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ON THE TERMS OF THE RECIPIENT? – NORWEGIAN SPORTS DEVELOPMENT AID TO TANZANIA IN THE 1980s.

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Abstract

This paper discusses the donor–recipient¹ relationship in a sports development aid context, and identifies potential dilemmas occurring when aiming to give aid on the recipient's terms. Using the case of the Norwegian sports development aid project Sport for All, it is argued that the Norwegian Confederation of Sports was clearly in control of the project throughout its various phases, and thus a contradiction between the discourse of equality and the actual practice was evident. It is demonstrated in the paper that donor–recipient relationships are power relationships that are complex and unclear to the involved parties, and shown that the Confederation's role is shaped through a web of power relationships. The paper questions the assumption that civil society organizations such as the Norwegian Confederation are more apt to provide aid on equal terms than government agencies.

Key words:

Sports; development aid; power; civil society organisation

In 1983 the Norwegian Confederation of Sports (NOC) implemented a sports development aid programme called *Sport for All* in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the largest recipient of Norwegian development aid in this period. The objective of *Sport for All* was to assist the construction of local sport structures, to organise sports activities, and to draft a programme for developing sports in and around the city of Dar es Salaam. The overall aim of the project was to encourage sustainable development where an essential element in the discourse was the idea of development on the terms of the recipient. The focus of this article is on the donor–recipient relationship in a sports development aid context. The potential dilemmas occurring when the aim is to give the aid on the recipient's own terms are discussed.

The increased focus on development aid in Norway during the 1980s was reflected in the establishment of the Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation as from 1.1.1984. After a period of discontent with the recipient governments' priorities and politics, new strategies were implemented (Kjerland and Ruud, 2003). One new strategy was to channel development aid through private organisations with development projects that focused on the

agreed areas of priority: women, the environment, and human rights. Going through private organisations made it possible for donor countries to evade the recipient state's political regime, and at the same time to maintain control over the aid as government priorities and regulations were obviously reflected in the demands made to the private organisations (Kjerland and Ruud, 2003).

Two related questions are examined here: 1. What is the nature of the dilemmas arising in donor–recipient relationships that aim to be on the terms of the recipient? 2. What are the possibilities and constraints of civil society organisations (CSOs) as agents for sports development aid?

Little research has been done within the history of sports development aid. This is reflected in development texts in general and development aid texts more specifically where sport is largely absent (Levermore, 2008). There are, of course, exceptions within the sports literature where a few researchers have addressed the sports development aid field from a historical perspective (Dubberke, 1986; Eichberg, 2008; Hazan, 1987; Henry and Al-Tauqi, 2008). The field of sports development aid has expanded considerably in recent years, and thus also the body of related literature although, mostly as analyses of current situations (Coalter, 2007, 2010; Hognestad and Tollisen, 2004; Kidd, 2008; Levermore and Beacom, 2009). Beacom (2007) and Levermore (2008) both argue that there is a research gap in the field relating to sports development aid from a historical perspective. As stated by Beacom:

This [lack of historical literature] is an error in the sense that it creates the impression that development interventions are a relatively recent phenomenon and misses long established characteristics of the process that help to explain its current challenges, in particular, the management of relations between the donors and recipients. (Beacom, 2007: 83)

Following an outline of the historical background of sports development aid, the theoretical and methodological framework is then presented. The potential dilemmas occurring in the donor–recipient relationship are then illustrated through two cases from *Sport for All*. The article finally discusses the potential of CSOs as providers of aid on the recipients' terms.

Sports development aid: the historical background

From the turn of the century, there has been increased attention internationally for sports development aid projects. This was especially evident in 2005 which year was declared by the UN to be its *International Year of Sport and International Development*. In the wake of this, organisations taking up sports as a tool in development aid mushroomed. Currently, large international organisations such as UNICEF and the Red Cross, sports organisations such as

the IOC and FIFA, multinational corporations like Adidas and Nike, and smaller private organisations, are all concerned with sports development aid (Levermore and Beacom, 2009).

The field of sports development aid has a long history. Already in the interwar period several actors initiated sports development aid projects in the developing world, initiatives that particularly escalated after World War II and persisted into the cold war era. As decolonisation increased throughout the African continent in the 1960s, so did sports development aid initiatives since the sports arena in particular provided particular opportunity to exercise influence in these newly independent states. In an era of cold war and ideological struggle any effort to spread ideology was useful, and states on both sides tried to exert such influence in the midst of the conflict (Beck, 2004; Hazan, 1987; Riordan, 1991). The Olympic movement also initiated sports development aid projects in this period. After several approaches to involve African countries in the Olympic family, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) established the programme *Olympic Solidarity* in 1973. *Olympic Solidarity* was committed to distribute financial and technical aid to national Olympic committees of Third World countries in order that they could send athletes to the Olympic Games (Henry and Al-Tauqi, 2008). Early sports development aid was elite-oriented. Sending top coaches to recipient countries to assist in developing talented athletes as well as offering training in high standard facilities in the donor countries for these athletes was common practice. Over the years an extensive focus on facility-building in the recipient countries prevailed, and in the developing world one could eventually find top modern stadiums and arenas for the benefit of elite sports (Bale and Sang, 1996).

In the early 1960s 'sport for all' policies emerged in Europe. The idea of these policies was that the health and well-being of the citizens was a government concern, and needed to be emphasised in order to facilitate social development. The 'sport for all' policies fit with an European society experiencing social challenges caused by industrialisation, and thus were eventually adopted by a number of European governments whose heavy investments yielded increased sports participation in the 1960s and 70s (Houlihan, 1994). As Houlihan shows, since the mid-1970s the number of international governmental institutions involved in sports both at the international and the national levels has increased significantly. In this regard the *Council of Europe* and UNESCO were particularly interesting as they adopted the 'sport for all' idea, emphasising the need for sport and physical education and affirming that sport was a human right that should be encouraged at all levels of society. This was formalised in the *International Charter of Physical Education and Sport*, adopted at the UNESCO General Conference in 1978. The idea of 'sport for all' became an ongoing phrase within these

institutions as it specifically aimed at being a means for achieving greater unity between the member countries, and to safeguard those ideals and principles they had in common in order to facilitate economic and social development (Straume, in press). It also became a catalyst for sports development aid projects.

When the NOC entered the field of sports development aid in the early 1980s, it was emphasised from the beginning that the organisation clearly opposed the sports development aid policy that had previously been applied. Instead, the NOC embraced a different type of sports development aid, focussing on grass root initiatives and 'sport for all'.

There were several reasons for the NOC to become involved in sports development aid. The protagonists argued that the NOC was in a forward position in sports compared to the developing world and therefore had something to provide. They also argued that such an initiative would contribute to sports itself by showing that sport was more than hooliganism, violence, black money and the emerging number of doping scandals that characterised international elite sports. Other dominating arguments included the potential for societal development inherent in sports development aid, and the building of a welfare state with a special emphasis on health benefits. Still, the main reason that the NOC was able to implement a sports development aid project was the ongoing changes in Norwegian development aid strategies that made funds available for private organisations with development projects. In order to be funded certain demands were proposed by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), which was Norway's public implementing aid agency at the time, and which had to be met. The recipient orientation and emphasis on vulnerable groups of the society were two of these demands (Straume, in press).

The project implemented in Dar es Salaam which came to be called *Sport for All* lasted from 1983 until 1990. The project aimed to benefit the entire urban population of Dar es Salaam with a special emphasis on women, children and the disabled. The means for reaching these groups was to work within the school system to educate teachers and sports leaders, to further develop the already existing sports organisation and to provide new and used sports equipment imported from Norway to Tanzania (Norwegian Confederation of Sports 1982a). During this period an estimated 12 million NOK had been granted, of which NORAD contributed 80 per cent and the NOC the remaining 20 per cent (NORAD, 1989).

Theoretical framework

Several researchers have discussed the donor–recipient relationship in development aid (e.g. Burnell, 1997; Tisch and Wallace, 1994). Traditionally this relationship has been explained by

asymmetric positions, where one dominant and strong donor part executes power over the weak recipient. Modernisation theories explained the development process as linear with a clear 'recipe' on how development should be achieved (e.g. Rostow 1960; Frank 1969). Any execution of power was perceived as a necessary step on the way towards change and development of a norm defined by the stronger part. This dichotomy came to be challenged by researchers who claimed that the complexity of power was evident. Among these were post-development theorists who criticised the concept 'development' itself and the content of this expression. They argued that 'development' merely was a constructed term, defined by the apparatus that was set to solve the problem of development (Nustad, 2003). As Lie points out, post-development theorists see development 'as a hegemonic, monolithic and homogenising discourse' (Lie, 2004: i) and thus criticises development as being a 'western construction to bring about western modernity, values and mentality' (ibid.). In summary, post-development theorists 'present a total criticism of the idea of development, where development is presented as a massive, superior discourse and an execution of power with the poor as victims' (Nustad, 2003: 39). The Norwegian anthropologist, Nustad, draws attention to a possible criticism of post-development theory; 'It draws a caricature of development discourses as almighty and totally dominating to the people exposed to them' (Nustad, 2003: 44). Hence also post-development theories are potentially dichotomising and may work best at the ideational level.

An important contribution of post-development theory is its emphasis on power as relational and as something that needs to be understood in the context of which it operates. Consequently the relationship between the donors and the recipients is conceived as inherently complex. Burnell (1997) illustrates this complexity when he writes:

There is not one, but several different kinds of aid relationship to be found in reality (...) the parties to a particular relationship may not share identical views of the nature of that relationship, and outside observers could have their own understandings, different again. (...) the relations may be dynamic over time. Donors undertake a commitment after first making an offer; prior to that, there will be an indication that an offer might be made. This could arise in the context of a set of expectations that have been generated within an established aid relation. The maintenance of a commitment and, conversely, threats to consider suspending aid deliveries, the withholding of aid, abandoning a relationship and excluding a possible recipient from further considerations are all opportunities to attempt to exercise power. Aid recipients too take initiatives. For instance, on occasions a particular relationship has been terminated contrary to the donor's wishes. (Burnell, 1997: 20)

Power in the aid relationship is neither constant nor necessarily one-sided. As Neumann points out, 'power is not something you *have*, but rather something you *do*, in interaction with others' (Neumann, 2003: 7). What makes power in aid relationships so efficient is that it postulates freedom: 'The subject that is being dominated has an opportunity to make choices,

however consequently limited by the power relation' (Nustad 2003: 25). As Guttman states in his analysis of Ludic diffusion: 'The strong (who are never all-powerful) have their way after the weak (who are never completely powerless) have their say' (Guttman, 1994: 6).

In this article, power is defined as relational, complex and processual. Consequently, when such aspects of the aid relationship as 'Who defines the content of the aid?', 'Who sets the terms?' are examined, it is acknowledged that these questions may be opaque, both to the actors involved and to the researchers, and that the situation may change over time. A nuanced discussion is therefore required in order to describe the roles of power within the relationship. An important aspect of power is linked to how the partners in the relationship are defined through the concepts that are used, both by the partners themselves and by the researcher. In particular the content of the term 'recipient' needs to be decomposed and discussed.

Tvedt (2002) claims that the term 'recipient' cannot work to analyse aid relations as it simplifies the differences within the countries to which the aid is given. Further, he claims that generalising the recipient reduces the complexity of the aid relation, since the only foci are on the diffusion aspect. 'The development aid field is one where values are negotiated' (Tvedt 2002: 164). Burke also finds the stigmatisation of whole groups problematic as he writes about 'the people': 'Who are "the people"? Are they everyone, the poor, the "subordinate classes" (...) the illiterate or the uneducated? We cannot assume that economic, political and cultural divisions in a given society necessarily coincide' (Burke 1991: 10). With this in mind the challenge of using the discourse 'on the terms of the recipient' seems obvious. Still, the term 'recipient' is used in this article when analysing the aid relationship. Through two examples from *Sport for All* we decompose the concept of the recipient and show the complexity also on the recipient side.

Methodology and sources

This paper reports a single case study that covers Norwegian sport development aid from 1983 to 1990. In case study research a distinction is often made between *intrinsic* case studies, which seek a better understanding of a unique case, and *instrumental* case studies that provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory (Stake, 1994). This case study falls into the latter category since it seeks to identify central dilemmas within sport development aid that are relevant outside the context of the specific case.

The study was carried out through a combination of archives and documentary research which was supplemented by a series of interviews. Public archives at NORAD and at

the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam were visited and scrutinised. However, neither held much information about *Sport for All* despite the fact that it had been supported over a substantial period. An important source of written material was the comprehensive archives at the Norwegian Confederation of Sports (NOC). The majority of written sources comprised project plans, project reports and minutes from meetings as well as both personal and formal correspondence.

Two field trips to Tanzania were carried out resulting in 12 interviews with persons involved with *Sport for All* from the recipient side. These people were mostly identified on the basis of the archive sources. A few were also identified through the first group and interviewed during the first author's stay in Tanzania. A purposive sampling procedure was employed (Silverman, 2001) to assure the inclusion of relevant perspectives both on the recipient and the donor sides. The interviewees' involvement with *Sport for All* varied from programme participants, National Sport Council members, sports officers and government ministers. In this study these interviewees represent the recipient group, and thus we see that the recipients are at the public rather than grass root level. Interviews were also carried out on the Norwegian side in order to cover the donor–recipient relationship concerning *Sport for All*. Fourteen people were identified, ranging from leaders in the NOC and NORAD to people specifically working with *Sport for All* in Tanzania in the 1980s.

In combining oral and written sources it is necessary to be aware of potential sources of error. Oral sources have the advantage of being close to the subject of study and thus provide information that does not appear in the written material. Hence they can complement written sources. They can also be helpful in tracking down other sources, both oral and written, and thus be important sources of knowledge (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). However, as Kvale and Brinkmann point out, obvious methodological problems may appear in the interview situation. First of all this concerns the subject's memory especially concerning normative attitudes and opinions in the past. Secondly, it concerns the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee, their roles, and how these may influence the conversation. Several times during the interviews in Tanzania it was necessary to explicitly emphasise the first author's role as a researcher and not as a representative, either from the NOC or any other development organisation.

As a single case study, no explicit comparison is made with other cases. As stated by Yin (2008), the use of single cases does not exclude analytical generalization. The use of theoretical propositions concerning the dynamics of power guided both the data collection and the analysis of these data. The donor–recipient relationship that studied here was framed

within a specific historical and national context. Consequently empirical results of the study may not be generalized to other contexts. The contribution of the study is to demonstrate how relations of power, as theoretically and empirically described are shaped under given circumstances. Some of these circumstances are shared across donor–recipient relationships internationally. For example, the importance placed on recipients has been a common feature of sports development aid internationally.

Results and discussion

In line with the recipient orientation principle, the discourse ‘on the terms of the recipient’ was frequently used in development aid rhetoric in the early 1980s. The NOC also used this type of discourse when arguing for sports development aid, and in several instances it was emphasised that ‘evidently all development shall be on the terms of the developing country’ (Berg 1981: 5).

In the written sources we can see that there seems to be an interest in procuring ‘more and better information about the needs that exist in the particular development country and an assessment of which of these needs Norwegian sport is able to remedy’ (Norwegian Confederation of Sports, 1981a) (stated by the NOC secretary-general in 1981). It may appear as though when approaching the Tanzanian government regarding this issue, one did not initially ask *if* they wanted or needed aid in the first place, but clearly taking for granted that they were in lack of something which could be remedied by the help of Norwegian sports. An impression of the experts’ approach in framing the aid is given in a report from the initial work of the pilot project. (Leirvaag and Wigum, 1983) Although there was an assessment of the existing sport activities and their organisation in Dar es Salaam, they focused on the introduction and implementation of a new system clearly drawn from a Norwegian organisational model (Norwegian Confederation of Sports, 1982a).

The Tanzanian National Sports Council (NSC) reacted positively to the idea of Norwegian sports development aid, and there seems to have been a certain local engagement. Nonetheless, in planning the project the terms were more or less fixed, and the recipient perspective was not an area of particular emphasis. Evidently, this also had an impact on the aid regarding who defined the various priorities of the project. In the following, through two different examples, we shall see which dilemmas may occur when carrying out a development aid project on the terms of the recipients.

Example 1: Mass sport philosophy

One of the main criteria that NORAD imposed on the NOC, was that *Sport for All* should focus on mass sports rather than elite sports. This mass sports focus clearly corresponded with Norwegian sports policies at the time and coincided with the NOC's own priorities. When the NOC approached the Tanzanian NSC with the idea of providing sports development aid, they made clear that any such aid had to benefit the masses. This meant that the aid from the beginning was presented with some terms that the Tanzanian side had to comply with. As the NOC's secretary-general wrote; '...the Tanzanian government had in advance been informed that the criterion for a Norwegian project was that it benefited mass sports. The Tanzanians were interested in that' (Norwegian Confederation of Sports, 1982b). This was confirmed by a former principal secretary at the Ministry of Information and Culture in Tanzania (TMIC) who stated that 'it was proposed by the Norwegian government and Technical Corporation of that time that we could benefit of this kind of focus on sport for all.' The sport for all ideology that had settled in the Norwegian sports movement was regarded a success in Norwegian terms. The idea that this ideology also fitted in with the Tanzanian society seemed to be taken for granted. Thus, presenting sport for all to the Tanzanian recipients was somehow indisputable, and there seemed to have been no opening for the NSC to prioritise differently. Such donor-driven initiations and lack of apparent recipient inclusion is potentially problematic when the goal is recipient inclusion. Interviews with the recipient side made clear that the idea and suggestions were experienced as coming from outside and as quite different from the ways sports previously had been perceived in Tanzania. Still, this did not trigger a reaction. As put by one interviewee: 'A wave came that said *Sport for All*. Nobody sat down and asked "What do we actually want?"' (Dar es Salaam University professor). Another of the interviewees said the following:

It was within the system and the *Sport for All* was introduced to the National Sports Council. 'Here we have an idea. We want to start a project known as *Sport for All*, and these are the objectives and the way to go through. We want to go into these areas, we want these kind of people to deal with, we have this to offer, so we need your backing up and we need you to go with us, to help it be organised and done.' And then of course the National Sports Council informed the government, and the government said that this was tremendous and that they should go ahead. (Former NSC secretary-general)

It is a paradox that at the same time as the importance and self-evidence of aid being on the recipient's terms is being emphasised, a set of criteria and ideas is submitted requisite to the funding of the project. By presenting such criteria it is contradictory to think that the terms of the recipients will prevail.

Nonetheless it looks like *Sport for All* was eventually accepted and embraced by the Tanzanians. As the Principal Secretary at TMIC stated:

We discussed the matter, and we saw the importance of introducing this, so funds came from Norway to assist the ministry to introduce this concept, and to have all the people of all ages do some sporting activity.

On the issue of *Sport for All* being initiated from an outside actor he further claimed that however inappropriate or unnecessary it may have initially seemed, it did not take long for the Tanzanians to adjust to the idea.

This was originally a Norwegian idea. You know, sporting *per se* for many Africans, not only Tanzanians, it is not in the culture of the elderly people, and still conceived as limited within a certain age. (...) So as a concept it was Norwegian, but it was good and it was accepted by the Tanzanians.

The Tanzanian recipients were given a choice, even though limited, through the relationship with the donor. As Guttman (1994) states, power is carried out because it is accepted, and this seems also to have been the case with the *Sport for All*. The following quote from a former secretary-general of the NSC illustrates this: 'It was a package from the owners of the project introduced into us for acceptance.' There was little room for the recipient's influence since, as several of the Norwegian informant's also point out, the terms were more or less set.

Example 2: Equipment

One of the aspects of *Sport for All* that became subject for discussion was the extensive focus on sports equipment. Still, from the documents and the interviews we see that the Tanzanians were clear in their wants: the requests for equipment were always raised at meetings with the Norwegian experts (Leirvaag and Wigum, 1983). There were several initiatives to collect both new and used equipment in Norway and ship it to Tanzania. However, exporting new equipment to the country was restricted due to a Tanzanian currency crisis. One solution was to support the production of equipment internally in the country. This was also requested by several persons on the Tanzanian side. '...Mkodo emphasized the need for sports equipment (...) it would be of much use to start production of sports equipment in Tanzania' (Norwegian Confederation of Sports, 1981b) and further 'in the Ministry of Information and Culture one was very committed to start domestic production of sports equipment based on the country's own natural raw materials (...leather and cotton)' (Norwegian Confederation of Sports, 1981c). In the pilot project, the experts worked with the issue and emphasised that they were very interested in finding a solution where equipment could be produced in the country. This

was supported by NORAD and specified in the contract with the NOC where one of the points was to ‘contribute to starting home production of sports equipment’ (Norwegian Confederation of Sports and Norwegian agency for international development, 1983) in Tanzania. This was followed up in the agreement between Norway and Tanzania in December 1983 where it was further decided to ‘explore the possibility of setting up a manufacturing firm to produce sports equipment and the other related paraphernalia’ (Norwegian Confederation of Sports and Tanzanian Ministry of Information and Culture, 1983). In January 1984, the principal secretary at the TMIC requested a joint venture between the Nordic countries in setting up a medium-size factory for manufacturing sports equipment in order to relieve the pressing needs in the country (Tanzanian Ministry of Information and Culture, 1984). When the NOC communicated the request to NORAD’s representative in Dar es Salaam, they were dissuaded from entering into this venture due to the insecurity of the Tanzanian economy. As a result the plans were eventually abandoned by the Norwegian donors.

There were obvious dilemmas with the equipment issue. In addition to technical and financial challenges such production was probably not in the expertise of the NOC. Neither was it in the ‘spirit’ of the aid at the time, where the focus essentially centred on distribution. This example shows that the NOC tried to meet the requests of the recipient concerning the equipment factory, and illustrates that the efforts taken in the relationship between the donor and the recipients in the sports development aid were not unambiguous. The recipients were confronted and heard, and apparently spoke with stronger voices than in the case of the mass sport philosophy where the terms seem to have been set from the start. Notwithstanding, the effort was limited by the power relation, not between the NOC and the Tanzanian recipients, but between the NOC and Norwegian policy makers. Political guidelines and terms following aid initiatives had to be complied with, and this obviously influenced both the organisation in framing and implementing the aid, as well as the recipients’ involvement in the projects.

Defining roles in the donor-recipient relationship

The power of definition is important in the donor–recipient relationship. This is evident both when it comes to defining the aid itself as we have seen above, and in defining the aid actors. *Sport for All* aimed to reach the masses, with a special emphasis on women, children and the disabled, recipient groups defined by the Norwegian donors in accordance with the general aid policies at the time. There was little room for influence by the Tanzanian counterparts in defining the recipient groups since again, the terms were set.

The question of who defines the recipient is crucial in this respect. However, even more important is possibly the question of how the recipients define themselves, as the definition of their own role will affect the outcome of the aid with regards to ownership and sustainability. As Tvedt (2002) pointed out, generalising the recipient can contribute to reducing the complexity of the aid relation since it is a system where values are negotiated and thus not necessarily unidirectional. Still, in the case of *Sport for All* it seems evident that the recipients played second fiddle in the relationship with the donors.

