Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorBreivik, Gunnar
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-06T12:40:27Z
dc.date.available2018-11-06T12:40:27Z
dc.date.created2017-11-10T09:10:18Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationSport, Ethics and Philosophy. 2017, 12, 133-148.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1751-1321
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2571249
dc.descriptionI Brage finner du siste tekst-versjon av artikkelen, og den kan inneholde ubetydelige forskjeller fra forlagets pdf-versjon. Forlagets pdf-versjon finner du på tandfonline.com / In Brage you'll find the final text version of the article, and it may contain insignificant differences from the journal's pdf version. The definitive version is available at tandfonline.comnb_NO
dc.description.abstractThe article looks at sport as a form of human action where the participants display various forms of Intentionality. Intentionality may be defined as ‘that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.’ Sporting actions are about human intentions, beliefs, desires, perceptions and not to forget, movements. This means that sports typically display what we call ‘Intentionality.’ The study of Intentionality and intentional actions has previously received relatively little attention among sport philosophers, but deserves more attention. Even though there is a tension and several differences between continental and analytical approaches to philosophical problems, there is a common understanding of the phenomenon we call ‘Intentionality.’ The debate between John Searle, representing the analytical camp, and Hubert Dreyfus, representing the phenomenological camp, is instructive to see the differences, and also the commonalities between the two approaches. The article starts with a clarification of the concept of Intentionality and sketches some of the history and background of the concept. It then presents the main conceptual framework that Searle uses to distinguish the different types and forms of Intentionality and his views on sporting actions. This is followed by a presentation of the phenomenological approach of Dreyfus and the response by Searle. The article ends by discussing the possibility of a combined and enriched view where a clarification of the logic as well as the phenomenology of sporting actions is needed. It may thus be possible to bridge the gap between the two approaches.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.subjectintentionalitynb_NO
dc.subjectactionnb_NO
dc.subjectsportnb_NO
dc.subjectsporting actionnb_NO
dc.titleIntentionality and Action in Sport: A Discussion of the Views of Searle and Dreyfusnb_NO
dc.title.alternativeIntentionality and Action in Sport: A Discussion of the Views of Searle and Dreyfusnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber16nb_NO
dc.source.journalSport, Ethics and Philosophynb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/17511321.2017.1332677
dc.identifier.cristin1512821
dc.description.localcodeSeksjon for kultur og samfunn / Department of Cultural and Social Studiesnb_NO
cristin.unitcode150,33,0,0
cristin.unitnameSeksjon for kultur og samfunn
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel