spheres of sleep, play/spare time and work, which elsewhere is a basic social arrangement in modern society, and which tends to occur in different places with a different set of co-participants and under different authority. Kjellberg explains that:

> The identification in such an institution, which is actually required from all members
> even at the lowest level, presumes in itself *an indoctrination of common attitudes and*
> *standardized behaviors; in a word – of style* (p. 288).

According to Goffman, entering a total institution involves a radical shift in the inmates' *moral career* which also requires a change in the beliefs they have concerning themselves and significant others, and is conditioned by three distinctive elements. Firstly, any member of the staff class (the officers) has certain rights to discipline any member of the inmate class (the candidates/conscripts), while in modern society the adult himself is typically under the authority of a single or a few immediate superiors in the work place. The result is that the authority of behavior corrections are more continually present in a total institution, which is perhaps also why the former conscripts experienced being *constantly scrutinized* (cf. 8.2.2).

Secondly, Goffman (1965) argues that "the authority of corrective sanctions is directed to a great multitude of items of conduct of the kind that are constantly occurring and constantly coming up for judgment; in brief, authority is directed to matters of dress, deportment, social intercourse, manners and the like", something we have seen expressed by actors in the field in the present study (cf. 8.2.2 and 8.2.3).

In this respect, Kjellberg argues that the officers learn to become professional officers not so much through training, but by living with other officers. He proceeds that common attitudes and standardized behaviors *become functional* due to the situation of being in a total institution. As explained by Goffman, the inmates, or actors, must undergo a common cultivation and discipline process in order to fit into the administrative system which exists in the total institution, and this process involves an explicit focus on equal dress, equal system and order, equal manner and *equal daily routines*; in other words an explicit focus on equal style.

Most of the adaption issues and tensions between individuals that were found in this study were related to living life in a total institution and *not* the professional education or work in which the actors engaged (cf. 9.3.1). In particular, the mixed-gender rooms caused a tension that can be explained by the total institution's quest for relatively equal daily routines and resting times in the rooms, and the fact that women and men are *"forced" to engage in*

unequal "acts of recognition", which impacts daily routines. Bourdieu (1998; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) explains that the social work of inculcation and socialization imposes upon men and women different sets of dispositions in habitus with regard to which *social games* are held to be crucial for them to engage in, in order to gain recognition. When the women put effort into "little things men do not bother about" (cf. 9.3.1), it is likely to be a result of women being caught in a game of femininity which involves an illusio that drives them to follow some logics, rules and norms the men do not understand, since they are not engaged in that game. Regarding management of the body Shilling (1997; 2003) argued that the body is a marker of difference (cf. 4.1.2). He referred to Elias who explained that when society became more complex and people became more and more interdependent, courtiers developed "an extraordinarily sensitive feeling for the status and importance that should be attributed to a person in society on the basis of his bearing, speech, manner or appearance" (p. 135) (cf. 4.3.3). According to Bourdieu (1978; 1995; 1998) this resulted *in "the body for others"* utilized in an *aesthetic stratification* of the social world (cf. 4.2.3 and 4.3.4).

In the aesthetic stratification of the social world, men and women must manage their bodies in distinct but *different ways*, and as Bourdieu notes, women tend to be encouraged *more* than men to develop their bodies as *objects* of perceptions for others. Therefore, when the women get up thirty to forty-five minutes before the men to fix themselves (and thus wake up and irritate the men) (cf. 9.3.1), it can be considered a "forced investment" that the women *mus*t make in order to be judged as *respectable* women, because their feminine/identity and status are determined by *others' valuation of their appearance* ("the body for others"). Also, "the little things", such as tidiness, system and order, may be important for the women because they profit from making an effort, and may sense being subject to misrecognition if they do not invest in their bodily appearance and "the little things" that are expected from a respectable women and a proper "mother and wife". As Skeggs (2004) notes, respectability is one of the most ubiquitous signifiers of class, i.e. distinct style. It is structured in feelings and dependent on others' validation of the self. Thus, Skeggs finds that messages about class and femininity impact directly on women's daily routines. As we have seen this also applies to women in the military.

Considering relationship between men and women in mixed-gender rooms, Hellum (2014) finds that barriers and sexual tensions between men and women decline in this setting, meanwhile Lilleaas & Ellingsen (2014) find that the gender-mixed rooms seem to undo gender relations among men and women. This was found in situations where men were in the majority and the women adapted in accordance with the men's premises. In the Medical Battalion the women were in a slight majority which seemed to put the men in a threatened position, as claimed by their officer (cf. 7.2.2). As a result, the men engaged in acts that can be interpreted as efforts to reconstruct their dominance: the demonstration of physical superiority, bullying and harassment (cf. 7.2.2 and 9.3.1). The impression gained from the tensions and struggles observed in this study is that in situations where the men obeyed, subordinated or adapted to women in authority/power (as well as that of higher ranked male officers), they used misogynistic and other types of unfavourable comments to reconstruct their symbolic dominance and turn hierarchies up-side down (cf. 8.2.4). Regarding the male

candidates' harassment and bullying of the female candidates in the Medical Battalion, this is likely to have been further amplified by a need to reconstruct their classification as masculine in a situation where the battalion and service/expertise with which they were associated was classified as feminine, puny, weak and "half gay". A classification which had the following consequence, expressed by one of the male candidates: "But it is also that *we* are seen as gang of girls, and that *all are just girls* in the Medical Battalion" (cf. 9.3.1).

The third feature Goffman (1961) identifies as a characteristic of total institutions is that "misbehaviors in one sphere of life are held against one's standing in other spheres". In particular this appears as a challenge related to sexual relationships between military personnel, something which we saw in chapter 9.3 as being a cause of tension and jealousy. As one of the officers explained, "they [candidates/soldiers] must certainly have relationships in their spare time, but they manage not to separate it from the service. And then some become jealous […] it created a split in the platoon […] and so it ends up that people sit and cry in my office" (cf. 9.3). Like Las Vegas, Setermoen garrison has its "Strip", but what happens on "the Strip" in the total institution will not stay there, it will follow the actors directly into the work place and "the home", because the total institution breaks down the separation between the three spheres of sleep/sex, play/spare time and work.

9.5.3   Control through Style

The third feature that strengthens emphasis on style in military education is the diffuse/diverse expertise of the military profession:

> One might have believed that professional military training has a very specific and
> delimited goal, but the opposite seems to be the case. The training includes knowledge
> in widely heterogonous fields, presumably a reflection of the fact that military
> education has always been in the center of conflicting demands (Kjellberg, 1965, p.
> 289).

In other words, the struggle on what should be required to do a military officer role appropriately is not a new struggle, something which is also illustrated by the classic debate on 'functional requirements and social norms' reviewed in chapter three (cf. 3.2.1.1). According to Kjellberg, the conflicting demands have been seen "particularly as a result of the struggle between general and specialized education" (p.5)[358]. He uses the example that the curriculum at the Norwegian Military Academy (established in 1750) included courses in mathematics, artillery, fencing and dancing, which according to Kjellberg could be seen as an outcome of the compromises that were built into the professional training: "one for the officer as a specialized technical expert, the other for a general education of the officer towards a type of gentleman-ideal" (p. 288). Training in dance and tactfulness remains a course at the Military Academy today, and the officer candidates took part in a course in "dining and

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[358] Kjellberg notes that his point was suggested by Elias (1950) in his study of the Naval Profession (cf. 4.3.4). Elias argued that power ratio between different groups with different demands either leads to an outcome based on compromises or continued conflict.

etiquette" during the fieldwork that was conducted at Setermoen. As of 1965 Kjellberg stated that in spite of the extensive changes the profession has experienced, identification with a specific culture has remained one of the military profession's central features. He proceeds:

> One of the most interesting aspects of the profession now is, indeed, the range of its skills, which extend from detailed technical knowledge to managerial expertise. Each of the military officers might, in fact, have a deep insight into many different fields, but there is something diffuse in the expertise of the profession as a whole. *Its general content is to be found in a particular culture, where the crucial element is style. This means that the general trait to be imparted into the training is the "by-product" of the learning process, and something beyond the acquiring of specific knowledge and skills* (p. 289).

Accordingly, the military profession *differs from other professions in that sameness is done through a common style instead of common occupational expertise* (see also 9.5).

Regarding the debate on the functional basis of uniformity versus diversity (cf. 2.2.2), Kjellberg suggests that the need for a uniform or common culture is strongly felt in the military profession

> because the general content of the profession has become more and more abstract, and the need to uphold a professional cohesion increasingly important. The professional culture or "military mind" may be looked upon as *a device by which experts in different fields are kept together*, in spite of their inborn tendency toward divergent occupational orientations. At the same time such a common culture may help to define the particular identity of the military officers in relation to the environment, something which becomes rather precarious in a situation in which the profession in its expertise touches upon so many different fields. […] From this point of view *one could look at the general aspect of the training as a mechanism, envisaged to support a control within the profession* (p. 290).

Important points made by Kjellberg in the quote above, and which I would argue also apply to the present study, are firstly that the general aspect in the military training is "found in a particular culture, where the crucial element is style" (p. 289), and secondly, that "one could look at the general aspect of the training *[style] as a mechanism, envisaged to support a control within the profession* (p. 290). The latter is why I will argue that this study supports Belkin's (2012) claim that *"the military establishes social control over the troops" (p. 25) through masculine beliefs combined with feminine practises.* My point is that according to Bourdieu (1998) femininity is a regulation mechanism that is based on morals and shame, utilized to *establish control over women through emphasis on appropriate style*, which also seems to be the case for soldiers/officers (cf. 8.1.2). A feminist critique against Bourdieu is that he propertizes and objectifies women. A critique against previous research on military masculinity could, however, be that soldiers/officers have been placed in a hegemonic position instead of being propertized and objectified in a way similar to Bourdieu's

objectification and propertization of women. As was stated by the officer who felt a pressure to join the operation in Afghanistan, he was *owned* by his battalion (cf. 9.1). According to Skeggs (2004) ownership is intimately connected with morality (what is proper to propertizes), and she, thus, argues that morality needs attention because it is coded into social relations by those who have the symbolic power to *use culture as a resource* and to decide that certain characteristics have value and can be made *proper*. This is a perspective that seems fruitful for further investigation in a situation where morals and ethics were brought in as justification and motivation for the use of military force (cf. 6.4 and 9.5.1). Regarding objectification, Bourdieu argues that the women's role, as *capital bearing objects for others,* is to *convert economic capital into symbolic capital through the display of proper taste and style*. Similarly, as capital bearing objects (property) of the military authorities Norwegian troops are required to display an appropriate culture/style, including an appropriate gender balance (cf. 9.2). If our Armed Forces are to be a reflection of our democratic political system" and "demonstrate gender equality in practice" (White Paper No 36, (2006-2007), p. 10) more women are needed in the ranks. If our Armed Forces are to be able to walk the thin line between warriors and murderers needed for the military operations to be classified as human and legitimate (civilized), the military personnel must embody the appropriate attitude and style. Thus it is required that the soldiers/officers are "*well-trained, physically, mentally, ethically and morally*" (Innst. S. nr. 234, (2003-2004), p. 3.8) (cf. 6.4).

Chapter 10:

Conclusion

10.1   What is at Stake in the Social Struggle over Who Can Take Part?

Two research questions were developed to fix the direction and limit the content of the micro-level investigation:

1. What is required from men and women respectively to do an officer role appropriately?
2. How do men and women with different forms of capital respond to different formal and informal requirements in the military field?

By examining these questions I intended to get a better understanding of the military field's classification and value systems, and how these were accepted, challenged and guarded. Through this the aim of the dissertation was to investigate *what is at stake in the social struggle over who should be allowed to enter into the military profession/field.*

Considering research question number one, the result shows that officer candidates are encouraged to become normative role models with "the right attitudes" for the next generation of soldiers to imitate. Doing the job as a normative role model (officer) appropriately is dependent on the ability to embody power resources (ability to dominate) and obey regulation impositions (willingness to subordinate) at the same time. Accordingly, the study supports Belkin's (2012) claim that military masculinity is structured by contradiction, and that the military compels soldiers/officers to embody masculinity and femininity at the same time. This claim is based on an understanding where masculinity is seen as a belief system that comes with impositions of accumulating power resources and striving for dominance, victory, honor and recognition, through which one is being classified as masculine. Femininity is understood as a form of regulation that is based on morals and shame, and used to establish control over women and troops through an emphasis on appropriate culture, attitudes and style.

Considering the emphasis on appropriate culture, attitudes and style, this project departed from a debate on *Warrior Culture in a Peace Nation,* in which the Defence Minister seemed to interpret warrior culture as a culture in which slain enemies were celebrated. Finding such a culture undesirable, she advocated for a professional military culture in which the issue of taking life was treated with deep seriousness, and the community recognized the effort in a dignified manner. Following the debate, Edström et al (2009b) questioned what the terms professional culture and warrior culture really mean and contain. The study showed that the warrior culture in question disseminated in the investigated local field referred to a warrior code with the purpose "to grant nobility to the warriors' profession" (French, 2003, p. 113), and help the warrior to balance on the very thin "line between a warrior and a murderer" (French, 2003, p. 117). With Bourdieu's approach it follows that *being classified as officer/soldier versus murderer, civilized versus uncivilized, appropriate versus inappropriate, constitutes a stake in the struggle on soldiers' culture, attitudes and style*.

It has also been found that the requirement of the officers to embody "the right attitudes" is linked to the changed mission and use of military power that followed the end of the Cold War, when morals and ethics were brought in as justification and motivation for the use of military force, with White Paper No 42 (2003-2004). This meant that promotion of Western/Norwegian values was adopted as security political interests. Extending Elias' perspective with that of Bourdieu (see Bourdieu's critique of Elias), it is argued that the Norwegian Armed Forces are, accordingly, taking part in a struggle over the monopolization of the symbolic violence that 1) places some people in authority over other people in a global, gender and power hierarchy, and 2) conditions the monopolization of legitimate physical violence in the (possible) pacification of the global society, i.e. a civilization process at a global level.

As a consequence of the military forces being part of a struggle over the power to impose symbolic violence and, thus, the classification system that structures social relationships, it is required that the officers represent and support the interests that are in accordance with the hegemonic/dominant Norwegian and Western will. In Bourdieu's words this means that the officers must be loyal to the established order, with its relations of domination and subordination. Thus, a requirement is that the officers must "stay in the box", have "the right attitude", and be able to "swallow the culture", which means that an officer should incorporate the dominant classification and value systems to a doxic character in his/her habitus.

Yet, at the same time as officers are required to subordinate to the established order and obey regulation impositions, they must also be able to dominate. The contradictory requirements are reflected in the culture being referred to as 1) a performance culture in which the "power of example" is used as a pedagogical method to encourage winning instinct and accumulation of power resources, such as physical fitness, and 2) a feedback culture in which buddy evaluations and buddy rankings are actively used as a pedagogical method to socialize the officer candidates into the norms accepted in the social fellowship.

Considering research question number two, the requirement to embody power resources and become a winner and a leader results in internal competition and struggles for positions within the local hierarchy. The results further indicate that the different actors "sense their place" in the local hierarchy, with the result that those who embody the kinds of capital (resources) that offer recognition and success continue; whereas those who lack the appreciated capital or find the competition bothersome voluntarily choose to leave the field.

Regarding responses to the requirement to obey regulation impositions, the field was characterized by a voluntary submission and adaption to the requirements, as well as a struggle to maintain (reproduce) the field's traditional criteria for valuation, in particular physical prowess. An exception can be found among actors, male and female, officers and candidates, who had previous experience as conscripts. These actors seemed to be more likely to question the rules and logic of the field. They also seemed to differ from the rest in that they had chosen to become officers (candidates) due to good fellowship and a mastering of practical skills during conscription, as well as the possibility to work with development of other people. Those who joined the Officer Candidate School directly, and in particular the females, seemed to be driven by personal challenges, competition and aspiration to perform and prove themselves. Several women desired to be "one of the guys" and were, accordingly, fine without any female competitors.

Another finding in the study is the high degree of consistency between the military management documents that seek to create a network which speaks and acts as one unit, such as the doctrine FFOD 07, and the requirements and opinions promoted by actors in the local sites. On the other hand, there was a resistance toward the political management ambitions to change traditional requirements and criteria of valuation, which aim for a wider combination of skills and qualities than those held by the traditional soldier. For instance, it was argued that women are welcome *as far as they meet the (physical/set) requirements*. It can be concluded that changed requirements alter the established order and jeopardize the kind of capital that gives *certain people* access to social mobility and position in the military hierarchy, at the cost of people with other kinds of qualifications and characteristics. This results in a struggle to reproduce the traditional tests and valuation system that measure and certify the dominant group's (male) characteristics and traits.

Moreover, it was found that passing a selection process based on physical and mental prowess, in competition with many others, offered the officers (candidates) the possibility to be identified with the ideal of the "chosen military body". This seems to be an exclusive identity that calls forth an interest to invest in the military game and conform to the field's inherent rules and requirements. However, "the chosen military body" is an identity that depends on the military measuring and certifying one's physical capital. The result shows that female officer candidates, who had struggled through the selection and were proud being among the chosen few, had been told they had nothing to brag about, no reason to be proud, because they were allegedly not selected among the best but admitted by a quota for women. In other words, their claim to authority was refused due to an assumption that their physical capital had not been measured and certified, at least not to the same standard as men. This

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seems to be a reason why it was found that some/many women in the field are strongly against affirmative actions, decline to be "lifted up", request to work hard for their positions in the field and advocate for maintenance of "harsh physical requirements" that apply equally to all.

As a consequence, women contribute to the reproduction of the field's traditional valuation criteria and classification schema, and help to close the field for women and men with other kinds of capital. It can be argued that this is an effect of symbolic violence which calls forth a submission to the dominants group's interest, and that advocating for retention of "set requirements", in this respect, is an act of recognition. On the other hand, if harsh physical test requirements do not apply to all, the possibility to be identified with "the chosen military body", and symbolize possession of physical capital just through wearing the military uniform is at stake. And this seems to be an exclusive identity desired by several women. Thus, it is likely to suggest that some of the women also work for their own interest of being identified as "the chosen military body", or "one of the guys" when they request things be "absolutely clear cut in terms of who is allowed to enter and who is allowed to wear the uniform and who is to hold the ranks".

Furthermore, it was shown that several small-sized women who had been admitted as officer candidates in the Medical Battalion were subjected to bullying and harassment by the male candidates, who used their superior physical capacity to define who was in the field for legitimate reasons, and to "psyche out" the smallest women. According to their officer, the small-sized women had a strong motivation to disprove the stereotype of being a cute and petite girl by joining the military. It is argued that these women enter the military field with bodies that stand in direct contrast to skills and qualities associated with military requirements. Thus, they jeopardize the belief system on which the military's capacity for legitimating personal claims to authority and a powerful and masculine identity depends. With their bodies women, and particularly "the cute and petite girls", set at stake the classification of the military profession as masculine, tough and physically demanding. Accordingly, they also challenge the belief system on which the production of fighting spirit is based.

10.2   Contributions and Suggestions for Further Research

This study shows: 1) how military education is arranged with mentally and physically demanding tests that offer status and pride to those who succeed; 2) how the illusio of the 'chosen body' calls forth an interest to make investment in the military game and conform to the field's inherent rules and requirements; and 3) how (petite) female bodies disrupt the production of masculine beliefs that serve to produce fighting spirit and an attractive military identity. This is the contribution presented by this dissertation to the field of sport sociology. Further research could explore expectations of the military and the military body, and the production of these expectations in sport and/or the larger civil society. The image of the military that is produced through sport, schools and popular culture affects the types of interests recruits and candidates look to pursue upon joining the military. Such research would therefore also be of interest to military authorities, since new recruits seem to enter the military institution with stereotypical expectations of military service and gender. Another target for additional research related to the production of ideas about military service and gender could be the pedagogical material used in the military education. For instance the *Handbook for the foot squad in the field* opens with the text: "The squad leader […] must mold *his men* to become physically tough and mentally robust soldiers" (The Army, 2010, p. 9), thus making it clear that a squad leader is a he and the members are men.

Regarding the research field of military sociology and "gender and military issues", the present dissertation contributes with called for empirical research on relationships among both men and women in the military, including relationships between the two. A topic that did not receive enough attention in the present research was the relationship between personnel with different personalities and appetites for competition, recognition and attention. Moreover, I encourage research into how the breakdown of barriers that usually separate spare time and service, i.e. characteristics of the total institutions, affects men's and women's professional careers.

Finally, this study offers a snapshot into the extremely complex field of Globalization and Militarism. There is no doubt that debate and further analysis is needed regarding whose interests our action and military operations are contributing to; who benefits and who suffers? As was stated by one of the interviewed officers, "we need to know what we are doing, and if it is morally right to do it."

Attachments

Attachements

Attachment 1:   Approval from Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD)

Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS
NORWEGIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA SERVICES

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Vår dato: 25.06.2010   Vår ref: 24438 / 2 / IB   Deres dato: Deres ref:

TILRÅDING AV BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 20.05.2010. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

24438	*Militære identiteter, kropp og kjønn - en sosiologisk analyse av kulturer i Det norske forsvaret*
Behandlingsansvarlig	*Norges idrettshøgskole, ved institusjonens øverste leder*
Daglig ansvarlig	*Nina Rones*

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet, og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger vil være regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsforskriften. Personvernombudet tilrår at prosjektet gjennomføres.

Personvernombudets tilråding forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, vedlagte prosjektvurdering - kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven/-helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et eget skjema, http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/forsk_stud/skjema.html. Det skal også gis melding etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet.

Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database, http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/prosjektoversikt.jsp.

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 31.12.2014, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Vennlig hilsen

Bjørn Henrichsen   Inga Brautaset

Kontaktperson: Inga Brautaset tlf: 55 58 26 35
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Attachment 2: Information Sheet for the Participant Observation

ØNSKER DU Å DELTA I FORSKNINGSPROSJEKTET

OM Å BLI OG OM Å VÆRE MILITÆR?

I forbindelse med prosjektet *Om å bli og om å være militær* som gjennomføres ved Norges idrettshøgskole Forsvarets institutt, er det behov for å fremskaffe forskningsbasert kunnskap knyttet til militære kulturer og identiteter. Jeg, Nina Rones, har fått tillatelse fra FST og HBS til å foreta en observasjonsstudie som fokuserer på militær kultur og identitet i befalsskoleutdanningen. Observasjonsstudien innebærer ikke noe merarbeid for deg, men for at jeg skal kunne notere ned og bruke observasjonsinformasjon om deg/ gitt av deg i det videre forskningsarbeidet, kreves det at du gir ditt samtykke til dette. I hovedsak vil jeg notere ned meninger og holdninger som utrykkes tilknyttet militær kultur og identitet.

All informasjon du gir vil bli behandlet strengt konfidensielt og anonymiseres slik at det ikke vil være mulig å gjenkjenne deg som opphavsmann/-kvinne til noe av det som gjengis i rapporteringen. Det er Norges idrettshøgskole som er behandlingsansvarlig institusjon, og informasjonen skal utelukkende brukes for forskningsformål. Alt datamaterialet vil bli anonymisert ved prosjektslutt.

Det er helt frivillig å delta i prosjektet og du kan på hvilket som helst tidspunkt trekke deg uten å måtte begrunne dette nærmere. Dersom du trekker deg vil alle innsamlede data og sitater fra deg bli slettet.

Prosjektet er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste A/S og har fått prosjektnummer 24438. Prosjektet forventes å være avsluttet i desember 2015.

Jeg håper du synes dette høres interessant ut og ønsker å bidra til prosjektet ved å gi meg anledning til å benytte observasjoner jeg gjør og som du inngår i, i forskningen.

Har du spørsmål i forbindelse med denne henvendelsen, prosjektet for øvrig, eller ønsker å bli informert om resultatene fra undersøkelsen når de foreligger, kan du gjerne ta kontakt med meg på adressen under.

Med vennlig hilsen
Nina Rones
Doktorgradskandidat
Norges idrettshøgskole Forsvarets institutt
Postboks 4014 Ullevål stadion
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Attachment 3: Informed Consent Form for the Interviews

ØNSKER DU Å DELTA SOM INFORMANT I FORSKNINGSPROSJEKTET

OM Å BLI OG OM Å VÆRE MILITÆR?

I forbindelse med doktorgradsprosjektet *Om å bli og om å være militær* som gjennomføres ved Norges idrettshøgskole Forsvarets institutt er det behov for å innhente data gjennom intervjuer. Du er en av dem jeg kunne tenke meg å gjøre et forskningsintervju med. Intervjuet vil ha en varighet på omtrent en time.

All informasjon du gir vil bli behandlet strengt konfidensielt og anonymiseres slik at det ikke vil være mulig å gjenkjenne deg som opphavsmann/-kvinne til noe av det som gjengis i rapporteringen. Det er Norges idrettshøgskole som er behandlingsansvarlig institusjon, og informasjonen skal utelukkende brukes for forskningsformål. Navnet ditt blir ikke lagt inn på data! Hvis du samtykker til det vil samtalen bli tatt opp på lyd. Lydfilen vil bli behandlet konfidensielt og slettes ved prosjektslutt.

Det er helt frivillig å delta i prosjektet og du kan på hvilket som helst tidspunkt trekke deg uten å måtte begrunne dette nærmere. Dersom du trekker deg vil alle innsamlede data og sitater fra deg bli slettet.

Prosjektet er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste A/S og har fått prosjektnummer 24438. Prosjektet forventes å være avsluttet i desember 2015.

Jeg håper du synes dette høres interessant ut og ønsker å bidra til prosjektet ved å gi meg anledning til å intervjue deg. I så fall er det fint om du skriver under på den vedlagte samtykkeerklæringen. Ved å skrive under på denne samtykkeerklæringen samtykkes det kun for at informasjon om prosjektet er mottatt, og at du ønsker å delta som informant gjennom ett intervju.

Har du spørsmål i forbindelse med denne henvendelsen, prosjektet for øvrig, eller ønsker å bli informert om resultatene fra undersøkelsen når de foreligger, kan du gjerne ta kontakt med meg på adressen under.