In describing the recipients' perceptions of their own role in *Sport for All*, the director of the Sport Development Department in the Ministry of Information, Culture and Sport in Tanzania captured the essence of the dilemma with the donor-recipient relationship when it comes to defining roles. He stated that it was as if 'the people were made to believe that there is a gift from Norway. They were made to be the recipient, with no other role than saying "thank you"'. According to him the recipients operated as passive, undefined actors in the relationship, not necessarily by choice, but by the donor's obvious leading role in the project. He further stated that the perception of one's own role stemmed from the lack of inclusion and assessment of one's own needs.

The dilemma of aid presented as a gift is common in development aid relations. Nustad points out that:

Gifts in the shape of development aid have many of the same qualities as other gifts. First and foremost they are sustaining the relationship between the giver and the recipient. These gifts are meant to solve a problem: lack of development. (Nustad 2003: 21)

Nustad claims that the power of the gift lies 'in the ability to define an idea as true, and suppresses other ideas' (Nustad 2003: 21). This presents an interesting aspect in the relationship between the Norwegian donors and the Tanzanian recipients in the *Sport for All*. As we have seen, Norwegian ideas of how to aid Tanzania involved mass sports and a sport for health ideal, and whether Tanzanian ideals of sport differed from the Norwegian does not seem to be granted particular attention. Thus, in the question of defining roles in the donor-recipient relationship we see that although not necessarily actively or intentionally suppressed, as the director said when the aid was perceived by the Tanzanians as a gift, one might think that the consequence was that they felt indebted and had to give their consent. The former Tanzanian secretary-general at the NSC stated that because of aid politics operating with gifts and the Tanzanians being told what to do and what was best for them, an inferiority complex had emerged. In practice this inferiority complex was manifested in accepting aid initiatives clearly dominated by the donor and also tacitly accepting the donors'

perceptions and attitudes to the recipients. In the following comment he illustrates how the recipients defined their own role, and the inferiority complex becomes apparent. When talking about the construction of a new national stadium that was proposed for Dar es Salaam, he said that ‘it was a Norwegian company that was contracted for it, because they knew that once you brought in the local elements you don’t achieve what you want.’ In a peculiar way it is as if the recipients accepted their positions as recipients only, with no other role than saying “thank you”. Not only does this quote say something about how the recipients perceived themselves, it also says something about their actual involvement in the project.

Strategies for involvement and sustainability

Ownership with a resulting sustainability was set as the main and final objective of *Sport for All*. Crucial in the argumentation was the idea that the recipients should manage on their own after the Norwegian experts pulled out of Tanzania. In the evaluation of the first period it was stated that there was an impression that the project had been well received by the Tanzanian authorities and organizations (Hernes et al., 1986). Further the report argued that public opinion had been sought and values of the sport activities created by the project were comprehended as important by the recipients. However, the NOC concluded that ‘the conditions for transfer of responsibility for the extension of the project are not yet satisfactory’ (Hernes et al., 1986). Thus, the project continued for another period and was eventually terminated in 1990. Activities more or less stagnated after the Norwegian donors pulled out.

A lack of recipient involvement and ownership and a lack of plan for sustainability seem to have been an issue, and this is also emphasised by several sources. As a former course attendant and deputy at the NSC said:

Who was to own this *Sport for All* project, was it the initiator of the idea or the recipient? (...) after the initiator went the people in the receiving end didn’t know what to do next. (...) There was something seriously wrong with the planning, and maybe sharing information.

This is supported by the director of the Sport Development Department in the Ministry of Information, Culture and Sport who stated that the obvious Norwegian control over the project prevented it from being owned by the Tanzanians. He said that ‘the nature of the project was as if it was a Norwegian project in Tanzania, rather than becoming a Tanzanian project.’ Another interviewee said that the Norwegians took the project with them when they left, and therefore one could not see much of the activities anymore. As he said; ‘people are there, but because it was not their program, because the *mzungu* [white person] from Norway

who brought the project is not here, [it is gone]’ (Former *Sport for All* course attendant and deputy at the NSC). As observed in the examples with the mass sport philosophy and equipment, it was evident that the project was being initiated, run and defined by the Norwegians. Whether the Tanzanians were ready for it seems not to have been discussed, and this is also the impression from the same interviewee:

Those people who thought that the sport projects should be brought to Tanzania, thought that it was like bringing something to people (..) that they did not requested for or maybe they didn’t need it at that particular time. Therefore, either they were not prepared to receive what was brought to them, or the infrastructure was not ready, and even mentally they were not prepared

Such statements from the recipients present interesting perspectives in the sports development aid. However important it may have seemed from the Norwegian point of view, it may not have been appropriate or even needed in Tanzanian society at the time. This, combined with the lack of inclusion as partners and a lack of feeling of ownership that followed, made it difficult to sustain. Still, on the issue of sustainability it seems as though the lack of funds became decisive as more urgent needs had to be given priority. As stated by the former Principal Secretary at TMIC:

There are so many aspects of development in developing countries which can be threatened by the limits of resources available (...) The demands for the promotion of sports were quite large, and when you come to consider the priorities within the promotion of sport, then when the donor pulls out you tend to have a gap. Because the nation has not come to a point where there will be sufficient regular funds available to be able not only to sustain but to enlarge the activity (...) So with the limitations in funds and other more pressing priorities, you see healthcare and schools and so on, these other priorities received these funds, and therefore the project went down.

This last paragraph sums up what is likely to be one of the main dilemmas of sports development aid, and it also indirectly touches upon what we have already seen regarding the power relationship between the donor and the recipient. In *Sport for All* the donor took a leading role, defining the project and the needs of the recipients. For their part, the recipients act in a context where the aim of developing sports competes with a range of other serious needs. In this situation, meeting the need for sports will no longer be a priority issue.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) as aid agents

As mentioned earlier, in the 1980s the development aid focus moved from state-to-state cooperation to supporting CSOs with development projects. In practice the financial support to the CSOs increased from 80.3 million NOK in 1980 to 400 million in 1987. The number of CSOs also increased considerably (Tvedt, 2009). There was a belief that the CSOs were a counterweight to the state since there were fewer formal demands attached to them, and since

they apparently operated in close cooperation to the recipients. Nevertheless, as Nustad (2003) points out, the use of CSOs as aid agents with focus on the recipients is problematic because there is a strong link between the state and the CSOs. In fact it was the state that considered the emphasis on the CSOs as necessary. In a general discussion of the relationship between the CSOs and the state, Lorentzen (2007) points out that in projects where the influence of the state has been extensive, the CSO's own influence has been reduced accordingly. Furthermore, examples have shown that in many cases where CSOs operate, they take the role of the state. Tvedt (2009) argues that in line with development strategies emphasising CSO and private initiatives, the perspectives and work of the organisations are increasingly linked to state policy and resources. At the same time, CSOs are being hailed as representatives from the civil society, democratic grass root organisations and social movements. Hence it is simplifying to talk about the CSOs and the state as contradictions. In trying to give aid on the recipients' terms, a CSO is likely to meet the same challenges as the state (Nustad, 2003).

The two examples highlighted above show two different approaches by the NOC regarding its role as a CSO. In case of the mass sport philosophy, the NOC could base its work on the already-established ideology of sport for all. The NOC was unfamiliar with development aid work, but as a sport organisation it was clearly familiar with all aspects of sports, and hence contributed by transferring its own ideas to Tanzania. Simultaneously, the focus on mass sports fit the NOC ideology perfectly as this was also the focus nationally. In sports development aid the NOC could therefore contribute with something familiar and at the same time meet the demands of the development aid policy makers. The aid initiative was driven by the organisation by virtue of the fact that it could contribute. However, regarding the aim of aid being given on the recipient's terms, the NOC seems to have acted with a certain naïvety, and one may be tempted to ask whether the organisation really saw the needs of the recipients in their eagerness to contribute to the aid arena. In the second example, the NOC saw the necessity of equipment, and was likely to relate to the needs of the recipients. The NOC was open to exploring the possibilities of supporting internal production of sports equipment in Tanzania. Evidently, the problem of the recipients was captured, but with no experience in development work the organisation lacked the necessary resources, experience and knowledge in pushing it through. Thus when NORAD – with its expertise in the development aid area dissuaded the NOC, plans were immediately abandoned.

This illustrates the complexity of the power relation between the donor and the recipient. As Burnell (1997) points out, there are several kinds of aid relationships to be found

in reality as the donor is not only a donor and the recipient not only a recipient. The case of *Sport for All* displays several power relationships at several levels, both on the Norwegian and the Tanzanian side.

Although the NOC was the implementing donor organisation, it naturally had to comply with the conditions of NORAD, since NORAD in fact covered 80 per cent of the total costs of the project. Among the general demands of NORAD was that implementation of the project should be in understanding with the government of the recipient country and should benefit the local population without consideration of race or religious belief. NORAD also identified several points specifically that the NOC had to comply with, all with the aim of mass sports in Dar es Salaam (Norwegian Confederation of Sports and Norwegian agency for international development 1983).

NORAD for its part had to conform to current political guidelines. In a report to the Norwegian Parliament from the Labour Ministry of Education and Church Affairs (KUD) in 1981 regarding cultural politics in the 1980s, sports issues were also included. It was emphasised that the Ministry was positive to the idea of integrating sports in Norwegian aid programmes, and was willing to contribute to a stronger cooperation in the area. The report stressed that any such aid had to build on the same principles as the general Norwegian development aid (Norwegian Ministry of Education and Church Affairs, 1981). Thus we see a complex web of power relations operating on the donor side.

