Sporting knowledge and the problem of knowing how
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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- Artikler / Articles 
Original versionJournal of the Philosophy of Sport. 2014, 41, 143-162
In the Concept of Mind from 1949 Gilbert Ryle (1949/1963) distinguished between knowing how and knowing that. What was Ryle’s basic idea and how is the discussion going on in philosophy today? How can sport philosophy use the idea of knowing how? My goal in this paper is first to bring Ryle and the post-Rylean discussion to light and then show how phenomenology can give some input to the discussion. The article focuses especially on the two main interpretations of knowing how, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. In the second part of the article I discuss how views from phenomenology and philosophy of mind can enrich and widen our understanding of what knowing how means in relation to sport practices. It is argued that knowing how is not limited to athletic abilities but includes knowledge of how the environing world operates in relation to athletic action.
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