Med vennlig hilsen
Nina Rones
Norges idrettshøgskole Forsvarets institutt
Postboks 4014 Ullevål stadion
Tlf. 23 26 21 06
E-post: nina.rones@nih.no

SAMTYKKEERKLÆRING

DELTAKELSE I FORSKNINGSPROSJEKT

OM Å BLI OG OM Å VÆRE MILITÆR

Jeg har hatt anledning til å lese informasjonsskrivet om prosjektet Om å bli og om å være militær som gjennomføres ved Norges idrettshøgskole Forsvarets institutt, og samtykker med dette i å delta i prosjektet slik det er beskrevet.

Jeg kjent med at intervjuet blir tatt opp på lydbånd for så å bli transkribert og anonymisert.

Jeg er kjent med at det er frivillig å delta og å undertegne denne samtykkeerklæringen, og at det ikke medfører noen personlig fordel eller ulempe for meg om jeg undertegner eller ikke.

Jeg er kjent med at jeg når som helst kan trekke meg fra deltakelse i prosjektet.

Signatur ………………………………………….

Attachment 4: Interview Guide – First Year Candidates – Mid Phase

INTERVJUGUIDE – ELEVER 1. ÅR

INNLEDNING OG INFORMASJON

Takk for at du tar deg tid til dette intervjuet.

Jeg er doktorgradsstipendiat ved Norges idrettshøgskole Forsvarets institutt, og ønsker å gjennomføre dette intervjuet som en del av et prosjekt hvor jeg ser nærmere på militær kultur og det å bli og det å være militær

Jeg har taushetsplikt og er ansvarlig for at informasjon du gir behandles konfidensielt, anonymiseres, utelukkende brukes til forskning, og ikke kommer på avveie.

Det du sier i intervjuet vil ikke ha noen form for betydning i forhold til vurderingen av deg på befalsskolen, og jeg vil ikke dele informasjonen du gir med noen militære ledere.

Sitater som gjengis i artikler eller avhandling vil anonymiseres, slik at de ikke skal kunne knyttes tilbake til deg.

Det er helt frivillig å delta i prosjektet og du kan på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt trekke deg uten å måtte begrunne dette nærmere. Dersom du trekker deg vil alle innsamlede data og sitater fra deg bli slettet.

Dersom du tillater det, ønsker jeg å ta et lydopptak av samtalen. All informasjon vil bli anonymisert under avskrivingsprosessen. Jeg vil ikke lese inn ditt navn på lydopptaket.

Si ifra dersom du underveis i samtalen vil at jeg skal slå av lydopptakeren.

Du kan la være å svare på spørsmål underveis i intervjuet dersom du ønsker det.

Skrive under samtykkeerklæring

INNLEDENDE SPØRSMÅL

Hvor gammel er du?

Kan du si litt om din utdanning og eventuelt yrkesbakgrunn?

Kan du si litt om dine interesser og hobbyer?

ÅRSAKER TIL Å VELGE BEFALSSKOLEN

Hva var det som så gjorde at du søkte befalsskolen?

Når er første gang du kan huske at du ble interessert i befalsskolen?

Hva var det som gjorde at det ble Hærens befalsskole (og ikke luft, sjø, HV, gjennomgående krigsskole eller annet)?

Hva var det som gjorde at det ble linje for sanitet/panser?

Hvorfor eller på hvilken måte tror du dette er en utdanning som passer for deg?

Hadde du kommet til å starte på befalsskolen hvis du ikke hadde kommet inn på denne linjen (panser/sanitet), men fikk tilbud om en annen skole/linje? Hvis nei; hvorfor ikke?

OPPLEVELSE AV TJENESTEN

Hva synes du om militæret så langt?

Er befalsskolen slik som du forventet?

Hvordan eller på hvilke måter svarer det til forventningene?

På hvilke måter svarer det ikke til forventningene?

Hva har du likt best av det dere har vært med på så langt? Hvordan/hvorfor?

Hva har du likt minst av det dere har vært med på så langt? Hvordan/hvorfor?

Hvordan synes du selv du klarer deg så langt?

Kan du beskrive en hendelse/situasjon hvor du var spesielt fornøyd med dine egne prestasjoner?

Kan du beskrive en hendelse/situasjon hvor du ikke var så fornøyd med hvordan du presterte?

Opplever du at du har noen spesielle fordeler i forhold til å gå på befalsskolen?

Opplever du at du har noen spesielle utfordringer i forhold til å gå på befalsskolen?

Hva har vært det tøffeste eller vanskeligste så langt?

Hva har vært det letteste så langt?

Tror du at du har noen spesielle fordeler i forhold til å skulle fungere som befal i Forsvaret?

Tror du at du har noen spesielle utfordringer i forhold til å skulle fungere som befal i Forsvaret?

Hvordan opplevde du FOS?

HVEM PASSER/PASSER IKKE?

Hvis du tenker tilbake på FOS:

Hva tror du befalet la vekt på når de vurderte deg som egnet for befalsskolen? (egenskaper, ferdigheter, kunnskaper, evner)

Hva tror du gjorde at aspiranter på FOS som ikke kom inn ble vurdert som uegnet, ikke passende for befalsskolen?

Var det noen på laget ditt på FOS som du var overrasket over at ikke kom inn? (Hva er det med denne/disse personene som gjør at du trodde det kom til å gå bra?)

Var det noen på laget ditt på FOS som du var overrasket over at kom inn? (Hva er det med denne/disse personene som gjør at du trodde at han/hun/ ikke ville klare det?)

Nå som dere har gått på befalsskolen i et par måneder; uten å nevne navn; er det noen du mener ikke burde ha kommet inn? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

Hvordan mener du en god soldat bør se ut?

Hvorfor og hvordan er dette viktig? Blant medsoldater? Blant sivile? I operasjonsområdet?

Hva med kvinner?

Hvordan synes du et godt befal bør være?

Har du noen synspunkter på dette i forhold til kjønn? Er det noen forskjell på kvinnelige og mannlige befal?

Hva synes du om befalet her i bataljonen?

Er de gode forbilder for deg? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

Hvordan er forholdet mellom befal, befalselever og vernepliktige her i bataljonen?

Hva tror du skal til for å få tillit som befal ovenfor vernepliktige?

    Hva med vervede – hva tror du skal til for å få tillit/bli akseptert som befal for dem?

Hva tror du skal til for at et befal skal få tillit blant befalskollegaer og overordnede da?

DET FYSISKE

Hva betyr fysisk trening for deg?

Kan du si litt mer om hva og hvordan du trener?

Har du endret treningsvaner etter at du begynte på befalsskolen?

Hvordan er de fysiske utfordringene i tjenesten dere har til daglig?

Har det fysiske så langt vært tøffere, lettere eller som du trodde?

Hvor viktig er fysisk form den jobben du skal gjøre som sersjant til neste år?

> Hva slags type fysisk form er viktig for dem jobben du skal gjøre?

Hva synes du om de formelle fysiske kravene som stilles ved opptak? (Både formelle tester og det fysiske i feltuka på FOS.)

KVOTERING - KVINNER

I de siste årene har det vært et stort fokus på kvinner i Forsvaret. Hva synes du om dette?

Hva mener du om flere jenter, eller kvinner, i Forsvaret?

> Hva er positivt? Hva er negativt?

Hvis kvinner hadde vært i flertall på beflasskolen; hadde du kommet til å søke da?

Er det viktig eller nødvendig med flere jenter i Forsvaret? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

Hva tenker du om bruk av kvotering av kvinner som et middel for å oppnå likestilling i Forsvaret?

Hvordan forstår du kvotering? Hva legger du i begrepet?

Vet du om det benyttes kvotering i Forsvaret i dag, og i så fall på hvilken måte?

Hvilken betydning tenker du at eventuell bruk av kvotering kan ha for kvinner i Forsvaret?

Hvilken betydning tenker du at eventuell bruk av kvotering kan ha for menn i Forsvaret?

Hva betyr det at kvinner har andre fysiske krav enn menn? (3000 m, styrketester)

Hva betyr det at eldre har andre fysiske krav enn yngre?

Hva tenker du om å ledes av kvinnelig befal? Oppfølging hvis negativ: Hvorfor er dette annerledes enn å ledes av menn?

Hvordan er forholdet mellom gutter og jenter på kullet ditt synes du?

Hvordan er forholdet mellom jentene synes du?

Det er mange som sier at jenter må jobbe hardt for å bli en av gutta; men hva skal til for at en mann, eller gutt, skal bli en av gutta?

Vil du si at du er en av gutta? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

INTOPS

Hva synes du om måten befalet snakker om utenlandstjeneste på?

Kunne du tenke deg intops/utenlandstjeneste?

Hvorfor vil du/vil du ikke det?

Hvordan forholder dere på kullet dere til de som ikke ønsker utenlandstjeneste?

Har du noe inntrykk av hvordan befalet forholder seg til de som ikke ønsker utenlandstjeneste?

FRA SIVIL TIL MILITÆR

Er du stolt av å gå på befalsskolen?

Hva tenker du er forskjellen på det å ta en sivil utdanning og det å ta en militær utdanning?

Hvilken verdi tror du at befalsskolen har på det sivile arbeidsmarkedet?

Hvordan tror du at sivile ser på dere som er i Forsvaret?

Har du forandret deg etter at du begynte på befalsskolen?
Hvordan har du blitt? Hva har endret seg?

AVSLUTNING

Tenker du annerledes om Forsvaret nå enn da du startet?

Har du vurdert å slutte? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

Hva skal du gjøre etter endt befalsskoleutdanning?

Hvorfor ønsker du/ønsker du ikke å fortsette i Forsvaret?

Hvis Forsvaret: Hva slags tjeneste/karriere er det du ønsker deg? Hvorfor akkurat dette?

Hvis Forsvaret: Er det noen avdeling/tjeneste du ikke kunne tenkt deg å tjenestegjøre i? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

Er det noe du ønsker å legge til, kommentere eller presisere før vi er ferdige med intervjuet?

Tusen takk for at du tok deg tid til å bli intervjuet. Lykke til videre!

Attachment 5: Interview Guide – Officers – Mid Phase

INNLEDNING OG INFORMASJON

Takk for at du tar deg tid til dette intervjuet.

Jeg er doktorgradsstipendiat ved Norges idrettshøgskole Forsvarets institutt, og ønsker å gjennomføre dette intervjuet som en del av et prosjekt hvor jeg ser nærmere på militær kultur og det å bli og det å være militær

Jeg har taushetsplikt og er ansvarlig for at informasjon du gir behandles konfidensielt, anonymiseres, utelukkende brukes til forskning, og ikke kommer på avveie.

Jeg vil ikke dele informasjonen du gir med verken elever eller andre militære ledere.

Sitater som gjengis i artikler eller avhandling vil anonymiseres, slik at de ikke skal kunne knyttes tilbake til deg.

Det er helt frivillig å delta i prosjektet og du kan på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt trekke deg uten å måtte begrunne dette nærmere. Dersom du trekker deg vil alle innsamlede data og sitater fra deg bli slettet.

Dersom du tillater det, ønsker jeg å ta et lydopptak av samtalen. All informasjon vil bli anonymisert under avskrivingsprosessen. Jeg vil ikke lese inn ditt navn på lydopptaket.

Si ifra dersom du underveis i samtalen vil at jeg skal slå av lydopptakeren.

Du kan la være å svare på spørsmål underveis i intervjuet dersom du ønsker det.

Skrive under samtykkeerklæring

INNLEDENDE SPØRSMÅL

Hvor gammel du er?

Militær grad

Tjenestested og stilling

Kan du si litt om din utdanning og yrkesbakgrunn, sivil og militær?

Kan du si litt om dine interesser og hobbyer?

ÅRSAKER TIL Å JOBBE I FORSVARET

Kan du fortelle meg hva som gjorde at du begynte i Forsvaret?

Hvorfor har du fortsatt i Forsvaret?

Kan du si litt om hvorfor du jobber i akkurat den stillingen du har nå?

Hvorfor eller på hvilken måte er dette en jobb som passer for deg, eventuelt ikke passer for deg?

Hva synes du er mest spennende i denne jobben?

OM BEFALSSKOLEN OG SELEKSJONEN – HVEM PASSER/PASSER IKKE?

Hvilket inntrykk har du av årets kull med befalsskoleelever?

> Hva er bra?

> Hva er ikke bra?

Du trenger ikke nevne navn, men er det noen som har kommet inn på befalsskolen som du mener ikke burde kommet inn? Hvorfor ikke?

Kan du beskrive hva du mener er et godt befal?

Hvorfor og hvordan er dette viktig?

Hva med kvinner?

Har du noe inntrykk av hvorvidt det er noen forskjeller på det å være befalselev i de ulike bataljonene? Hvordan?

Kan du tenke deg noe som gjør at noen ikke vil passe som befal i enkelte av bataljonene?

Hva mener du skal til for at en elev skal klare å komme seg gjennom befalsskolen? (Kunnskaper, evner, ferdigheter, egenskaper, fysikk)

Hva mener du skal til for at pliktsersjanter skal få tillit eller aksept som befal ovenfor de vernepliktige?

Tror du at det er noen forskjell for kvinnelige og mannlige pliktsersjanter i forhold til å få tillit og respekt fra de vernepliktige?

Har du noe inntrykk av hvordan det er for pliktsersjantene å få tillit eller aksept blant kollegaer og overordnede ute i bataljonene?

Er det noen forskjeller i forhold til kjønn her?

DET FYSISKE

Hva betyr fysisk trening for deg?

Kan du si litt om hva og hvordan du trener?

Hvorfor trener du slik? (utfordre ifh til egen kropp)

Trener du for å bli sterk/se sterk ut/føle deg sterk?

Trener du for å holde vekta?

Hvor viktig er fysisk form for militære prestasjoner?

Hva slags prestasjoner er det som krever fysisk form?

Hva slags type fysisk form kreves?

Har du noe inntrykk av hvordan befalselevene blir trent ute i bataljonene?

Hva synes du om treningen?

Hvor viktig er fysisk form i den jobben befalselevene skal gjøre når de blir befal i bataljonene?

Hvorfor og hvordan er det viktig?

Hva synes du om de formelle fysiske kravene som stilles ved opptak? Både formelle tester og det fysiske i feltuka på FOS.

OM KVINNER

I de siste årene har det vært et stort fokus på kvinner i Forsvaret. Hva synes du om dette?

Hva mener du om å få flere jenter, eller kvinner, i Forsvaret?

Hva er positivt? Hva er negativt?

Hva tenker du om antall jenter i de ulike bataljonene?

Attachements

Hvorfor er det så mange jenter i saniteten?

Hva tenker du om at det er så mange jenter der?

Hvorfor er det så få jenter i ingeniør og på GSV?

Hva tenker du om at det er så få jenter der?

Er det egentlig nødvendig med flere jenter i Forsvaret? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

Hvordan forstår du kvotering? Hva legger du i begrepet?

Vet du om det benyttes kvotering i Forsvaret i dag, og i så fall på hvilken måte?

Hvilken betydning tenker du at eventuell bruk av kvotering av kvinner kan ha for kvinner i Forsvaret?

Hvilken betydning tenker du at eventuell bruk av kvotering av kvinner kan ha for menn i Forsvaret?

Hva synes du om bruk av kvotering av kvinner som et middel for å oppnå likestilling i Forsvaret?

Hva betyr det at kvinner har andre fysiske krav enn menn? (3000 m, styrketester)

Hva betyr det at eldre har andre fysiske krav enn yngre?

Hvilke erfaringer har du selv med å jobbe med kvinner i det militære?

Hvordan har du opplevd dette?

Har det vært annerledes enn å jobbe med menn på noen måte?

Hva du erfaring i å ledes av kvinnelig offiser? Hvordan var dette? Var/er dette annerledes enn å ledes av menn?

Det er mange som sier at jenter må jobbe hardt for å bli en av gutta; men hva skal til for at en mann, eller gutt, skal bli en av gutta?

Hvordan klarer jentene seg i forhold til guttene i befalsutdanningen synes du?

Hvordan klarer jentene seg i forhold til guttene i rollen som befal ovenfor de vernepliktige synes du?

Er det noen oppgaver i Forsvaret du mener kvinner kan gjøre bedre enn menn?

Er det noen oppgaver i Forsvaret som du mener menn kan gjøre bedre enn kvinner?

Har du erfart at kvinner har medført problemer i gjennomføring av tjenesten? Hvordan? Hvorfor?

Har du erfart at menn har medført problemer i gjennomføring av tjenesten? Hvordan? Hvorfor?

Hvordan opplever du selv å være kvinne/mann i Forsvaret?

INTOPS

Hvordan opplever du at befalskoleelevenes holdninger til intops/utenlandstjeneste?

Har du selv vært i utenlandstjeneste?

Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

Hva tenker du om befal som ikke har vært i eller ikke ønsker utenlandstjeneste?

Hva tenker du om befalsskoleelever som ikke ønsker utenlandstjeneste?

Kan du fortelle litt om de fysiske kravene du opplevde i utenlandstjenesten din?

Kan du fortelle litt om de kroppslige belastningene du opplevde i utenlandstjenesten din?

MILITÆR KULTUR

Hva mener du er de viktigste forskjellene på det å være militær og det å være sivil?

Hva vil du si det er som kjennetegner eller særpreger det militære?

Hva tenker du er forskjellen på det å være leder i det sivil og det å være leder i militært?

Hvordan opplever du at sivile ser på dere militære?

Hvilken verdi opplever du at befalsskolen har på det sivile arbeidsmarkedet?