Also on the recipient side these power webs become transparent. In the planning and implementation of *Sport for All*, the NOC cooperated with the Tanzanian counterpart, the NSC. Following directives from NORAD, the NOC encouraged mass sports activities as part of the aid policy. The NSC had to comply with this in order to be supported. The NSC was a government organisation, directly under and closely cooperating with the Directorate of Youth and Sport in the Ministry of Information and Culture (TMIC). The close connection to the state seems not to have been problematic, neither for the NOC nor NORAD. In fact, the NSC was a natural choice of counterpart given the status they had in the Tanzanian society as the leading sports organisation. However, several interviewees indicated that people in power positions exploited the project by demanding to be given equipment and other earmarked material. On several occasions during the course of the project, equipment apparently came into the wrong hands and was sold on the open market. The NOC, lacking aid experience and competence, seems to have been unable to manage such challenges in relation to the recipient. Thus, the relationship of both the NSC and the NOC to the Tanzanian authorities was characterised by power and compromise.

Through this case we can see that the idea of CSOs working close to the grass roots, and thus being better agents for development on the terms of the recipient, may have been self-contradictory. Although the NOC, as a CSO through the aid policies at that time, was meant and believed to be working with the grass roots, they worked indirectly with the Tanzanian state through the NSC. This apparent link may have worked against the NOC in its aim of providing aid on the recipient's terms and benefiting those who were eventually the main recipients of the aid: the women, children and the disabled of Dar es Salaam.

Conclusion

It is evident that *Sport for All* in Dar es Salaam was a product of its time, both at the discourse and practice levels. The aid focused on supporting private organisations, The NOC fitted into this category, and thus a sports project could become a reality. However, in order to be supported by NORAD, the NOC had certain criteria to comply with, and these were also required to be complied with at the receiving end. These criteria included and emphasised mass sport for the benefit of every group in the society, especially women, children and the disabled. The idea of the aid being given on the recipient's terms also harmonised with Norwegian aid policies at the time.

The preceding discussion has shown the dilemmas arising when a development aid project is executed on the terms of the recipients. We have pointed out that a common understanding of the role of the aid actors is necessary, and have seen that the uncertainty of the participants role essentially affected the outcome of the sports development aid to Dar es Salaam. The two examples revealed two different approaches by the NOC. In areas where the NOC claimed to be an expert, the organisation clearly advanced their own ideas, and the recipients were disregarded. On the issue of equipment, they lacked expertise and were open to listening to the recipients. Generally in *Sport for All*, there is reason to believe that the terms of the recipients were overlooked when the actual project was to be implemented. We found support for this through interviews with Tanzanians where *Sport for All* was perceived as a Norwegian project in Tanzania rather than a project managed by the Tanzanians themselves. The main reasons for this were a lack of involvement and plan for sustainability, which evidently appears as a dilemma in the aid relationship. Eventually we pointed out that the main dilemma of the Sport for All aiming to give sports development aid on the recipient's terms was that sport activities were not the main priority in a developing society like the Tanzanian in the 1980s.

Our second question dealt with possibilities and constraints when CSOs act as agents for reaching development goals. We saw that supporting CSOs through development projects was a clear strategy by the Norwegian authorities as unlike the state they believed that the CSOs were more apt to reach the grass roots and thus work on the recipient's terms. The NOC, with its mass sport philosophy, operated at the grass roots level on the practical field, and made an effort to benefit the defined target groups. However, an association with the state authorities was unavoidable, as the NOC's counterpart, the NSC, was closely connected to the state. Meeting the requirements of NORAD and the demands of the NSC was an apparent challenge, but of crucial importance for the NOC when cooperating with the Tanzanian recipients. Together, the resources, the lack of aid experience, and the NOC's own ideology were factors that constrained the NOC as an efficient aid agent on the terms of the recipient.

The aid system is one in which values are negotiated. Consequently the relationship between donors and recipients is not unambiguous. Neither is the apparent donor and recipient only a donor and a recipient; nevertheless, their roles are defined by the aid relationship. We have argued that with regards to the *Sport for All*, several power relationships were manifest at several levels, and thus the complexity of aid relations was evident.

Note

¹ In development aid rhetoric the terms 'donor' and 'recipient' are somewhat outmoded and now replaced by the more politically correct term 'partnership'. The shift towards using the term partnership came in the late 1990s, and was supposed to show in a direct way that the aid relationship was one with equal partners. However, in the period of this study, the terms 'donor' and 'recipient' were common in the development aid discourse, and thus we also use these terms consistently in this article.

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