Er du stolt av å jobbe i Forsvaret?

AVSLUTNING

Har du vurdert å slutte i Forsvaret? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

Hva synes du om at jeg som forsker kommer og observerer på befalsskolen?

Er det noe du ønsker å legge til, kommentere eller presisere før vi er ferdige med intervjuet?

Tusen takk for at du tok deg tid til å bli intervjuet. Lykke til videre!

Attachment 6: Building Hierarchies of Codes in MaxQda

The figure illustrates how hierarchies of codes were progressively built up in MaxQda.

Attachment 7: Code System in Progress

In the printed code system below I have started to categorize and sort the initial line-by-line codes from interviews with male officers into larger codes, while the coded female interviews are still in line-by-line codes.

Code System [496]
Mannlige befal [0]
    Krever vilje til formbarhet og utvikling [0]
        Personer utvikles formes og sosialiseres i Forsvaret [8]
        Former elevene [0]
        Må jobbes mer med kvinnene [0]
        må si til jenter "la den negative støyen gå forbi" [1]
        må sparke jenter hardere i baken for å få dem frem [1]
        jenter er selvkritiske [1]
        må si til jenter ikke ta deg nær av det [1]
        må sette jenter der vi spiller de gode ikke dårlige [1]
        jentene tar tilbakemeldingene mer perosnlig [1]
        om utdanningen i bataljonene [1]
        forteller om den militære lederrollen [2]
        befal skal forme seg selv [1]
        forsvaret jobber med menneskene [1]
        innbiller seg at forsvaret fremelsker mennesker og utvikler men [1]
        i forsvaret får man tilbakemeldinger hele tiden [1]
        åepn kultur for tilbakemeld så du kan korrigere deg selv [1]
        noen av kvistene elevene møter er tilbakemeldingene på seg [1]
        tilfredstillende å se folk utvikle seg [1]
        må gi trygge rammer til prøve selv [1]
        kjeft gir ikke trygghet til å kunne utvikle seg selv [1]
        prøver å utvikle selvstendighet [1]
        den du blir på bs er påvirket av instruktører og kulturen [1]
        artig å se utviklingen av mennekser [1]
        elevene går på kvister som de lærer av [1]
        en del av dannelsen er tilbakemeldingene på deg som person [1]
    Befalet opplever å utfordres og utvikles som person i jobben [0]
        bra med forsvaret at man faktisk får lov være aggressiv [1]
        før militære var han aldri den flinke men ugangskråka [1]
        ble etter 1.gtj fordi fikk lov å gjøre noe bra for første gan [1]
        du får veldig mye ansvar som 19 årig sersjant [1]
        forsvaret gjør noe med deg som person [1]
        Utfordrende å jobbe i Forsvaret [1]
        jobben gir utfordringer [1]
        trives i stillingen fordi utdanning av nytt befal er viktig [1]
        mest spennende med jobben er å treffe mennesker [2]
        alternativet til befalsskolen var lærer [1]
        viktig å ikke stagnere [1]
        vil utenlands for å få erfaring og oppleve det [1]
    Kravet om utenlandstjeneste er vanskelig [0]
        vil ikke ut nå pga famile [1]
        verdisettet endrer seg med alderen [1]
        når du var 18 var det livet lyset og veien -springe i skogen [1]
        vil ikke at barna skal vokse opp uten faren sin [1]
        interesse er å være familiefar [1]
    Krever kameratskap og sosiale antenner [0]
        soldatene respekterte de som var kollegiale og viste omsorg [1]
        respekt er viktig [1]

soldatene respekterte befal du kunne prate med [1]
godt befal må være sympatisk og kunne bygge tillit [1]
Glad i å jobbe med mennesker [1]
Krever rett holdning [0]
    Må ha gode holdninger [0]
        gode holdninger er ærlighet men lojalitet når en har bestemt [1]
        gode holdninger er respekt for andre [1]
        gode holdninger er ønske om å gjøre en god jobb [1]
        gode holdninger er viktig [1]
    Krever riktig stil, moral og kultur [0]
        Kulturen [0]
            om de ulike bataljonene [1]
            krig er å påtvinge motstanderen sin vilje [1]
            forsvaret skal påtvinge andre sin vilje med makt. krever
            fysik [1]
            forsvarets vesen er å påtvinge andre mennesker sin vilje [1]
            sjø og luft har våpenplattformer, hær har mennesker [1]
            i hæren er det mennesker som er hovedverktøyet [1]
            har tatt feil valg for videre karriere oppover [1]
            ikke så mange cowboy og gutteting igjen i oppover i karriere
            [1]
            uheldig for karriere å si noe istrid med politikerne [1]
            folk må holde seg innenfor boksen [1]
            forsveret er en firkanta boks [1]
            sanitet og css klarte stridsteknikk bedre enn panser [1]
            sanitet og css la ned innsats for å klare stridsteknikk [1]
            panser som driver stridsteknikk til daglig la ikke ned innsats
            [1]
            finnes andre måter å mestre på enn å ødlegge kropp på
            mestrøvel [1]
            forskjellig kultur i bataljonene [1]
            manøverbataljonene har dyrket kulturen sin [1]
            manøver har dyrket fram stolthet over sin kultur [1]
            ulempen med å dyrke kulturell stolthet er at de ser ned på
            andr [1]
            forsyning har fått en knekk [1]
            forsyning har blitt krigere -de har vært i mye kamp [1]
            det har blitt mye mer respekt for sanitet [1]
            utviklingen er pga krigen [1]
            har blitt mer ærlighet rundt krigen i dag enn for noen år
            siden [1]
            forsvaret har sterkt kameratsakp du ikke finner andre steder
            [1]
            lettere å forholde seg til militære, sivile vet ikke hva vi gjø
            [1]
            føler ikke at bsinstruktør er ærlig arbeid [1]
            ærlig arbeid er å være nede på bakken sammen med gutta
            [1]
            vil heller være med å jobbe enn å observere [1]
            militær kultur kjennetegnes av sterkt kameratskap [1]
            kaller sjøforsvarets tur til adenbukta for et cruise [1]
            forsvarets solreiser finnes - admin stillinger i afgh [1]
            hæren har tatt tøffeste tak i afgh men Bolle har blitt kjent [1]
            kan ikke si hva man vil [1]
            får binders på rulleblad hvis du sier noe feil [1]
            politikervelde som har bredt seg utover [1]
            militær kultur er en prestasjonskultur [1]
            opplever at de er lønnstapere i staten og har ikke lov å
            demons [1]
            miljøet i forsvaret er bra men noen rammefaktorer mangler

[1]
tidligere stillingsvalg gjør at han ligger stedfast [1]
har vurdert å slutte mange ganger [1]
skal ikke si du har ikke noe her å gjøre nårfolk ikke vil ut [1]
det er kategorisk å si at alle må ville ut og ekskluderende [1]
hvsi du fortsetter etter pliktår aksepterer du at du må ut [1]
tok utenlandstjenste pga karriere [1]
uten utenl tje blir du bakerst i søknadsbunken [1]
ca 60 prosent av forrige kull vil utlandstjenste [1]
man belønnes med karrieresjanse med å ta belastningen [1]
riktig at man belønnes for å ta belastningen [1]
de som ikke tar belastningen ute bør ikke få førstepri på still
[1]
trives pga miljø og menneskene [1]
Alfa-saken [3]
politikerne gjør sitt ytterste for å kaste dritt på oss [1]
er ikke fryktelig imponert over toppnivået i forsvaret [1]
forsvarssjef løp som forvirra bikkje da ministeren bekymra
seg [1]
opplevde at folket støttet dem, mens politikere og ledereikke
[1]
politikerne som har bestemt at vi skulle ut [1]
har ikke dratt til afgh for vår egen del [1]
politikeren lurer seg unna med tåpelig retorikk [1]
opplevde at ledelse og politikere håndterte alfasaken dårlig
[1]
Krever konkurranse og vinnerinstinkt [0]
Må være på [0]
må ha mestringstro [1]
viktig å være robust [1]
må være robust [1]
inititativ er juvelen hos en lagfører [1]
må ha glød og pågangsmot [1]
bs elevene er smartere akademisk i dag for hardere konkuranse [1]
elevene er skolemessig flinkere i år [1]
kollegaer konkurerer om best tjeneste uttal heller en vær team [1]
kvotering jenter og konkurranse [1]
Positive erfaringer med jenter [0]
jentene klarer seg fint i stridsteknikk [1]
har gode erfaringer med jenter i forsvaret [1]
jenter er mer åpne [1]
Saniteten [0]
ren matematikk og pri på søkn ga mange jenter i san
[1]
jentene i sanbn søkte seg dit og det var ren rangering
[1]
saniteten med alle jentene i år er folkehøgskole [1]
Forelskelser medfører forskjellsbehandling [0]
det er noe etisk og moralsk feil med befal som går på
soldat [1]
forbannet og irritert på manl befal som går på
soldatkvinner [1]
har hatt problemer med mannlig befal som går etter
soldatkvinne [1]
den som får pepper når mannlig befal går på kv soldat
er jenta [1]
kvinnelig befal er for smarte til å gå på soldatgutter
[1]
har brukt mye tid på forhold manbefal kvsoldat [1]
Tøffere krav for jenter [0]

      jentene får krassere tilbakemeldinger [1]
      tøft gjort å være alene jente i en bat [1]
      jenter må prestere adskillig bedre for å få respekt [1]
     Konkurranse blant jentene [0]
      Jenter har behov for å bevise at de er like gode som gutta [1]
      ulempen med jenter er at det fører med seg en del intriger [1]
      kvinner har behov for å bevise at de er gode [1]
     Kvotering [0]
      kvotering bør ikke skje [1]
      kvotering skjer [1]
      kvotering skjer, det er feil [1]
      kvotering gjør at kvinner sees ned på [1]
      alle som kom inn var kvalifiset ingen ble kvotert [1]
      det viktigste er å få rett person på rett plass [1]
      men må ikke stresse med å få inn jenter så kravene ikke er der [1]
     Begrunnelser for jenter [0]
      en historie om panserbat som "beskrev en jente" i stillingsanon [1]
      å ikke sulle ha jenter er basert på gruppetenking [1]
      viktig med jenter for ren mannskultur = gruppesak [1]
      ser ikke noen grunn til å ikke ha jenter i forsvaret [1]
      men det er tåpelig å si at jenter skal inn for miljøets del [1]
   Krever fysikk og rett kropp [0]
    Motiveres av muligheten til å være i aktivitet og å være ute [0]
    setter pris på aktiv jobb og mulighet til å være ute [1]
    viktig å få være ute [1]
    viktig å få brukt kroppen [1]
    trives med å få være ute i felt [1]
    Viktig med god Fysikk [5]
    trenger mer kunnskap så de ikke ødlegger kroppen sin [1]
    utfordringen i afgh går på det mentale [1]
    fikk tid til å trene i afgh så kom hjem med god form [1]
    hadde ikke fysisk tjeneste i afgh [1]
    om fysiske krav i utltjenste [1]
    forteller om fysiske krav i strid [1]
    fysiske krav har endret seg i tid gammelt og nytt forsvar [1]
    viktig å trene for vedlikehold og trivsel [1]
    fysiske krav i bataljonene [1]
    de fysiske kravene er reelle [1]
  Føler seg undervurdert og ønsker anerkjennelse [0]
  status [1]
    eldre ser mer positivt på forsvaret enn yngre pga 2.ww [1]
    mangler støtte og interesse fra folk [1]
    forkning ok fordi bra at noen bryr seg og at folk får vite mer [1]
    sivile spør om han har drept når han går i uniform i det sivile [1]
    noen sivile er veldig trangsynte [1]
    sivile egoistiske og navie og forstpr ikke hva vi gjør i afgh [1]
    følte folk så ned på deg når uniform i det sivile [1]
    statusen på militær ledelse er synkende [1]
    er stolt av de han har under seg, ikke over seg [1]
    er stolt av å jobbe i forsvaret men ikke av ledelsen [1]
    tror forsvaret har lavere status i dag [1]
  Diskvalifiserer [0]
    sersjanter som kritiseres mest er de brautende [1]
    stort frafall så noe er ikke som det skal i seleksjonen [1]

            frafallet har vært på de som fikk lavest rangering på fos [2]

            skjøv fra seg sersjanter som så stivt på reglementet [1]

            mennesker med problemer skjøv de brautende sersjantene fra seg [1]

        Forbildeeffekt i befalet [0]

            bra befal gir positiv effekt i hele forsvaret [1]

            det er befalt som møter soldater i førstegtj. [1]

            befalsutd er viktig fordi befalet er stammen i forsvaret [1]

            synes befalsutdanning er det viktigste vi har i forsv [1]

            befal må være flink i faget for å få respekt [1]

Kvinnelig befal [0]

        synes stolthet fort kan føre til at man blir hoven og bedre enn [1]

        synes det er hovent å tenke at militære er så mye bedre enn BI [1]

        er ikke stolt av å være militær [1]

        stolthet [0]

        kanskje er man ikke så stolt av å bære uniform ute [1]

        er veldig stolt av å være offiser [2]

        foreldre stolt over sitt offisersbarn [1]

        Forsvaret er for de utvalgte [0]

        ikke en menneskerett å være leder i Forsvaret [1]

        ledelse i Forsvaret er ikke for hvem som helst [1]

        å ikke ha vært i krigen gjør at man mister trov i noen miljø [1]

        mer diskreditt for å ikke ha vært i krigen enn for å være kvinn [1]

        både kvinner og menn får discred av å ikke ha vært i krigen [1]

        hvem er du som ikke har vært i krigen selv? [1]

        statusforskjeller mellom avdelinger [1]

        får ikke de beste til å jobbe på hbvs grunent lav status [1]

        ikke status å jobbe på hbs [1]

        militært lederskap er ikke så hot på det sivile markede som før [1]

        Fysiske krav [3]

        mye teknikk i de fysiske kravene [1]

        Holde seg i form er viktig interesse [1]

        det er tradisjon for at fysiske krav stilles til alle [1]

        For mangfold av fysiske tester [1]

        mangfold av fysiske tester er bra fordi ikke alle er like [1]

        må klare fysiske krav pga internasjonale produksjonskrav [1]

        må klare fysiske krav fordi KBE boken sier en må være robust [1]

        transport av sykeog sårede er fysisk krevende [1]

        befalsskolen krever fysisk robusthet utover elevenes forventnin [1]

        Fysisk trening er alfa og omega [1]

        fysisk trening viktig for velvære og overskudd [1]

        fysisk trening viktig for selvbildet [1]

        fysisk trening er viktig for vektregulering [1]

        god form til tross for alder [2]

        fysiske krav er viktig fordi det er viktig å ha mål [1]

        fysiske krav er viktig for å vite hva man skal strekke seg ette [1]

        hvis man ikke holder seg i form mister man troverdighet [1]

        fysisk form er viktig for troverdigheten [1]

        ok med reduserte krav med alder [1]

        eldre har mindre fysiske roller [1]

        trenger ikke like fysiske krav generelt [1]

        fysiske krav på gsv er helt hinsides [1]

        Arbeidsvilkår [2]

        å jobbe med mennesker er drivkraft for å jobbe på befalssk [1]

        føler at hun sevlrealiserer seg [1]

        internettkultur oppstod fordi det ikke var noe å gjøre [1]

        treningskultur oppstod fordi det ikke var noe fornuftig å gjøre [1]

        opplever å kunne påvirke [1]

        trives pga har hatt meningsfulle jobber [1]

        trives pga har fått utfordringer i Forsvaret [1]

        trivdes fordi systemet i Forsvaret passet [1]

trivedes ikke fordi jobben ikke var meningsfull [3]
trives i Forsvaret [1]
jobben var ikke meningsfull fordi det manglet oppdrag [1]
har hatt inkluderende sjefer [1]
tør å ta opp konflikter [1]
tør å gråte overfor sjefer [1]
kan ikke ta alle tilbakemeldinger på krigsskolen personlig [1]
militære er som prester og leger [1]
symbolsk å ta av og på uniformen [1]
miliære er ledere 24-7 [2]
militære skiller seg fra sivile ved at de er sitt ytke 24-7 [1]
er offiser i hodet selv om uniformen tas av [1]
indre drivkravft for å jobbe = institutional tankegang [1]
ikke opptatt av ytre motivasjon som økonomi [1]
jobber til man er ferdig, ikke etter klokka [1]
hal åtte til halv fire offiser er et begrep [1]
geografi er viktig for hvor hvor man jobber [1]
høyt under taket og humor [1]
et gode å få trene i arbeidstiden [1]
koster for mye å slutte i forsvaret pga trygg arbplass med gode [1]
Kvinner [2]
vanskelig å være pen i forsvaret, må være litt mach som jente [1]
opplever at det har vært sterkt fokus på kvinner i årevis [1]
liker ikke oppstilte kvinnekampanjer [1]
rekrutterere bommer når reklamekvinnene ser ut som noen blondi [1]
kaller samfunnet for likestillingssamfunnet [1]
kvinner i noen bransjer har tøffere hverdag enn andre [1]
må finne bruksområde for kvinner [3]
fokuset på kvinner kan bli for mye [1]
tror ikke kvinner passer til alt [1]
må se hva man kan bruke kvinner til [3]
noen kvinner kommer på feil hylle [1]
hvis ikke kvinnene kommer på rett hylle mister de mestringstroa [1]
kvinner krangler mer enn menn [1]
det er på kvinnerommet alle konfliktene er [1]
kvinner er skapt sånn at de krangler [1]
forsvaret er speilbilde av kjønn i samfunnet [1]
kvinner er kvinner værst [1]
må ha like fysiske krav for spesialtjenester [1]
gode erfaringer med å være kvinne [1]
har ikke blitt diskriminert eller overkjørt som kvinne [1]
når over 30 tør du å være kvinne [1]
trenger ikke spille en rolle [1]
dame for faen [1]
symboliserer at hun er kvinne med jenteting [1]
dame når det passer meg [1]
blir akseptert for å være kvinne [1]
har lært å behandle kvinner gjennom sivile studier [1]
kvinner er mer hårsåre enn menn [1]
hårsåre kvinnfolk har det ikke godt i forsvaret [1]
kvinner passer ikke til alt [1]
kvinner er annerledes enn menn [1]
som kvinne kan du kritiserer kvinner i forsvaret ikke som mann [2]
kvinner mangler eksplosivitet [1]
Sivilsamfunnet [0]
forsvaeret er ikke som før [1]
folk tror Forsvaret er preget av autoritær ledelse [1]
de som ikke takler forsvarets krav kan gå på BI [1]
BI brukes som distinksjonsmarkør [1]
BI er for alle. Krigsskolen for de som takler det ekstreme [1]

unifrom fører til spørsmål i det sivile [1]
uniformen medfører forventinger til adferd [1]
samfunnet har ikke fått med seg risikoen offiserer deltar i [1]
tror ikke politikerne vet hva militære gjør [1]
offiserer blir lagt lokk på i media [1]
vil gjerne teste lederskapet sitt i det sivile [1]
nysgjerrig på det sivile [1]
sivile har stereotyp oppfatning av forsvaret [1]
sivile tror militære er autoritært [1]
samfunnet har ikke fått med seg kravene som stilles til offiser [1]
samfunnet har ikke fått med seg utviklingen i forsvaret [1]
at offiserer legges lokk på i media er et signal [1]
politikerne treffer ikke med sine kommentarer [1]
nødvendig med sivil kompetanse for å ha muligheter i det sivile [1]
uten mastergrad kommer de militære kort i det siviel [1]
Disiplin og struktur + Forming og disiplinering [1]
synes folk i forsvaret tenker likt og har samme perspektiv [1]
liker struktur og disiplin [1]
tror ikke ny elever har tankerekken som kreves men vil forme de [1]
skal disiplinere og forme elevene [1]
de formbare vil utvikles til å bli krigere [1]
jobben er å forme og disiplinere elevene til kulturen [1]
kravene avhenger av troppsjefen [2]
bataljonene former sine elever [1]
hvordan utvikle selvledere med disiplinering er vanskelig [1]
balansegang mellom stramhet og slakkhet er utfordring [1]
viktig at soldater ser korrekt ut [2]
korrekt utseende er en måte å manipulere på [1]
korrekt utseende betyr noe for persepsjon [2]
korrekt utseende gir inntrykk av profesjonalitet [1]
utseendekulturen har endret seg [1]
spesialjegerne ser ut som tusseladder [1]
adferdskorrigering av kollegaer oppleve vanskelig men nødvendig [1]
korrigerer kollegaers måte å bære uniform/hodeplagg [1]
sivile tror militære er disiplin og struktur [1]
militæret er disiplin og struktur [1]
Kultur [0]
lua feil vei er helt crazy [1]
konene ønsket ikke at de militære jentene var med gjengen [1]
ble utesteng av koneklubben på setermoen [1]
jenter må bevise at de duger, gutter at de ikke duger [1]
forteller om episode med diskriminering [8]
machokulturen kan ta litt av [1]
liker måten menn kommuniserer på [1]
Kan være at sjøforsvaret og ikke vi gjør det rette [1]
Sjøforsvaret har kompetanse [1]
Sjøforsvaret skiller seg ut [1]
kulturkrasj mellom forsvarsgrenene [1]
de som ikke er formbare vil ikke tilpasse seg kulturen [1]
de som ikke tilpasser seg kulturen vil slutte [1]
de som tilpasser seg kulturen vil bli med videre [1]
kulturen vil selektere de beste [1]
kulturen er forskjellig i de forskjellige bataljonene [2]
kulturen avhenger av troppssjefen [2]
GSV er gutta på skauen [1]
Panserbataljonen har med seg mye testosteron [1]
ulik kultur i forsvarsgrenene [1]
Mors og farsrollen [1]
Mamma er viktig identitet/interesse [2]
jobbutfordringer under graviditet [1]

kan ikke/klarer ikke å dra ut etter at barn kom [1]
rollekonflikt mellom offiser og mor [1]
Synlighet [0]
kvinne har en figurefekt [1]
man er spesielt synlig som kvinne [1]
kvinners synlighet gjør at de blir spurt oftere i undervisn [1]
deilig å ta av uniformen og ikke være synlig offiser [1]
synlig med uniform i det sivile [2]
belastende med synligheten uniformen bringer [1]
jente i uniform gir ekstra synlighet [1]
behov for å anonymisere seg [1]
Kvotering [1]
jenter vil ikke bli kvotert [3]
jenter vil jobbe for å nå kravet [1]
kvotering bidrar til ryktebørsen [1]
kvotering gir usikkerhet hos kvinner om de har fortjent stillin [1]
viktig å kunne si at man har fått stilling fordi man var best [1]
viktig å kunne si at man var kvalifisert, ikke kvotert [1]
kvotifisert [1]
rask karriere starter ryktebørsen [1]
jenter må ikke rykke rett opp i lederjobber [1]
de som er gode kommer seg opp uansett glasstak og kvotering [1]
mannfolka vil alltid hetse de som er kvotert [1]
får anerkjennelse når du er dyktig og ikke må dyttes [1]
stolt av kollega som kommer seg opp uten å bli dytta [1]
kvotering gir negativt snakk [1]
det er synd på de som har blitt kvotert og opplevd følgene [1]
stolt av kollega som kommer seg opp pga hardt egetarbeid [1]
må jobbe hardt for å fortjene noe [1]
Forhold på befalsskolen [0]
En felles inngang til Forsvaret er positivt pga ressurssamling [1]
forsøk på objektivt opptak gjennom karakternivellering [1]
subjektivitet spiller inn i vurderingene [1]
elevene blir overrasket over harde arbeidskrav og lange dager [1]
elevene mister egen valgmulighet [1]
elevene mister fritid [1]
elevene blir disiplinert [2]
når man først er selektert til en bransje vanskerlig å bytte [1]
har vært bekymrt for kv elever som har vært i tøffe miljøer [1]
befalselevene har opp og nedturer i løpet av året [1]
Rangering og tilbakemeldinger [2]
Kameratvurdering [2]
rangeringskultur på krigsskolen [1]
Konkurranse [0]
Konkurransekultur mellom kvinner [7]
fanesak at kvinner ikke skal konkurrere med hverandre i forsvar [1]
grusomt med konkurranse på krigsskolen [1]
konkurransekultur på krigsskolen [1]
Internasjonale operasjoner [2]
har internasjonal erfaring [1]
har lyst til å bli med de andre ut [1]
det sosiale fellesskapet og bli med gjengen er viktig utenlmoti [1]
Ledelse [0]
ikke fasitsvar på hva som er en god leder [1]
i hverdagen i Forsvaret brukes normal ledelse [1]
ledelsesform varierer med situasjon [1]
Holdninger og tanker er lært [0]
Bøker og dokumenter autoriter definerer en sannhet [3]
Egenskaper [0]
mp ha sosiale antenner [1]

robusthet [0]
må være robust [2]
må være fysisk robust for å få tillit [1]
hvordan du takler ting avh av robusthet [1]
robusthet handler om å ikke være hårsår [1]
valgte forsvaret fordi det var tøft [1]
valgte forsvaret fordi hun Var gutte jente [1]
Bruker fritid til sivile studier [1]
Faglige interesser [2]
er typen som har blitt valgt som tillitsmann i idrett og skole [1]
opplever å ha lederegenskaper [1]
tillit er viktig lederegenskap [1]
sosiale antenner er viktig [1]
Faglig dyktighet er viktig på lavt nivå [1]
faglig dyktighet gir troverdighet [2]
faglig dyktighet på høyt nivå handler andre ting enn lavt [1]
krav til lederdyktighet endres med gradsnivå [1]
hva som er gode lederegenskaper avh av gradsnivå [1]
organisering og ressursutnyttelse viktig ledereg på høyt nivå [1]
sosial dyktighet viktig lederegenskap [1]
de 5 lederegenskapen på FOS er likestilt [1]
mangel på initiativ reduserer tillit [2]
å ta initativ er en frase [1]
mangel på omsorg reduserer tillit [1]
ledere i forsvaret må kunne møte det ukjente og ekstreme [1]
ledere i Forsvaret må raskt kunne slå om fra mamma til krig [1]
faglig dyktighet er viktig [1]
Sets [0]

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